[GAO-02-97 ] Force Structure: Options for Enhancing the Navy's Attack Submarine Force , Part 2/2
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While either refueling four SSN- 688s or refueling and converting four
Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would add four submarines to the fleet, the options
do not provide equal forward presence capability. The dual crewing of the
Trident force would enable four SSGNs to provide more forward presence than
four refueled SSN- 688s. 17 A DOD analysis concluded that 8- 10 single- crew
ships (such as the SSN- 688s being considered for refueling) would be
required to provide the same level of forward presence capability as four
dual crewed SSGNs. 18
According to an analysis performed for the Navy, a fleet of four SSGNs could
provide on average a total 2.65 submarines deployed in three theaters and
the flexibility to surge from theater to theater. 19 In contrast, four
refueled SSN- 688s would provide less than one submarine forwardly deployed.
The Navy has not fully analyzed the forward presence coverage that a force
of two SSGNs would provide. However, officials note that two ships can only
provide continuous presence in one theater and that employing only two SSGNs
reduces schedule flexibility. In addition, the two SSGN option would reduce
the availability of the SSGN to free up other naval forces such as
destroyers and attack submarines for higher priority missions such as
theater ballistic missile defense, anti- air warfare, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and sea control. Furthermore, officials
told us that it would make economic and logistical sense to base a force of
two SSGNs in one homeport rather than a homeport on each U. S. coast.
However, basing two SSGNs on a single coast would mean that either the
Pacific or European theaters would not routinely reap the deployment
benefits of the SSGN.
17 The SSGN?s concept of operations is a preliminary estimate based on the
Trident SSBN and attack submarine historical deployment structures and
maintenance patterns, the Trident submarine?s high deployment tempo and
extended deployments demonstrated in a series of strategic submarine
exercised called Submarine Continuity of Operations. For further
information, see Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile
Submarines (SSBNs) to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs),
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, June 1999.
18 Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile Submarines
(SSBNs) to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs), Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, March 1999.
19 Trident SSGN Marginal Utility Analysis: 2010 Peacetime Presence, Center
for Naval Analyses, March 2001.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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The SSGN?s presence capabilities exceed those of the SSN- 688s proposed for
refueling. Each SSGN would provide 242 presence days per year for a total of
968 days for a force of four SSGNs. In contrast, a refueled SSN- 688 would
provide only 73 presence days per year or 292 presence days for a force of
four SSNs.
As noted earlier, the SSGN would provide vastly greater Tomahawk presence
days with an average of 334 Tomahawks per day in- theater for a four SSGN
force. 20 In contrast, four refueled SSN- 688s would only provide an average
of 10 Tomahawks per day in- theater at any given time.
Similarly, four SSGNs would provide an average of 14 special operations
forces platoons in- theater. In contrast, refueled SSN- 688s could surge up
to one platoon for a limited duration.
20 This assumes a load of 98 and 154 Tomahawk missiles in the special
operations and maximum strike configurations, respectively.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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In December 1999, the Chairman?s study concluded that a force structure
below 55 attack submarines in 2015 and 62 attack submarines in 2025 would
leave regional military commanders- in- chief with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands. A force of 55 attack submarines
provides just over 4,000 days of presence in overseas theaters each year (an
attack submarine provides 73 presence days annually) and 62 attack
submarines would provide about 4,500 presence days. The study also concluded
that 68 attack submarines in 2015 and 76 in 2025, were required to meet
other high priority but less critical demands. These force levels would
equate to 5,000 and 5,500 presence days, respectively. 21
Our review did not evaluate the validity of the study?s force structure
recommendations, although we did examine the extent to which the proposed
options would help DOD achieve the lower of these goals established by this
study.
Without additional submarines the baseline force would not meet attack
submarine presence day goals for 19 years between 2002 and 2035.
21 We rounded presence days to the nearest hundred.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
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Transformational Potential
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Of the proposed options, refueling four SSN- 688s contributes the least
toward meeting DOD?s presence day goals. This option helps DOD to achieve
its presence day goals for 9 additional years (from 2004 to 2012) above that
provided by the baseline force. However, DOD would still be unable to meet
its presence day goals for 10 years between 2002 and 2035.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Refueling four SSN- 688s and replacing them with Virginia- class submarines
helps DOD achieve its presence day force structure goals for 17 additional
years over that provided by the baseline force. DOD would be unable to meet
its presence day goals in only 2002- 2003. This is the only option that
would have no presence day gaps between 2004- 2035.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Of the proposed options, converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs contributes
the most presence days and helps DOD achieve its presence day goal for 14
additional years over that provided by the baseline force. With the four
SSGN option, DOD would fall short of its presence day goal for only 5 years
(between fiscal year 2002 and 2035).
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Option 4 would enhance the submarine force by refueling four SSN- 688s and
converting two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs. This option helps DOD achieve its
presence day goals for 13 additional years over that provided by the
baseline force. However, DOD would fall short of its presence day goal for 6
years (fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and fiscal years 2027 to 2030).
