65FR37414 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
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Posting-number: Volume 65, Issue 115, Page 37414
[Federal Register: June 14, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 115)]
[Notices]
[Page 37414-37417]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr14jn00-116]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-440]
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-58, issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee),
for operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, located in Lake
County, Ohio.
The proposed amendment would permit changes to the Perry Nuclear
Power Plant Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to incorporate
descriptions (in the form of text, tables, and drawings) of
modifications to the Emergency Service Water (ESW) alternate intake
sluice gate. The modifications will include: (1) Installation of a
safety-related Class 1E selector switch that will be used to disable
the automatic opening function of the sluice gate during warm weather
and (2) installation of a non-safety inflatable sealing device on the
gates between the ESW forebay and the alternate intake tunnel. The
modifications are designed to increase overall reliability of the ESW
system and to eliminate undesired operation of the ESW pumps.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1)
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The new selector switch is procured as safety-related Class 1E,
is fully qualified environmentally and seismically, and is also
qualified in regard to mechanical and electrical operational cycles.
Based on these characteristics, the switch is deemed to be highly
reliable and will not introduce any new failure modes to the gate
control circuit. In addition, the key operated feature of the
selector switch ensures that inadvertent positioning of the switch,
i.e., an operator error, is not possible. Re-positioning of the
switch will be procedurally controlled and will require conscious
operator action along with use of a key. Therefore, it is concluded
that addition of the new selector switch will not introduce any new
failure modes and it will not cause or create any malfunctions of
equipment.
The new inflatable seal and supporting mechanical equipment was
procured as non-safety. The frequent verification of sluice gate
seal integrity assures that the seals will be
[[Page 37415]]
functional during accident and transient mitigation. This is
supported by the probabilistic analysis that determined that the
inflatable seal use results in a negligible increase in the Core
Damage Frequency (7.4 E-8). Therefore, it is concluded that the new
inflatable seals will not introduce any new failure modes and it
will not cause or create any malfunctions of equipment.
The effect of disabling the automatic opening of the sluice
gates with the proposed selector switch was evaluated and determined
that the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27, Ultimate Heat
Sink For Nuclear Power Plants, are met which ensures compliance with
General Design Criteria (GDC) 44, Cooling Water.
Analyzed events are initiated by the failure of plant
structures, systems or components. The ESW system is an accident
mitigating system that provides a reliable source of cooling water
during accident conditions and is not an accident initiator. The
proposed change does not have a detrimental impact on the integrity
of any plant structure, system or component that initiates an
analyzed event. The proposed change will not alter the operation of,
or otherwise increase the failure probability of any plant equipment
that initiates an analyzed accident. As a result, the probability of
any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased.
Sufficient water is available to the ESW pumps to satisfy
requirements for all modes of operation, accounting for minimum lake
levels. The alternate intake tunnel that branches from the main
discharge tunnel is isolated from the ESW pumphouse by the normally
closed sluice gates. The alternate intake tunnel and sluice gates
are not relied upon for mitigation of a Loss of Coolant Accident
(LOCA) or other accidents with radiological consequences analyzed in
the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The probabilistic
analysis demonstrates that the unavailability of the alternate
intake tunnel is acceptable during the time period that the sluice
gate manual open/close circuit and the automatic opening signal is
defeated, due to the extremely low probability of normal intake
failure. The modifications do not result in changes to initial
conditions of an accident nor alter assumptions used in any
consequence determinations. This activity cannot increase the dose
to the public nor on-site radiation doses such that actions to
mitigate the radiological consequences of an accident would be
impeded; nor does this modification directly or indirectly affect
the ability of any other plant system to mitigate the radiological
consequences of an accident. The proposed change will not alter the
operation of any plant equipment assumed to function in response to
the aforementioned analyzed events. Therefore, the probability of
occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated
remains unchanged.
2. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed modification of the opening circuit has been
designed, and will be procured and installed in accordance with the
original ESW system design codes and standards. ESW system functions
as required by GDC 44 and RG 1.27, have not been impacted by the
change. Systems supporting the operation of the ESW system have not
been affected. Failure of the modification to perform its design
function due to electrical or mechanical failure would be identical
to the current ESW system performance.
