22. Plans firm up
Valmiki Faleiro
22. Plans Firm Up
Following the SS Sabarmati incident on 17 November 1961 and firing on Karwar fishermen on the night of 24/25 November 1961, the Government of India issued definitive instructions to the armed forces on 29 November 1961 to begin preparations for action. The order put HQ Southern Command under Lieutenant General JN Chaudhuri in charge of the action.
India’s 17 Infantry Division would be the Special Task Force for Operation Vijay. Its GOC, Major General MM Khanna, was due to proceed for a course at the UK’s Royal College of Defence Studies. Brigadier KP (“Unni”) Candeth at the Directorate of Artillery at Army HQ was quickly promoted to Major General and appointed GOC 17 Infantry Division.
The Task Force would be deployed less a brigade (with one operational brigade and one reserve brigade) but another brigade would fill in. On the same day, Major General DK Palit, Director Military Operations, left a message for Brigadier Sagat Singh, Commander 50 Independent Parachute Brigade at Agra, to rush to Delhi.
In the words of Major General VK Singh, “Sagat commandeered a Dakota of the Paratroopers' Training School, and was in Palit's office in less than an hour. It was here that he learnt about the planned operation for the liberation of Goa and his own role in it. Later in the day, there was a conference in the office of the Chief of General Staff, General Kaul, where the plans were finalized. ... The Warning Order for the operation was issued [as a flash signal under the signature of Lt Gen BM Kaul, Chief of General Staff] at 1530 hours on 29 November in the form of a ‘Personal For’ signal from the Chief of Army Staff to the Army Commanders, with copies being endorsed to Major General M.M. Khanna and Brigadier Sagat Singh” (History of the Corps of Signals, Volume III, Chapter 3).
Portugal was aware of India's naval deployment as well as plans for ground attack. Portuguese Brigadier António Leitão and the Goa Governor-General, Major General Manuel António Vassalo e Silva himself pleaded with Lisbon for reinforcements: armaments, munitions, transporters, communication equipment. The little that was there was old and obsolete.
To Salazar, there was no war, hence no need of reinforcements.
The Portuguese military command in Goa could only improvise the Plano Sentinela (sentry plan). The plan was to first delay entry of the enemy at the borders, with the use of guerilla tactics if necessary. When aggression could no longer be resisted at the borders, the bridges were to be blown up and the enemy held back on the opposite bank of the rivers. Essence of the plan was to delay enemy advance. Finally, when no longer possible to resist, defenders were to resort to a gradual fallback to the Mormugao peninsula, the last redoubt, and once there, defend it at all costs – until UN intervention arrived.
Portuguese Cavalry Captain (later General) Carlos de Azeredo, who was posted in Goa at the time, said the Sentry plan "was totally unrealistic and unachievable". For the plan to work, "portable communication equipment was necessary. There was none available."
Alluding to the 17 November 1961 event at Anjediva Island, Nehru said on 1 December 1961, “We cannot tolerate such acts. We will take the necessary steps at the right time.” Krishna Menon assured a Goan delegation from Bombay that "force would be used if necessary to liberate Goa at the right time". As we now know, India had already decided to use force in August 1961.
On the same day (1 December 1961), India approved the ground assault plan. It would be a two-pronged attack. 17 Infantry Division less a brigade under GOC Major General (later Lieutenant General and Army Commander) KP Candeth would be the main task force to enter Goa from the east and capture Panjim, Mormugao and other key objectives.
A subsidiary thrust from the north was assigned to the 50 Independent Parachute Brigade under Brigadier (later Lieutenant General and Corps Commander) Sagat Singh, in order to divide Portuguese forces that would otherwise put up a concerted resistance to 17 Infantry Division.
It was the first time that all three arms of India’s defence services – land, water and air – would be used in the ops.
On 2 December 1961, troops began to move to the concentration area (pre-commencement of war position), Belgaum. All were in place by 9 December 1961. D-day (alliteration for ‘day’ of attack) was 14 December 1961.
On 3 December 1961, BBC reported Portugal saying that India planned an invasion of Goa. Police oppression mounted in Goa. Freedom fighter and future labour leader George Vaz cabled Nehru on searches, arrests and torture of freedom fighters in Goa. Thomas Dias (of Ambajim-Margao, brother of Mapusa-based journalist Bonifacio Dias, both freedom fighters and native of Cavelossim) was arrested and badly tortured. This was reported in the 4 December 1961 edition of Hindustan Times. On 5 December 1961, the same newspaper front-paged the headline, Indian Army Build-Up on Goa Border – No Action is Planned.
-- Excerpted from revised text of the book, Patriotism In Action: Goans in India’s Defence Services by Valmiki Faleiro, first published in 2010 by ‘Goa,1556’ (ISBN: 978-93-80739-06-9). Revised edition awaits publication.
Jeanne Hromnik
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Valmiki Faleiro
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