[GAO-02-180T ] Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs Designed to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs Designed
to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction
(14-NOV-01, GAO-02-180T).

This testimony discusses GAO's recent work on U.S.
nonproliferation programs, and to comment on S. 673--a bill to
establish an interagency committee to review and coordinate such
programs. GAO found that the U.S. programs have achieved some
success, but more needs to be done to keep nuclear weapons,
materials, and technologies out of the hands of terrorists and
countries of concern. Furthermore, there are questions about how
to sustain the security improvements being made. In addition, the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of State programs
to employ weapons scientists face difficulty in conclusively
demonstrating that they are achieving their intended goal of
preventing the spread of weapons-related knowledge and expertise.
With respect to S. 673, there is some debate among officials
about the need for more coordination of U.S. nonproliferation
programs. Based upon work and the findings of two independent
commissions that recently examined these programs, GAO believes
that additional coordination would be helpful and that the
legislation could serve as a vehicle to share information and
best practices for addressing problems GAO identified. GAO also
believes that S. 673 could be strengthened by mandating
development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly
identifies overall goals, time frames for meeting those goals,
and ways to set priorities for allocating resources to address
U.S. nonproliferation concerns.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-180T
ACCNO: A02469
TITLE: Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs
Designed to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass
Destruction
DATE: 11/14/2001
SUBJECT: Nuclear weapons
Nuclear proliferation

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GAO-02-180T

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 30 p. m. Wednesday, November 14,
2001 NUCLEAR

NONPROLIFERATION Coordination of U. S. Programs Designed to Reduce the
Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction

Statement of Ms. Gary L. Jones, Director, Natural Resources and Environment

GAO- 02- 180T

Page 1 GAO- 02- 180T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here
today to discuss our recent work on U. S. nonproliferation programs designed
to reduce the threat to national security posed by the former Soviet Union?s
weapons of mass destruction and to comment on S. 673- a bill to establish an
interagency committee to review and coordinate U. S. nonproliferation
programs. Our statement today, which follows our testimony before this
Subcommittee last week that provided an overview of U. S. tools for
combating proliferation, 1 emphasizes how the events of September 11, 2001,
have heightened the importance to our national security of global U. S.
nonproliferation programs.

In summary, our most recent work on the U. S. government?s various
nonproliferation programs has found that they have achieved some success,
but more needs to be done to keep nuclear weapons, materials, and
technologies out of the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For
example, hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material remain at some risk
because the Department of Energy?s (DOE) program to secure this material
continues to experience problems with access to sensitive Russian sites.
Furthermore, there are questions about how to sustain the security
improvements being made. In addition, DOE and State Department programs to
employ weapons scientists face difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that
they are achieving their intended goal of preventing the spread of weapons-
related knowledge and expertise.

With respect to S. 673, there is some debate among officials both within and
outside government about the need for more coordination of U. S.
nonproliferation programs. Based upon our work and the findings of two
independent commissions that recently examined these programs, we believe
that additional coordination would be helpful and that the legislation could
serve as a vehicle to share information and best practices for addressing
the problems we identified in our work. However, the legislation would not
address a number of other problems, such as limited access to sensitive
Russian sites and various program management concerns that diminish the
effectiveness of U. S. nonproliferation efforts. We also believe S. 673
could be strengthened by mandating development of an overarching strategic
plan that clearly identifies overall goals, time

1 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U. S. Policy Tools for Combating
Proliferation

(GAO- 02- 226T, Nov. 7, 2001).

Page 2 GAO- 02- 180T

frames for meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating
resources governmentwide to address U. S. nonproliferation concerns.

