34. Quickest Advance by 50 Para

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Valmiki Faleiro

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Apr 9, 2022, 9:16:10 PM4/9/22
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34. Quickest Advance by 50 Para

 

Author’s note: A bit long, but worth reading to the end (reason why I wrote it!) You won’t get to read all this at one place. Pleasant reading!

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It was the quickest imaginable advance by all three units of the 50 Para Brigade. 2 Sikh LI reached Betim, 1 Para Punjab reached Banastari and 2 Para Maratha reached and occupied Ponda – all coming by the longer and more difficult routes from the North – the same afternoon/evening, 18 December 1961. No one expected Brigadier Sagat Singh to conduct such a super fast operation, exceeding his brief.

 

The Portuguese government in Lisbon promptly placed a reward of US$ 10,000 (of the value of 1961) for the capture of Brigadier Sagat Singh!

 

The Brigadier learnt of this himself when, mid-June 1962, the brigade was back at Agra, and one evening he was in mufti at the Clarkes Shiraz Hotel. Some American tourists kept looking at him intently. Finally, one of them came up and asked if he was Brigadier Sagat Singh. He said yes and asked how the American recognised him. The tourist said he and the group had recently visited Lisbon where posters with the brigadier’s photograph were splashed across cafes all over town, announcing the reward. The brigadier had a hearty laugh and offered to be taken captive, but the Americans declined the bounty saying they were not going back to Lisbon (Maj Gen VK Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, 2005, Ninth Printing 2012, Page 307).

 

Brigadier Sagat Singh was a Rathore Rajput from Bikaner who joined the State Forces, then passed out of the IMA in 1941 and saw action in Iraq during World War II. When promoted to Brigadier in September 1961, he was, without precedent but thanks to Lt Gen (later General and COAS) PP Kumaramangalam, Adjutant General at Army HQ, given charge of the 50 Independent Parachute Brigade at Agra.

 

It was unprecedented because Brig Sagat Singh was not a paratrooper. And at age 40, nobody jumps out of flying planes to earn wings and the maroon beret. But Brig Sagat Singh was different ... he did the tough probation, jumped twice a day and earned wings in record time. He was soon in Goa. His performance was brilliant. The only blemish, in this author’s opinion, was the avoidable assembling of Portuguese POWs before a firing squad, following an attempted escape by three POWs (more on this later).

 

A tall and daring military leader, Brig Sagat Singh was one of the brightest minds produced by the Indian Army. Promoted to Major General, he was GOC 17 Mountain Division during the 1965 Indo-Pak war when China tried to intervene in favour of Pakistan. Maj Gen Sagat Singh contested instructions of his Corps Commander to withdraw, stood his ground, dared the Chinese, called their bluff, and, with able brigade commanders like Brigadier (later Major General) Eustace D’Souza from Velsao commanding the 112 Mountain Brigade, saved Natu La, a strategically vital high altitude pass, for India.

 

[Maj Gen Eustace D'Souza was one of three Goan brigade commanders who defended high altitude mountain passes facing the Chinese during the 1965 war. The other two were: Brigadier (later Lieutenant General and the eighth Vice Chief of Army Staff) Stanislaus (“Stan/Stanley") Menezes from Sangolda who commanded a Grenadiers brigade at a high altitude pass in Ladakh and Brigadier (later Major General) Sydney Pinto of St. Cruz/Kalapur who commanded a brigade at Jelep La that was withdrawn by GOC 27 Mountain Division who, unlike Maj Gen Sagat Singh, followed orders of the Corps Commander. The Chinese quickly occupied Jelep La after it was vacated by India.]

 

[Maj Gen Sydney Pinto was older brother of “The Legend”, Maj Gen (later Lieutenant General and Army Commander) Walter Pinto GOC 54 Infantry Division whose out-of-the-box ‘Battle of Basantar’ catalysed the ceasefire in West Pakistan during the Bangladesh War. During that war, Maj Gen (later Lieutenant General and Army Commander) Eric Vas from Saligao was Reserve Commander of two operational infantry divisions (11 Inf Div – and the 12 Infantry Division that he had raised) in the Rajasthan desert, Maj Gen (as mentioned, later Lieutenant General and the eighth Vice Chief of Army Staff) Stan Menezes commanded 14 Inf Division in 1970 and was Chief of Staff of India's only Strike Corps, I Corps, deployed at the Shakargarh Bulge on the western front in 1971, and Maj Gen Eustace D’Souza commanded 19 Infantry Division plus 10 BSF battalions (25,000 men from 365 communities and castes!), reclaimed large swathes of land in J&K's Lipa Valley in the strategically vital Gulmarg area – and led the triumphant Republic Day Parade at Rajpath on 26 January 1972. Maj Gen Benjamin Gonsalves commanded 57 Mountain Division on the Eastern front (below). The Goan factor in India’s shortest and most decisive war, at all levels of command, across the three services, makes it amply clear that, proportionate to population, the Goan Officer punched far, far above his weight – actually several times more. This has been discussed in detail elsewhere in this book.]

