This Week At Amtrak

[Gulf Coast Passenger Rail]

----- Original Message -----
From: This Week at Amtrak
To: t...@unitedrail.org
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2009 7:41 PM
Subject: This Week at Amtrak ; October 22, 2009


This Week at Amtrak; October 22, 2009



A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida
32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail in...@unitedrail.org •
http://www.unitedrail.org





Volume 6, Number 44



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a
nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans
for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in
Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota,
California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New
York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a
variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web
site at http://www.unitedrail.org.



URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept
funding from any outside sources.



1) Well. A lot has been happening in the two weeks since the last This
Week at Amtrak was published. Before we get into some specifics, we
first need to hear what Minnesota Association of Rail Passengers and
United Rail Passenger Alliance Vice President of Law and Policy Andrew
Selden has to say on the current state of Amtrak.



[Begin quote]



By Andrew C. Selden



Amtrak blinds itself, in its endless posturing to fool its
bankers in Congress, by measuring its performance by numbers that do
not really matter, while ignoring or burying numbers that do matter.
As a result, it makes decisions, including strategically important
allocations of precious investment capital, on the basis of
fundamentally misleading data.



The most glaring example is Amtrak's endless blathering
about "ridership." Ridership is only a measure of a sale transaction.
It does not differentiate among the size of the sales. One "rider"
from New Haven to Boston is, by this yardstick, exactly equal to one
rider from Washington, D.C. to Boston, or even Los Angeles to Boston.
Amtrak makes this worse by blurring useful sales data (ticket prices)
into averages by which they measure (actually, it's just arithmetic,
not really "measuring" anything) "yield," which is the average revenue
per passenger mile on a train or route. This tends to reinforce the
false belief any one passenger is pretty much the same as any other.

In an urban transit system where every passenger pays the
same fare, that might be okay.



But on Amtrak, where a typical "corridor" customer might
pay $10 to $30, but a family in a sleeper to the west coast could be
paying $1,000 or more, these "riders" are decidedly unequal. Fifty of
the former are less than two of the latter. But Amtrak is obsessively
focused on "ridership."



A yardstick Amtrak tries to hide, and apparently never
uses to make important resource allocation decisions, is load factor.
Load factor is the percentage of your inventory you are able to sell.
Airlines live and breathe load factor.



Load factor is available seat miles (total inventory)
divided by revenue passenger miles (seat-miles sold to paying
passengers).



Load factor ("LF") matters greatly. Among other things it
is a perfect measure of capital efficiency, and where a business is
over-invested vs. under-invested. It is an indirect measure of
opportunity cost. A trend analysis of LF is a tell-tale for a growing
or a dying business.



It indicates whether an operation has achieved an
efficiency of scale, or needs to ramp up, or down, its application of
capital assets to achieve an efficiency of scale. The NEC's low load
factors show Amtrak is already over-invested there: it offers much
more inventory than it can sell for $30, or even give away. Long
distance trains, with high load factors, show where Amtrak is under-
invested, turning away potential $1,000 customers by the hundreds.



Simple "ridership," without consideration of load factor,
is classic "Amtrak accounting" that disregards the cost and
utilization of capital. If you have a rich uncle who doesn't care, or
a politically-oriented appropriations committee that has other
objectives, or a gullible state agency that doesn't seem to get it (a
la Oklahoma and the Heartland Flyer), then one can disregard capital
costs, load factor, and utilization. Ready access to "free" capital
(but always with a heavy political and opportunity cost) obscures
that.



Suppose a train or route has a LF of 40% (NEC average is
about 40%). Suppose the LF is static, or even growing slowly. Is that
a good thing? Or does that suggest the capital – represented here by
the rolling stock, the overheads and even the relationship and rent
costs with the host railroad – might be better applied elsewhere?



In other words: Can those trainsets produce, or earn, even
more someplace else?



