Carlisle Patriot, 13 Aug 1825 - Cumberland Summer Assizes (16)

[petra.mi...@doctors.org.uk]

Saturday 13 Aug 1825   (p. 4, col. 1-6)

 

CUMBERLAND SPRING [sic] ASSIZES.

  

LIBEL.

WHEATLEY v. PEILE AND GIBSON.

 

[continued]

 

We now come to the second paragraph. I know not how the fact may be, but from its commencement it appears plain that some communication had been made on the subject, or perhaps a paragraph had appeared in another newspaper.—Mr. SCARLETT then read the second paragraph, and contended that it ought to have conciliated the plaintiff. An observation was put into Mr. WHEATLEY's mouth, that a question was unimportant, and that it was immaterial whether it was answered or not. Mr. BROUGHAM said this was incorrect: what then? where is the mighty consequence? But he "apologised." This, said Mr. BROUGHAM, was a libel. Excellent! Why it was a compliment to say that a man apologised when he discovered himself in error—nothing could be set forth more to Mr. WHEATLEY's advantage. The remark attributed to Mr. LITTLEDALE was also denied, and was called a libel on that gentleman! Really, this was somewhat new doctrine. How it could be a libel on that Gentleman "vast ability" would be requisite to discover; and if not a libel on him, certainly it was none on Mr. WHEATLEY. And what could be fairer than the concluding sentence: "Let the reader judge for himself. If we ought to have said any thing else instead of reprimand, we beg to be understood as withdrawing that term, and giving a carte blanche to our friends and our enemies to fill up the vacancy with what may please them better." Observe the candid use Mr. BROUGHAM had made of this. He says it means that Mr. WHEATLEY's enemies may supply the deficiency with whatever they may please to imagine to his disadvantage; that they may say what they would, and could not say what was too bad for him. This was the charitable interpretation of Mr. BROUGHAM, who came to ask for damages because his client had been misrepresented! Whereas the plain meaning of the passage was, that the defendants' enemies, who were most likely Mr. WHEATLEY's friends, might supply the vacancy with more favourable matter than the explanation had called forth.—This, then, continued Mr. SCARLETT, is the whole of these paragraphs, which has been construed as libels for the entertainment of a jury at Carlisle. I asked Mr. ARMSTRONG if he had never heard the plaintiff say that he should be satisfied with a farthing, for that would carry costs, because such observations have been made; and the answer was, that he did not exactly say that, but that his chief object was to defend his character. Character! Who has attacked it? Has he lost any business? Has he lost any friends? Has he lost a wink of sleep? No, no—that is not his chief object. Though he may expect to get but a farthing damages, that farthing, he well knows, would carry costs, and costs, to an attorney, would be a nice bit of profit to return home with from his attendance at the assizes—

 

Mr. BROUGHAM—He is not his own attorney.

 

Mr. SCARLETT continued—Not his own attorney indeed! Nay, Mr. BROUGHAM, that won't do; let the costs be given, and they find their way into his pocket depend on it. But I trust that he will obtain nothing of the kind. In the first place, I submit, he is not entitled to a verdict, upon his own shewing. He says his character is attacked as an attorney in the Court of King's Bench, while he was at the time practising in another Court at Whitehaven. His conduct there cannot affect his business in the Court of King's Bench: and on that ground I submit he is not entitled to a verdict at all. But come to the words upon their obvious meaning. They cannot be strained into libel. A man may be reprimanded, and not be officious; the reprimand may be given in mistake; or he may be officious, and be never the worse as an attorney. I am not sure, as I have said, that I should not like him the better for it. The paragraph was not written on him in the character of a gentleman of fine feelings, as a courtier, or an ambassador, but as an attorney, residing in a small town, and practising in the face of clients who would perhaps think the qualities hinted at very considerable recommendations. If a verdict is given against the defendants in this case, there will in future be plenty of actions. Good God! Gentlemen, let me ask what it is that he complains of? An imputation of a little vehemence and zeal in the discharge of his duties—things that we are all guilty of oftener than we are aware. I am not standing up here to vindicate libel; far from it; but if this is one, we may give up all idea of the liberty of the press. Why we shall have the proceedings of this trial published, with my learned friend saying that four nervous lines, which forty years ago passed as excellent poetry, are a single line of ridiculous prose. Would not the poet who wrote them say that was a libel were he to rise from the dead, and could you refuse him a verdict? Gentlemen, if you encourage such actions, no man can be safe—no one can write a line or open his mouth. Give the defendants a verdict, and you will meet the justice of the case. Mr. WHEATLEY, too, will gain his object: the trial will be noised throughout the kingdom in the papers; he will then truly "make a noise," will have a cheap and effectual advertisement to aid him on his "entry into business," and you will confer on the country the benefit of a most useful decision.

 

Mr. Baron HULLOCK summed up the evidence at considerable length.—The question for the jury to decide was, whether the paragraphs were maliciously intended to injure the plaintiff in his reputation as an attorney in the Court of King's Bench.

 

Mr. BROUGAM.—I beg your Lordship's pardon: but it is also laid as an individual.

 

Mr. Baron HULLOCK.—It is also laid, gentlemen, as an individual who is not an attorney. Before you can pronounce the production libellous, you must duly weigh it in all its bearings. A man may be rude and officious, and not be a bad attorney. A man may be rude and officious, and not be a bad man, for that would depend upon the ideas of the society which he keeps. The question mainly turns upon whether or not you think the paragraphs were published with a malicious intention. It may perhaps be considered an imputation of want of judgment in an attorney to say that he makes every man his opponent with whom he comes in contact. The second paragraph, however, seems calculated to do away with the offensive part of the first, should you even think it libellous. (His Lordship read it, and commented on it with his usual acuteness.) "It does not appear to me," he concluded, "that the last paragraph will at all warrant the construction of a libel. You, however, must form your conclusions from what you have heard. But should you think proper to give the plaintiff a verdict and damages, I feel myself bound to say that a very moderate compensation indeed will fully meet the justice of the case.

 

The jury consulted about five minutes, and returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Damages One Shilling.

 

Mr. SCARLETT—I hope your Lordship will think this a case in which to certify. (Not to allow the plaintiff his costs.)

 

Mr. Baron HULLOCK—Probably I may: I have been thinking about it.

 

Mr. BROUGHAM—If an apology had been made, there would have been no action.

 

Mr. Baron HULLOCK—There was no occasion for an apology, Mr. BROUGHAM: it was not a case for an action!!

 

Counsel for the plaintiff: Messrs. BROUGHAM, HOLT, and ARMSTRONG. For the defendants, Messrs. SCARLETT and TINDAL.

 

 

[to be continued]