Inflating the seals and defeating the automatic gate-opening
signal results in the availability of only one intake path from the
ultimate heat sink. Availability of only one intake during the time
that the automatic opening function is disabled has been
demonstrated to be acceptable because a water supply from the normal
intake to the ESW pumps will be available. Cooling water supply from
only one intake path cannot initiate an accident of a different type
than previously evaluated because the cooling water supply paths
cannot create or initiate an accident.
The ESW system is an accident mitigating system and is not an
accident initiator. Consequently, the alternate intake tunnel, the
sluice gates, the sluice gate seals, and the sealing system are all
components contained in the ESW system and are therefore not
accident initiators. The operational change to the sluice gates,
i.e., inflation of the seals and disabling of the sluice gate
automatic opening feature, does not result in any interactions or
interfaces with other plant systems, structures, or components that
could create the possibility of an accident of a different type. The
operational change prevents leakage past the sluice gates.
Similarly, the sluice gates in the closed position does not result
in any interactions or interfaces with other plant systems,
structures, or components that could create the possibility of an
accident of a different type. Performance of these isolation
functions cannot initiate an accident.
This change will not affect any known accident initiators or
contributors; therefore, it will not increase the probability of an
accident previously thought to be incredible. The proposed
modifications do not affect any system or component that could
initiate an accident. Therefore, this change will not create any
different type of accident than previously evaluated in the USAR.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated remains unchanged.
3. The proposed change will not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
The design of the ESW system includes suitable redundancy and
reliability to assure that an adequate supply of cooling water is
provided and that no single failure will prevent safe shutdown of the
unit. The normal cooling water supply to the ESW pump house is provided
by a branch tunnel from the main intake tunnel, while a backup supply
is available by means of a branch tunnel (alternate intake) from the
main discharge tunnel. Currently, the sluice gates automatically open
upon receipt of a signal from low water level switches in the ESW pump
house forebay. Opening of a sluice gate ensures the necessary cooling
water is available to the ESW pumps from the alternate intake tunnel.
The licensing basis assumes that two supply paths are available and
that automatic initiation would restore the cooling supply from the
alternate path if the normal cooling supply were lost. The proposed
modification will disable the manual/automatic-opening feature of the
sluice gates during the summer months and will thus isolate the
alternate supply path. A probabilistic study has demonstrated
compliance with the requirements of RG 1.27. The study determined that
an alternate source is not required due to having demonstrated that
there is extremely low probability that a single aqueduct can
functionally fail as the result of natural or site-related phenomena.
Therefore, the proposed modification does not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
The closed sluice gates and the non-safety sluice gate seals
prevent recirculation of plant discharge water to the ESW forebay and
therefore maintain the forebay at or below its design temperature
limit. The ESW system must be capable of providing cooling water at a
temperature such that the heat exchangers serviced by ESW can remove
their design heat loads for safe plant shutdown and for accident and
transient mitigation. In order to prevent a reduction in the margin of
safety associated with the ESW inlet temperature, the ESW forebay must
not exceed 85 deg.F. With the seals inflated, the closed sluice gates
will prevent recirculation and subsequent increase of the forebay
temperature above 85 deg.F and therefore the closed sluice gates do not
reduce the margin of safety associated with the ESW inlet temperature.
The back-up air supply for the sluice gate seals, the frequent
verification of the integrity of the sluice gate seals provided via
administrative controls, and the functional and leak testing of the air
system isolation check valves provides assurance that the inflated non-
safety sluice gate seals can be credited during accident and transient
mitigation and normal plant operation. Therefore, the margin of safety
associated with ESW inlet temperature will not be reduced since the
seals will be available to prevent leakage and subsequent increase of
the forebay temperature above 85 deg.F. Further, a probabilistic study
supports this conclusion by demonstrating that seal failure, when
needed, is highly improbable and would result in a negligible increase
to core damage frequency. Therefore, it is concluded that inflation of
the non-safety seals and
[[Page 37416]]
reliance on them to prevent sluice gate leakage during all modes of
operation does not represent a reduction to the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By July 14, 2000, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov). If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mary E. O'Reilly, FirstEnergy
Corporation, 76 South Main St., Akron, OH 44308, attorney for the
licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions,
[[Page 37417]]
supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated June 1, 2000, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and accessible
electronically through the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room link at
the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June, 2000.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Anthony J. Mendiola,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate III, Division of Licensing
Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-15001 Filed 6-13-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P