 

[We were on the 1965 Indo-Pak War.]

 

[In the run-up to the 1965 war, Major Jaisingrao Rane from Sanquelim, with 7 Grenadiers (then a camel-borne battalion, today a mechanised unit), foiled Pakistan’s attempt to intrude and establish a post in Chhad Bet in the Rann of Kutch in 1957-58. He was unfairly accused of sparking the violence. Prime Minister Nehru wanted the officer punished and sent COAS General KS Thimayya himself to the spot. General Thimayya ended up commending Major Rane. As a young 2/Lt at the OTS-Madras, when a higher ranked British officer said to him, “You bloody Indians don’t have manners!” the boxing champ gave the Brit an instantaneous practical demo … flooring him with a bloodied nose in a single punch. Major Rane joined the Madhya Bharat State Force (later integrated into the Indian Army) and married Sanyogita Bhonsle of the royalty of Tiroda-Sawantwadi, Goa’s first elected woman MP (Lok Sabha). Of their four children, the eldest was 2/Lt Jayendra Rane, Vr.C, the 1971 war hero-martyr who, when rescuing his trapped men in East Pakistan, took enemy fire on all sides except his back. Daughter Jyoti Botelho is a “Best Cadet” NCC paratrooper now a businessperson, Jeetendra Rane is an agriculture graduate and Sanjay Rane is an advocate.]

 

[Incidentally, this Rane branch of Sanquelim has enviable traditions in the armed forces. Major General Krishnarao Rane was with the Madhya Bharat State Force of Gwalior when the British absorbed it. Maj Gen Rane was KCIO (King's Commission Indian Officer, forerunner of the ICO or Indian Commission Officer) No. 0007 – among the first Indians in the fighting arm of the Indian Army. His son is Air Marshal Yeshwantrao Rane, now a veteran who in 2007-10 was AOC-in-C Southern Air Command, which was established at Akkulam-Trivandrum (now Thiruvananthapuram) by an earlier Goan, Air Marshal Terence de Sa ("Hindustan Warner") from Sangolda, the first AOC-in-C Southern Air Command.]

 

[During the 1965 war, Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Vishwas Bhandare from Cumbarjua/St. Cruz/Kalapur – the junior most to be promoted over three others who were Mount Everest heroes – commanded the ‘B’ Company of 2 Para Bn of 50 Para Bde. On the night of 16/17 Sep 1965, he was ordered on an attack mission to provide flank protection to 3 Jat, the main attack battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Desmond Hayde, MVC, at Jallo Bridge on Ichhogil Canal near Dograi on the GT road (Lahore) axis. When ambushed, Capt Bhandare rapidly bayoneted two Pakistani soldiers while the third fell at his feet and was taken POW (Capt Bhandare never received the VrC he was recommended for – thank small mercies that Lt Col Hayde got his MVC). Lt Col Hayde swung his undersized battalion from the flanks and rear with guns, grenades, bayonets and bare hands” to beat all resistance and surpass all expectations, sensationally reaching the outskirts of Lahore – from where, quizzically, instead of being given logistical support and reinforcements, he was ordered to retreat!  This was one of the toughest battles ever fought in the annals of Indian military history – street to street, room to room and hand to hand so to say – and 3 Jat bagged 3 MVCs, 4 VrCs and 7 SMs in a single operation. For more on Brig Desmond Hayde, read authors Rachna Bisht Rawat and Archana Masih. Fifty-six years after the event, Lt Col Bhandare still wonders why 3 Jat was ordered to retreat.]

 

Brig Sagat Singh was a Lieutenant General commanding IV Corps in the East in 1971. He changed the course of the Bangladesh War. He had competent division commanders like Major General Benjamin Gonsalves from Cana-Benaulim commanding 57 Mountain Division, Major General (later Lieutenant General) Ram Dharam Hira commanding 23 Mountain Division – Ben Gonsalves and Rocky Hira were the first Indian Generals to set foot on the outskirts of Dacca on 12 December 1971 with troops of Maj Gen Ben Gonsalves spearheading the race to Dacca – Major General (later General and COAS) KV Krishna Rao commanding 8 Mountain Division and Major General Gurbax Singh (later injured and replaced by Major General Gandharv S Nagra) commanding 101 Comm Zone which was shifted from XXXIII Corps and brought under the command of IV Corps with its 95 Mountain Brigade under Brigadier (later Major General) Hardev Singh Kler, MVC, AVSM who crossed north to south towards Dacca. Lt Gen Sagat Singh made Dacca not just attainable but disagreeing with his Army Commander, went for Dacca and attained it, bringing the war to an early end and handing Pakistan its worst ever humiliation (see 1971 Indo-Pak War – Op Cactus Lily later in this chapter). For that, Lt Gen Sagat Singh, though not made Army Commander, was given a Padma Bhushan.

