Theories Of Error
Krishnan Iyer
We shall now look at Khyativaadaa. Each of the Shad Darshanas ( six schools of thought) and the other Darshanas developed its own theory of error rendered to fit its epistemology and metaphysics . As discussed earlier the entire edifice of the propositions of each of these schools is built on its theory of errors (in perception). Khyativaadaa deals with erroneous perceptions.
Our knowledge of something presupposes a subject of that knowledge and the object corresponding to it. The nature of this knowledge depends upon the mind and the cognitive organs of the subject, as well as on the conditions in which the object is situated in relation to the subject .Now, a distant object may be mistaken for something else, though the organs of perception may be in a healthy condition; This error may be caused due to a peculiar relation formed between the perceiver and the position of the object. Our perceptions of things influence what we infer and conclude.. As every inference is based on previous perception, erroneous perception will nullify the value of the inferences built upon it.
It must be remembered that khyaativaada is essentially a theory of the nature of the object of illusory perception and not of the subject. All the theories of error propounded by the different schools of thought differed from each other but they all agree on this fundamental point based on the following two propositions. The subject matter is the classical example of Snake and Rope ( Sarpa – Rajju) :
a) That in both the veridical and non-veridical perceptual cognitions of the snake, there is no difference on the issue of the subject . The difference is in the object alone.
b) That the non-veridical perception (illusory experience) of a snake and the veridical perception (non- illusory experience) of a snake are exactly alike.
That is , in both , the initial cognition , “ this is snake” , and the later cognition , “ this is rope” , that sublates the initial cognition , it is one and the same object that is manifest. It is only the false conception of “Snakeness” that is sublated subsequently, but the content of both the cognition is same.
The various theories are : Akhyati ( Purva Mimamsa) , Atma Khyati ( Yogachara / Svtantra Vijnavada Budhism ) , Asat Khyati ( Madhyamika Budhism ) , Anyata Khyati ( Nyaya Vaisheshika) , sadasat Khyaati ( Sankhya) , Sat Khyaati ( Vishsishta Advaita), Anirvachaniya Khyati ( Advaita).
All theories are spanning the two extremes , ie. Satkhyati ( the content of the erroneous perception – the snake – is existent and take it as a case of Non apprehension only ), and Asatkhyati ( the content of the erroneous perception – the snake – is non-existent and take it a s a case of misapprehension) . Anirvachaniya Khyati stands alone not bound by these extremes.
1.Akhyaati : Herein the error is simply the failure of the mind to apprehend one or more aspects of what is presented (The Prabhakara school hold the view that perceptual error is a composite experience comprising of memory and perception). Therefore , the error lies not in perception but in the lack of appropriate discrimination of the memory ( of the snake) and the apprehension (of the object in front). In our example, the mind fails to notice those features which are peculiar to rope ( roughness / stillness) ; it notices only such features as the rope has in common with snake, e.g., their size , shape , flexibility etc.
This partial perception revives the memory of real snake, which, through non - discrimination, is identified with the object presented. In the perception “This is snake”, the rope is perceived as snake on account of the non apprehension of its “ ropeness”.
Thus both the Rope and the ‘Snake’ are Real ( since , according to Purva Mimmsa, All knowledge is true),but the falsity arises in relating the remembered snake with the current rope herein. It is a mere non- apprehension of the distinction between the two cognitions and their objects. Hence this view of error is called akhyati or non- apprehension. Here error is one of omission only, not of commission. Later thinkers (Kumarila), while maintaining the intrinsic validity of knowledge, differ , as they maintain the logical distinction between truth and error. They recognise error as such and regards it as misapprehension and not just non-apprehension - Error is not only akhyati or non- apprehension but viparita-khyati or misapprehension as well.
Critical appraisal : However , the snake is perceived here and now, not as a memory. That ‘this is snake’ is the nature of the perception. Moreover, the lack of discrimination between the cognition and the memory cannot turn into the positive experience of snake as something present here and now.
Also , if the sublating cognition “this is a false knowledge” be considered to be a true cognition, then it should have a “false knowledge” as its substrate. This would incur the defect of “anaikaantika hetu” owing to the rise of the “true cognition” even in the absence of the cause. This theory hence, is untenable.
