Week 5 reflection: Lefebvre
Ian Rowen
Ian Rowen
GEOG 5100
9/22/12
Commentary on Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space
Lefebvre begins his book by calling for a study of space, not multiple spaces, but of space itself as both a social product, and means for the reproduction of relations of social production. Yet after calling for this focus on a singular space itself, he contradicts himself and posit as multiplicity of spaces—absolute space, abstract space, political space, differential space, and so on. In fact, asserts Lefebvre, every society produces its own space. He is not oblivious to the difficulties inherent in any attempt to bound different and exclusive societies, especially when, as he concludes, transitions, ruptures, and overlaps are better metaphors for social change than clean breaks.
His elucidation on spatial practice is, for me, the most coherent and important part of this sprawling work. Alas, it takes until the end of Chapter 5, after traveling through tangents on Venice and Tuscany, Chinese characters and Japanese gardens, Leibniz and Spinoza, surrealism and dada, for him to directly and clearly link his spatial theories back to Marx. By broadening Marx’s conception of land-labor-capital to include the production of space, he is able not just to treat land as a resource, but to look at how the broader production of space itself is an essential component of any mode of production. By discussing social space and the space of the commodity, he is able to move out of ossified Marxist thought-loops about labor-capital, and look at how an analysis of space is vital for an understanding of what he terms the reproduction of the social relations of production. Apart from his novel bridging of political economy with spatial transformations, Lefebvre’s insight allows for occasionally brilliant discussions of architecture, urbanization, and leisure (I particularly enjoyed his criticism of Le Corbusier and the automobile industry).
Alas, his perpetual invocation of the East as the Other, his repetition of the specious Marx-Weber “Asiatic mode of production” trope, his (admittedly) uninformed speculation about the spatial content of Chinese characters, and his wild assertion about the “great open spaces” of the East (363), and his needless and occasionally mystifying references to pure mathematics call the veracity of much of his scholarship into question. This is not to say that a book so suggestive, fertile, and wide ranging should be disregarded, but to insist that it demands critical reading.
Of course, no one thinker, no matter how brilliant, can get everything right, especially when attempting a global meta-history, or meta-philosophy, and a reconciliation of matter and spirit. But it is not just in distant details and tangents that Lefebvre seems to stray into dangerous conceptual territory. One of the most fundamental conceits of his book—his division of spatial practice, representations of space, and representational space—seems to me to rest on quite shaky analytical ground. As noted above, I find Lefebvre’s spatial practice a very useful concept, and wish he stuck simply to that, instead of attempting (and I think ultimately failing) to simultaneously unpack and bridge matter and discourse. It is his distinction of representations of space and representational spaces that seems vague and troubling, and I will briefly use Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game, an extraordinary book that Lefebvre refers to several times with insufficient explanation, to trace out why.
Lefebvre describes representations of space as the conceived, and representational spaces as the lived realm of the symbolic. Perspective in painting, or architecture plans or grids, are examples of the former, while art and religious symbolism are examples of the latter. But I do not understand how Lefebvre separates these fields. The Glass Bead Game is in fact an elaborate and beautiful evocation of their unity. In Hesse’s book, music, mathematics, architecture, etc., have been transcribed into symbols. Glass Bead Game players begin with, say, a Bach fugue, and connect it conceptually to say, a Doric arch, by means of abstract symbolic manipulation. The domain of the game is the totality of human knowledge, and it admits no separation between art and science, between ideas and symbols. This bridging of, as Lefebvre may have it, “representations of space” and “representational spaces” is in fact considered the highest form of art and intellectual pursuit in Hesse’s 25th century contemplative Swiss utopia.
Despite Lefebvre’s endless circular repetition, his meandering spirals, his distinction between the conceived and lived never feels clean or clear, nor does his motivation for doing so. I almost wonder if this tripartitite division of perceived-conceived-lived has been theoretically over-determined by his subscription to the updated land-labor-capital triad of Marxism (as opposed to the older labor-capital binary)—or is he just fond of threes as an abstract way to bridge the materialist-idealist divide and so subsume the semioticians he seems to despise?
The other serious problem I have with Lefebvre is what appears to be his reification of the state, without which his argument about the historical transition from absolute to abstract space would collapse. Following Mitchell and Foucault, I don’t think such a state-society distinction is viable… But that’s an argument for another paper… and perhaps Lefebvre’s other work offers a more elaborated theory of the state.
This all having been said, I will quite likely return to this work as I continue to theorize the cultural politics of tourism. Particularly useful may be Lefebvre’s portrayal of the space of leisure as the “epitome of contradictory space” (385), one that serves to reproduce the production relations of bourgeois capitalism, yet also contains a tendency to “surmount divisions” in space and time, bridging work and non-work, labor and the festival, revealing the “breaking points” of the rest of social space.
Kaitlin Fertaly
Kaitlin Fertaly
GEOG 5100
Response to The Production of Space by Henri Lefebvre
In Henri Lefebvre’s 1974 book The Production of Space, he sets out to re-conceptualize how we define and understand space. His project is a substantial one that traces the philosophic foundations of space, the connections between time and space, and the political economic implications of producing space. In this reading of his work, I will focus on some of the key themes including Lefebvre’s history of the concept of space in intellectual thought and the implications of the production of space to history through the concepts of absolute and abstract space. However, I want to point out upfront that as tantalizing as I find his conceptual framework in terms of the ways in which it combines ideas of hegemony, signs and symbols, and practical, lived experiences of space, I find it difficult to operationalize these ideas into specific research questions without reducing space to one of its parts (though this may be due in part to his meandering writing style and my struggle to understand his nuance).