The states of the former Soviet Union possess enormous assets, including
nuclear material and scientific expertise, that could help terrorists or
countries of concern acquire weapons of mass destruction. By some estimates,
the former Soviet Union had, at the time of its breakup 10 years ago, about
30,000 nuclear weapons, 650 metric tons of weapons- usable nuclear
materials, 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, an extensive biological
weapons infrastructure, and thousands of systems capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction. The political changes and ensuing economic
turmoil left 30, 000 to 75,000 senior nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons scientists, as well as thousands of less experienced scientists,
without full- time employment. In addition, Russia?s 10 closed nuclear
cities, which form the core of the nuclear weapons complex, have massive
unemployment problems and face an uncertain future because Russia is
downsizing its nuclear weapons activities.

To date, the Congress has authorized in excess of $5. 5 billion for U. S.
programs aimed at helping Russia and the other newly independent states to
reduce the threats posed by their weapons of mass destruction. Much of this
money has been spent on the Department of Defense?s (DOD) efforts to
eliminate vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and to secure former
Soviet weapons and their components. DOE is also a major player in U. S.
nonproliferation programs. Its programs focus on, among other things, (1)
improving the security of hundreds of metric tons of nuclear materials at
various sites located throughout Russia and (2) employing Russia?s weapons
scientists, including those in Russia?s 10 closed nuclear cities, so that
they will not sell sensitive information to countries or terrorist groups
trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. The State Department also
oversees two international science centers in Russia and Ukraine that pay
former Soviet weapons scientists to conduct peaceful research.

S. 673 calls for a committee that would consist of representatives from the
Department of Commerce, DOD, DOE, and State, and be chaired by a
representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. The committee would be responsible for monitoring and coordinating
nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union (1) within and between
U. S. government departments and agencies, (2) between the U. S. government
and the private sector, and (3) between the United States and other
countries in order to minimize conflict among the programs and to maximize
the utility of U. S. public spending. Specifically, the bill calls
Background

Page 3 GAO- 02- 180T

for the committee to arrange for the development of analyses and provide
guidance on the issues and problems relating to coordination within and
between the U. S. government, the private sector, and other countries?
nonproliferation programs.

Today, I will focus my comments on our recent work related to several key
nonproliferation programs: DOE?s Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting Program; the 1993 U. S./ Russia Highly Enriched Uranium
Agreement; and DOE?s and State?s programs to employ Russian weapons
scientists. Successful implementation of these nonproliferation programs is
clearly in our national security interests. While these programs have had
some success, much more needs to be done to ensure their successful
implementation.

In February 2001, 2 we reported that the security systems installed by DOE?s
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program were reducing the risk
of theft of nuclear material in Russia but that hundreds of metric tons of
nuclear material still lacked improved security systems. At that time, DOE
had spent about $601 million and had installed completed or partially
completed systems protecting, among other things, 192 metric tons of the 603
metric tons of nuclear material identified at risk of theft. Nevertheless,
Russian officials? concerns about divulging national security information
continue to impede DOE?s efforts to install systems for the remaining
nuclear material at sensitive Russian sites. DOE has recently concluded an
improved access agreement with Russia. However, the program?s continued
progress depends on DOE?s ability to gain access to sensitive sites and
reach agreement with Russia on reducing the number of sites and buildings
where nuclear material is located and where security systems are needed. DOE
estimates that the program will not be completed until 2020, at a cost of
$2.2 billion. In the meantime, nuclear material remains at some risk of
theft. DOE also has limited information on how much financial assistance
each site throughout Russia will require to sustain the operation and
maintenance of the systems that are being installed and how long the
assistance will be needed.

In responding to our February 2001 report, DOE agreed with our
recommendations to develop options for completing the program on the

2 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia?s Nuclear Material Improving;
Further Enhancements Needed (GAO- 01- 312, Feb. 28, 2001). Nuclear

Nonproliferation Programs Have Had Success, but More Work Needed to Secure
Weapons, Materials, and Technologies

Page 4 GAO- 02- 180T

basis of the progress made in gaining access to these sites and agreement on
the closure of buildings and sites. Furthermore, while DOE currently does
not have a means to monitor the security systems it is installing to ensure
that they are working properly on a continuing basis, it has agreed to
implement our recommendation to develop a monitoring system in cooperation
with Russia.

