Auto Loader supports two modes for detecting new files: directory listing and file notification. You can switch file discovery modes across stream restarts and still obtain exactly-once data processing guarantees.
In directory listing mode, Auto Loader identifies new files by listing the input directory. Directory listing mode allows you to quickly start Auto Loader streams without any permission configurations other than access to your data on cloud storage.
In Databricks Runtime 9.1 and above, Auto Loader can automatically detect whether files are arriving with lexical ordering to your cloud storage and significantly reduce the amount of API calls needed to detect new files. See What is Auto Loader directory listing mode? for more details.
File notification mode leverages file notification and queue services in your cloud infrastructure account. Auto Loader can automatically set up a notification service and queue service that subscribe to file events from the input directory.
File notification mode is more performant and scalable for large input directories or a high volume of files but requires additional cloud permissions to set up. For more information, see What is Auto Loader file notification mode?.
I'm developing an add-on for AutoCAD 2009. The project output is a class library. When I attempt to debug and load the class library, I get this "LoaderLock was detected message." I've been writing these add-ons for awhile and this is the first message of this type I've seen.
LoaderLock was detectedMessage: Attempting managed execution inside OS Loader lock. Do not attempt to run managed code inside a DllMain or image initialization function since doing so can cause the application to hang.
The loader lock is a process-wide lock used by the system to synchronize access to loading DLL's into a process address space. Functions that load DLL's, free DLL's, query DLL info, etc., all acquire the loader lock. What typically impacts developers the most is that the loader lock is held while DllMain is running as well - this means that an OS lock that you aren't normally aware of can be held while running your code.
The loader lock can be viewed as being at a very low level in the lock-hierarchy. Code running under the loader lock during DllMain can be the cause of deadlocks. For instance, the CLR has its own set of internal locks which it could hold while loading DLL's. If you call managed code from within your DllMain, you could cause the CLR on your thread to acquire one of these locks while holding the loader lock. If the CLR on another thread had acquired that lock (causing the origin thread in DllMain to block) and then tried to load a DLL which would acquire the loader lock, your process would deadlock.
It sounds like the CLR is trying to preemptively detect running managed code under the loader lock. When you see the stack from this failure in the debugger, identify what is causing your managed code to be running from within a DllMain and remove it.
In my experience with AutoCAD, the LoaderLock warning can be safely ignored. It's not a sign of your code doing something wrong, but rather the warning is raised because of the way AutoCAD is loading and initializing your application.
I'm trying to use angular dynamic component loader and I'm facing a change detection issue when I'm using ChangeDetectionStrategy.OnPush. I read about it in this git issue and saw this Plunker and from what I understand is that dynamic added component are detach from their parent change detection tree and onPush won't work (Only default).
I was wondering if there's a way to still use ChangeDetectionStrategy.OnPush. Is there a way to assign component to certain tree? For now I changed all my regarding components from onPush to Default and the app works fine but I do prefer to use the onPush strategy.
You can just invoke change detection from the parent using the ComponentRef reference you get when you create the component, every time you change the status of the component.
Within the dynamic component there shouldn't be a difference.
Gootloader specifically represents a significant threat to enterprise environments because it is designed to deliver additional malware. We included it as a highlighted threat in our 2022 Threat Detection Report, and it boasts a regular presence in our monthly top 10 rankings for Intelligence Insights. Despite the high volume of Gootloader infections, there is relatively little reporting available on complete intrusion chains.
Gootloader queries the value of the USERDNSDOMAIN environment variable, which is a simple check to determine if the affected host is part of an Active Directory domain. This means that the malware specifically targets business or enterprise victims that use Active Directory. On systems where the check passes, Gootloader pulls down an additional JScript stage that executes in the same wscript.exe process. That stage contains two embedded payloads: a .NET DLL component and a Cobalt Strike beacon or other malware component. During execution, these two payloads are written into Windows Registry keys to enable persistence.
wscript.exe executes the initial JavaScript dropper (how do I withdraw funds (epl).js), unpacks a second .js file (choice showing.js), and then creates a scheduled task. This initiates a chain of execution where cscript.exe executes the second .js file along with an instance of PowerShell without any command line, which, in turn, passes an encoded command into a second PowerShell instance. The scheduled task is a persistence mechanism intended to run these commands again the next time the user logs in (more on this in the Persistence section).