Lefebvre begins by tracing the history of space through philosophical thought concluding that we are left with a gap between mental, physical, and social space. Throughout the work, he critiques disciplines/theorists which either do not define space or consider it a mere container in which things, people, ideas, etc. exist (3). This means that we must be careful about relying on a discourse of space because this will not help us gain knowledge of space as “codes as a means of deciphering social space must surely reduce that space itself to the status of a message, and the inhabiting of it to the status of a reading. This is to evade both history and practice” (7). Instead, he argues we need a “unifying theory” to draw together the threads of mental, physical, and social space because without it, without a theory that will get us knowledge of space (not knowledge of things in space), we are left with a hegemonic project which he refers to as the “science of space” (9). Instead, Lefebvre argues, space is produced.
By arguing that “social spaces are socially produced”, Lefebvre identifies the fact that space has been fetishized, obscuring what we know about social relations that take place within it. He defines space in very Marxian terms as “not a thing but rather a set of relations between things,” and using the example of national parks he shows how they are really products of economic and technical activity which go beyond just the production of a kind of space but also are a part of greater political practices (83-84). It is also through the production of space that society leaves material traces that in turn reproduce the social organizations that lead to its production in the first place. Furthermore, spaces are not neatly bundled, but overlap and are superimposed on one another such as global space which does not replace the local (86). Connections and networks also crisscross through space (e.g. his example of a house) that allow them to “interpenetrate” one another. Therefore, if we reduce or fragment space, we are masking numerous social relationships that going into the production of these different spaces.
In order to get at the origins of this condition, the fetishization of space, Lefebvre argues that transitions between different modes of production can help us to see the production of new spaces (47). In particular, he is concerned with the transition from absolute space, a political religious space, to a space of accumulation (abstract space) which arose through violence and involves the fragmentation and homogenization of space (287). For Lefebvre, abstract space is easily fetishized, hidden behind the veil of hegemony because it is both an idea of space and lived space and it is this congruence that masks its true, treacherous nature (288).
Chandler Griffith
Chandler Griffith
Reaction Paper – Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space
9/24/12
In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre seeks to provide us with a “unitary theory of space,” with the aspiration to “rejoin the severed and reanalyze the commingled (413).” As intimated rather obviously by the title, Lefebvre calls for a focus on space’s production, as opposed to its use or consumption. He argues that the latter, as the fodder for semiotics and the “decoding of space,” tells us only of what exists in space and little, if anything, about it’s genesis and production (7). Furthermore, he alleges that any attempt to “read” or “decode” space assumes a fixed quality inconsistent with the organic and constantly changing nature of space.
Lefebvre maintains that current spatial studies focus too much on spatial practice and hardly at all on how space is formed. This criticism is reminiscent of Karl Marx’s critique of Adam Smith’s focus on distribution. For Marx, the production of the commodity was the true locus of value. The parallels between Marx’s notion of “commodity fetishism” and Lefebvre’s assertions about space being treated as “a thing” shed light on the dangers both saw in obscuring complex relations, interdependence, and temporal connections. Lefebvre criticizes the fetishization of space, the obscuring of all that is inherent in its production, as an exercise with little, if any, intellectual purpose.
Lefebvre makes these ideas more tangible in his discussion of “trial by space,” namely how space and society shape each other in drastic ways (416). If we, like Lefebvre, see space as an arena where “each idea of value acquires or loses its distinctiveness through confrontation with the other values and ideas that it encounters there (416),” then focusing on the production of a given space should indicate which values can and will prevail there. His judgment on socialism’s decline is that it simply had difficulty “generating its own space (417).” This Darwinian take on spatial relations seems overly deterministic, but does represent a break from more discursive readings of space.
Though compelling, Lefebvre’s arguments are often difficult to follow. I struggle with his use of dichotomies and triads to illustrate things that he ultimately claims cannot be easily categorized or explained. It is as if he uses these binaries and divisions to merely give dimension to these concepts, but then cautions the reader not to use them any further. It is clear that his influence on contemporary theories of space is both far-reaching and penetrative. However, it appears that few if any scholars have further developed his overarching arguments and instead focus on easily parsed out particulars such as “second nature” and “social space.”
Lauren Gifford
Discussion questions, The Production of Space (Henri Lefebvre)
Lauren Gifford
GEOG 5100: Social Theory
23 September 2012
I appreciate the task of reading The Production of Space and working to understand Lefebvre’s ideas around how space is constructed. While his ideas raised a number of questions, the most provocative seems to be his ideas around natural, or absolute, space. Mainly, I found contradictions in Lefebvre’s conception of nature. Is it a social construct, or an inherent space? At one point he writes that absolute space is made up of “fragments of nature…” (48). It seems as if he simultaneously fetishizes nature as a commodity, and attributes to it the origins of creativity and life.
In describing nature as a means with which to produce capital, he writes, “…nature is resistant, and infinite in its depth, but it has been defeated, and now waits only for its ultimate voidance and destruction” (31). This is in line with a Marxist view of nature, and even what Polanyi and Harvy go on to write about, and it’s a foreshadow on the current discourse about the increasing global commodification of nature as a development mechanism.
However, LaFebvre also writes that nature “remains the common point of departure: the origin and the original model of the social process-- probably even the basis for all ‘originality’.” (30) I get confused with this idea that nature is the point of departure, yet it’s also a socially constructed emotional trigger. He writes: “…nature obsesses us all, as do childhood and spontaneity, via the filter of memory” (30).
