Experimental Insights On Collective Action Dilemmas: Social Comparison, Present Bias, And Coordination - Thesis

[Geoengineering News]

https://media.proquest.com/media/hms/PRVW/1/oQfId?_s=hTftAjOZhED3%2FkWf6wzwf100j5I%3D#view=FitV

Authors: Pablo David Campoverde Varela

August 2025

Abstract

This dissertation investigates collective action challenges in climate change mitigation through a combination of behavioral modeling and experimental analysis. Chapter 1 develops a behavioral model of pro-social behavior under positional concerns, showing experimentally that individuals reduce contributions when their efforts exceed a peer-based norm. Chapter 2 examines present bias in solar geoengineering decisions, comparing a social planner and a free driver in both theory and experiment. The findings indicate that free drivers and planners respond differently to the timing of climate damages, though the response patterns are more complex than anticipated. Chapter 3 uses game theory and an experiment to explore how geoengineering alters coordination dynamics. Modeling geoengineering as an insurance mechanism, the study finds that while it reduces the costs of coordination failure, it also weakens the incentive to coordinate. Across all chapters, the dissertation underscores how fairness norms, time preferences, and strategic uncertainty shape climate-relevant decision-

making.

Source: University of Wyoming