2.Asat-khyaati - Asat here means non-existence. Herein , something that is non-existent is seen as existent ( since everything is non-existent ).The perceived snake as well as its substratum , the rope are non-existent – thus , denying reality to both Relata and the relation subsisting between them. It is worthwhile noting that in this theory the snake is not only non –existent here and now. The theory states that the illusion has Avidya as its cause, which , with the help of the latent impressions (Vasanas) of the preceding cognition, has the power to manifest a non-existent ( unreal) object.
Critical appraisal : It is not possible to experience something that is non-existent. The very cognition of the absence of a Red Rose ( at a given time and place) presupposes the existence of the Red Rose per se. Only then the non existence of Red Rose at a time or place can be negated . Incapable of explicating negation (badha) properly.
Also , if Avidyashakti is the power in the manifestation of an illusory object , wherein the cognition is the agent , then the object reveled through this cognition is the product, but the relation between Avidyashakti and the product cannot be satisfactorily explained. The non-existent cannot be the term of a causal relation. To say that the unreal is the effect of something is illogical ,for, an effect can never be unreal. The theory has to be rejected outright.
3. Atma khyaati or Subjective Cognition - This is an idealistic theory holds that there is no external reality besides a subjective and continuous series of momentary cognition (Kshanika VignaanaVaadaa) – ie. It negates external objects, since perception involves a mental state as an internal subjective thought. Falsity is involved in the externalization of internal thoughts. Thus, the inner cognition is apprehended as an external object.
This yogachara branch of Buddhism theory is rejected on the basis that falsity cannot be separated from the truth, since in both cases the internal thoughts are projected as external objects, whether it is snake or rope. The illusion is actually a mental state that is projected outside and the illusory snake, a mental image which has subjective existence but objective non-existence. The error consists in the snake being perceived as an external object. The sublating cognition merely negates the externality of the content of the illusory cognition, and not the content altogether. In “this is Not a snake” , what is denied is not the snake per se , but merely the ‘thisness’ of the cognition.
However , if we take the Snake in cognition ”this is Snake” as internal , then it should the object existing internally., and since herein the subject and the object are different forms of the same cognition, the cognition should be in the form of “I am snake”, which is not the case.
Further, the nature of the sublating cognition-“it denies neither the Snake nor the ‘thisness’. It simply denies the empirical consequences of the Snake occasioned by the non-apprehension of distinctness. Complete rejection of this proposition is warranted .
Anyatha-khyaati : Anyatha khyaati means apprehending an object in a matter which is different from what it actually is. It is taken as an error of commission. According to this theory, the snake and rope are both real ,only their synthesis, their relation as ‘rope-Snake’ is unreal and the perception of the shape of the rope is interpreted as the snake that was actually perceived at some other place and time. The memory of snake is revived and the memory-image of snake is presented as the percept of a (real) rope. The revival of ‘snake’ in memory is due to a ‘complicated’ perception (Jnana-Laksana Pratyaksha) which is an ‘extraordinary perception’.The represented snake is actually perceived, though in an extraordinary (alaukika) way.
However , the perception of snake is taking place here and now and should be based upon the current sense input through the sense organ ( vision) . Even in the erroneous cognition, snake does not appear as a distant object, but is identified with something which is presented to the senses. Without acknowledging the perception of snake in some form in the object in front, the knowledge that ‘this is snake’ cannot occur. The sublating cognition, ‘This is Not Snake’ does not show that the Snake is connected with some other place and time. The alaukika pratyaksa (extraordinary perception) stand is not credible and hence the theory is untenable..
sadasat khyaati – from the Sankhya, is based upon ‘united’ perception of a real (sat) and unreal (asat) object. Taking another classical example of Silver & Nacre ,the silver, which is real elsewhere, is perceived here as an (unreal) silver where the nacre is. Hence, there is the cognition of real silver as unreal in the nacre. Thus, it is a conjoint perception of real and unreal objects as ‘this is silver’ where the nacre is.
But something that is non-existent cannot be perceived in front of one, just because it is existent somewhere (in the silversmith's shop). The object perceived must be present in front in order for its perception to take place, since perception is immediate and direct. Here is mixing up memory without acknowledging that the Silver has come in from Memory. On account of going against the basic tenets of Pratyaksha pramana , this theory is also rejected.