If memory and imagination play a role in the recreation a social space, is nature not a social space? (Though he does explicitly group nature with physical space (27)). This ambiguity translates to a difficulty fully articulating an understanding of absolute space. Also, does Lefebvre not describe the production of space similar to Marx’s production of capital, that it requires a constant evolution and reproduction to maintain and reproduce itself? If that’s the case, how would one describe the physical reproduction of trees, animals, etc?
I’m not seeking an answer, specifically. I am curious how the idea of nature and natural space can be used as a tool to better understand how LeFebvre and others conceptualize the construction of social and physical spaces, and how the natural environment factors into those conceptions. It can also be a tool to consider nature spatially, as a geographer, and it’s relationship to the creation of place. I’m sure nature can be both a social construct and “the common point of departure” but how that contradiction fits in with the notion of absolute space is still unclear.
Joanna Weidler-Lewis
Joanna Weidler-Lewis
Lefebvre Response Paper
Lefebvre himself states that a question implicit in The Production of Space is "what is the mode of existence of social relations?" (p. 401). According to him social relations cannot be understood solely through a form, function, or structure, rather they can only exist within some "underpinning". "Space" is his underpinning. However, space is much more than the basis for social relations even though it is necessarily the setting for human actions. Space produces society but is also produced by society through society's means of production and its ideology.
To elucidate our understanding of the relationship between space and society, Lefebvre develops a "conceptual triad" of spatial practice, representations of space, and representational space. Spatial practice embodies the spatial relationship between objects and products, as well as links the places set aside for work, private life, and leisure (p. 38). Representations of space “are tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose"(p. 33). They are conceptual, inherently ideological, and are the space for scientists and urban planners. Representational Space is symbolic space that emerges as a result of our lived experience and our interaction with images and symbols (p. 39); its products are "symbolic works", often "aesthetic trends" such as works of art (p. 42).
Space is further designated as either absolute or abstract. (I know I am missing even more distinctions: social, historical, diverted, etc.) Absolute space is space that is natural space modified, though not transformed, by people to serve their immediate needs; it is appropriated space. Abstract space, is opposite of absolute space insofar as it is the result when space is produced for domination through fragmentation, homogenization, or commodification. Abstract space is the space of capitalism. Lefebvre states, "capitalism and neocapitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the ‘world of commodities’, its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies as well as the power of money and that of the political state” (p. 53).
As I try to understand abstract space and its relation to capital and capitalism, I am wondering if I have taken this last quote out of context. It seems to me that Lefebvre has made case for recognizing the importance of space broadly, and for its role in the reproduction of society specifically. Thus, it is fundamental in the reproduction of capitalism. But if abstract space is produced by capitalism as Lefebvre suggests, does that mean that abstract space would not exist without capitalism (or neocapitalism)? Can there be other types of abstract spaces produced by other systems? I do not think I have fully grasped the consequences of Lefebvre's theory on Marx's theory - then again I do not think I have fully grasped all of the consequences of Marx's theory.
Lefebvr's initial hypothesis was:
Theoretical
and practical questions relating to space are becoming more and more important.
These questions, though they do not suppress them, tend to resituate concepts
and problems having to do with biological reproduction, and with the production
both of the means of production themselves and of consumer goods (p. 62)
I think questions of space still remain important even almost forty years after his original publication. I would like to return to this text when I have more time (and more understanding) for it would be interesting to look at this initial hypothesis and consider the text in relation to more recent developments of virtual space, globalization, and even the technological advances of biological reproduction.
Lindsay Skog
Lindsay Skog
In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre formulates a political economy of space and its production. Lefebvre argues that Marx undertheorizes space in favor of a political economy of things in space. In response to Marx’s concern with the production of things—the commodity, Fefebvre in interested in both the production of space and what is produced from space. For Lefebvre, and at the heart of his argument, space is both social and socially produced. Ultimately, Lefebvre aims to illuminate that ways in which the capitalist mode of production fetishizes space—obscurring the social relations intimately embedded with space, as well as the violence involved in that process.
To support his argument, Lefebvre starts by differentiating two forms of knowledge—savior and connaissannce. Following Foucault, Lefebvre identifies savior as discursive knowledge used to support the hegemony of ruling class—in this case the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, connaissannce—a subversive form of knowledge—allows for a critical perspective on savior, revealing its discursive and hegemonic construction. Lefebvre seeks to develop this later form of knowledge as it relates to space.
In pursuit of connaissannce, Lefebvre uses three concepts of space—spatial practice, representation of space, and representational space. For Lefebvre, space is socially produced and reproduced through spatial practice. Spatial practice takes unique forms under different forms of production. The remnants, or sediments, of spatial practices accumulate and inform the production and reproduction of (new) space. Representations of space are space as it is conceived, or idealized. These are the tools of cartographers, architects, urban planners, etc that depict the ways in which space should appear, function, and serve. In opposition to representations of space, representational space is lived, perceived space. This is material space as those interacting with it experience it. Analyzed together these three concepts of space reveal the social relations embedded in space and the violence inherent in their alienation from space.
I found Lefebvre’s discussion of space as a discourse to be particularly useful in understanding the power of space as a form. For Lefebvre, space is the material embodiment of a discourse. Moreover, space operates—that is it defines the field of knowledge, allows (includes), and limits (excludes)—just as a discourse. In this dual understanding, space both functions as a discourse and is the product of a discourse. Just as a discourse analysis constructs a critical perspective, space may be examined critically to reveal embedded social relations and the violence and alienation involved in their elusion.