Real world, actual example: take a standard KFC restaurant
with 72 seats grossing a million a year, and is often "full" (i.e.,
has a very high LF). It is a cash cow. The owner is happy. His banker
is happy. But an investment banker focused on returns on capital
(i.e., making money by maximizing output) will say, "Bulldoze this
obsolete, underperforming asset. Get rid of it. It is a parasite. It
is an obstacle to growth and profit. In its place, build a new, larger
KFC with 150 seats and a bigger kitchen and a drive-through, that is
physically capable of growing into a TWO or even three million a year
store." And if the KFC instead were a lightly-used 40-seater that was
doing $500,000 a year and showing no real growth, even if it were
steadily profitable at that level, any rational analysis would
conclude the store should be closed outright, and maybe re-located
across town by the Wal-Mart, or out by the interstate. LF as well as
cash flow, market share, and earnings are all part of the constant
analysis that should be done of any commercial activity.



Amtrak NEVER does that. Amtrak instead fools itself and
fools its bankers in Congress and its client state governments with
phony-baloney data about transaction volumes ("ridership") and other
irrelevancies.



ITEM: Amtrak's net loss last year was UP from the year
before, for the umpteenth year in a row, even after all the subsidy
and the deferred maintenance and the shrunken fleet and all the other
voodoo accounting. That is why Amtrak is still a sinking ship, and why
Interim President and CEO Joe Boardman, just like his several
predecessors, is no different from Captain Edward Smith of the White
Star Line. And trains like the Harrisburg – Philadelphia locals, or
Acela, or the Heartland Flyer, with their low load factor, whatever
the ridership, are just like that tiny scrape in the hull that
eventually worked its disproportionate magic on the fortunes of the
RMS Titanic.



[End quote]



2) Amtrak issued another route renewal report, and issued a final
report on a second route.



The Pioneer route report, which was commented on
previously in this space, was issued in a final form with no real
changes in how Amtrak perceives to put this train between Denver and
Seattle back into service at extremely high costs and a too long lead
time, despite questioning from two United States Senators along the
route, Senator Crapo of Idaho, and Senator Wyden of Oregon.



The new report issued was for restoration of the North
Coast Hiawatha (Originally, the North Coast Limited, pre-Amtrak.) over
the original Northern Pacific Railroad tracks. This route will
parallel the Empire Builder route, but make a more southerly trip. Pre-
Amtrak, the Empire Builder and the North Coast Limited were strong
rivals between Chicago and Seattle, and both routes have breath-taking
mountain scenery. The North Coast Hiawatha was one of the trains
massacred by the route cuts of the Carter Administration.



Amtrak wants – yes, we’re not kidding – over one billion
dollars to restore this route, with the bulk of the money going to
track upgrades. After the Burlington, Northern Pacific, and Great
Northern railroads were all folded into one company (which eventually
became BNSF when the Santa Fe was added to the mix), the Northern
Pacific route was considered redundant to the Great Northern (Empire
Builder) route, and was downgraded. Part of the route in Montana was
sold to a short line operator, too.



All of that aside, Amtrak has come out with ridiculously
high figures for route restoration, including an amazing $330,000,000
just for six trainset of new equipment, including locomotives. This
works out to an astounding $4,500,000 per piece of equipment, which is
not only impossible to justify, but incredible anyone could present
this figure with a straight face. Additionally, Amtrak demands
millions and millions of dollars for crew training, as it has done in
previous reports.



This analysis of the North Coast Hiawatha landed in the
This Week at Amtrak mailbox.



[Begin quote]



Amtrak North Coast Hiawatha Report Reflects Apathy and Atrophy; Fails
to Answer Many Questions



By Joseph D. Henchman

October 17, 2009



Introduction



On October 16, 2009, Amtrak published the North Coast
Hiawatha Passenger Rail Study as required by the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA). That law required
Amtrak to produce a report within one year of October 16, 2008
examining the feasibility of restoring passenger rail service between
Chicago and Seattle via the former Northern Pacific mainline in
Southern Montana.



