Fwd: [security-lunch] Feb 4 | Michele Orrù on "A new software stack for building anonymous credential systems"

[Alan Karp]

--------------
Alan Karp

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From: Michael Leo Paper via security-lunch <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>
Date: Mon, Feb 2, 2026 at 2:12 PM
Subject: [security-lunch] Feb 4 | Michele Orrù on "A new software stack for building anonymous credential systems"
To: securit...@lists.stanford.edu <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>

Security Lunch ⛄ Ed. — Wednesday,  Feb 4th, 2026, 12:00 pm @ CoDa E160

A new software stack for building anonymous credential systems

Michele Orrù

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Abstract: 

Anonymous credentials allow users to obtain credentials from an organization and later prove their possession while disclosing as little information as possible. In practice, they are zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of a valid signature. In this talk, we present the core design principles behind modern anonymous credential systems and introduce a new software stack aimed at simplifying their construction and deployment. The stack abstracts cryptographic complexity while remaining flexible enough to support a range of credential schemes, proofs and access policies. We illustrate its use through concrete real-world applications and frame this work within ongoing efforts to standardize zero-knowledge proofs and anonymous credentials for the web.

Based on the following works: 

Michele Orrù, ACM CCS 2025: Revisiting Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials

https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1552

Michele Orrù, and Cathie Yun (Apple), IETF CFRG: Interactive Sigma Proofs and Fiat-Shamir

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-sigma-protocols/

Michele Orrù, Lindsey Tulloch (Tor Project), Victor Snyder-Graf (Risc Zero), and Ian Goldberg (University of Waterloo): A modular approach at keyed-verification anonymous credential

In submission

Bio:

Michele Orrù is a chargé de recherche (assistant professor) at CNRS in Paris, France.
Prior to that, he was a research scholar at UC Berkeley. His research focuses on limiting long-term mass storage of personal data and personally-identifying information. In the past, he has contributed to several open-source projects including Python, Debian, and Tor.

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