Sat khyaati –is the theory of vishishtadvaita ( of Ramanujacharya) wherein it is stated that there must be real silver present in the nacre for one to see. Since all objects are fundamentally made of the same five elements, everything is present in everything else ( Panchikaranam). Hence, perception of silver in the nacre is due to the presence ( more ) of real silver there relative to silver in any other thing. However this theory allows perception of anything in every object perceived, since everything is there in everything else. Under this scenario , the discrimination of one object from another would be impossible at any time and hence this theory is also untenable.
Anirvachaniya-khyaati : The ‘Non-dualists’ maintain that the illusory object is neither real nor unreal, and hence inexplicable. The non-veridical perception is as much a unified cognition as is the veridical, only its object is neither existent nor non-existent.
That ‘this is snake’ is an immediate and direct perception. Non-existent snake could not provide this; it cannot scare the perveiver.. The snake is perceived as ‘here and now’. This knowledge comes from direct sense input in the observation of the ‘snakeness’ of the object perceived. This knowledge is sublated when the rope is seen in an abundance of light. Ie. the substantiality of the snake is negated when there is sufficient light .The perception of snake is recognized as false immediately . From the perceiver’s perspective the snake did exist before . Hence, the snake is not unreal, as its existence was experienced during perception and is ‘out there’. The snake knowledge is later sublated when the rope is ‘seen’ in the presence of sufficient light , and hence is not real either. Hence, the snake was neither real nor unreal – it is sat-asat vilakShaNa, different from real and unreal both. In common parlance it is said to be mithya.
According to this theory , one cannot describe the nature of the snake perceived in the rope with certainty . It is not real, for it is sublated subsequently ( baadhithah) . It is not unreal, for it is perceived. Hence it is inexplicable ( Anirvachaniya). Herein comes into play an extra-ordinary nature of object of cognition , but the nature of cognition is not altered ,which lends strong credence to this theory. Negatively ropeness is covered (avarana) and positively snake is projected (Viksepa) on it. Error is indescribable super imposition which does not really affect the ground and is removed by right knowledge. Error is true as long as it lasts and becomes unreal only when it is contradicted by a higher knowledge. The illusory ( Pratibhaisika) is sublated by the phenomenal(Vyavahaarika) and the latter by the transcendental (Paramarthika).
Extraordinary perception of an ordinary object (Nyaya).Extraordinary object of ordinary perception ( Advaita).The Nyayas are realists and since they believe in the mind-independent existence and nature of objects of cognition, they have a hard time arguing about perceptual error because in the theory of error either the existence of the object of cognition or its nature, or both, are not mind-independent. Hence, in a desperate attempt to save realism they put forward an astonishing view in which they conceptualize perception of the illusory object to be extraordinary(alaukika pratyaksa) and make the illusory object of cognition to exist elsewhere, which is abrupt. Moreover, they also need to explain how the ability of alaukika pratyaksa can be a curse causing perceptual error.To The Advaitins, on the other hand, theory of error comes easy in the hands because the object of erroneous cognition looks like being mind-dependent. Hence, this theory of error (anirvachaniya), which talks of an indescribable illusory object, is in perfect coherence with their beliefs of mind-dependent objects. They arrive at a logical conclusion to this problem through a thorough analysis and criticism of the other theories of error and put forward the most reasonable proposition
It is somewhat similar to pratibhaasika satyam. The silver is perceived by the perceiver’s mind, but it is not a mental projection as in dream. The object silver is ‘out there’ for him to see and thus external to him like any other vyaavahaarika satyam. It propelled him to act; to try to acquire the silver that he saw. Vyaavahaarika objects exist for vyavahaara, before and after perception, and are available for transactions during transmigratory existence, since they belong to Ishvara’s srrishti. On the other hand, illusory objects exist only for as long as they are perceived. They do not disappear by themselves. Negation of them requires an experience that sublates (Baadhitha) their perception. They are not unreal, like the flower in the sky , which can never be experienced. At the same time, they are not real for transactions; I cannot make a silver ornament out of the silver that I see where nacre is. Since it is neither real nor unreal, it is inexplicable.
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