Confronted with a political environment favorable to the
expansion of its services, the report suggests an institution whose
marketing and innovative instincts have atrophied. The report’s tone
reflects a determination to drag out the timeline and extract as many
subsidies as possible rather than seriously consider how a successful
passenger rail service in the study area can be implemented.



Below are specific areas the report is insufficient or
raises serious concerns.



Amtrak penalizes the study train for diverted passengers
from other trains, but does not credit it for passengers fed to other
trains.



Amtrak’s report penalizes the ticket revenue of the North
Coast Hiawatha by $8 million because Amtrak estimates the train will
divert passengers from the Empire Builder, a heavily-patronized Amtrak
train (693 passengers each train in FY 2009 through July) that also
operates daily between Seattle and Chicago. Amtrak goes so far as to
say that the diverted revenue will “increase Amtrak’s direct operating
loss.”



This analysis is incomplete for two reasons. First, the
Empire Builder is often sold out for being over capacity, so an
additional train may have the net impact of freeing up space on that
train to be sold to others, wiping out any revenue loss. Second, and
more importantly, Amtrak does not estimate additional revenue for
other trains from the addition of the North Coast Hiawatha (or if they
do, they don’t report it). Few Amtrak long-distance passengers ride
end-to-end, with many taking shorter trips often involving transfers
to other trains. On the west end is the Seattle-Portland Cascade train
as well as the long-distance Coast Starlight to California. On the
east end are services to St. Louis, New Orleans, Washington, Boston,
New York, and Michigan. Added service into and out of Seattle and
Chicago will result in additional revenues for all of these trains. If
Amtrak “penalizes” the North Coast Hiawatha for “diverting” passenger
revenue from trains, it should also “credit” the North Coast Hiawatha
for “feeding” passenger revenue to other trains.



One approach Amtrak did not take would be to estimate
system-wide revenues and expenses from the addition of the North Coast
Hiawatha. This would give a true picture of the actual incremental
cost of service expansion. Amtrak is also studying the expansion of
services in several other routes, and is producing piecemeal reports
on financial impacts, one-by-one. As Amtrak adds trains and
frequencies, the additional options stimulate demand beyond that of
one-train-on-one-corridor. A comprehensive approach of these proposals
would be necessary for informed decision-making.



Amtrak Inexplicably Buries Its Conclusion that the Train Will Cost Its
Operating Costs



There are two types of costs associated with running
trains. One are relatively fixed costs that do not vary with the
number of trains (system reservations and website, management costs,
station costs), and the other are costs that vary with the number of
trains (crew costs, fuel, payments to host railroads, and to some
extent equipment maintenance). Amtrak’s estimate of North Coast
Hiawatha operations, put in these terms, is as follows:



Passenger Related Revenue (not including $8 million revenue penalty
for diversions from Empire Builder) – $51,000,000



Variable Expense: Fuel – $7,400,000



Variable Expense: Train Crew Labor – $13,000,000



Variable Expense: On-Board Services Labor – $14,700,000



Variable Expense: Mechanical – $11,900,000



Total Variable Expenses – $47,000,000



Net, Variable Expenses – +$3,000,000



Non-Variable: Station & System Expenses – $27,100,000



Total, All Expenses – $74,100,000



Total Net, All Expenses – ($24,100,000)



Farebox Recovery, Variable Expenses Only – 108.5%



Farebox Recovery, All Expenses (Amtrak reduces the farebox recovery by
10 percentage points by excluding the diverted revenue to the Empire
Builder) – 68.8%



Amtrak’s long-distance service requires subsidies to cover
its operating shortfalls [Based on Amtrak accounting methods]. Few if
any recover 68.8% of their costs for all expenses, or actually break
even on variable expenses, as Amtrak estimates here. Why Amtrak buries
this information is inexplicable. One possibility would be that
acknowledging Amtrak will run a train with a rather positive financial
performance undermines its argument that massive subsidies are
required to operate it.



