Fwd: [security-lunch] Sept 24 | Stijn Pletinckx on "Maintaining a Secure Internet"

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Alan Karp

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Sep 22, 2025, 6:11:22 PM (7 days ago) Sep 22
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Alan Karp


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From: Michael Leo Paper <mpa...@stanford.edu>
Date: Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 2:14 PM
Subject: [security-lunch] Sept 24 | Stijn Pletinckx on "Maintaining a Secure Internet"
To: securit...@lists.stanford.edu <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>


Hi everyone! 🐘

I am the new coordinator of security lunch.
We will have the first talk of the academic year on Wednesday and I'm looking forward to seeing all of you there!
If you want to give a talk, or if you know someone who would like to give a talk, please feel free to email me!


Security Lunch 🍂 Ed. — Wednesday,  Sept 24th, 2025, 12:00 pm @ CoDa E160

Maintaining a Secure Internet
Stijn Pletinckx

Can't make it in person? Join us on zoom.
See our past & upcoming events on our website

Abstract: 
It is commonly said that the Internet was never built with security in mind. Instead, we designed ad-hoc mechanisms to account for security shortcomings in network protocols. While these measures solved many problems, they did not solve all issues, and in some cases even created new ones. More worryingly, we also see that novel protocols struggle to provide security by design.
In this talk, I will discuss two works in which we study relatively recent protocols and assess their security implications. The first takes a look at Certificate Transparency (CT) logs and shows how these logs can be leveraged by adversaries to find vulnerable websites on the Internet. The second studies the PROXY protocol and shows that it is trivial to connect to internal infrastructures using this protocol, which can lead to information leakage, and can turn email severs into open relays.
If time permits, we will look at some ongoing work that leverages LLMs to analyze RFC documents from a security perspective, which could potentially help with the design of more secure protocols.



Bio:
Stijn Pletinckx is a fourth-year PhD Candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He works under the supervision of Christopher Kruegel and Giovanni Vigna, and is currently a visiting researcher in the Stanford Empirical Security Research Group working with Zakir Durumeric. His research focuses on the intersection of network security and Internet measurements, often incorporating concepts of web security as well. In general, he aims to empirically study the Internet landscape within a security context.


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