Security of Russian nuclear material has also been improved through the
implementation of the 1993 U. S./ Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement.
The agreement calls for USEC, Inc. to purchase 500 metric tons of weapons
usable highly enriched uranium by 2013. 3 We reported in December 2000 4
that USEC had purchased low enriched uranium blendeddown from 103 metric
tons of highly enriched uranium, which, according to USEC, represents the
equivalent amount of material from 4,000 nuclear warheads. The corporation
continues to purchase additional weapons usable material. Despite this
success, problems exist in this program. Specifically, several key measures
that are intended to provide confidence that the highly enriched uranium is
extracted from Russian nuclear weapons and that this highly enriched uranium
is then blended- down into low enriched uranium have not been put in place.
Furthermore, U. S. officials lack access to Russia?s dismantlement
facilities for its nuclear weapons and to the weapons dismantlement process.
DOE officials have told us that they are continuing to negotiate with Russia
to solve these problems.

The United States funds three programs that share the goal of employing
Russia?s weapons scientists in nonmilitary work and thereby preventing them
from selling their knowledge to terrorists or countries of concern. These
three programs take a somewhat different approach to solving the same
problem. For example, in general, the State Department?s Science Center
program funds grant research projects, 5 while DOE?s two programs- the
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities
Initiative (NCI)- fund commercial projects with industry

3 USEC, Inc.- formerly the United States Enrichment Corporation- enriches
uranium for use as fuel in commercial nuclear power reactors. 4 Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Implications of the U. S. Purchase of Russian Highly
Enriched Uranium (GAO- 01- 148, Dec. 15, 2000). 5 Weapons of Mass
Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers Program

(GAO- 01- 582, May 10, 2001).

Page 5 GAO- 02- 180T

partners. In early 1999, 6 we reported on a number of management weaknesses
in the IPP program and recommended several corrective actions. DOE has since
implemented all of our recommendations to improve program effectiveness.
Among other things, DOE made program changes based on our findings that (1)
the IPP program had not achieved its broader nonproliferation goal of long-
term employment for weapons scientists, (2) some ?dual- use? projects may
have unintentionally provided defense- related information to Russia, and
(3) most program funds were spent in the United States rather than in
Russia.

Similarly, as we reported in May 2001, 7 NCI had limited success during its
first 2 years. DOE estimates that the program employs about 370 people,
including many weapons scientists who work primarily on a part- time basis
through research projects sponsored by the U. S. national laboratories. We
found that a disproportionate amount of the NCI program?s funding has been
spent in the United States. About 70 percent, or about $11.2 million, of the
$15.9 million that DOE spent through December 2000 was spent in the United
States- primarily at its national laboratories- for such items as overhead,
labor, equipment, and travel. The remaining 30 percent was spent for
projects and activities in Russia. Our review found that DOE needs to
address a fundamental question: Does it need two programs operating in
Russia?s nuclear cities with a shared goal and, in some cases, with the same
types of projects? DOE agreed with our recommendation to consider
consolidating the two programs in order to achieve potential cost savings
and other efficiencies.

A major problem with the three programs designed to employ former Soviet-
weapons scientists is the difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that they
are achieving the programs? intended goal of preventing the spread of
weapons- related knowledge and expertise to terrorists or countries of
concern.

6 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE?s Efforts to Reduce the Risks
Posed by Russia?s Unemployed Weapons Scientists (GAO/ RCED- 99- 54, Feb. 19,
1999). 7 Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE?s Efforts to Assist Weapons
Scientists in Russia?s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges (GAO- 01- 429, May 3,
2001).

Page 6 GAO- 02- 180T

S. 673 is focused on improving the coordination of the various programs
aimed at keeping weapons, materials, and technologies out of the hands of
terrorists and countries of concern. Although there is debate about the need
for more coordination of these U. S. nonproliferation programs, based on our
work and the findings of two independent commissions that recently examined
these programs, we believe that additional coordination would be helpful and
that the requirements in the legislation represent a positive step overall.
However, enactment of this legislation would not solve all of the problems
we have identified with these programs and does not address the need for an
overarching strategic plan for U. S. nonproliferation programs.