Note: Amtrak does not clarify whether its estimate of
system and route costs are the amounts that will be assigned to the
North Coast Hiawatha or whether they are incremental costs of adding
the train. For example, assume (using made-up numbers) Amtrak spends
$100,000 a year operating the existing station at Fargo, North Dakota
(which the North Coast Hiawatha would stop at), and $5 million a year
running its existing national reservation system. Assume also Amtrak’s
cost estimates in the report include line-items of $50,000 for the
Fargo station and $200,000 for system reservations (they don’t; those
items are not broken out). Does that mean Amtrak is spending an
additional $250,000 when the North Coast Hiawatha is launched, or
rather the North Coast Hiawatha will be assigned $250,000 of existing
costs?



If the latter, it is relevant information, but its
inclusion warps the decision-making process. Among Amtrak’s costs of
operating the North Coast Hiawatha would be costs Amtrak is already
incurring, and will incur whether the route is launched or not. To use
economics terms, a decision-maker would be erroneously looking at
average cost instead of marginal cost.



If it is the former, Amtrak needs to justify the $27
million in route and system expenses beyond merely saying they are
“other direct expenses.” The amount reflects a third of the expenses
associated with running the train, and while not suspect on its face,
it does raise questions. Why does Amtrak’s report not include a
technical appendix itemizing the costs it has estimated?



Amtrak Provides Just One Option: A Single, Slow, Short Train over the
Entire Route



Unlike here, Amtrak’s past studies have often included a
series of operating options. The recent Pioneer Service Study looked
at several different alignments, the Sunset Limited Service Study
looked at different service options, and the Ohio Service Study looked
at different frequency options. Here, however, Amtrak provides no
option other than one single, slow, short train. Given Amtrak’s own
ridership and cost estimates, this is indefensible. It also allows
Amtrak to demand higher subsidies than would be required to operate
the North Coast Hiawatha.



The report recommends the establishment of one round trip
a day along the 2,300 mile route on a 49 hour schedule, for an average
speed of 47 M.P.H. (The North Coast Limited in 1956 managed 46.5
hours, so Amtrak proposes a train slower than one run 50 years ago.).
The train would consist of locomotives, a baggage car, a crew car, two
sleeping cars, three coaches, a dining car, and a lounge. Since each
sleeping car has a maximum capacity of 49 and each coach has a maximum
capacity of 74, that would mean a total train capacity of 320.



On page 28, Amtrak estimates even this slow, single train
will result in 359,800 passengers a year, or 492 per train. On the
face of it, this suggests the train will fill 153% of its capacity. Of
course, few passengers will ride end-to-end, resulting in turnover en
route. It would be useful to know Amtrak’s estimate of passenger-miles
or load factor, but the report does not provide those numbers. Even if
each seat turns over once per trip, the load factor would still be 76%
(which would make airlines envious).



Amtrak’s report handicaps itself by limiting the train’s
capacity. Many of a train’s expenses are fixed (engineer and conductor
costs, for instance) or grow only minimally (fuel and service
attendant costs, for instance) with additional cars. In the past,
American passenger trains have operated with 16 to 22 cars (Today, in
Canada, the Canadian transcontinental often operates with 22 cars in
high season). The only serious limiting factor on train lengths are
station platform lengths and locomotive power (itself limited based on
the route’s curves and grades) and the ability to transmit hotel power
from the locomotive to the rest of the train; usually 18 cars in the
United States is the maximum train length because of this. Amtrak
provides no information on why it limits the North Coast Hiawatha to
nine cars (with only five being revenue cars) other than it lacks the
imagination to try for more.



Since Amtrak’s proposed train already has locomotives, a
baggage car, a crew car, dining car, and lounge, any additional cars
would be revenue cars generating sleeping or coach ticket revenue. A
14-car train, for instance, would double the North Coast Hiawatha’s
capacity, potentially doubling its revenue and most certainly not
doubling its costs. Given Amtrak’s ridership estimates, such a
capacity expansion would be justifiable. Amtrak does not investigate
this option.