 

Describing him as India's Finest Combat Leader, military historian Major General VK Singh says, "Sagat Singh was one of India's most brilliant and audacious military leaders. ... His standing among Indian military leaders is the same as that of Patton in the US Army, and of Rommel in the Wehrmacht" (Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army, 2005, Ninth Printing 2012, Page 295). “As commander at various levels of his unmatched career – from Lieutenant Colonel to Lieutenant General, from commanding a battalion to commanding a Corps – Lt Gen Sagat Singh had never failed. Not content with the victory of an operation, he often went achieving far beyond his given battle objectives (Dacca in 1971 is a spectacular case in point). His exploits during the Goa operations are now part of the Indian Army's folklore, and are often used as examples for students of military science" (Singh, 2012, Page 299).

 

“Independent India has not seen the like of him,” wrote his former ADC, Major General Randhir Sinh, UYSM, AVSM, SM in his well-researched and authoritative biography of the legend, A Talent For War: The Military Biography of Lt Gen Sagat Singh (2013, Second Reprint 2015, Page 248 – which this author read thanks to veteran paratrooper Lieutenant Colonel Vishwas Bhandare). Lieutenant General SK Sinha in his Foreword to the biography, described Lt Gen Sagat Singh as “the most distinguished battlefield commander of the Indian Army”. Major General Ian Cardozo said, “His leadership was not only on the battlefield but over the minds and will of the people he commanded” (Sinh, 2015, Page 267).

 

Maj Gen Cardozo of Candolim evidently spoke from personal experience…

 

Major General Ian Cardozo – Cartoos Saab – was a young Major in 1971, the second in command of 4th Battalion, the 5th Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), a unit already exhausted and depleted to 384 men from previous battles. Wrong intelligence told Lt Gen Sagat Singh that the enemy was withdrawing from Sylhet to reinforce either Ashuganj or Dacca. The Corps Commander wanted 4/5 GR to quickly seize Sylhet. All the 8 to 10 ageing Mi-4 helicopters of the IAF’s 110 HU at the disposal of IV Corps were pressed for a SHBO from Kalaura. In ‘one of the quickest heliborne operations in military history’, the unit was heli-landed from Kalaura to Sylhet on 7 and 8 December 1971, with reinforcements to be heli-landed in a continuous operation. Just then, something queer happened.

 

The BBC misreported that a full Gorkha brigade had landed at Sylhet. The enemy withdrew two brigades from Ashuganj to tackle the intruders at Sylhet. Lt Gen Sagat Singh instantly saw opportunity and shifted all the choppers from Kalaura-Sylhet to Daudkhandi near Ashuganj, to SHBO an entire brigade of Major General Benjamin Gonsalves’ 57 Mountain Division across the Meghna River into the Dacca Bowl. The Sylhet Gorkhas of 4/5 GR were left to their own fate. Ironically, the race to Dacca depended on how long the severely undersized 4/5 GR could tie down the two Pakistani Brigades and the Sylhet garrison – an enemy twenty times its size.

 

This is where the quote of Major General Ian Cardozo at Page 267 of Major General Randhir Sinh’s book, A Talent For War plays in – the leadership over the “minds and will” of men that Lt Gen Sagat Singh commanded…

 

Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Arun Bhimrao Harolikar, CO of 4/5 GR, together with his 2/i-c Major Ian Cardozo, spread out their few and exhausted men to feign a brigade frontage that the BBC had misreported (instead of half a battalion that it actually was!), launched a silent khukri night attack (the last in modern military history) that decapitated 32 of the  enemy with a clear message, “Don’t mess with the Gorkhas or you will lose your head”, fended off the enemy nine days and nights, made Dacca attainable at least eight days sooner, and eventually accepted the surrender – seriously! – of three Pakistan Brigadiers, two full Colonels, 173 Officers, 290 JCOs, 8,000 troops and 39 non-combat Pakistanis – an unparalleled 'David versus Goliath' outcome – a day before the surrender of the East Pakistan Army at Dacca.

 

The Pakistanis realised their mistake only too late: they believed they faced an entire Gorkha Brigade when it was actually an exhausted, half-sized battalion! It was at Sylhet that Major Ian Cardozo himself cut off his ‘lifeless leg’ with a Gorkha khukri and the rest, as they say, is history.

 

In Goa in 1961, Brig Sagat Singh’s thrilled Army Commander, Lt Gen JN Chaudhuri, who lost three bets and Rs. 500/- on the speed of the brigadier’s advance, took a helicopter ride from Belgaum early the next morning (19 December 1961)  as we shall see next week.

 

-- Excerpted from revised text of the book, Patriotism In Action: Goans in India’s Defence Services by Valmiki Faleiro, first published in 2010 by ‘Goa,1556’ (ISBN: 978-93-80739-06-9). Revised edition awaits publication.

 

Follows:

1. B&W photo without caption: Lt Gen Sagat Singh.

2. Photo with caption from a newspaper, self explanatory.

3. Colour photo without caption: Maj Gen Ian Cardozo.


1 Lt Gen Sagat Singh.jpg2 Sheikh Mubijur Rehman, JS Aurora & BF Gonsalves.jpg3 Maj Gen Ian Cardozo.JPG


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