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<div>At approximately 9:15 a.m. Sanaa time, the CARNEY detected an anti-ship ballistic missile attack fired from Houthi controlled areas of Yemen toward the M/V UNITY EXPLORER, impacting in the vicinity of the vessel. UNITY EXPLORER is a Bahamas flagged, U.K. owned and operated, bulk cargo ship crewed by sailors from two nations. The CARNEY was conducting a patrol in the Red Sea and detected the attack on the UNITY EXPLORER.</div><div></div><div></div><div>At approximately 12 p.m., and while in international waters, CARNEY engaged and shot down a UAV launched from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen. The drone was headed toward CARNEY although its specific target is not clear. We cannot assess at this time whether the Carney was a target of the UAVs. There was no damage to the U.S. vessel or injuries to personnel.</div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div>the The Attacks Of 26 11 2 in hindi free download</div><div></div><div>Download: https://t.co/SF9Hw4zYSc </div><div></div><div></div><div>In a separate attack at approximately 12:35 p.m., UNITY EXPLORER reported they were struck by a missile fired from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen. CARNEY responded to the distress call. While assisting with the damage assessment, CARNEY detected another inbound UAV, destroying the drone with no damage or injuries on the CARNEY or UNITY EXPLORER. UNITY EXPLORER reports minor damage from the missile strike.</div><div></div><div></div><div>At approximately 3:30 p.m. the M/V NUMBER 9 was struck by a missile fired from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen while operating international shipping lanes in the Red Sea. The Panamanian flagged, Bermuda and U.K. owned and operated, bulk carrier reported damage and no casualties.</div><div></div><div></div><div>At approximately 4:30 p.m., the M/V SOPHIE II, sent a distress call stating they were struck by a missile. CARNEY again responded to the distress call and reported no significant damage. While en route to render support, CARNEY shot down a UAV headed in its direction. SOPHIE II is a Panamanian flagged bulk carrier, crewed by sailors from eight countries.</div><div></div><div></div><div>These attacks represent a direct threat to international commerce and maritime security. They have jeopardized the lives of international crews representing multiple countries around the world. We also have every reason to believe that these attacks, while launched by the Houthis in Yemen, are fully enabled by Iran. The United States will consider all appropriate responses in full coordination with its international allies and partners.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Launched in December 2019, the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA) is a global and standardized monitoring system for the collection of primary data about attacks on health care. The system is used in emergency-affected countries and fragile, conflict-affected and vulnerable settings that are priority areas of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme. The dashboard aggregates global data and allows users to filter the data for tailored analysis.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Impact: This data represents the number of attacks in which each health resource was impacted. It does not indicate the total number of resources that were attacked. For example, one attack could have an impact on patients, transports and supplies at the same time.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Recently reported attacks: Users can access the full report by clicking on the Attack ID of interest. All attacks from the selected data range can be viewed in full using the button on the bottom right of the table.</div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div>Annual data: The annual data chart is linked to the country filter selected by the user and does not take into account selected date ranger nor selected types of attacks. When no country is selected, this chart reflects global numbers.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Definition: WHO defines an attack on health care as any act of verbal or physical violence or obstruction or threat of violence that interferes with the availability, access and delivery of curative and/or preventive health services during emergencies. The nature and types of attacks vary across contexts and can range from violence with heavy weapons to psychological threats or intimidation.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Each reported attack is assigned a level of certainty by a designated WHO staff member which conveys a level of confidence that the reported attack has occurred. The level of certainty applies to whether the attack occurred, but does NOT apply to the detailed data about the attack.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Database: Reported attacks on health care are entered in the SSA web-enabled secure global database. Reports that have been verified and cleared by a designated personnel and the WHO Representative are further published on the SSA dashboard.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Data displayed in this dashboard is available for download using the Export to Excel button on the bottom right of the Recently Reported Attacks table. The data export function takes into account filters selected by the user.