Climate Intervention at High Latitudes: A 2030 Security Scenario - Report
Geoengineering News
Overview
The effects of climate change are already posing significant security challenges worldwide. Extreme weather regularly destroys lives, livelihoods, and critical infrastructure; warming temperatures affect food and water security, amplifying fragility and cross-border tensions. Governments are increasingly attuned to the risks of instability, tensions, or even conflict in climate-changed geographies, including in the Arctic. Against this backdrop, scientists also warn that key climate tipping points, or systems-level irreversible changes, are fast-approaching, including the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, the reversal of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), and faster-than-expected permafrost thaw.
This graphic from Climate Action Tracker shows the gap between current and policies and actions (which would result in 2.5 – 2.9 degrees warming by 2100), and what is needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of 1.5 degrees average warming.
While the world has made progress in cutting carbon emissions and the clean energy transition is progressing, it is not happening fast enough. In October 2025, UN Secretary General Antonio Guiterrez acknowledged that the Paris Agreement goal of keeping global warming “well below” 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial temperatures is likely out of reach, and the 2025 UN Emissions Gap Report warns that if countries maintain current policies, average warming will reach 2.8 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. This level of warming means more extreme heat, less predictable extreme weather events, mass displacements, greater risks of food and water security crises, and growing instability in multiple regions of the world.
This diagram from NOAA illustrates the concept of “peak shaving.” The blue lines represent the impact SAI could have on temperature under an aggressive emissions mitigation scenario.
In response to this alarming trajectory, there is growing interest in the research, development, and possible deployment of climate interventions aimed at minimizing the worst impacts of our current path and allowing more time for decarbonization. Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI), a type of Solar Radiation Modification, is one such intervention. SAI would reduce the amount of planet-warming sunlight reaching the Earth by introducing reflective particles into the stratosphere, similar to the cooling effect observed from large volcanic eruptions or increases in air pollution. Such action comes with its own set of security dynamics and governance challenges, however.
This storymap aims to explore the security dynamics associated with a fictional but plausible proposed SAI deployment in 2030. It discusses the potential reactions and priorities of different countries and regions. It identifies key issues that the scientific research community and relevant policymakers need to consider as they prepare for increased attention to climate intervention as part of the toolkit to manage climate change.
Methodology Note
This storymap presents an overview of potential security and foreign policy dynamics associated with a fictional yet plausible scenario of a proposed high-latitude climate intervention. The storymap does not discuss scientific or governance issues related to SAI in depth. The findings are based on desk research, results from a tabletop exercise, and expert interviews. The tabletop exercise involved more than 25 foreign and security policy experts from multiple countries.
In the tabletop exercise on which this storymap is based, the United States was not played by a team and is therefore not included in the analysis below. For purposes of the exercise, the United States was envisioned as a country in flux, going from the prominent climate action of the Biden Administration to the step backs on climate policy from the Trump Administration. In the below 2030 scenario, the United States was presented as governed by a newly-elected moderate leader whose platform included restoring multilateralism, tackling shared problems, and reimagining U.S. institutions, including a strong civil service.
The tabletop exercise and this storymap leverage a simulator created by Reflective to visualize the potential local effects of different SAI interventions compared to continued warming. Read more about the simulator here.
Participants receive a briefing ahead of an interactive exercise on SAI and geopolitics during New York Climate Week, September 2025.
The 2030 Scenario
Arctic sea ice extent for November 2025, compared to the median extent from 1981 to 2010 (pink).
The year is 2030. Extreme climate-driven weather events are intensifying worldwide. Scientists are warning that within the next five years, the Arctic Ocean is projected to be seasonally ice-free. There is also increasing concern among the climate science community, though less certainty, about faster-than-expected permafrost thaw, Greenland ice sheet melting, and the fate of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC).
These concerns drive a new, more intense set of climate security discussions at global security and economic forums, such as the Munich Security Conference and the World Economic Forum. Security leaders warn that the fallout from such changes, including major disruptions to global food, water, and energy systems, could lead to instability and potentially even conflict.
Against this backdrop, a public–private consortium led by Canada and the United Kingdom has proposed an urgent deployment of stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) over the Arctic, designed specifically to preserve sea ice and slow Greenland melt. The consortium aims to move quickly, but is also seeking buy-in and legitimacy from other countries and the broader international community. They have proactively convened key stakeholders on the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly meeting in New York to make their case and recruit additional consortium members.
