Ass Bent Over Pussy
Nichole Wernett
The United States Attorney's Office announced that during a federal court session in Billings, on April 7, 2010, before Chief U.S. District Judge Richard F. Cebull, WILLIAM ALVIN WICK, JR., a 28-year-old resident of Lame Deer, appeared for sentencing.
On the evening of November 17, 2007, WICK, Ron Oneida Whiteman, Charles William Spotted Elk-Booth, Jr., and a juvenile male were driving around Lame Deer on the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation drinking. The group saw the victim walking down the street and decided to pick her up, WICK was driving. The victim was staggering as she walked, because she was drunk. She got into the car with the men and sat in the back between Whiteman and Spotted Elk-Booth. They then bought more alcohol - vodka - and continued to drive around Lame Deer.
After that rape, Whiteman took her out of the car and took off the rest of her clothes. She fell to the ground because she was too drunk to stand. Whiteman tried to force her to perform oral sex, but she resisted. The men placed her on the hood of the car, naked, and WICK and Spotted Elk-Booth held her arms down as Whiteman raped her again. Whiteman then threw her to the ground and Spotted Elk-Booth tried to rape her but could not get an erection. Whiteman and WICK put her on the hood again and WICK tried to rape her but could not get an erection, so he inserted his fingers into her vagina.
Following the assaults on the hood of the car, Whiteman and Spotted Elk-Booth carried her to the trunk. Before they put her in the trunk, naked, the juvenile raped her again while she was held by Whiteman and Spotted Elk-Booth in a bent-over position. She pleaded with the men not to put her in the trunk to no avail. They drove around with her in the trunk drinking whiskey until she was rescued from the trunk of the car by the police. The victim had extensive bruising on her legs, thighs, buttocks, arms and chest, and lacerations and abrasions on her body.
The victim has very little memory of what happened to her. She was drinking at home on November 17, 2007. She was drunk and she left her home at some point to walk to downtown Lame Deer. She then remembers a man telling her to perform oral sex and then her head was grabbed and the man was trying to force her mouth to his penis. She remembers WICK, who she knew because she was related to him by marriage, laughing at her as she told him to leave her alone. Then the trunk closed. She remembers being in the trunk of the car, and screaming and asking the men to leave her alone. She also remembers hearing WICK laughing and talking while she was in the trunk.
The victim was taken to the hospital for treatment and a sexual assault examination was performed. Swabs were taken from the hood of the car and from the trunk. DNA testing confirmed that the victim's blood was on the hood and on the door of the trunk.
WICK provided two recorded statements. During the second statement, WICK admitted that he tried to have sexual intercourse with the victim but was unable to get an erection, so he stuck his fingers into her vagina. These acts occurred on the hood of the car. He admitted that he knew the victim was in the trunk of the car and that he drove around with her while she was in the trunk.
Because there is no parole in the federal system, the "truth in sentencing" guidelines mandate that WICK will likely serve all of the time imposed by the court. In the federal system, WICK does have the opportunity to earn a sentence reduction for "good behavior." However, this reduction will not exceed 15% of the overall sentence.
Petitioner has exhausted her state remedies pursuant to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254(b). She filed a motion to suppress in the trial court. A hearing on said motion was heard prior to trial, and the motion was denied by order of the Honorable L. J. Foley, Jr., Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Milwaukee County. By stipulation of the parties, all testimony at the hearing on suppression was received as evidence for the purpose of trial. Petitioner appealed from the judgment and order of the circuit court, and in the decision of State v. Guy, 55 Wis.2d 83, 197 N.W.2d 774 (1972), the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. After examination of the trial court transcript and the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, I find that the grounds raised in this petition were raised before both the trial court and the appellate court.
There is no allegation that petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing at the state court level. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not warranted in this matter. On February 20, 1973, I granted petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter.
