Hi Bruno, regarding matters of Soul

[Allen Francom]

Hi Bruno,

Elsewhere we had started a discussion that deserves a more public facing mechanism.

I had complained that the universal computation is prima fascia adequate for physics based on what you and I know that is for whatever reason incredibly difficult to communicate in general to others.  And I am happy up to here.

Then I had a complaint about when you "venture off the reservation" to include matters of "soul" that are beyond the physics held in evidence this way.

Your counter-point which I did not and still do not fully understand or appreciate is that you are coming from a very heavy philosophical background...  "the meaning of life" type stuff, going way back.

So it goes, once "god has invented the integers" and the rest is left to the imagination of man, how do we account for the identity of a soul.  Which one.  How many "instances" of a "life" can it handle simultaneously, separately, across time, etc., and IS THERE ONLY ONE ?  What is the differentiation of "this one" and "that one", where we had just perfectly nailed "the rest of physics", in terms that can be considered to be finite, countable, and subject to 'information horizon' in terms of local systems.

You had agreed that this is a very deep topic that you have not yet managed to elaborate on publicly and has real significance.  Again, I don't get it, and I am having a hard time imagining what you have done so far "extending" to address this realm.

In the past, I had made noises that you can make a "universal operating system" and multi-task "layers" of reality just fine, to include some realm of "soul" but this would still prove out to be the countable, finite, and information horizon kind of expression in the "universal dovetailer" reasoning...

Anyway, I am all ears.  I've actually pondered over this for a couple years now and my interest is sincere, even if I find it so far somewhat objectionable.  ( how can you learn if you can't risk being wrong or so far under-informed - takes precedence over any objection )

--

"Groovy..."

light...@gmail.com

[Kim Jones]

Do you buy Arithmetical Realism? That puts you in the Platonist tribe. If not, your only other choice is to tag along with Aristotle and believe in magical stuff like “matter". These are two are the irreducable faces of human belief. Reality is either WYSIWYG or it isn’t. Leads straight to the mind/body problem that most would love to ignore or dismiss as “heavy philosophising” I guess. 

Kim

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[Allen Francom]

Hi Kim,

If that is for me... 

What I buy is just reductionist and ground-up.  There needs be at least two fundamental inseparable but different things, one is some kind of a force, and one is some kind of a distinction.  Say for example, the "force" of a CPU and the bits this force is divided into.  Neither stands alone.  Neither are fully reducible to the other.

Arithmetic is just symbols unless there is somebody there to move the pencil.  It is only one half of what is needed, to my reasoning.

So far as I have been able to tell, I am somewhere in-between such philosophies.  I tend to not read much of philosophers because I prefer to do all my own thinking and learn everything the hard way.  This is slow going, and painful.  Standing not very high it is easy to fall off the pedestal and start over.  Nobody has yet, though, beaten back the bits.  I guess that means Leibnitz.

Building up now, given the two fundamental principles... where does the soul go in these.  That is my question to Bruno.  My suspicion is that it is a third element that I have not given... nor do I care to consider in the context of Physics or even Metaphysics, unless somehow FORCED to do so.  I think it is a deservedly separate topic.  But Bruno seems to suggest he has that as well or that it is construct-able.  In which case, some more "structure" is in order than to merely say some magic power word to cover it.  "It is just... arithmetic..." boom done.  No.  More...

--

"Groovy..."

light...@gmail.com

[Allen Francom]

Kim, 

Here is a recent example

http://www.wired.com/2015/12/outsiders-crack-a-50-year-old-math-problem/

If you give a math problem to a programmer and you tell him or her to watch ALL the bits involved in performance of the math, they will observe "steps" that the math symbols themselves fail to surface in a continuous fashion to the eyes of the mathematician.  Don't skip steps, don't fail to observe a bit flip and examine why did THAT bit flip, every step of the way.  Don't reduce maths.  Leave them LONG.  They started long for a reason.  If you reduce and simplify then you loose meaning and perhaps 'actual' mechanics.

Data compression and one time pad are key features of anything fundamental.  Fulcrums to place levers upon.

A little practice here and some faith to move mountains may tend to develop.