It is now clear that Lefebvre inspired Harvey. While Harvey focused on the ways in which the capitalist mode of production overcomes its limits, in part, by seeking out new spaces of production and consumption, Lefebvre is more concerned with the production and productivity of those spaces.
For me, the piece that is unclear is the relationship between relative, absolute, and abstract space. It seems that, for Lefebvre, it is in the transformation from relative to absolute to abstract space that social relations are alienated from space, but I do not understand the move from relative to absolute space.
Eric Reiff
Eric Reiff
23 September 2012
Reaction Paper 3
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space
This work is a meandering and sweeping attempt to reframe thinking, in particular of modernism and capitalism, in terms of a production of space. Building upon the entire sweep of continental philosophy Lefebvre directly critiques Marxism, structuralists, architecture, and all the social sciences (OK almost everyone) for focusing on slices of space as containers holding their disparate esoteric knowledge instead of the production of space across time. For example, Lefebvre wants to show us how control over the means of production is a short sighted Marxist goal; a goal that assumes the reductionist, particularized space of capitalism on its own terms. In addition he critiques all disciplines that attempt to carve out a space for themselves based on spatial content. Lefebvre sees a focus on particular spaces as a naïve reinforcement of the powers of modernism and capitalism, a duo which derives its power and reproductive capacity by dividing space into territorial segments that afford it the hegemony to continue to divide space for further reproduction. The hegemony of this divide and conquer technique not only divides knowledge up like private property, but it also stops time to do this. Lefebvre argues that in order to parcel out knowledge we have to turn it into a timeless abstraction. By stopping time to create abstract space we do violence to the progression of history; society then stagnates.
Lefebvre’s arguments spiral dizzyingly around dualisms and tripartites. The most important tripartite is arguably that of spatial practice, representation of space, and representational spaces. My understanding of this is that spatial practice is the in-the-moment actions that individuals preform in their environment with reflection only coming after the moment. Representations of space are the contemplations of in-the-moment actions that get translated into social symbols, and that this is all acted out over time (history) in the constant, collective regeneration of representational spaces. What is key in this is that representational space is meted over time—that is it changes. In addition it is created (performed?) by society without an epistemological agenda. What modernist/capitalist space does is to suspend time in order to focus on particularized space, which we fill with agendas. This has all sorts of negative political effects including allowing nationalists or even states to claim a space and fill it with timeless symbols. More importantly this space traps us into thinking in reductionisms. These reductionisms trick us into treating space as an empty container to be filled with feminist, German, environmentalist, communist, capitalist, etc. agendas. It is this carving out of space that stops or at least retards the movement of history. Without this movement society stagnates, fixated on reductionist spaces rather than the production of space.
As with Hegel, Heidegger, and other thinkers on the edge of knowledge I found his conceptualizations to be challenging but not impossible. He should be forgiven for talking in twos and threes about something he sees ultimately as one malleable, living entity that allows us to shape it as it shapes us. His step back from the contents of space to focus on the production of space is a brilliant move that rummages through continental philosophy to salvage what is useful i.e. production from Marx and history from Hegel, while keeping most every important thinker involved in his conversation. For my own work I will continue to think through abstract space and how it allows and perhaps encourages the deflowering of nature. I’m also curious to think through abstract space in closer detail with Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology. Amazingly this work did more to synthesize and reveal Hegel and Heidegger for me than anything previously.
Elizabeth Wharton
Elizabeth Wharton
September 19, 2012
The productive forces have since taken another great leap – from the production of things in space to the production of space.”
The Production of Space by Henri Lefebvre (P. 357)
Lefebvre begins by reviewing the ways that scientific and philosophic inquiry have encountered and dealt with space, moving quickly into a pointed critique of contemporary treatments of space that, he says, fail to acknowledge, address, or close the gap “between mental and social, between the space of the philosophers and the space of people who deal with material things” (p. 4) (here critiquing Foucault) or that “completely ignores the yawing gap that separates this linguistic mental space from that social space wherein language becomes practice” (p. 5) (here taking Chomsky to task). These and other thinkers, in Lefebvre’s view, have ultimately failed to build understanding of a “science of space”, producing “mere descriptions” or “fragments and cross-sections” rather than a unitary understanding.
The problem with this fragmentation goes well beyond its incompleteness and insufficiency toward understanding the nature of space – rather, he argues, that this very fragmentation is a manifestation of the hegemony (in Gramscian terms) of the capitalist class. He therefore articulates the task he has set for himself: to address “the necessity of reversing the dominant trend towards fragmentation, separation and disintegration, a trend subordinated to a centre or to a centralized power and advanced by knowledge which works as power’s proxy” (p. 9) Thus he sets out to develop a complete understanding of modern, capitalist space by uniting the physical, mental and social in a single theory of space – the space of social practice.
Lefebvre returns repeatedly to the discussion threads laid out in his opening chapter on the history of space, and the interconnected intellectual history of how space has been conceived -- both in the sense of understanding and intentionality. Likewise, each element of his theoretical framework for understanding space is returned to repeatedly. He is never done with a given concept but carries it with him into the next discussion, shifting the emphasis but not abandoning anything to the category of already “explained”, implicitly insisting on the non-modularity of the overall phenomenon of spatial production; it is how the whole operates that matters in the end. This meandering – this repeated return to each theme – renders the work frustratingly difficult to access at times, leaving me wishing that Lefebvre had had an organized and forceful editor. At the same time, I wonder if it reflects more than a particular writing style (or disregard for editing), but rather is in itself an embodiment of his argument and an active rejection of a reductionist approach. (Lefebvre acknowledges the usefulness of reduction as necessary simplification in some cases, but warns that its “methodological necessity may become servitude” (p. 105), describing the misfortune of the specialist who “makes this methodological moment into a permanent niche for himself” (p. 107).