Amtrak also does not investigate the option of greater
frequencies or runs over segments of the route (aside from noting that
Washington State would not object to running trains to Minneapolis
instead of all the way to Chicago). As Amtrak has discovered with
service in California and Illinois, additional trains each day can
reduce subsidies because (1) added frequencies can mean equipment
spends less time idle at each end and (2) added frequencies can
increase revenue from additional riders taking advantage of more
options. A second frequency 12-hours off of the proposed schedule
would be a natural consideration, as would additional day-train
frequencies between segments of the route. It is unfortunate Amtrak
looks at additional frequencies not as expanding passengers options
and thus revenue, but rather as something to be penalized for
“cannibalizing” passengers and revenue from existing trains.



Most transportation providers offer travelers options. One
of Amtrak’s largest weaknesses is many of its trains run only once per
day, resulting in equipment sitting idle for 6-18 hours at each end
and passengers giving up if they cannot work with Amtrak’s one
timetable option. Twice the trains can in many cases result in more
than twice as many passengers. Fixed route costs, such as station
operating costs (here estimated to be $27.1 million), can also be
spread over more trains. As noted above, Amtrak estimates that the
train’s operation itself, exclusive of system and route costs, will
break even.



Amtrak Does Not Investigate Marketing Options



Amtrak’s report also provides no discussion of service
options or marketing opportunities. The report mentions the North
Coast Hiawatha’s Livingstone station is not far from Yellowstone
National Park, but does not enlighten the reader as to whether Amtrak
will capitalize on that beyond leaving passengers at Livingstone. (In
the past, the Northern Pacific Railroad ran shuttle trains and later
shuttle buses to the park.) The private Grand Canyon Railway in
Arizona offers four different accommodation options, including a basic
coach seat option. The higher-priced options include snacks,
entertainment, and Grand Canyon National Park admission. In Europe,
the CityNightLine overnight train service offers several different
accommodation options, with higher-priced options including welcome
wine or beer, an array of magazines, and breakfast on arrival. Other
Amtrak trains have included parlor lounges, observation cars,
children’s playrooms, quiet cars, wine tastings, and enroute tour
guides. Other ideas could include on-board treadmills or weight
equipment, video arcades, taverns or bars, or gift shops. Amtrak’s
report shows no creative thinking with regard to providing services to
passengers, an important aspect of its operation.



This is particularly indefensible in that Amtrak requires
the purchase of brand-new railcars to launch the service, and
estimates it will take 4-5 years to begin operations after funding
becomes available. If Amtrak needs five years and new trainsets to
provide exactly what it has provided for years on other routes, it is
not thinking sufficiently creatively.



Amtrak’s report also provides no discussion of joint
marketing opportunities for other popular attractions along the route,
including the Mall of America in Minneapolis; historic tourist
attractions in Butte, Montana (a larger town which Amtrak inexplicably
writes off without bothering to estimate the costs of serving it
despite rails existing and being on the train’s route, even though it
reports that public and Montana Department of Transportation comments
strongly favored studying operating service via Butte) and Bozeman,
Montana; airports; and small-town communities currently without rail
service in Washington State.



Conclusion



Throughout the report and its actions in recent history,
Amtrak views its role as merely common-carrier transportation handling
passengers when they show up. Instead, Amtrak should push itself to
figure out how it can develop a market, providing a travel experience.
Doing so will improve the bottom line for the company and for
taxpayers, but requires shaking Amtrak out of its apathy and atrophy.



Questions Unanswered by Amtrak In Its Report



1. What is Amtrak’s estimate of the load factor for the North Coast
Hiawatha, and how many passenger-miles will it generate?



2. What are the system-wide and marginal revenues and costs associated
with launching the North Coast Hiawatha, including additional revenues
to other trains from its operation?



3. How many of the cost items within Amtrak’s estimated $74.1 million
in estimated North Coast Hiawatha operating expenses will be incurred
whether or not the train route is launched?



4. What are the revenue and costs associated with other operating
options, such as a longer train of 14-22 cars, or additional
frequencies?



5. What additional level of capital investment would be required to
raise average operating speed to 55 M.P.H. (42 hour schedule), 65
M.P.H. (36 hour schedule), or 75 M.P.H. (31 hour schedule)?