--

"Groovy..."

light...@gmail.com

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Dec 2015, at 23:48, Allen Francom wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Elsewhere we had started a discussion that deserves a more public facing mechanism.

I had complained that the universal computation is prima fascia adequate for physics based on what you and I know that is for whatever reason incredibly difficult to communicate in general to others.  And I am happy up to here.

Then I had a complaint about when you "venture off the reservation" to include matters of "soul" that are beyond the physics held in evidence this way.

Your counter-point which I did not and still do not fully understand or appreciate is that you are coming from a very heavy philosophical background...  "the meaning of life" type stuff, going way back.

So it goes, once "god has invented the integers" and the rest is left to the imagination of man,

Not the imagination of man. The imagination of numbers, which emerges from the additive and multiplicative structure of numbers.

how do we account for the identity of a soul. 

The soul cannot do that. The Inner God is no more nameable than the Outer God. But we can associate to any sound universal machine a soul, by the conjunction of "believe by the machine/number" and true (in the standard model of Arithmetic).

Which one.  How many "instances" of a "life" can it handle simultaneously, separately, across time, etc., and IS THERE ONLY ONE ? 

There is only one, described by the modal logic S4Grz, but it can differentiates into anyone. As long as it does not believe in an arithmetical falsity its theology, including its physics, is invariant. All difference are contingent.

What is the differentiation of "this one" and "that one", where we had just perfectly nailed "the rest of physics", in terms that can be considered to be finite, countable, and subject to 'information horizon' in terms of local systems.

I will think of a way to explain this, but it is basically given by the variants of the logic of self-reference. 

You had agreed that this is a very deep topic that you have not yet managed to elaborate on publicly and has real significance.  Again, I don't get it, and I am having a hard time imagining what you have done so far "extending" to address this realm.

In the past, I had made noises that you can make a "universal operating system" and multi-task "layers" of reality just fine, to include some realm of "soul" but this would still prove out to be the countable, finite, and information horizon kind of expression in the "universal dovetailer" reasoning...

Are you OK with the dovetailer argument up to step seven? It provides already the idea that we have to generalize Everett's move on the whole sigma_1 arithmetic, and so we have to justify the apparent "victory" of the quantum wave from the statistics on all computations, not just the "quantum" one. 

Anyway, I am all ears.  I've actually pondered over this for a couple years now and my interest is sincere, even if I find it so far somewhat objectionable.  ( how can you learn if you can't risk being wrong or so far under-informed - takes precedence over any objection )

I don't do that. The UDA (Universal Dovetailer argument) exposes a reduction of a problem (the computationalist mind-body problem) into another problem (the derivation of physics from a relative statistics on first person experiences).

Then AUDA (Arithmetical UDA) shows the solution that the universal machine already explains. I let her talk, thanks to the help of Gödel, Löb, Solovay, and many others. 

I can explain more, but most papers I wrote explains this, with varied level of details. UDA shows the necessity, and AUDA shows the possibility somehow.

I would be happy if someone shows me wrong, so feel free to find an error, without working in anaother theory of course.

Keep in mind that I am the skeptical here. I have more evidence for computationalism than for weak materialism. My only point is that you can't have both, without adding non Turing emulable magic to the mind.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Dec 2015, at 04:55, Allen Francom wrote:

Hi Kim,

If that is for me... 

What I buy is just reductionist and ground-up.  There needs be at least two fundamental inseparable but different things, one is some kind of a force, and one is some kind of a distinction.  Say for example, the "force" of a CPU and the bits this force is divided into.  Neither stands alone.  Neither are fully reducible to the other.

Arithmetic is just symbols unless there is somebody there to move the pencil.  It is only one half of what is needed, to my reasoning.

So far as I have been able to tell, I am somewhere in-between such philosophies.  I tend to not read much of philosophers because I prefer to do all my own thinking and learn everything the hard way.  This is slow going, and painful.  Standing not very high it is easy to fall off the pedestal and start over.  Nobody has yet, though, beaten back the bits.  I guess that means Leibnitz.