Nevertheless, to begin to get our heads around Lefebvre’s space produced, it is perhaps necessary to detour into a bit of reductionist thinking around the component terms, so long as we do not (ultimately) stop there and leave the pieces catalogued but unassembled. Lefebvre’s whole is in fact something different than the sum of its parts. But one has to start somewhere… So here, a preliminary and incomplete attempt to identify and the concepts that stood out to me as most critical toward understanding the theoretical whole:
Social space / space as a product: Just as products cannot be regarded by themselves because they come about as a result of and embody specific social relations, space is also produced through the same social relations of capitalist production. This produced social space cannot be regarded as something distinct from mental or physical space but rather incorporates all three. By defining space as socially produced, Lefebvre is actively rejecting any concept of space as a neutral container, showing that in fact such an analytic serves only to obscure the underlying power structures. He broadly argues that each mode of production produces a different kind of space, but here is primarily concerned with the spatial production of modern capitalism.
The conceptual triad - spatial practice, representations of space, and representational space: Toward understanding the product / production of social space, Lefebvre early on presents his “conceptual triad” of perceived, conceived and lived space. Through these he is endeavoring to concretize the experience of social space. Taken into an urban context (and probably egregiously oversimplified) I imagine this in the reality of a given city’s road system. The road itself, the pre-construction planning documents and post-construction maps, and the various experiences that city inhabitants have (from luxury car to crowded bus) begin to hint at each piece of the triad. Lefebvre later warns against the trap of focusing on representations of space alone rather than “the fragmented and uncertain connection” between them (p. 230).
Dominated space and appropriated space: Lefebvre introduces the concept of dominant space as “space transformed – and mediated – by technology” (p. 164). His description of dominated space as “invariably the realization of a master’s project,” with a motorway slicing through countryside as one example, seems to tie it closely (though not exclusively) with the extension of state power. Appropriated space, in contrast, he presents as a more organic relationship between humans and their environment – appropriated by and used for the needs of a given community.
Abstract space: Lefebvre describes the emergence of abstract space, set in contrast to absolute space (the space of religious and political meaning and organization), evolving from the space of accumulation that emerged across Europe during the Middle Ages, but has been realized fully in modern capitalism: the space of commodities, financial institutions and the state. In abstract space “The space of a (social) order is hidden in the order of space.” (p. 289) So, in abstract space, the operation of power is most obscured and seemingly removed, and the symbols we might attempt to “read” in the landscape the most deceptive. Abstract space is also contradictory space – wherein we find the contradiction between quantity and quality, globalization and fragmentation, exchange value and use value.
Differential space: Because it is fundamentally contradictory, and thus unstable, Lefebvre argues that abstract space contains the seeds of an alternative: differential space, set in contrast to the homogenizing force of abstraction. Differential space is posited as the solution, one that reflects the actual needs of the body and society which “cannot live without generating, without producing, without creating differences” (p. 396)
Ahn Lee
Ahn Lee
GEOG 5100
Response: Lefebvre
The Production of Space is Henri Lefebvre’s wide-ranging exploration of the relationship between mental and “real” space. It is, in essence, a study of the fetishization of space, or the obscuring of hegemonic power through the production and reproduction of hierarchical relations, manifest in all perceived, conceived, and lived spaces. The book positions itself amongst a diverse progression of work on philosophy, linguistics, history, and political economy—at times to the detriment of cohesiveness but overall, successful in reorienting questions of capitalism and its concomitant lived experiences toward a contemporary socio-political landscape.
Lefebvre begins with linguistics, which he seems to argue represents an analogous struggle to understand the relationship between the realm of the cognitive and the physical, or the “true” and the “real”. Critical of certain trends in linguistics, Lefebvre asks, does language “precede, accompany, or follow social space?” (p. 16). How do we conceptualize a science of space, particularly if spatial codes (the tools for understanding space) have been produced alongside the phenomena they are meant to elucidate? Indeed, as Lefebvre observes, we tend to forget that space confers relations amongst people; it is a manifestation of social structures and processes rather than an ideal in and of itself. Thus, we cannot separate space from the production of space, which is mediated by the bourgeoisie in hegemonic fashion. In short, Lefebvre makes the point that the process of interpreting signs and symbols produces a certain kind of “knowledge”; this is an understanding of that which is being communicated. However, there is another kind of “knowing” which, rather than serving power, refuses to acknowledge it (p. 10).
To fully understand space as a form then, Lefebvre offers a conceptual framework broken into 1) spatial practice, 2) representations of space, and 3) representational spaces. He goes on to elaborate on the forms and their relationship throughout history, repeatedly delving into histories of art, architecture, and built landscape. After all, he argues, space has replaced industrialization as the chief problematic of the current era—an era of rapidly transforming technology, knowledge, and “domination of nature” (p. 103). Fueled by capitalism, this space is both fetishized and abstract. This is not entirely unlike Marx’s description of commoditization and exchange, as Lefebvre observes, “Fetishized abstract space thus gives rise to two practical abstractions: “users” who cannot recognize themselves within it, and a thought which cannot conceive of a critical stance against it” (p. 93).