6. Given that Amtrak will be purchasing new equipment for these
trains, what innovative ideas will Amtrak explore for the equipment?



7. What marketing opportunities will Amtrak explore for the operation
of the trains, to maximize passenger travel experience and develop the
market?



8. What are the costs associated with operating via Butte, Montana?



9. How would a system-wide expansion of train lengths and frequencies
for long-distance trains change the operating performance of this
route?



10. Why does Amtrak estimate so many people will ride the North Coast
Hiawatha, relative to other long-distance trains?



About the Author



Joseph Henchman lives in Arlington, Virginia, and is
interested in transportation economics and rail planning. He works as
an attorney and policy analyst with a non-profit think tank in
Washington, D.C., but this report is not associated with that
organization. His email address is jdhenchman [at] yahoo.com.



[End quote]



3) Amtrak has now issued four reports since the end of the summer.
First, the Sunset Limited – East of New Orleans/Gulf Coast report
(Amtrak doesn’t want to run the service); the Ohio 3-C report for
restored service between Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati (Amtrak
doesn’t want to run the service), the Pioneer report for restored
service between Denver and Seattle (Amtrak doesn’t want to run the
service), and, finally, the North Coast Hiawatha restored service
report (Amtrak doesn’t want to run that service, either).



When you add up Amtrak’s estimates to restart these four
routes, it’s over $2,000,000,000 (that’s two billion dollars, if you
don’t want to count zeros).



In reality, if Amtrak really wanted to do any of these
projects, the estimates are probably high by at least 40%, if not a
full 50%. But, when you’re a planner for a quasi-governmental agency
and you’re accustomed to spending someone else’s money (That would be
money which belongs to you, the taxpayer.), costs don’t really matter.
What matters is convenience and lots of bells and whistles (No pun
intended.). Amtrak’s dream world dictates all new equipment,
extravagant stations where smaller ones will do, crew training costs
which are incomprehensible to any railroad professional, and a gold-
plating of railroad infrastructure “just in case” the railroads want
their entire right-of-way wish lists fulfilled at someone else’s
expense.



All of this leads to the inescapable, sad conclusion that
until Amtrak has a new management team which has any inkling of a
vision for the future which includes new passenger car orders, a
business plan based on reality instead of only raiding government
treasuries, or without fantasies of ignoring the conventional
passenger rail business because of the glamour of an incorrect
assumption Amtrak will be the exclusive high speed rail operator
(there’s a thought to give you nightmares for a week), restored long
routes such as the North Coast Hiawatha may not be the best plan.



As presented, Amtrak’s four route restoration plans are a
prescription for disaster.



The Gulf Coast report laments Amtrak went to all of the
trouble of studying multiple scenarios, and settled on four, all of
which Amtrak has priced too high. The reality of the Gulf Coast report
is if Amtrak simply extends the City of New Orleans from New Orleans
to Orlando, Amtrak will instantly reestablish a Chicago-Florida train,
restore service on the Gulf Coast, and have a powerhouse operation for
the cost of one extra trainset for the City of New Orleans (due to
current too long equipment layovers in New Orleans) and the cost of
Positive Train Control installation on the CSX line between New
Orleans and Jacksonville.



The Pioneer report wants to set up a separate operation
for the Pioneer between Denver and Seattle, with through-cars on the
back of the California Zephyr between Chicago and Denver. Amtrak never
considered the huge benefit of running a second frequency in the form
of the Pioneer between Chicago and Denver, apparently because it would
be too much trouble, no matter how much of a financial gain would be
found.



The Ohio report wants to set up a pretty good service, but
with a lousy end point in Cincinnati so the service will not connect
withe the Cardinal; Amtrak continues its reckless policy of not often
enough offering connecting trains just in case some passengers may
want to travel on more than one route to reach a final destination.



None of the reports take into account the matrix effect of
connectivity, more travel choices, or more stations served. Amtrak can
only see costs, instead of benefits.