Building up now, given the two fundamental principles... where does the soul go in these.  That is my question to Bruno.  My suspicion is that it is a third element that I have not given... nor do I care to consider in the context of Physics or even Metaphysics, unless somehow FORCED to do so.  I think it is a deservedly separate topic.  But Bruno seems to suggest he has that as well or that it is construct-able.  In which case, some more "structure" is in order than to merely say some magic power word to cover it.  "It is just... arithmetic..." boom done.  No.  More...

But arithmetic justifies a whole theology, or psycho-logy (with the old sense of psyche). It is testable as it predicts the the logic of the observable must be extracted in a precise way from the logic of machine's self-reference, and that has been done at the propositional level, and we get a quantum logic, hopefully the one needed to get the unique measure. This lead top precise open problem, and one has been solved, as I explain in my last paper:

The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.06.013

We can come back on this. Note that arithmetical realism is what you need to believe to not get your kids out of the school when they teach that there is an infinity of prime numbers. It is a very weak hypothesis in both math and most sciences.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Brett Hall]

The philosopher Sam Harris from the USA will be interviewing David on his podcast tomorrow (to be published, I don't know when). Questions can be submitted via Twitter using the hashtag #WakingUpPodcast .

This is a valuable way, in my view, to get Deutsch's views out there to a younger audience (who've not read the books, participated in the newsgroups and so on...)

Cheers :)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Dec 2015, at 05:35, Allen Francom wrote:

Kim, 

Here is a recent example

http://www.wired.com/2015/12/outsiders-crack-a-50-year-old-math-problem/

If you give a math problem to a programmer and you tell him or her to watch ALL the bits involved in performance of the math, they will observe "steps" that the math symbols themselves fail to surface in a continuous fashion to the eyes of the mathematician.  Don't skip steps, don't fail to observe a bit flip and examine why did THAT bit flip, every step of the way.  Don't reduce maths.  Leave them LONG.  They started long for a reason.  If you reduce and simplify then you loose meaning and perhaps 'actual' mechanics.

Mathematical logic can be considered as the science of the difference between symbols and their interpretations. It explains why even arithmetic, and all Turing universal systems of beliefs cannot be reduced by any complete theory. 

So, no problem with your link, nor with your argument. Mechanism is not the "reductive" hypothesis that we are simple machine, because we can explain that simple machine have behaviors which are not reducible to simple theories.

It is a theorem of arithmetic that all rational sound universal machine have a soul which is not a machine from both the 3p and the 1p view of that machine. "soul" being defined by the method of Theaetetus, and rational belief by consistent sets of beliefs closed for the modus ponens rule.

On the everything-list I have provided arguments showing that Church's thesis and incompleteness save the machine from reductionism. Judson Webb wrote a book on just that point, seen first by Emil Post a long time ago. That should be obvious when you realize that the incompleteness forces all nuances between truth, provable, provable-and-true, provable-and-consistent, provable-and-true-and-consistent, to obey quite different logics, despite describing the exact same part of the arithmetical reality (and this being different for each machine, though). 

Physics is eventually given by the logic of "provable-and-true-and-consistent" on the universal dovetailing, which can be modeled by p -> []p, despite other interpretation of that formula are possible, and the theory applies to a variety of non-machine entities as well. We share the physical reality with some class of "angels"!

Data compression and one time pad are key features of anything fundamental.  Fulcrums to place levers upon.

A little practice here and some faith to move mountains may tend to develop.

All right.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Allen Francom]

Hi Bruno,

I like to consider in terms of the Known, Unknown, and Unknowable instead.

The "machine" cannot know if it is complete or not so it cannot prove it one way or the other, nor anybody in and of the machine, or any systems of symbols and reason they might develop.  In essence, all it can do is keep running.  A "proof" regarding completeness is "off the reservation" of reality from the get-go because it can't know for sure if it can't be complete by accident or if there is anything more or not in the Unknowable.  There is something as yet ill-considered in all of this sort of thing.  "Hasn't halted yet" seems the best answer, and move on.

Meanwhile the salvation of degrees of freedom comes from "information horizon".  As Steven Wright says, "You can't have everything, where would you put it ?"

Here we can discuss a perfect circle and a radius as imaginary vs. actually building such out of a finite set of marbles.

There is the math, and then there is doing the math.  The actual performance, which is not "all at once" by the eyes of any finite resource or known imagination to be held in evidence.

