No. 95-1717.ZS Summary
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(Bench Opinion)
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. LANIER
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 95-1717. Argued January 7, 1997-Decided March 31, 1997
Respondent Lanier was convicted under 18 U. S. C. 242 of criminally
violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them
sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been in-
structed, inter alia, that the Government had to prove as an element
of the offense that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Four-
teenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the
right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced
sexual battery. The en banc Sixth Circuit set aside the convictions
for lack of any notice to the public that 242 covers simple or sexual
assault crimes. Invoking general interpretive canons and Screws v.
United States, 325 U. S. 91 (plurality opinion), the court held that
242 criminal liability may be imposed only if the constitutional right
said to have been violated is first identified in a decision of this
Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual
situation -fundamentally similar- to the one at bar. The court regard-
ed these combined requirements as substantially higher than the
-clearly established- standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil
cases under 42 U. S. C. 1983.
Held: The Sixth Circuit employed the wrong standard for determining
whether particular conduct falls within the range of criminal liability
under 242. Section 242's general language prohibiting -the depriva-
tion of any rights . . . secured . . . by the Constitution- does not
describe the specific conduct it forbids, but-like its companion con-
spiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. 241-incorporates constitutional law by
reference. Before criminal liability may be imposed for violation of
any penal law, due process requires -fair warning . . . of what the law
intends.- McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27. The touchstone
is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed by the
courts, made it reasonably clear at the time of the charged conduct
that the conduct was criminal. Section 242 was construed in light of
this due process requirement in Screws, supra. The Sixth Circuit
erred in adding as a gloss to this standard the requirement that a
prior decision of this Court have declared the constitutional right at
issue in a factual situation -fundamentally similar- to the one at bar.
The Screws plurality referred in general terms to rights made specific
by -decisions interpreting- the Constitution, see 325 U. S., at 104; no
subsequent case has confined the universe of relevant decisions to the
Court's opinions; and the Court has specifically referred to Court of
Appeals decisions in defining the established scope of a constitutional
right under 241, see Anderson v. United States, 417 U. S. 211,
223-227, and in enquiring whether a right was -clearly established-
when applying the qualified immunity rule under 1983 and Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, see, e.g., Mitch-
ell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 533. Nor has this Court demanded
precedents applying the right at issue to a -fundamentally similar-
factual situation at the level of specificity meant by the Sixth Circuit.
Rather, the Court has upheld convictions under 241 or 242 despite
notable factual distinctions between prior cases and the later case, so
long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct
at issue violated constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v.
Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 759, n. 17. The Sixth Circuit's view that due
process under 242 demands more than the -clearly established-
qualified immunity test under 1983 or Bivens is error. In effect that
test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give
officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from civil
liability and its consequences that individuals have traditionally
possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes. As with official con-
duct under 1983 or Bivens, liability may be imposed under 242 if,
but only if, in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the
defendant's conduct is apparent. Pp. 4-13.
73 F. 3d 1380, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.