Little of Amtrak’s work reflects it was created by anyone
with real concepts of passenger service, what’s overall best for
passengers, or what posture best serves Amtrak – and, our country –
financially.



For right now, until some of this changes, Amtrak may best
serve itself and all of us by making some logical, small steps which
will strengthen the company financially. Things like Kansas City-
Omaha, Oklahoma City-Kansas City, Peoria-St. Louis, Savannah-
Jacksonville, or Barstow-Bakersfield (/San Jose). Maybe think about
Harrisburg-Newark via the Lehigh Valley.



Even easier would be to add truly new Superliner capacity
to the existing long distance trains, to start to capture many of
those $1,000 tickets Amtrak is losing now because the sleepers are
full at various peak load points.



For those hoping for restoration of routes which never
should have went away, this fall is truly a season of discontent.
Amtrak seems to have gone out of its way to make things as difficult
as possible for any returning trains, yet its chairman of the board
and some senior executives are making presentations around the country
about how Amtrak is the perfect organization to be the exclusive high
speed rail operator for new services in America.



Until Amtrak gets its house in order and demonstrates it
has some – any! – vision, no one (even government bureaucrats) are
going to be foolish enough to anoint Amtrak as the high speed rail
operator.



4) Last Saturday, October 17, 2009, a determined band of people met
together here in Jacksonville, Florida. The group named itself the
Sunset Marketing and Revitalization Team, and has been meeting for
over a year now at various locations along the former transcontinental
route of the Sunset, prior to its unceremonious loss of the east end
of the route beyond New Orleans due to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.



John Sita, Jr. of New Orleans is chairman of the SMART
group, and Jerry Sullivan of Jacksonville was the gracious host of the
meeting.



The meeting lasted three hours, and the SMART members
represented a number of states along the route, both east and west of
New Orleans. One SMART member from Louisiana made an all-rail trip
from his home to the meeting. To cover the roughly 600 miles from New
Orleans to Jacksonville without the Sunset, he rode first to
Washington via Birmingham, Atlanta, and Charlotte on the Crescent for
a full day and a night, and then took the Silver Star from Washington
for the afternoon and overnight trip to Jacksonville. Whew! Talk about
dedication ...



Without getting into the various discussions and
deliberations the group had, what is notable is the very need for the
existence of this group. This group has no formal sponsorship, and is
completely self-funded. These people banded together because they feel
their quasi-governmental national passenger rail carrier has failed in
its duty and obligations to restart the Sunset Limited east of New
Orleans, and has constantly failed during the entire existence of
Amtrak to make the Sunset Limited a daily train between Los Angeles
and New Orleans (And Orlando when the train ran its full route.).



In the real, non-Amtrak world, this group should never
have been necessary. If Amtrak had the compunction to live up to its
mandate as a national rail carrier, there would be no discussion about
the gaping hole in Amtrak’s route map between New Orleans and
Jacksonville. An entire region of the country is disenfranchised for
passenger rail service because Amtrak isn’t clever enough to figure
out how to make the Sunset a success.



So, a group whose membership is more than 50 souls is
working together to take the place of a taxpayer funded organization’s
planning department to figure out how to make the Sunset Limited
viable. Amtrak should be terribly embarrassed.







If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at
Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending
your e-mail address to



fre...@unitedrail.org



You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and
city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed
on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail
from t...@unitedrail.org; we are unable to go through any approvals
processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly
confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than
distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.



All other correspondence, including requests to
unsubscribe should be addressed to



bruceri...@unitedrail.org



Copies of This Week at Amtrak are archived on URPA’s web
site, www.unitedrail.org and also on www.todaywithjb.blogspot.com
where other rail-related writings of Bruce Richardson may also be
found.



URPA leadership members are available for speaking
engagements.



J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

bruceri...@unitedrail.org

http://www.unitedrail.org






--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

_______________________________________________
TWA mailing list
T...@unitedrail.org
http://unitedrail.org/mailman/listinfo/twa