The facts, as they appear from the record, follow. On December 5, 1970, shortly before noon, petitioner was arrested at her home by several officers of the Milwaukee Police Department on an arrest warrant charging her with the sale of cocaine. The arresting officers were members of the narcotics division of the vice squad of the Milwaukee Police Department and were familiar with paraphernalia used by heroin users. While the officers were inside the petitioner's home and engaged in conversation with the petitioner, they observed on a bedroom nightstand various paraphernalia typically employed in the heating and administering of heroin. Present on this table were a couple hypodermic needles, an eyedropper, a glass of water, small pieces of copper wire, a "cooker" (a burned bottle cap with a wad of cotton in the middle) and white residue. A "cooker" is used to "cook up" the heroin before administering it into the arm.
One of the arresting officers, Detective Randa, advised two policewomen, Officers Atkinson and Honeck, to search petitioner. He gave no instructions about how the search was to be conducted but assumed that the policewomen knew how to search the petitioner. The search took place in the following manner. Petitioner and the two women police officers went into petitioner's bathroom and closed the door. At the time petitioner was clad only in a nightgown and underpants. In the bathroom she was told to strip, bend over, and spread her buttocks. It was difficult for petitioner to bend over because she was seven months pregnant, but she succeeded. The police women then looked into her privates and found nothing.
Detective Randa asked the policewomen, after they came out of the bathroom, if they had had a chance to search the petitioner "real well." Because of cramped quarters and poor lighting in the petitioner's bathroom, Officers Atkinson, Honeck, and Randa decided that petitioner should be transported to the vice squad section of the Safety Building in Milwaukee and searched a second time because there was more light and more room in the vice squad room.
Detective Randa testified that he had known petitioner for about six years in his capacity as a narcotics division officer, and that he had been involved in an earlier prosecution of petitioner for possession of heroin. In addition, Randa stated that he had been informed by a "reliable informer" four or five years before that petitioner was known to carry heroin in her vagina. He had known the informant for about seven years but did not know the occupation of *195 the informant. He also did not know where the informant got his information.
The search of the petitioner which ultimately caused her conviction for possession of heroin and the present petition took place in the vice squad room. Petitioner was again told to disrobe by the two policewomen. She disrobed, bent over, this time leaning on a chair, and one of the policewomen, using rubber gloves, assisted her in spreading her buttocks. While the second policewoman held an ordinary flashlight, the other observed the corner of a plastic container protruding from petitioner's vagina. Petitioner removed the container and gave it to the policewomen. The plastic bag was later determined to contain four smaller plastic packets. Subsequent chemical analysis established that they contained a total of .29 grams of heroin.
The facts further show that petitioner had several prior felony convictions. On March 25, 1969, she was convicted for possession of heroin and sentenced to not less than two and not more than six years. On or about August 30, 1967, she was convicted of forgery. She was sentenced to not more than four years; execution of the sentence was stayed and she was placed on probation for two years. This was revoked and she was incarcerated at the Wisconsin Home for Women on or about June 26, 1968.
Jurisdiction is present to decide this matter under 28 U.S.C. 2254.[1] Petitioner is presently "in custody" pursuant to a judgment of a court of the State of Wisconsin and has exhausted her available remedies before resorting to this court.
The imposition of concurrent sentences imposes sufficient restraints on a petitioner's *196 liberty to require this court to consider her case on the merits. If petitioner was deprived of her constitutional rights because of an illegal search and seizure, the broad scope and "grand purpose" of the writ of habeas corpus requires this court to dispose of this as justice requires. If petitioner's constitutional rights were not abridged, she should be notified of the reasons for denying her petition, instead of this court's hiding behind the mask of "judicial convenience."
During the past decade, the methodology of determining reasonableness has been seriously challenged. It was previously thought that there were no set formulae for determining reasonableness. For instance, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1901, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968), it is stated that "[t]he constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case."
Recently, however, the Supreme Court rejected the principle and found that the arresting authority possesses unqualified authority to search the person of the arrestee. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973), the Supreme Court formulated that the valid arrest of an individual is per se a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.[2] This being so, *197 a search incident to the arrest requires no further justification. The Court stated at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 477:
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