Operational Risk Management Strategies: "Dumb, Different or Directed"

[Clark]

What Happens When the Brief Gets Too Brief

by Capt. David Levenson, USAF

Every crew brief covers operational risk management (ORM), but the ORM
part often lacks depth. Mission commanders and flight leads simply ask
if everyone has had enough crew rest or sleep. ORM is much more than
that.

On one particular flight, the entire crew had gotten plenty of sleep,
but ORM still played a significant role in averting a mishap over the
skies of Macedonia. I was ECMO 1 in an EA-6B during a night-strike
mission over southern Kosovo. After the strike, we headed toward our
tanker. The communications with AWACs were unusually weak and full of
static. There was a layer of broken clouds just below the tanker
altitude. Without air-to-air radar or night-vision devices, finding
the tanker was becoming next to impossible. With our fuel getting
close to bingo, we finally found the tanker and commenced the join-up
on the left, which is the standard side for the Navy, but not standard
for the Air Force.

We hadn't briefed which side of the tanker we would join on-mission
planning overshadowed that type of detail. Once joined, we realized
that two British Tornados were already on the tanker, one taking fuel
and the other on the right side. After they finished, I saw Dash 2
disconnect and apparently clear off below us. As we slid back,
anticipating getting in the basket, a bright flash filled our cockpit
accompanied by severe buffet. The Tornados had tapped burner right in
front of us, instead of exiting down and aft. They turned off their
lights and went left into us. My pilot dumped the nose and
successfully avoided them. We climbed back to the tanker, got our gas,
covered another strike, and returned to Aviano.

Once on deck, I told the operations officer what had happened. Tanking
briefs started getting a lot more attention. In fact, in the 45 days
we were over the skies of Bosnia, this near-midair was one of the most
hazardous flight events I experienced.

This may seem like just another close call, but ORM could have easily
lessened the severity of the problem or broken the chain of events
leading to it. In most cases, you can easily cope with the risks of
day-to-day flying. The next time you brief ORM, think of "Dumb,
Different, or Directed." Each of these categories won't cover all
risks that you may encounter, but they can highlight potential
problems.

Some ORM concerns under "Dumb" are flying in terrible weather,
descending below the briefed hard deck, or continuing a flight beyond
calculated bingo. These things can usually be solved quickly in the
cockpit. There are also not-so-obvious, dumb risks, and these might be
the most important: poor mission planning, flying with people who have
unresolved personal problems, or flying with outdated FLIP or charts.
Unfortunately, these will not become apparent until too late.

"Different" covers those actions that vary from the normal activity.
For example, flying into a new airfield or unfamiliar airspace. Air
refueling at night is also a good example. Before our near collision
with the Tornado, we should have identified the unusual procedures and
briefed them. While not particularly dangerous, the items in
"Different" can contribute greatly to causing a more dangerous
situation.

Lastly, "Directed" activity covers those actions ordered by higher
authority that may influence the aircrew's judgment. These actions are
check-rides, functional check flights, cross-countries, or combat. The
crew might be directly or indirectly pressured to complete the flight
or check. Over Macedonia, our crew wanted to complete the air
refueling, avoid a bingo divert into an unfamiliar airfield, and
support the last of the night strikes. The internal drive to complete
a mission, whether combat or peacetime, can cloud aircrew's judgment.

Identifying the possible hazards is a great first step, but it is just
as important to identify control measures for these hazards and ways
to lessen the effects. If the severity or probability is too great,
complete avoidance is often the best solution. Usually, identifying
the hazard and sticking to the planned mission is enough.
Occasionally, you have to make slight changes in the plan. Remember,
the goal of ORM is to lessen the known risks involved. It may be as
simple as taking off earlier from a high-density-altitude airport when
the temperatures are typically cooler.

This article originally appeared in the December 2000 issue of
Approach

The latest NASA ASRS Callback is out: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_354.html

[Parsons, John, DALMEC]

Good one.  You think you can use this concept DDD in writing an article about Phased implementation and how your cockpit briefs should be changed?

John

[Kent B. Lewis]

Hi John

I can, and also discussions with Dispatchers. And for the GA folks out there, Flight Service briefings. I like how the author put it in terms even a Marine could understand :)

I'll call you directly.

--
Kent Lewis
(817) 692-1971
www.signalcharlie.net