So, then, what constitutes abstract space? What came before it? And, can Lefebvre improve upon Marx’s explanations of this capitalist transformation in the Grundrisse (which did not convince me?) Lefebvre’s chapter, “From Absolute Space to Abstract Space” seemingly attempts to answer these questions but, alas, somewhere between the psychoanalysis and jumbo of historical and literary references, he leaves me utterly lost. Again, like Marx, Lefebvre points back to the process of accumulation during feudal times and a growing distinction between the town and the country, urban and agrarian (p. 234). Before abstract space, it seems there was absolute space (at least, absolute space dominated spatial relations), or those places physically transformed through the use of their intrinsic qualities. These places were still perceived as “natural” despite their obvious platform for the exercise of political power.
Abstract space, on the other hand, appears similar to alienated labor in that it arose from the removal of the role of productive activity from the process of social reproduction (49). My question is, given Lefebrve’s focus on the city, how can we use the concept of abstract space in a rural context? Are there any contradictions or complications that his framework, as given, cannot address?
Joel
Joel Correia
23 September 2012
Geography 5100
A Brief Response to a Long Work by Henri Lefebvre: The Production of Space
For Henri Lefebvre Marx’s formulation of political economy and the role of production was a beginning, but not the end. “Marxism should be treated as one moment in the development of theory, and not, dogmatically, as a definitive theory” (original emphasis, Lefebvre 1991, 321). Lefebvre seeks more from political economy and criticizes Marx for lacking to incorporate a critical aspect, he might say the most critical aspect, space. Hence, The Production of Space (POS) is an elaboration of a political economy of space. In this response paper, I focus on three aspects of POS: the triad as an analytic, the relationship between absolute and abstract space, and the notion of a unitary theory.
As the “pendulum of social theory” (Dunn, lecture notes 2012) swings toward materialism, Lefebvre draws significant influence from Marx, Engles, and to a lesser degree Gramsci. One of the clearest examples of this influence is the role that dialectic logic and the binary appear in his project. He states that there is a “dialectical relationship which exists within the triad of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived” (39). Here we see an important development in Lefebvre’s approach, the analysis of “three elements” (39) in dialectic relation and conversation with one another, but moving beyond the dualisms created through subject-object relations. Lefebvre infers that the binary relationship is insufficient and that through misuse in various fields of science its lacks the potency Hegel and Marx labored to develop in this method. The binary only creates opposites and contrast and as a result “each becomes a signifier instead of remaining obscure” (285). This is important for Lefebvre because he posits that “space is illusory” (287) consisting of a double illusion (27). Thus, the binary as an analytic does not allow for this illusion to develop and one cannot therefore understand space. As such, the triadic relationship is recurrent in his analysis in various forms: physical-mental-social, land-labor-capital, architecture-urban-political, language-symbols-codes, and so on. Later he likens this the triad to musical formants in that “they imply one another and conceal one another” (285). Thus, reinforcing the notion that space is illusory.
Though triads are central to Lefebvre’s exposition of POS, he frequently elaborates notions of dual, related, but distinct, elements. Chapter 4 is devoted to the relationship between and transition from absolute to abstract space. This is a central moment in the POS for it represents a critical change in the notion of space that involves power, violence, and the process of fetishization (here of space not commodities as for Marx). Such that spatial practice presupposes society (38), relative spaces presuppose and “secrete the absolute” (233). I understand this to mean that relative space is space in a pre-appropriated form. Once space is appropriated and imbued with a magical/spiritual (i.e. consecrated) meaning it becomes a politicized natural, or absolute space (48). Space in this sense is conceived of as a “work” because it unique or distinct, similar to a piece of art whose creator can be determined. Many of these consecrated (i.e. religious) sites during this time are centered on the crypt, on the subterranean, on the feminine. They are absolute spaces. However, Lefebvre demonstrates that as time passes, so does architectural design. Panofsky’s “visual logic” (259) marks a shift from the feminine to the phallic (read masculine) and to the domination of space. Following shortly after Panofsky, economic relations begin changing and accumulation (of capital) accelerates in the 16th century when towns are formed around marketplaces (268-270). This change disrupts the social and economic relations of agricultural production because towns are designed to exert dominance over the agrarian spaces that surround them and extract wealth from them. Though not explicit in POS, this is Marx’s moment of primitive accumulation and Lefebvre’s moment when absolute space becomes abstract. Here space also changes from “work” to “product,” or something that can be regularly replicated and produced in a manner similar to Marx’s mode of production for commodities. The transition is violent and was marked by years of “wars of accumulation” in Europe (275-278). In the social production of space, new space is built upon old and the residue of matérial (previous labor, knowledge, and social relations) is always present but hidden. The process of producing space while masking the inherent social relations fetishizes it and creates a façade. Most literally the façade also plays an important role in the restructuring of space from absolute to abstract during this time.
Lefebvre’s project is aimed at reconceptualizing space from the Euclidean and Cartesian to one that is understood as the product of social relations. By employing the analytic he developed in POS, one can defetishize space and understand its production. His project is focused on the creation of a “unitary” or meta-theory centered on production (of space) not on the product (such as Marx with the commodity). This is an interesting aim, for he is clearly informed by materialists whom would shun the notion. Perhaps, the unitary aspirations come from the pendulum’s swing toward idealism? This is a question, among many others, that I would like to explore in class.
galenbmurton
Galen Murton
September 23,2012
Levebvre meets Nagarjuna
Henri Lefebvre provides a sweeping and rigorous critique of Western thought in The Production of Space. Overall, however, I was struck by his utter neglect of virtually all philosophical traditions outside of the European continent (save his token references to “the East,” China, Peru, etc.). Despite “lacking adequate knowledge of the Orient,” I was impressed how significantly his “unitary theory” resonates with the writings of Nagarjuna, an author of foundational literature of Madhyamika (Middle Way) Buddhist philosophy (42). Common to both Lefebvre and Nagarjuna is dialectical argument that eliminates dualities in recognition of the interdependence of all (socially produced) phenomena (and spaces). In an effort to counter what I read as his incomplete Orientalist references, I think a Buddhist ‘Middle Way’ analysis of Lefebvre’s theory is worth a quick study (42).
