Dialogics

[Charise Scrivner]

Dialogicrefers to the use of conversation or shared dialogue to explore the meaning of something. (This is as opposed to monologic which refers to one entity with all the information simply giving it to others without exploration and clarification of meaning through discussion.) The word "dialogic" relates to or is characterized by dialogue and its use. A dialogic is communication presented in the form of dialogue. Dialogic processes refer to implied meaning in words uttered by a speaker and interpreted by a listener. Dialogic works carry on a continual dialogue that includes interaction with previous information presented. The term is used to describe concepts in literary theory and analysis as well as in philosophy.

Along with dialogism, the term can refer to concepts used in the work of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, especially the texts Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics and The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin.

Bakhtin contrasts the dialogic and the "monologic" work of literature. The dialogic work carries on a continual dialogue with other works of literature and other authors. It does not merely answer, correct, silence, or extend a previous work, but informs and is continually informed by the previous work. Dialogic literature is in communication with multiple works. This is not merely a matter of influence, for the dialogue extends in both directions, and the previous work of literature is as altered by the dialogue as the present one is. Though Bakhtin's "dialogic" emanates from his work with colleagues in what we now call the "Bakhtin Circle" in years following 1918, his work was not known to the West or translated into English until the 1970s. For those only recently introduced to Bakhtin's ideas but familiar with T. S. Eliot, his "dialogic" is consonant with Eliot's ideas in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," where Eliot holds that "the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past".[1] For Bakhtin, the influence can also occur at the level of the individual word or phrase as much as it does the work and even the oeuvre or collection of works. A German cannot use the word "fatherland" or the phrase "blood and soil" without (possibly unintentionally) also echoing (or, Bakhtin would say "refracting") the meaning that those terms took on under Nazism. Every word has a history of usage to which it responds, and anticipates a future response.

Bakhtin also emphasized certain uses of language that maximized the dialogic nature of words, and other uses that attempted to limit or restrict their polyvocality. At one extreme is novelistic discourse, particularly that of a Dostoevsky (or Mark Twain) in which various registers and languages are allowed to interact with and respond to each other. At the other extreme would be the military order (or "1984" newspeak) which attempts to minimize all orientations of the work toward the past or the future, and which prompts no response but obedience.

Sociologist Richard Sennett has stated that the distinction between dialogic and dialectic is fundamental to understanding human communication. Sennett says that dialectic deals with the explicit meaning of statements, and tends to lead to closure and resolution. Whereas dialogic processes, especially those involved with regular spoken conversation, involve a type of listening that attends to the implicit intentions behind the speaker's actual words. Unlike a dialectic process, dialogics often do not lead to closure and remain unresolved. Compared to dialectics, a dialogic exchange can be less competitive, and more suitable for facilitating cooperation.[3]

Feminism, Bakhtin, and the Dialogic assembles thirteen essays on the intersection of Bakhtin's narrative theory, especially his concept of dialogism. The book explores the dimensions of using Bakhtin for a feminist analysis and discerns the connections between feminist dialogics and cultural materialism. The authors offer various views ranging from studies of ecofeminism, gender theories of novelistic discourse, Bakhtin and French feminism, to analyses of contemporary novelists such as Toni Morrison, Nadine Gordimer, and Pat Barker.

Drawing on Bakhtin's sociolinguistics, this book provides an introduction to feminist work on Bakhtin and the development of a cultural politics of reading. Challenging questions are raised: What is dialogic feminism? Can Bakhtin's theories advance a feminist politics? How does a feminist dialogics fit into a materialist feminist practice? Can the "dialogic imagination" also describe some of the most radical moments within feminist thinking? The interdisciplinary focus of these responses represents the ongoing dialogue among literary critics, cultural theorists, and feminists.