Knowledgeable officials both within and outside government disagree about
the need for more coordination of U. S. nuclear nonproliferation programs.
We spoke with representatives from DOD, DOE, State, and the Nuclear Threat
Initiative- a private foundation dedicated to reducing the threat from
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons through direct action, education,
and awareness building activities. These officials noted that the FREEDOM
Support Act of 1992 (P. L. 102- 511) establishes a coordinator in the State
Department for assistance programs to the Newly Independent States of the
former Soviet Union, including those programs dealing with nonproliferation.
They were unanimous that coordination among federal agencies implementing
nonproliferation programs is already taking place at a high enough level and
that the coordinating mechanism established by this bill may not be needed.
However, throughout the course of our work on various programs, officials
from the U. S. government and the private sector told us that there is a
need for greater coordination among U. S. nonproliferation programs and
activities. Some officials also believe that improved coordination is needed
between the United States and international programs, such as those
implemented by the European Union. Officials have also stated that although
coordination among U. S. nonproliferation programs does occur, it is
frequently informal and subject to changes in program personnel.

Two independent commissions that have examined U. S. nonproliferation
programs over the past 3 years share this view. In July 1999, the Commission
to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the Deutch
Commission) recommended the creation of a high- level council that would
formulate policy, reach timely decisions, and harmonize the interagency
process of program execution and resource allocation in accordance with an
integrated national plan. In January 2001, the Secretary of Energy Advisory
Board Russia Task Force (chaired by S. 673 Could Improve

Coordination but Would Not Address Other Problems in Implementing DOE?s
Nonproliferation Programs

Page 7 GAO- 02- 180T

former Senator Howard Baker and former Counsel to the President Lloyd
Cutler) reported on DOE?s nonproliferation programs in Russia. The task
force recommended, among other things, improved coordination among programs
of different agencies through the creation of a high- level leadership
position in the White House. It also called for the development of a
national strategic plan for U. S. nonproliferation programs.

In our view, enactment of this legislation could improve coordination and
communication among U. S. government, private sector, and other countries?
nonproliferation programs. Greater coordination could also have other
impacts, such as (1) minimizing duplication, (2) leveraging resources, and
(3) focusing programs more clearly on common goals and objectives. However,
it would not solve many of the other problems facing the implementation of
U. S. nonproliferation programs that we have previously reported on, such as
access to sensitive Russian sites and various program management concerns.
We agree with the views expressed by the Deutch Commission and the Baker-
Cutler Task Force that a missing element from the current U. S. government
implementation of nonproliferation programs is an integrated strategic plan.
We believe that such a plan is needed and that S. 673 could be strengthened
by mandating development of a plan that clearly identifies overall strategic
goals, time frames for meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for
allocating resources governmentwide to address U. S. nonproliferation
concerns. By delineating ways of measuring progress toward goals, a cross-
cutting strategic plan would provide a mechanism to hold departments and
agencies accountable for achieving the overall goals of U. S. government
efforts to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. A
governmentwide strategic plan could be built on strategic plans that have
already been developed by the agencies that implement these programs and
could address such issues as the following:

Are the end dates for the completion of the various nonproliferation
programs, such as securing nuclear materials in Russia, still viable?

How can the security improvements made be sustained beyond the completion
of the programs?

In light of September 11, do we have the right mix of nonproliferation
programs needed to address the varying security problems facing our nation?

This concludes my formal statement. I would be happy to respond to any
questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Page 8 GAO- 02- 180T

Contact and Acknowledgments For further information on this testimony,
please contact Ms. Gary L. Jones on (202) 512- 3841. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony included Gene Aloise, Ryan T. Coles, Joseph
Cook, Beth Hoffman Leon, Hynek Kalkus, Glen Levis, and F. James Shafer.

(360157)
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