Fwd: [security-lunch] Apr 8 | Ryan Lehmkuhl on "Let’s Aggregate? Towards making private telemetry as ubiquitous as TLS"

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Alan Karp

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Apr 6, 2026, 1:19:40 PM (4 days ago) Apr 6
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Alan Karp


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From: Michael Leo Paper via security-lunch <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>
Date: Mon, Apr 6, 2026 at 10:18 AM
Subject: [security-lunch] Apr 8 | Ryan Lehmkuhl on "Let’s Aggregate? Towards making private telemetry as ubiquitous as TLS"
To: securit...@lists.stanford.edu <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>


Security Lunch ⛄ Ed. — Wednesday,  Apr 8th, 2026, 12:00 pm @ CoDa E160

Let’s Aggregate? Towards making private telemetry as ubiquitous as TLS
Ryan Lehmkuhl
Can't make it in person? Join us on zoom.
See our past & upcoming events on our website


Abstract: 
Private-aggregation systems allow a company to collect valuable telemetry data from their users without ever having to collect sensitive disaggregated user data in the clear. The past few years have seen a flurry of activity around private aggregation: practical constructions, draft IETF standards, and proof-of-concept deployments by Apple, Google, and Mozilla. In spite of this progress, few of the apps we use today actually collect telemetry data using private aggregation. This talk will try to answer two questions: Why is the real-world use of private-aggregation systems so limited? And what can we do about it? To do so, we will draw on our experience designing private-aggregations systems and on conversations with engineers at Apple, Cloudflare, Google, Mozilla, and ISRG who have deployed them.

Bio:
Ryan Lehmkuhl is a Ph.D. student at UC Berkeley advised by Henry Corrigan-Gibbs. He earned his M.S. from MIT, and B.S. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences from UC Berkeley, where he was advised by Raluca Ada Popa, Alessandro Chiesa, and Pratyush Mishra.
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