Fwd: [security-lunch] (Sep 23) "Microarchitecture and (Trying to) Secure Software" (David Kohlbrenner)

[Alan Karp]

--------------
Alan Karp

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Ihyun Nam via security-lunch <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>
Date: Mon, Sep 21, 2026 at 9:00 AM
Subject: [security-lunch] (Sep 23) "Microarchitecture and (Trying to) Secure Software" (David Kohlbrenner)
To: securit...@lists.stanford.edu <securit...@lists.stanford.edu>

Security Lunch: Wednesday, September 23rd, 2026, 12:00PM @ CoDa E160

Title: Microarchitecture and (Trying to) Secure Software

Speaker: David Kohlbrenner

Speaker will be available for 1-1 meetings from 10am to late afternoon on 09/23. Please email dkoh...@cs.washington.edu to schedule a time slot.

Can't make it in person? Join us on zoom: https://stanford.zoom.us/j/92492090915?pwd=gpobdILCkAPS6UbsRg86y8NhvFuDmn.1.
See our past and upcoming events on our website: https://securitylunch.stanford.edu/.

Abstract:
Microarchitecture security has become a hot topic in computer security over the past decade, growing from single digit papers per-year to a dozen or more per-conference and specialized venues. This area growth has mostly come from attack work, which leverages interesting microarchitectural designs and optimizations to undermine the expected safety properties of secure software. Following closely behind, compiler, program analysis, and architecture work has proposed mechanisms to prevent such attacks. This talk will cover what microarchitecture-enabled attacks on secure software are, some of the surprising attacks we've found, and the defense approaches we've been exploring.

Bio:
David is an Assistant Professor in the Paul G. Allen School at the University of Washington and co-directs the Security and Privacy Research Lab. His research focuses on understanding and mitigating security risks to software that arise from hardware design. Projects with his collaborators include discovering novel side-channel mechanisms from CPU frequency (Hertzbleed) to prefetchers (Augury) to GPU compression (Pixnapping), and verifiable mitigations for side channels. He was also a lead on the RISC-V Keystone TEE Framework project. David's work has been recognized with an IEEE Micro Top Pick, two Top Picks in HES, and multiple Pwnie awards. Previously, he co-founded an embedded security company, Somerset Recon, and was a member of Carnegie Mellon's PPP CTF team.

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