Both Lefebvre and Nagarjuna posit a triad that seeks to explain the existence of phenomena – the production of space and the nature of reality, respectively – in relation to socially produced/mentally constructed systems. Lefebvre’s tripartite synthesis is that spatial practice (that which is perceived) exists in relation to representations of space (that which is conceived) and representational space (that which is lived). Spatial practice comprises the social production and reproduction of society; it is thought perceived as reality and supports the modes of production as well as social relations. Representations of space are conceptualized, the social space where maps and language evolve to guide society with structure and order. And representational space is where symbols and signs congeal into codes and socially recognized systems, enabling society to produce and reproduce via collectively recognized reference points.
According to Nagarjuna, all phenomena (that we perceive) are inherently empty of independent existence and yet, on the other hand, that emptiness is all that exists. As a result, ‘form is emptiness and emptiness is form.’ To Nagarjuna, spatial practice would be all space and things that are perceived and (erroneously) believed to exist in and of themselves. Furthermore, that which is perceived and believed has two co-dependent aspects: conventional reality (the way forms are utilized and communicated) and ultimate truth (the inherently empty nature of such forms). It follows that conventional reality may be construed as representations of space, conceptualized forms that are empty of independent existence but exist in society as things to guide and orientate us. Conversely, ultimate truth is that which is lived, the representational space that, once understood, clearly exists as symbols for socially constructed forms.
Finally, the philosophical traditions against which both Nagarjuna and Lefebvre were struggling have unique parallelisms and led each philosopher to his own ‘Middle Way.’ Nagarjuna revised Madhyamika thought to split the dualistic extremes between Sautrantikas’ nominalism and Sarvastivadins’ substantialism. Similarly, Lefebvre’s ‘unitary theory’ is a synthesis between Hegel’s Idealism, and a critique of its “illusion of transparency,” and Marx’s Materialism anti-thesis, and the “realistic illusion” it perpetuates (27-30).
Although I am not yet certain that this thought exercise is entirely convincing, it has served two valuable purposes. First, it allowed me to apply Levebvre’s tripartite to a foreign subject matter and, in so doing, forced a consideration of his dizzying theory on the production of space in relative terms. However, a continuation on this theme into the conceptual realm of relative, absolute, and abstract space will have to wait for another time.
Second, it brings to bear that Lefebvre altogether ignored a massive and impressive philosophical corpus that could, and would, have deepened his arguments and challenged his conclusions. It’s too bad he never went there himself. In fact, towards the end of The Production of Space, Lefebvre proposes that his metaphilosophy ultimately goes “beyond philosophy, beyond discourse, and beyond theory of discourse” and suggests “the abolition of Western metaphysics, of a tradition of thought running from Descartes to the present day via Hegel” (407). While this may be true, and some do think he pulled it off, he also forgot to include the other side of the globe.
Austin Cowley
Austin Cowley
GEOG 5100: Introduction to Social Theory
Reassessing the “Spaces of” Approach in Lefebvre’s Production of Space
Lefebvre’s influence on contemporary human geography is ubiquitous. Two of the most prominent geographers, David Harvey and Doreen Massey, arrive at a confluence between Marx and Lefebvre where social (re)production and experience meet global capitalist forces. Thus, the geographer’s claim to space in many ways owes its genesis to Lefebvre. The course of dominant thinking in geography – as well as other social sciences that attempt to analyze space – tends to veer from Lefebvre’s own theory at the point where “part-spaces are carved out for inspection from social space as a whole. Thus we are offered a geographical space, an ethnological space, a demographic space, a space peculiar to the information sciences, and so on ad infinitum (91).” Where, then, do these endless “spaces of” descriptions fall short of Lefebvre’s own project, and how does the author utilize history and social context differently?
Although Lefebvre mentions several different types of space, the triad of spatial practices, representations of space, and representational space form the conceptual foundation of all proceeding work. This triad implies that in any given social context, all three conceptions are in motion and in constant dialogue with one another. There are likewise other concepts that give this scaffolding its form: production, social relations, and time. Lefebvre, like Marx is interested in the process of production rather than products or “things” themselves. In doing so, the social relations embedded into that production come into sharper focus. The notion of time, however, is less apparent across the triad. In relation to spatial practice, the temporal dimension is residual, an imprint that has left its mark across abstract, capitalist space. Thus, the discussion of “spaces of” mostly takes shape here, whether it is a refugee camp or a subway car in Moscow. Representations of space, then, are the moments at which these modes of thinking about space (its dominant form being the abstract space of capitalism) coalesce in the forms of maps and development projects. Moreover, it’s through certain representations of space that the dominant modes of thinking are reproduced materially (e.g. housing projects, shopping malls, and city centers). The third category, however, is one where space takes less measurable physical form yet is nonetheless overlaid on physical space. This space, which relates to time in the form of potentiality (Agamben, 1998) shapes the imagination, the conceivable, and thus the livable. The intersection of these three concepts forms space in broadest terms.