The second PowerShell command establishes persistence via a scheduled task using a combination of cmdlets. The execution of the .NET DLL module is one of the main differentiators between traditional Gootkit and the initial Gootloader. [Note: the following sentences were added on November 18, 2022]. The initial instance of wscript.exe establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task to execute when the affected user logs in. It picks up execution at the cscript.exe stage.
In the .NET DLL module, the adversary implements code to pull an obfuscated payload (such as Cobalt Strike) from a Windows Registry key, remove the obfuscation, and then execute its contents. The decoding part is fairly straightforward, using text replacement to shield the malware from cursory inspection. Follow-on payloads vary and have included Cobalt Strike, Gootkit, and Osiris. In the event Cobalt Strike is the follow-on payload, see our malware analysis for more details.
Red Canary recommends detecting Gootloader activity to catch this threat early in the intrusion chain. One potential detection idea is to look for the execution of PowerShell with the encoded command switch (-enc), which you can find here. See below for additional opportunities to identify Gootloader or follow-on activity in your environment.
You can prevent Gootloader from executing by changing the default file association for JScript files on your Windows systems. Consider using a Group Policy Object to associate JScript files with notepad.exe instead of wscript.exe. This will make the malicious scripts open in Notepad when a victim double-clicks on the file. For successful execution, the victim would have to manually issue a wscript.exe command instead.
Additionally, a little bit of education can help mitigate Gootloader. In all of the instances we observed, victims were seeking legal agreement documents via Google searches. Documenting safe places to obtain legal documents can help prevent users from downloading potentially malicious files.
I have a self built system that is running ds3617 on 1.02b dsm 6.1 without issue but I use an older Advent Firefly FP-3104 as a test system I have installed dsm 5.2 loader ds3615xs 5.2-5592.1 and 6.1 loader ds3617xs loader 1.02b on this computer with no issue's I've tried to install dsm 6.2 today to test it out before moving my main system over to it and although I can get it to post and find it on my network with synology assistant it does not detect any drives attached to the sata ports. I have not had this issue with the older bootloaders. The board has a legacy bios not uefi.
I didn't get as far as trying to install the pat file as it won't detect a hdd so it does not give me the option to select the pat file to install the os but the file I have is 6.2/23739. It's the boot loader stage where I'm stuck. Also the hdd's I'm using are all formatted. I've tried different ports and 3 different hdd's with no luck. when I switch back to 1.02b loader it finds the drive's and gives me the option to install dsm.
Set as ACHI the drives are recognized on all ports using dsm 5.2 loader ds3615xs 5.2-5592.1 and 6.1 loader ds3617xs loader 1.02b using loader 1.03b drives are not recognized so I'm unable to install dsm. Anything else I could look at would be appreciated I'd like to get it running on this system before I try on my main rig.
The only thing I've done different on this install to usual is convert the image file to an iso file as I can never get xpenology working using the image files I always have to use an iso file normally I download 1 but this time I could not find 1 so converted it myself.
No fix, the dsm image no longer supports Intel Clarkdale cpu's so you are limited to dsm 6.1, you should be able to get it to work if you build your own driver or see if someone has already made 1 available. it wasn't worth the trouble for me as it's an old system I had lying around I used for testing.
We have raise it with the vendor in this case, and they may accommodate us, but I can see various other vendors doing the same thing. It seems to be an implementation detail, rather than part of any standard.
The UC20 install relies on booting the image that has been written to a fixed disk, but the UEFI firmware is not auto-detecting in this case, so there is no boot and no install without intervention outside of UC20.
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