"Oleg Smirnov" <
os...@netc.eu> wrote on Wed 04 May 2022 11:31:16a:
>> 'Lawlessness' doesn't seem to apply in the context of geopolitics. It
>> depends on 'laws' which in turn dependent on whoever makes, interpret
>> and enforce rules.
>
> Such a wise cynicism may be good only with a good sense of proportion,
> and in the Ukraine case it went grossly out of proportion. There was
> an usurpation of power by some "insistent" faction which didn't
> represent the majority, but "the west" supported this faction. For
> Russians it's impossible to accept it for granted.
When it comes to 'democracy', a major problem with 'American
exceptionalism' seems that in the national context 'democracy' is
substituted for 'republicanism'. That is, a system of checks and
balances in which direct popular participation by means of elections and
is jury-duties and the like are part.
On the international stage on the other hand, exceptionalist propaganda
often present 'majoritarianism' as 'democracy' -- a kind of platonic
'tyranny of the majority' that, especially in client-states, can be
easily manipulated. The practical function of this type of 'democracy'
than simply is that of a disposable 'cut-out' (an intermediary in a
clandestine operation) that serves to insulate a real centers of power
from responsibility.
Parts of Russian external propaganda apparently now tries to beat
American propaganda at its own game by questioning the majoritarianist
credentials of a disputed client-state.
It remains to be seen if that's going to work in europe as, since WW2,
in western Europe the legitimacy of governments was largely based on the
'usurpation' of democracy. The reason that it didn't turn malignant
during the cold war, was simply the fear of a Marxism. The 'questioning
more narrative' from RT by giving people like Max Keizer a platform,
seemed much more effective.
But of course RT is now censored in the free democracies of Europe. Now a
US-based mirror is required to see it. :-)
>> Also the 'neo-nazi narrative' doesn't seem to resonate at all in the
>> west,
>
> The "western" image of Nazis, at least its version intended for mass
> consumption, is simplistic: the Nazis must be brutal and against the
> Jews, and that's it. This is why the "western" media repeatedy issue
> the argument they believe is unbeatable: how there might be Nazis if
> their president is Jewish.
To the best of my knowledge het NS-regime started eliminating German
children that were considered a liability to the national cause
(Unwertiges Leben) in the early 1940. I think after the invasion of
eastern europa some one third of the population perished? What Norman
Finkelstein labeled a holocaust-industry that redirects attention to one
particular group of victims seems another problem that plagues Europe
today. It redirects attention form the real causes of WW1 & 2, and
complicates relations with the Levant and Arab populations it Europe
many of whom would rather discuss the treatment of Arabs in Palestine.
A more interesting account i read long ago was 'The origins of the
second Word War' by APJ tayor. I recall that the man became the focus of
slander-campaign after which only polemicists willing to harassed for
challenging the official narrative would publish. Since then, that
apparently became the 'proof' of that only the official account is the
reasonable one, and any deviation is the be classified as 'hate'. :-)
> In Russia, the Nazi term is applicable to any kind of radical
> nationalism/sectarianism seeking to whip up a popular unity through
> promotion of a sense of entitlement combined with a hateful and
> denigratory agenda against certain group(s) seen as a hindrance (and
> usually, to make it efficient, it also must be somewhat psychotic).
I suspected that a sense of entitlement seems inherent in all national
schemes.
Global access to resources is essentially a zero-sum game. Technical
innovation and cooperation rather than competition might increase
efficiency of production over prolonged intervals of time. But from what
i understand of the historical record underlying patterns so far never
chanced much as people are essentially inclined to compete unless the
benefits of cooperation greatly exceeds the benefits of completion.
The (American) liberal system apparently attempted to regulate
competition for a common good witch showed some promise, while the
spin-off of Marxism apparently attempted to (selectively) repress
competition which only seemed to have worked as long as there was a
'clear an present danger' to the 'common wealth'.