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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One goal of naval transformation efforts is to counter challenges expected
in the future. One of the challenges facing the Navy is the use of anti-
access or area denial strategies by potential adversaries. Such strategies
aim to deny U. S. forces access to the ports, airfields, bases, and near-
shore sea areas they depend on to conduct military operations. Systems
intended to counter U. S. naval forces in littoral areas could include
advanced diesel- electric submarines, mines, anti- ship cruise missiles,
air- defense systems, and potentially, weapons of mass destruction. Defense
analysts 22 envision that undersea platforms that can penetrate these areas
do not require forward basing agreements and would be of increased value in
the future. The Navy?s current submarine transformation efforts include a
project on ideas for expanding the number and variety of weapons and sensors
carried by Navy attack submarines.
Transformation advocates have identified the SSGN as having transformational
potential while the refueled SSN- 688s would provide no new capabilities and
have limited remaining hull life and available volume for upgrades. As a
quiet, self- sustaining undersea platform, the SSGN could penetrate the
littoral battlespace and counter area denial tactics. The large size and
stability of the SSGN would allow for modifications to enable
experimentation with future concepts and such potentially transformational
capabilities.
Officials noted, however, that a two SSGN class would provide less
flexibility than the four- ship class to conduct joint experimentation,
transformational concept development and special operations forces
operations while at the same time attempting to provide any significant
amount of forward presence.
22 A Strategy for a Long Peace, Kosiak, Krepinevich, and Vickers, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2001.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
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Transformation advocates have long identified the SSGN as having
transformational potential. In 1996, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments identified the SSGN as a promising alternative for the Navy?s
?restructuring efforts.? 23 In 1997, the National Defense Panel, created by
Congress to review the 1997 QDR and assess force alternatives, recommended
that the Navy look closely at converting Trident SSBNs to
23 A Navy for a New Era, Krepinevich, Andrew, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, May 1996.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 75 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
alternative missions. 24 In 1998, The Defense Science Board Study ?Joint
Operational Superiority in the 21st Century? also endorsed the SSGN concept.
In addition, Congress has had continuing interest in the SSGN concept and
has provided funding for studies and initial design work.
The continuing interest in the SSGN concept by transformation advocates
stems from the SSGN?s transformational features. First, the SSGN?s stealth
would be advantageous to survival in the crowded near shore waters where the
Navy expects to operate in the 21st century. The SSGN would be able to
operate covertly near enemy coasts undetected for weeks or months, if
necessary. Second, its speed, mobility, and range combined with large,
flexible payloads would enable it to respond to a variety of developing
world events. Third, because submarines do not require extensive logistics
support to operate forwardly they would not be dependent on vulnerable
forward bases or surface assets. Fourth, the SSGN?s precision- guided
Tomahawk missiles would reach distant targets about 1,000 miles away,
providing extensive strike capability into areas denied other U. S. forces.
Furthermore, it would have the potential to carry follow- on weapons such as
unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles, improved communications and other new
technologies to counter emerging threats. Fifth, the Navy has made a concept
known as network centric warfare the centerpiece of its efforts to transform
its forces. 25 With its improved communications, large antennas for sharing
data and the ability to network with other naval and joint warfighting
elements the SSGN would further contribute to the Navy?s vision for network
centric warfare. Sixth, the SSGNs combination of stealth, intelligence
gathering, and special operations capability would enable it to conduct its
own unique forms of information warfare. And finally, war games and
experimentation with the SSGN show its potential for using a mix of
shortreaction strike weapons and enhanced intelligence collection
capabilities to counter the challenge of mobile targets.
24 Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming Defense and National
Security in the 21st Century, Odeen, Philip A., et al., December 1997. 25
Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and Focused
(GAO- 01- 853, Aug. 2001).
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
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Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
To compare the operational life- cycle cost of the options, we obtained
estimated procurement, operations, maintenance, and personnel costs;
determined the funds needed in each fiscal year for each option; converted
the costs into fiscal year 2001 dollars; and calculated each option?s net
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options?
Life- Cycle Costs and Cost- Effectiveness
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
Page 77 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
present value. 1 Because alternative choices are being compared we included
the cost of decommissionings that are a consequence of that choice. For
example, if the choice is to refuel SSN- 688s, DOD would incur the cost of
decommissioning four Trident SSBNs (about $425 million) in addition to the
cost of the SSN- 688 refueling program. On the other hand, if the choice
were to refuel and convert Trident SSBNs, DOD would need to spend about $200
million to decommission four SSN- 688s.
Each of the force structure options provides benefits over different time
periods making direct comparisons difficult. Refueling of SSN- 688s covers a
period of 10 to 12 years of operational service whereas converting Trident
SSBNs into SSGNs covers a period of 20 to 22 years of operational service.
Because the SSN- 688 refueling option does not sustain force level goals of
55 submarines beyond 2016 we considered a third option that buys Virginia-
class submarine replacements for decommissioning refueled SSN- 688s.
Virginia- class submarines have a 6- year construction period preceded by 2
years of advanced procurement of long- lead equipment (mostly propulsion-
related equipment), for a total procurement cycle of 8 years for each ship.
