No. 95-2031.ZS Summary

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(Bench Opinion)

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

YOUNG et al. v. FORDICE et al.
appeal from the united states district court for
the southern district of mississippi
No. 95-2031. Argued January 6, 1997-Decided March 31, 1997

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires States to
provide simplified systems for registering to vote in federal elections,
including a system for voter registration on a driver's license applica-
tion. Beginning on January 1, 1995, Mississippi attempted to comply
with the NVRA, attempting to replace its ``Old System'' of registration
with a ``Provisional Plan'' that simplified registration procedures for
both federal and state elections. The United States Attorney General
precleared the Provisional Plan under 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (VRA), which forbids States with a specified history of voting
discrimination from making changes in voting ``practices or
procedures'' that have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color. However, a week before
the Plan was precleared, the state legislature tabled legislation needed
to make the changes effective for state elections. On February 10,
1995, the State abandoned the Provisional Plan in favor of a ``New
System,'' which uses the Provisional Plan for federal election registra-
tion only and the Old System for both state and federal election
registration. The State made no further preclearance submissions.
In this suit, appellants claim that the State and its officials violated
5 by implementing changes in its registration system without pre-
clearance. A three-judge District Court granted the State summary
judgment, holding that the differences in the New System and Provi-
sional Plan were attributable to the State's attempt to correct a
misapplication of state law, and, thus, were not changes subject to
preclearance; and that the State had precleared all the changes that
the New System made in the Old when the Attorney General pre-
cleared the changes needed to implement the NVRA.
Held: Mississippi has not precleared, and must preclear, the -practices
and procedures- that it sought to administer on and after February
10, 1995. Pp. 8-18.
(a) Several circumstances, taken together, lead to the conclusion
that the Provisional Plan, although precleared by the Attorney Gener-
al, was not -in force or effect- under 5 and, hence, did not become
part of the baseline against which to judge whether future change
occurred. Those seeking to administer the Plan did not intend to
administer an unlawful plan, and they abandoned the Plan as soon
as it became clear that the legislature would not pass the laws needed
to make it lawful. Moreover, all these events took place within a few
weeks: The Plan was used for only 41 days and by only a third of the
State's voter registration officials, and the State held no elections prior
to its abandonment of the Plan, nor were any elections imminent.
Pp. 8-10.
(b) Nonetheless, the New System included changes that must be
precleared because it contains ``practices and procedures'' that are
significantly different from the Old System. Minor changes, as well
as major, require preclearance. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U. S. 544, 566-569. This is true even where, as here, the chang-
es are made in an effort to comply with federal law, so long as those
changes reflect policy choices made by state or local officials. Id., at
565, n. 29. The NVRA does not preclude application of the VRA's
requirements. Change invokes the preclearance process whether that
change works in favor of, works against, or is neutral in its impact
on minorities because the preclearance process is aimed at preserving
the status quo until the Attorney General or the courts have an
opportunity to evaluate a proposed change. Although the NVRA
imposed mandates on the States, Mississippi's changes to the New
System are discretionary and nonministerial, reflecting the exercise
of policy choice and discretion by state officials. Thus, they are
appropriate matters for 5 preclearance review. Pp. 10-13.
(c) Mississippi's arguments in favor of its position that the Attorney
General has already precleared its efforts to comply with the NVRA
are rejected. Mississippi correctly argues that the decisions to adopt
the NVRA federal registration system and to retain a prior state regis-
tration system, by themselves, are not changes for 5 purposes.
However, preclearance requires examination of the federal system's
discretionary elements in a context that includes history, purpose, and
practical effect. The argument on the merits is whether these changes
could have the purpose and effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color. Preclearance is necessary to
evaluate this argument. Pp. 13-18.
Vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.