Today I reinstalled the driver and manually selected from the list (unchecked show compatible checkbox) and selected VF495 and that seemed to work. was able to regester my fingerprint with security manager.
I'm using an HP Probook 6460b under windows 7 x64, I had to do some research to find the last version of this software. Even on the product page (history tab) they don't mention the latest version of this Security Manager software. Same for the drivers, for exemple, the Fingerprint Driver is very old on my product page and I could find a new one somewhere on the website and it still work very fine ! They just rebranded from "Validity Fingerprint Driver" to "Validity Fingerprint Sensor Driver".
There is a usefull tab on each software/driver page called "History" where you can fallow the different versions. Why they don't use it to mention the newest version even if it's rebranded?
In case the newest doesn't work for some reasons, we can download and install the previous version.
So I suggest to HP to be greener and care on that, just by adding a link to the latest version and mention "There is a new version of this software/driver. It hasn't been approuved to work with your product. Use it at your own risk"
Sorry, I did not understand the answer. There is a more current driver named HP Client Security Manager to replace the HP Protect Tools. If you install HP Client, the HP Protect Tols driver will be maintained?
When I click off it, it just pops up again repeatedly, every second, until I get off the Fingerprint menu.
Also one thing to note - I can see the Biometric device driver in the Device manager just fine and the fingerprint sensor works fine for Windows Hello too. This is only an issue with HP CSM. Therefore I'm assuming it's not a driver issue.
The original post doesn't include any information about the code base. It may be that the client's security configuration is correct, but it has no access to the remote code. The classes are loaded directly from the "code base" by the client. They are not presented to the client by the service over the RMI connection. The service merely references an external source for the classes.
The server should specify the system property java.rmi.server.codebase. The value must be a URL that is accessible to the client, from which the necessary classes can be loaded. If this is a file: URL, the file system must be accessible to the client.
Example: If you want to send an object of type MedicationDTO (which is serializable) from server to client, make sure that it is in the same package path.In my case, in the server app, the object was in com.example.springdemo.dto and in the client app, it was in com.example.springdemo.service.dto.. The problem was that, using IntelliJ, because the service package had nothing in it, but an other package, their name was concatenated (service.dto) and I could not see that the path was not the same. So, make sure that your classes have the same package path. (Solution for my case: MedicationDTO class has to be in both application in package: com.example.springdemo.dto.
I know why it happens.for example you start server in the project A,but you use the Client in the project B to request this server,this is wrong.So you should put the server and client in the same project.
Features of HP Client Security Manager
I found a few articles still available under "Support" section here regarding the old version, with all the details how to use that old Manager, but looks like it useless now since they decided do not support it anymore. Hello let's you just sign in, old version has a password manager, which works with Chrome via extension (so far), such a huge plus.
HP offers industry-leading Client Management Solutions to help commercial customers mitigate issues that result in lost time, money, and productivity. This comprehensive portfolio helps reduce complexity and cost of managing commercial PCs through client management software from HP and third-parties, jointly-developed value-adds, and HP manageability tools. The HP Client Management Solutions portfolio is designed to meet a range of client management needs.
The HP Client Catalog for Microsoft Configuration Manager products automates the acquisition and deployment of HP software updates (SoftPaqs) to HP commercial PCs in a Microsoft Configuration Manager environment. The catalog file contains detailed platform information on HP commercial desktops, notebooks, and workstations. It can be used with the software update features of Microsoft Configuration Manager and Updates Publisher or Configuration Manager Essentials to provide automated driver and patch updates to HP-managed Clients.
HP Driver Packs contain the necessary Microsoft Windows drivers required to support the HP hardware platform(s) as listed in the release notes for each of the driver packs. The package contains drivers supporting both the integrated and add-in devices in an .INF-based installation format. This INF installation method can be used standalone or with bare-metal operating system deployment tools that require .INF-based drivers.
Note: Some hardware devices have additional software tools to help enhance the experience of using the device. For example, a graphics control center application. These software tools cannot be installed via INF method and must be manually installed after the drivers to get the best overall experience.
By default, the system uses the primary access token for a process whenever a thread of the process interacts with a securable object. However, a thread can impersonate a client account. When a thread impersonates, it has an impersonation token in addition to its own primary token. The impersonation token describes the security context of the user account that the thread is impersonating. Impersonation is especially common in Remote Procedure Call (RPC) handling.
However, adding a new device object to the stack does not change any ACLs, either those of the new device object (if it has ACLs) or those of any existing device objects in the stack. When a driver creates a new device object and attaches it to the top of the stack, the driver should copy the ACLs for the stack to the new device object by copying the DeviceObject.Characteristics field from the next lower driver.
The access token for each process contains a list of the privileges granted to the process. Privileges must be specifically enabled before use. For more information on privilges, see Privileges in the kernel driver documentation.
The Object Manager checks ACLs for simple object types, such as events and mutex locks. For objects that have a namespace, the type owner performs security checks. For example, the I/O Manager is considered the type owner for device objects and file objects. If the Object Manager finds the name of a device object or file object when parsing a name, it hands off the name to the I/O Manager, as in the file creation scenario presented above. The I/O Manager then checks the access rights if it can. If the name specifies an object within a device namespace, the I/O Manager in turn hands off the name to the device (or file system) driver, and that driver is responsible for validating the requested access.
The operating system kernel treats every driver, in effect, as a file system with its own namespace. Consequently, when a caller attempts to create an object in the device namespace, the I/O Manager checks that the process has traversal rights to the directories in the path.
With WDM drivers, the I/O Manager does not perform security checks against the namespace, unless the Device Object has been created specifying FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN. When FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN is not set, the driver is responsible for ensuring the security of its namespace. For more information, see Controlling Device Namespace Access and Securing Device Objects.
For WDF drivers, the FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN flag is always set, so that there will be a check of the device's security descriptor before allowing an application to access any names within the device's namespace. For more information, see Controlling Device Access in KMDF Drivers.
The higher the disparity in the privilege levels, the more interesting the boundary is for attackers that want to perform attacks such as a privilege escalation attack against the targeted driver or process.
As the app container can provide additional constraints, and is not running at admin level, path (1) is a higher risk path for an escalation attack since the trust boundary is between an app container ( a very low privilege process) and a kernel driver.
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