The net effect of this construction cycle is that the expenditure of
procurement funds for replacement submarines begins 2 to 4 years after each
SSN- 688 is refueled. In order to make the time period for replacement
program option comparable to the 20- to 22- year time period for Trident
SSGNs, our analysis includes the 10 to 12 years provided by the refueled
SSN- 688s and the first 10 to 12 years of service life for the Virginia-
class submarines. Because the Virginia- class submarines are estimated to
have a useful service life of 33 years, we subtract the remaining value of
its 21 to 23 years of unused service life from the initial investment cost
using a depreciation analysis. We also included the Virginia- class
submarine operating and support costs for the first 10 to 12 years.
Since the costs were converted to fiscal 2001 dollars, we used a real
discount rate (Treasury borrowing rate minus forecasted inflation) in
calculating the net present value.
1 Because investment alternatives normally incur different costs over
different time streams, it is our policy to compare the alternatives on an
equal economic basis using a technique called present value analysis. This
analysis, by recognizing the time value of money, converts costs occurring
at different times to a common unit of measurement, is predicated on the
theory that costs incurred in the future are worth less than costs incurred
today. Present value analysis also provides a means to transform a stream of
costs to a single number so it can be compared to another.
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
Page 78 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
Page 79 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Cost- effectiveness analysis seeks to find the least costly alternative for
achieving a given program or policy result. We evaluated the
costeffectiveness of the submarine force options in three program areas: (1)
submarine presence days, (2) Tomahawk presence days, and (3) special
operations forces presence days. Each of these metrics is measurable and are
primary missions of the proposed SSGN. Suitable metrics for other missions,
such as battle group support and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, were unavailable. The cost of a presence day was determined
by dividing the option?s net present value by the total presence days
provided by that option. Each deployed Tomahawk counts as a Tomahawk
presence day as does each special operations forces platoon presence day.
Converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs is the most cost- effective
alternative for providing presence days and in supporting the Tomahawk
strike and special operations forces missions. The two key factors affecting
the cost- effectiveness measures are the SSGN?s (1) extended deployment
periods and (2) massive payload capacities. The SSGN achieves its presence
days superior ?return on investment? by employing two crews and rotating
these crews while the ship is forwardly deployed. An SSGN is estimated to be
able to spend 66 percent of its time forward deployed per year compared to
20 percent for a refueled SSN- 688.
Notwithstanding the SSGN?s superior cost- effectiveness in the three mission
areas we evaluated, the refueled SSN- 688s would provide valuable mission
support in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
undersea warfare, and carrier battle group support.
Briefing Section V: Summary Page 80 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section V: Summary
Briefing Section V: Summary Page 81 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section V: Summary Page 82 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
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Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Note: Draft report was submitted as GAO- 01- 115. GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.
See comment 3. See comment 2.
See comment 1.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
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See comment 4.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 85 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The following is our response to the Department of Defense?s (DOD) letter
dated September 18, 2001.
1. DOD's comments restates the requirements discussed on page 9. 2. DOD's
comment restates our finding in the Results in Brief, on page 3. 3. See our
response in the Agency Comments section of the letter on
page 5. 4. We agree with Defense?s comment that the SSGN would substantially
enhance in- theater Tomahawk presence. Our comparison- which is based on the
notional Tomahawk loads the Navy uses in its ordnance requirements
determination process and not on budget constrained peacetime actual loads-
shows that an SSGN?s presence in a theater substantially enhances the
Tomahawk presence. GAO Comments
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 86 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Department of Defense Office of the Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics
Defense Intelligence Agency The Joint Staff
Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate Chief of Naval
Operations
Submarine Warfare Division Surface Warfare Division Resources, Requirements
& Assessments Division Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Research, Development and Acquisition
Naval Sea Systems Command Nuclear Propulsion Directorate Program Executive
Officer, Submarines
Virginia- class Program Management Office Trident Conversion (SSGN) Project
Team Strategic Systems Programs Office of Naval Intelligence Other
Organizations
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Congressional Budget Office
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices
Contacted Washington, D. C., Area
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 87 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
U. S. Joint Forces Command U. S. Atlantic Fleet
Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet Naval Special Warfare SEAL Delivery Vehicle
Team TWO
U. S. Central Command U. S. Naval Forces Central Command U. S. Fifth Fleet
(Bahrain via video conference) U. S. Special Operations Command
Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay Submarine Group 10
Submarine Squadron 16 Trident Refit Facility Trident Training Facility U. S.
S. Rhode Island (SSBN- 740) (Blue)
Naval War College Naval Undersea Warfare Center
Naval Special Warfare Command U. S. Pacific Command
Cruise Missile Support Activity Norfolk, Virginia, Area
Tampa, Florida, Area Kings Bay, Georgia, Area
Newport, Rhode Island, Area
San Diego, California, Area Honolulu, Hawaii, Area
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 88 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
U. S. Pacific Fleet Special Operations Command, Pacific Fleet Submarine
Force, Pacific Fleet U. S. S. Kamehameha (SSN- 642) U. S. S. Buffalo (SSN-
715) Naval Special Warfare SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE
Advanced SEAL Delivery System U. S. European Command
U. S. Naval Forces Europe Other Contacts
(350033)
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