The Canada-UK proposal has prompted significant debate. Countries at low latitudes have expressed concerns that Arctic deployment may not cool them sufficiently, but could disrupt the hydrological cycle and affect precipitation patterns. Meanwhile, other Arctic nations are concerned about the geopolitical implications (never mind the practicalities) of such a deployment in their backyard.
Technical Details
The fictional consortium’s proposed deployment is as follows: 3Tg of sulfur dioxide (SO2) will be injected annually over the Arctic at 60°N between 2035 and 2040, with the amount of material injected increasing over subsequent decades to a peak of 14Tg globally by 2100 (this scenario has been pre-loaded into the Simulator). The program aims to stabilize global temperatures at 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, under a world following SSP2-4.5 (“modest emissions reductions”). The proposed deployment at peak is comparable to the 10.4-15.5Tg of SO2 released during the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, which ejected significant amounts of ash and gas into the atmosphere, cooling the planet on average about 1° F (0.6° C).
A comparison of projected 2091-2100 Arctic sea ice extent used for the exercise, without SAI deployment (left) and with SAI deployment (right), illustrating the possible benefits of SAI (graphic from Reflective simulator).
The Players
How might key actors react to such a proposal? What are some important questions they might need answered? The analysis here is rooted in a combination of desk research, findings from a tabletop exercise, and expert interviews. This is a selection of potential stakeholders, but it is not comprehensive. It does not reflect the perspectives of all key players, including multilateral institutions, private sector actors, and other relevant countries.
Projections from Reflective’s simulator show the hypothetical SAI deployment could mitigate global temperature rise. But geopolitics, mistrust, and potential harms and inequitable impacts challenge unified global decisionmaking (graphic from Reflective simulator).
African Union
Arctic and Geopolitical Interests
The African Union is neither a member nor an observer of the Arctic Council and lacks direct policies related to the Arctic. However, changes in Arctic shipping routes would have implications for African trade, particularly in relation to the Suez Canal and emerging West African ports. The African Union recognizes that Arctic resource competition and shifting global alliances could have an indirect impact on African economies and diplomacy. Some analysts argue that African states should consider pursuing observer status to protect trade and geopolitical interests.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal
- The African Union would likely be concerned about the impact of a high-latitude intervention on temperatures and precipitation in Africa, as well as the potential differential effects across the continent. As a regional body, it would be unlikely to support an intervention that was perceived as harming some countries on the continent, even if it appeared to help others.
- The African Union would likely also raise questions regarding equity, specifically regarding the representation of developing countries in the scientific research that led to the consortium proposal, as well as in the initial composition of consortium countries.
West Africa could face more diminished water availability under an SAI deployment than without one (graphic from Reflective simulator).
China
Arctic and Geopolitical Interests
China is an observer in the Arctic Council and has declared itself a “near-Arctic state.” Its Polar Silk Road strategy integrates Arctic shipping routes into its Belt and Road Initiative, though progress has been uneven. China invests heavily in Arctic energy projects, particularly in Russia, and operates advanced research capabilities, including polar icebreakers and Arctic research stations. While ambitions are expansive, many projects face political and financial hurdles. Sino-Russian cooperation has deepened, however, with joint coast guard agreements and military exercises in Arctic waters.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal
- China may take a mildly oppositional public stance on such a proposal while privately supporting other countries taking the lead on an SRM deployment. Beijing may see an opportunity to be a free rider – its own science would likely indicate it would benefit, yet it would not bear the responsibility of conducting the diplomatic outreach for the project.
- China could also view the proposal as a geopolitical opportunity to strengthen its relationships in the developing world, claiming to act as their champion in the face of Western climate imperialism.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang meets with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2023. (Dati Bendo / European Union)
European Union (EU)
Arctic and Geopolitical Interests
The EU is an observer in the Arctic Council and has strengthened its Arctic policy since 2021. Its priorities are preserving peace, slowing Arctic climate change, and supporting the sustainable development of Arctic communities. While lacking territorial claims, the EU seeks influence as a regulatory power and trading partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also affects many elements of the European Union’s multifaceted Arctic policy.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal
- The EU may advocate for a multilateral scientific assessment to understand the risks, costs, and regional impacts before any decision on joining the consortium.