'National socialism' seemed more a scheme derived form fascism (of
Mussolini -- not post-WW2 propaganda) that combined both. The main
feature being that propaganda as a tool to manipulate public perception
and the repression of dissent was justified not as temporary in the
service of some teleological (religious or intellectual) doctrine, but
on the basis of an (assumed) permanent 'clear an present danger' that
emanated form the human condition itself.
> The Kiev regime *does* represent such elements.
I suspect that the current regime in Kiev is essentially a
internationally recruited plutocratic client-regime in a contested zone.
It seems happy to do whatever benefits it which implies its
international benefactors. Right now that apparently involves engaging
in an asymmetric Clausewitzian 'ideal' (total) war the results of which
with regard to toe local population are presented in the western press
is as a proof of the dedication of that same population.
Hence, in this narrative more weapons should be provided to the regime
to prosecute a dirty war.
> I still can agree that the Kremlin's "PR effort" is weak and clumsy.
I fear that the point is rapidly approaching that the only effective
remaining PR is the firing of a couple of tactical nukes so as to remind
the European public of how this could now easily end.
Unfortunately the policy of the Russia too, much like the US, seems to
have been and still is to divide Europa rather then to attempt to
encourage a more independent geopolitical stance from the US for which a
level of federal integration would be required. With diverges of
western-European and American geopolitical interests and Russia now
being the junior-partner in its relation with china, the best hope for
stability in the European area might be a regional balance of power that
could be more resistant to external manipulation?
>> since 'atlanticist' (NATO-oriented) propaganda presented the
>> current Russian government as a type of neo-nazi regime. I recall a
>> cover of the economist newspapers (1990's?) with a cartoon of
>> slumbering bear with swastikas in its eyes.
>
> Russia's historical background and [long kept] ethnic, cultural and
> regional diversity can not encourage Nazi-like developments. European
> formations, historically, were mostly sedentary Christians to each
> other, while Russia had to maintain a stable neighborhood also with
> Muslims and pagans, sedentary and nomadic. It caused certian adaptive
> universalist settings (which Europeans didn't need), it also defined
> certain Russia's differences against Europe.
Unlike most European powers, Russia had a hinterland where it could
bring territory under control without either major military endeavors or
traveling overseas to estabish colonies. But the existence of an empire
doesn't need to be an indication for opinions of populations under it's
control about each other of the empire.
I understand that part of the problem after the dissolution of the USSR,
was that Russian authorities both before and after the revolution
endeavored to reform subdivisions within the empire to make them
unsuitable as independent states.
Furthermore i understand that the NS regime liberally manipulated the
concept of both ethnicity and nationhood to fit it's political needs.
And didn't china revolved it's problem with 'local color' by switching
from a policy downplaying differences to accentuating them so as to
maken them so fragmented that separatist ambitions became irrelevant?
:-)
The idea of geopolitical competition between ethnic entities divided by
geopolitical fault lines, did however probably serve to
(propagandistical) install a permanent state 'clear an present danger'.
That was probably the formal basis for an attempt to clear eastern
Europe for an 'Aryan race'. But I suppose this policy too had a largely
practical rather than ideological background as a 'Slavic nation' was
associated with communism which in turn was perceived as a hazard to
European privileged classes including the German aristocracy on which
the NS-movement dependent in order to establish a government.
All things considered, I suspect that the NS-regime was opportunistic
and wicked rather than instructed by some uniquely depraved ideology as
post-war propaganda would have it. I think almost immediately after WW1
there were warnings in the ranks of the victorious states against an
attempt to squeeze Germany for reparations, and a read somewhere that
during the Nuremberg trails (of sort) some of the defendants demanded
accusatorial proceedings in which they would be able to argue that the
accent of a exceptionally homicidal regime was largely the result of the
intolerable conditions created by the victors of WW1 which were then
exacerbated by the financial crisis. Which was denied.
Apparently to avoid a repeat performance, after WW2 the US did attached
a condition to the marshal plan that countries that applied for soft
loans would not claim reparations form each other. Which seemed to have
worked.
gonna have to cut of here...