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Protecting the confidentiality of victims and contributors who share information about an attack is the main priority whenever data is made available on the public dashboard. The SSA does not collect any personal information about victims of an attack. Personal information about partners is collected as part of the verification process but is not shared publically. For security purposes, WHO Country Offices can request the withdrawal of data from the public dashboard at any time.</div><div></div><div></div><div>WHO supports open access to the published output of its activities as a fundamental part of its mission and a public benefit to be encouraged wherever possible. Permission from WHO is not required for the use of the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care dashboard material or data available for download. It is important to note that:</div><div></div><div></div><div>This manual is a revised and expanded version of FEMA 426. BIPS 06 provides an updated version of risk assessment techniques, a new concept on infrastructure resiliency, and identifies new protective measures and emerging technologies to protect the built environment. The objective of this manual is to reduce physical damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings and related infrastructure, and also to reduce resultant casualties during conventional bomb attacks, as well as attacks using chemical, geological, and radiological agents. This manual provides design guidance to the building science community of architects and engineers, to reduce physical damage caused by terrorist assaults to buildings, related infrastructure, and people.</div><div></div><div></div><div>With a DDoS attack, an adversary hopes to disrupt their victim's service with a flood of useless traffic. While this attack doesn't expose user data and doesn't lead to a compromise, it can result in an outage and loss of user trust if not quickly mitigated.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Attackers are constantly developing new techniques to disrupt systems. They give their attacks fanciful names, like Smurf, Tsunami, XMAS tree, HULK, Slowloris, cache bust, TCP amplification, javascript injection, and a dozen variants of reflected attacks. Meanwhile, the defender must consider every possible target of a DDoS attack, from the network layer (routers/switches and link capacity) to the application layer (web, DNS, and mail servers). Some attacks may not even focus on a specific target, but instead attack every IP in a network. Multiplying the dozens of attack types by the diversity of infrastructure that must be defended leads to endless possibilities.</div><div></div><div></div><div>To do this, we analyzed hundreds of significant attacks we received across the listed metrics, and included credible reports shared by others. We then plot the largest attacks seen over the past decade to identify trends. (Several years of data prior to this period informed our decision of what to use for the first data point of each metric.)</div><div></div><div></div><div>The exponential growth across all metrics is apparent, often generating alarmist headlines as attack volumes grow. But we need to factor in the exponential growth of the internet itself, which provides bandwidth and compute to defenders as well. After accounting for the expected growth, the results are less concerning, though still problematic.</div><div></div><div></div><div>bps (network bits per second)</div><div></div><div>Our infrastructure absorbed a 2.5 Tbps DDoS in September 2017, the culmination of a six-month campaign that utilized multiple methods of attack. Despite simultaneously targeting thousands of our IPs, presumably in hopes of slipping past automated defenses, the attack had no impact. The attacker used several networks to spoof 167 Mpps (millions of packets per second) to 180,000 exposed CLDAP, DNS, and SNMP servers, which would then send large responses to us. This demonstrates the volumes a well-resourced attacker can achieve: This was four times larger than the record-breaking 623 Gbps attack from the Mirai botnet a year earlier. It remains the highest-bandwidth attack reported to date, leading to reduced confidence in the extrapolation.</div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div>rps (HTTP(S) requests per second)</div><div></div><div>In March 2014, malicious javascript injected into thousands of websites via a network man-in-the-middle attack caused hundreds of thousands of browsers to flood YouTube with requests, peaking at 2.7 Mrps (millions of requests per second). That was the largest attack known to us until recently, when a Google Cloud customer was attacked with 6 Mrps. The slow growth is unlike the other metrics, suggesting we may be under-estimating the volume of future attacks.</div><div></div><div></div><div>While we can estimate the expected size of future attacks, we need to be prepared for the unexpected, and thus we over-provision our defenses accordingly. Additionally, we design our systems to degrade gracefully in the event of overload, and write playbooks to guide a manual response if needed. For example, our layered defense strategy allows us to block high-rps and high-pps attacks in the network layer before they reach the application servers. Graceful degradation applies at the network layer, too: Extensive peering and network ACLs designed to throttle attack traffic will mitigate potential collateral damage in the unlikely event links become saturated.</div><div></div><div></div><div>For more detail on the layered approach we use to mitigate record-breaking DDoS attacks targeting our services, infrastructure, or customers, see Chapter 10 of our book, Building Secure and Reliable Systems.</div><div></div><div> 795a8134c1</div>