What, then is purpose and method by which space can be utilized
as its own analytic category and not fall into the trap of endless and esoteric
spatial descriptions? Likewise, how does
the author’s own catalogue of social contexts avoid that common pitfall? Methodologically speaking, this form of
analysis attempts to take the lived experience of social space and raise it
"intact to the conceptual level" (132). In doing so, Lefebvre argues that space is
the “work of society” much in the same way that art is the material product of
its creator. In analyzing a work of art,
the interest lies in the creative moment and potentiality of the artist, not
simply its physical form or variation from other works. Lefebvre conceptualizes space similarly: “no space disappears
completely, or is utterly abolished in the course of the process of social
development — not even the natural place where that process began. 'Something'
always survives or endures - 'something' that is not a thing. Each such
material underpinning has a form, a function, a structure — properties that are
necessary but not sufficient to define it (403).” The "mode of existence" for social relations then is one defined by its material underpinnings of which are inherently spatial. What follows in this broader analysis, then is how these spatial forms (social contexts) inform and make possible the experiences that are lived through them.
Caitlin Ryan
(My apologies if this is a duplicate posting - I have had some trouble sending my reaction out to the group this morning.)
Lefebvre’s Production of Space was certainly a winding and at times difficult journey! I will focus here on the basics of trying to sort out some of the key concepts and arguments that make up his “unified theory” of space, and where those come from in terms of theoretical schools. First, I think it’s important to have a schemata of the three types of space he is working with, which are described variously throughout the book as follows:
1. Spatial Practice (le percu), also called perceived space.
2. Representations of space (le concu), also called conceived/conceptual space.
3. Representational spaces (le recu), also called lived space.
Lefebvre wants to escape the dichotomies that “boil down to oppositions, contrasts or antagonisms” (39), and which he associates with the schools of Descartes, Kant and others whom he is critiquing. Instead, he sees himself reviving a tradition based on Marx and Hegel, and so this triumvirate should be understood as a dialectical relationship—three ways of understanding space, which always work together to produce absolute space itself. However, at times one type of spaces appears to be more predominant than the other, and that is the case of much of the modern twentieth century capitalist society.
It goes without saying that Lefebvre is very much interested in reviving a Marxist interpretation of the world, and his attempt to develop a “unified theory” of space depends on Marxist concepts, notably on the idea of production as a starting point. He begins, as Marx does, by seeking to understand what kinds of space existed in precapitalist societies. But what I find more interesting is his simultaneous rejection of linguistics, semiotics and the philosophers in those schools (in a humorous footnote after a reference to performance, he insists that while he has borrowed terms from Noam Chompskey, “this should not be taken as implying any subordination of the theory of space to linguistics.” – p.33), with the seemingly contradictory incorporation of those ideas into much of his writing. Thus, he uses the language of signifiers and signified; the production of space “subsumes signifying processes without being reducible to them” (37), it incorporates objects and things in space even while admitting that space itself is produced. This sounds very much like an epistemological argument that incorporates ontological views. Furthermore, while Lefebvre rejects psychoanalytic and structural explanations for everything, he also notes that “structures do exist, and there is such a thing as the ‘unconscious’ “(36). This discussion reminded me very much of an article we read in a field methods class by Donna Haraway on situated knowledges. Haraway, a feminist geographer also with a strong Marxist background was writing about epistemology, knowledge production and feminist field methods. She concludes that it is wrong to completely reject the pursuit of scientific objectiveness, even while we must see that no science is itself true and objective. Rather, she argues that we must hold competing concepts in our minds together – radical historical contingency and scientific objectivness. In doing so, we must escape polar metaphors, much as Lefebvre rejects dichotomous ones, and search for new metaphors.
While there is much more to write and react to, I was also taken with Lefebvre’s discussion of the written and spoken word. One of my favorite essays is by George Orwell, On Writing Well, in which Orwell argues that good writing is not possible unless you have good ideas, but that good ideas are often formed in the process of good writing. Similarly, we have been discussing in our field methods class the recursive concepts of “I” knowing or thinking, “I” speaking, and “you” hearing. I have not been able to locate where this theory comes from, but the part which I think is most relevant goes thus: what I say puts a form to what I was thinking that was not yet there, and which transforms the message. The message is further transformed when you hear it, and once again undergoes transformation as I am watching you react and thus reacting myself, in my brain and then through my speech. In a similar vein, Lefebvre is deeply wary of what I would call a “hegemony of the written word”, of claiming that what is known is transparent. The written word is thus overemphasized: “the fetishism of the spoken workd, or ideology of speech, is reinforced by the fetishism and ideology of writing.” This section (pp. 27-29) incorporates so many things that an entire essay could probably be devoted to it, but I will finish with one more comment: Lefevre is here using the idea of thought vs. the written and spoken word to suggest that there are other ways of knowing, and he hints at the value of absurdity (as Harvey notes in the conclusion, Lefevre was closely tied with absurdist and Dadaist schools of art). But all this comes into form as a critique of linguistics and semiotics! In mocking jest, he caricatures semioticians: “Everything must be written! Writing transforms language, therefore writing transforms society!” Clearly Lefevre is a materialist at heart.
There is clearly so much more to work out, and I have been distracted by a single passage that really stood out to me in the beginning of the book. But in class I would like to get back to understanding a laundry list of concepts in this book, including:
- Absolute space (nature) vs. abstract space (capitalism)
- The savoir/connaisance distinction and why that’s so important
- Mental, social and physical space – do these match up 1 for 1 with the three I outlined at the beginning of this reaction?
- TIME? – where does it fit in?