Re: frankfurti lezárás

[csaba gyory]

Szia Zsuzsi,

ne haragudj, mondta is a Szépe, csak elfelejtettem. Itt küldök egy próbafordítást. Mikorra tudod megcsinálni?

üdv

cs



. . . And from Horkheimer Back to Habermas
Since I cannot give an comprehensive account of critical theory here,
I shall begin the voyage back to the present by formulating the position
that Habermas' attempts to overcome the aporias of Dialectic of Enlightenment
and to reconstruct critical theory (once he had accomplished a
definitive turning away from the philosophy of the subject toward a philosophy
of inter-subjectivity) rejuvenated critical thought, restored its scientific
credibility and provided it with new possibilities to contribute to the process
of social emancipation.48 For example, the emphasis on theory of communication
created an opening for productive dialogue with other important currents
in 20th century philosophy, such as analytical philosophy of language,
phenomenology and hermeneutics. On the other hand, it was this choice
that made possible the opening up of the theoretical perspective toward
the post-war phenomena of the construction of "democratic social states"
within which a process of (of course questionable) "communicative rationalization"
was gradually developed through the expansion of individualization
and processes of dialogical opinion formation — phenomena
which classical critical theory tended to interpret solely on the basis of the
concepts of mass culture and the administrative control of society. The
communicative turn, then, allowed the (of course debatable) detection of a
field of practical reason, which one could at least hope would be able to
transcend the closed circle of instrumental rationality and domination.
Last but not least, this field could be connected with the dynamic of the
"new social movements," which became the vehicle of social protest and
the claims for democratization after 1968.
Nevertheless, at the latest in the beginning of the 1980s Habermas
formulated a theory of modernity and modern democracy, focusing not so
much on the subversive potential of communicative reason as on the justification
of existent social structures as immutable and necessary.
Although there is no shortage of references to the "potential for transcendence"
which communicative processes possess, these references become
all the more decorative in a theory which ends up essentially as a justification
of the given. There are important theoretical reasons for this. Already
in the 1970s, the founding of communicative reason was based on a Kantian
type quasi-transcendental theory of communication which contradicted
a fundamental condition of critical theory; namely the awareness of
the historicality of every human undertaking. Later, once "history" had
been transformed to the field of the "particular" and "contingent," practical
reason had to be stripped of every substance and to aim at universality
which could — supposedly — be ensured only by a formalistic approach.
Because of this though, critical theory lost the ability it had had since
Marx's time to criticize the content of social life. Finally, adopting systems
theory to explain economy and bureaucracy, Habermas ended up at
the ethical-political neutralization of capitalist economic structures and of
the modern state, considering them as — at the most — "necessary evils."
Before we look at these points in detail and examine them in contrast
with Horkheimer's position in the 1930s, it is perhaps necessary to make
one more observation. For a supporter of Habermas there is no longer any
point in contrasting him with Horkheimer since communicative theory
was supposed to have "transcended" old critical theory once and for all.
In his critique of the old Frankfurt school, which coincided with the first
complete formulation of his theory in the beginning of the 1980s, Habermas
pointed out the impasse to which a totalizing critique of reason - like
that found in the Dialectic of Enlightenment — would lead. He related this
theory to Horkheimer and Adorno's disappointment with the historical
events taking place at the time (the rise of Nazism and Stalinism), concluding
that there was a need to radically transform critical theory into
something closer to his own viewpoint.49
However, it is not by chance that Habermas' critique focuses on the
two theorists" most pessimistic work; the Dialectic of Enlightenment. In
my opinion, it is true that the "dialectical anthropology" which the book
aims to formulate exaggerates the close correlation between cultural processes
in general and the principle of domination to such an extent that it
becomes unclear on what an emancipatory theory and praxis could be
based. Nevertheless, accepting this criticism of the Dialectic of Enlightenment
does in no way mean that the only alternative solution open to us is
the moderate Habermasian diagnosis of modernity. It is certain that
Horkheimer's early critical theory consisted in the immanent critique of
modern capitalist society. I hope, in the future, to set out a way of reading
Adorno's post-war work which exempts it from accusations of adherence to
an eschatological philosophy of reconciliation,50 thus making it fruitful for
providing an immanent critique of modern capitalist "liberal democracies."


forrás: Konstantinos Kavoulakos: From Habermas to Horkheimer's Early Work: Directions for a Materialist Reconstruction of Communicative Critical Theory. Spring 2005; pp 39 - 62.

http://journal.telospress.com/cgi/reprint/2005/130/39

Szia,

azért írok, mert a frankfurtit én egy fordítással
szeretném lezárni (angolról) és szépe mondta,
h te tudsz nekem szöveget küldeni.
Szóval ha küldenél nekem egy fordítanivaló,
alapozóhozszabott szöveget, annak tökre örülnék;)

üdv,
zsuzsi