- Brussels may also be concerned about NATO cohesion in the face of a proposed Arctic SAI deployment and how Russia might respond.
An SAI deployment could mitigate European temperature rise amid concern over climate impacts (graphic from Reflective simulator, above). However, the EU and NATO are most immediately concerned with threats from Russia (below).
(European Union)
Mexico
Arctic and Geopolitical Interests
Mexico is neither a member nor an observer of the Arctic Council and does not have a formal Arctic policy. Its engagement with Arctic issues comes indirectly, largely through global climate diplomacy, where Arctic change is discussed in broader governance contexts. There is no evidence of Mexico seeking observer status or articulating Arctic geopolitical ambitions.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal
- Mexico is likely to have concerns about the impact of such a deployment on temperature and precipitation in its backyard, and will likely be strongly aligned with the African Union and other developing countries on issues of equity, representation, and shared governance.
Mexico’s Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, Enrique Ochoa (right), represented Mexico at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil in November 2025. (Government of Mexico)
Norway
Arctic and Geopolitical Interests
As a member of the Arctic Council, Norway considers the Arctic its top strategic theater. Its 2024 Arctic strategy, Norway in the High North – Arctic Policy for a New Reality, reflects heightened geopolitical risks due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Priorities include defense, infrastructure, sustainable development, and cooperation with NATO allies. Norway emphasizes knowledge leadership on Russian and Chinese activities and regards northern presence as vital to national security.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal
- Norway would likely share the EU’s interest in a consensus multilateral scientific assessment to underpin any further action by the consortium.
- Oslo would also be particularly attuned to the Russian response to the proposal and would be concerned about Moscow’s military build-up.
Paratroopers train for Arctic operations during a joint Norwegian-US exercise in 2024 in Norway. (Sgt. Avery Cunningham / U.S. Army)
Russia
Arctic and Geopolitical Interests
Russia views the Arctic as a core national security domain. As a founding member of the Arctic Council, it has long sought to leverage the region’s economic resources and control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR). In recent years, its Arctic policy has shifted toward militarization, with expanded bases, infrastructure, and surveillance. The Arctic contains vast oil and gas reserves central to Russia’s energy strategy, and Moscow treats the NSR as internal waters, in conflict with international views. Growing cooperation with China—both commercially and militarily—has further reshaped Russia’s Arctic calculus.
Potential Response to Consortium Proposal
- Russia may perceive a world with global warming above 1.5 degrees Celsius as offering strategic advantages in the Arctic.
- Moscow could engage in oppositional behavior in response to the consortium proposal, including disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting public scientific skepticism and portraying the consortium as neo-colonial or imperialist.
- It could also use such a proposal as an excuse for deploying military assets “preventively” in the Arctic, or develop plans to disrupt or delay any potential deployment.
A Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker. (Kiselev d / CC BY-SA 3.0)
Exercise participants roleplaying as policymakers consider positions on a hypothetical SAI proposal.
Key Conclusions
Geopolitics, Not Science, Will Drive Initial Reactions
Countries are likely to default to their geopolitical instincts when confronted with an Arctic SAI proposal. Scientific arguments alone will not shape early responses; instead, states will interpret the deployment through the lens of strategic advantage, regional influence, and existing rivalries.
Russia Represents the Central Security Risk in Any Arctic SAI Scenario
Given its geographic proximity, military footprint, and history of suspicion toward Western-led climate interventions, Russia is the pivotal security challenge. Moscow could interpret an Arctic SAI effort as a strategic threat, either environmental or geopolitical, and respond by further militarizing the Arctic, interfering with operations, or attempting to sabotage the effort.
A Trusted Multilateral Assessment is Essential for Stability
A credible, multilateral scientific assessment, recognized by key Arctic stakeholders, is crucial to reducing misperceptions. It must provide a shared baseline of evidence on projected impacts not only in the Arctic but also in non-Arctic regions that may experience secondary climate effects. Such an assessment could help reduce security anxieties.
Without Early Trust-Building, Risks of Miscalculation Rise
If states enter the decision-making process without a shared scientific understanding or established diplomatic channels, geopolitical fears will prevail. This increases the risk of misinterpretation, escalation, and hardening of security postures. Once a deployment proposal is on the table, states will become more defensive and less open to persuasion. Trust-building, quiet diplomacy, and scientific collaboration need to be established early and well before any government is asked to take a position.