Fwd: [security-lunch] Dec 3 | Paul Flammarion on "Hop: A Modern Transport and Remote Access Protocol"

[Alan Karp]

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Alan Karp

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From: Michael Leo Paper via security-lunch <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>
Date: Mon, Dec 1, 2025 at 3:05 PM
Subject: [security-lunch] Dec 3 | Paul Flammarion on "Hop: A Modern Transport and Remote Access Protocol"
To: securit...@lists.stanford.edu <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>

Note that for this week's exceptional speaker, we will be in an exceptional room: Gates 403!

Looking forward to seeing many of you there 🙂

Security Lunch 🍂 Ed. — Wednesday,  Dec 3rd, 2025, 12:00 pm @ Gates 403

Hop: A Modern Transport and Remote Access Protocol

Paul Flammarion

Can't make it in person? Join us on zoom.

See our past & upcoming events on our website! 

Abstract: 

Since SSH’s standardization nearly 20 years ago, real-world requirements for a remote access protocol and our understanding of how to build secure cryptographic network protocols have both evolved significantly. In this work, we introduce Hop, a modern transport and remote access protocol designed to support today’s needs. Building on modern cryptographic advances, Hop reduces SSH protocol complexity and overhead, and addresses many of SSH’s shortcomings through a cryptographically-mediated delegation scheme, native host identification based on lessons from TLS and ACME, modern client authentication for modern enterprise environments, and support for both roaming and intermittent connectivity. We present concrete design requirements for a modern remote access protocol, describe our proposed protocol, Hop, and evaluate its performance. We hope that our work encourages discussion of what a modern remote access protocol should look like in the future.

Bio:

Paul Flammarion is a first-year Ph.D. student at the University of California, Irvine. His research focuses on Internet security, privacy, and network measurement. Previously, he was a visiting student researcher in the Empirical Security Research Group at Stanford University in 2024, where he contributed to the development of a new remote communication protocol. He holds an Engineering Master’s Degree in Digital Security and Networks from the Institut Supérieur d’Électronique de Paris (ISEP), France.

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[Tony Arcieri]

Curious if they'll take any lessons from mosh, which is connectionless and capable of sending deltas between the remote and local terminal state. It made me think that the WireGuard protocol (Noise-over-UDP) might be nice as the basis of a next-gen-SSH like this.

Mosh was also notable as one of the earliest pieces of software using AES-OCB, possibly the algorithm's biggest real-world application.

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Tony Arcieri