In Rastier's interpretive semantics, dialogics is the semantic component based on modal evaluations, whether of ontological status (real / unreal (or impossible) / possible), veridictory status (true / false), thymic value (positive / negative (or euphoric / dysphoric)), or any other evaluation. This chapter will focus exclusively on ontology and veridiction in dialogics. In dialogics, each semantic unit is assigned an ontological category (corresponding to a specific world) and a veridictory category, and is situated in a universe associated with an evaluative focus (a specific character, for example). The universe of reference is the universe whose units are evaluated according to the absolute truth of the text; the other universes, which may be contradicted by the universe of reference, are called universes of assumption. Consider the following story: On Monday, Lucy and Paul buy a lottery ticket. On Tuesday, Lucy finds out that they have won, but Paul -- the idiot -- doesn't believe it, leaves her on the spot, and dies without giving in. On Monday, the semantic unit they win is marked as 'possible' and 'true' in the universe of assumption of each of the two characters. On Tuesday, it becomes real and true in Lucy's universe, but real and false in Paul's. The universe of reference, which corresponds to the narrator's universe of assumption, is identical to Lucy's universe and different from Paul's. (Paul is wrong - the narrator describes him as an idiot.)

(2) The proposition is assigned a truth value, that is to say, a veridictory category (true or false) (for example: the Earth is round: true). This proposition is situated in one of the three worlds into which a universe may be subdivided: the actual world (what is), the counterfactual world (what is not, or cannot be), or the possible world (what could be).

(3) To each world there corresponds a specific ontological category, that is, its status relative to ontology, or existence. The category is assigned to a semantic unit situated in that world. The ontological categories are as follows: for the actual world: real (for example: the Earth is round: true, real); for the counterfactual world: unreal or impossible (for example: the Earth is flat: true, unreal); for the possible world: possible (for example: I will win the lottery with my ticket: possible).

(4) A universe is associated with a specific focus (an evaluator), which provides the propositions and evaluates them (for instance, a character or even several characters, if they share exactly the same beliefs). A universe, then, is made up of a set of evaluated units and their respective ontological and veridictory categories, which are associated with a specific focus, or point of view (for example, a specific character, the narrator, or an evaluator that is implicit in the lexicon of the language (in pejorative or meliorative words and expressions)).

(5) Over time (one generally uses the time of the story, but there is also narrative time, etc.), a proposition may appear in or disappear from a universe, shift to another world and thereby change its ontological status, its veridictory status, or even its formulation (Mary is beautiful could become Mary is very beautiful). In addition, a single unit can be situated simultaneously in several worlds. For further details on temporal segmentation, consult the chapter on the veridictory square.

A semantic unit that is situated in the possible world is considered not to have any veridictory status (true or false). (For example: It will rain tomorrow: possible). Obviously, when a proposition is possible, the inverse proposition is also possible; in order to simplify, we use only the proposition that is being emphasized. (For instance, saying that it is possible I will win also implies that it is possible I will not win; so we can retain the first proposition by itself.) When a possible proposition is validated or invalidated, it then moves to the actual world (and/or the counterfactual world). If the weather forecaster says that it will rain Tuesday, for instance, this proposition is situated in the possible world on Monday; on Tuesday it moves to the actual world and is assigned to either the 'true' (if it rained) or the 'false' (if it didn't rain) category.

In descriptive practice, the counterfactual world essentially serves to account for the most common forms of lies and "conflicts of beliefs" (other kinds do exist, involving the possible world). In a conflict of belief (the reverse being a consensus of belief), this is where we find the contradictor's semantic unit and its veridictory category. The classic change of belief that can often follow a conflict of belief and resolve it is represented by the movement of one semantic unit and its veridictory category from the actual world to the counterfactual world. Conversely, the unit previously situated in the counterfactual world "changes residence" along with its veridictory category to the actual world. In the classic lie, the actor presents his counterfactual world as actual and vice-versa. For convenience, the analysis may leave out the counterfactual world and use only the actual world and the possible world. The distinction between these two worlds can even become optional, and at that point, if the counterfactual world is left out, the distinction between worlds and universes becomes useless. What this does is to put the ontological category 'possible' and the veridictory categories 'true'/'false' on the same level.

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