So... Is the soul a third thing ?  Or is it in and of the math and the doing of the math, and itself some entity with an information horizon.

I feel like you must ultimately be suggesting the soul is the "doing' part.  The "oomph".

[Gary Oberbrunner]

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

"soul" being defined by the method of Theaetetus,

This is of course the key -- whether a machine or being of any kind has a "soul" depends on what you think a "soul" is. You'll have to expand on your remark above. I suspect your definition doesn't have any connection whatsoever with eternal life, salvation, heaven, or other religious trappings, and so might be considered a misnomer by some.

--

Gary

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

It is also unclear to me, which precise meaning Bruno had in mind.

There's a part after Socrates shows that some narrow conception of Protagoreanism cannot be tenable in Theaetetus' idea of knowledge as perception where he asserts: More basic than the content of perception is reference to the existential property. Therefore sights, sounds, smells etc. "are/exist" in a way prior to some particular cases/content of sight, sound, smell. Examples of this are concepts like  "one", "two", "different", "same" or judgements such as “fair”, "beautiful", "ugly", “foul.” with reference to what exists that is not solely dependent on sensations produced by some external world. But because we're talking "what exists", I don't think it unreasonable that whatever exists, this whatever should be able to intuit or relate to what it is made of, at least to a certain extent, even if it didn't have the symbols or language to express truth about itself and the world in said language.

In context of machines, e.g. when E. Post shares his flavor of incompleteness, or in his "anticipation" writing, there is a similar existential claim towards an unseeing immaterial cognition or "creative germ" as he calls it, with statements like: "The conclusion that man is not a machine is invalid" or "The creative germ seems not to be capable of being purely presented but can be stated as consisting in constructing ever higher types." being common here. His abstract "space for symbols that enter certain relations", where "spatial" is emphasized to be not Euclidian, physical, or continuous etc. also resonates with the inability to represent the idea, similar to what is implied in the Theaetetus section I referred to.

Post's account of the machine's creativity in this context imho blurs the line between science and art, touching upon relations between the creative process he lays out for machines and transfinite ordinal numbers, like seeing where the creative process is Principia Mathematica superimposed on types which follow each other as transfinite ordinals. That "germ" continually transcending ever higher types by seeing previously unseen laws which give a numeric sequence and new symbols and interpretations at each turn...

In my tacky, blunt, everyday language, this is merely another flavor or way of parsing incompleteness: a machine can never specify a complete formal system as once we run the thing, we see that we could prove a theorem it doesn't prove. As a Jazz guitarist, this account of creativity is as humbling as it is devastating, and trying to nail some interpretation of soul or agency of recognition it rests upon, is destined to fail, given these sorts of formal systems and their constraints. But to negate "soul's existence" outright, may perhaps be a larger error because something is afoot that may not completely determine the process of proof... but we are nonetheless, as Post indicated, watching that process. Depends on our faith/theories. Apologies to Bruno if I'm completely confusing the issue for readers/posters of this group, which in these waters is more than probable. PGC    
 

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Allen,

On 09 Dec 2015, at 17:47, Allen Francom wrote:

Hi Bruno,

I like to consider in terms of the Known, Unknown, and Unknowable instead.

The "machine" cannot know if it is complete or not so it cannot prove it one way or the other, nor anybody in and of the machine, or any systems of symbols and reason they might develop. 

They can know that If they are consistent then they are incomplete.

In essence, all it can do is keep running.

Like all of us.

  A "proof" regarding completeness is "off the reservation" of reality from the get-go because it can't know for sure if it can't be complete by accident

It would need an infinite accident. No amount of finite information would make a machine complete, even just relatively to arithmetic.

or if there is anything more or not in the Unknowable. 

Machine can correctly bet on this. Consistent machine can guess correctly a lot of things about the unknowable, including its geometries and mathematics.

There is something as yet ill-considered in all of this sort of thing.  "Hasn't halted yet" seems the best answer, and move on.

The goal is to formulate and solve the mind-body problem.

Meanwhile the salvation of degrees of freedom comes from "information horizon".  As Steven Wright says, "You can't have everything, where would you put it ?"

"where" is an aristotelian notion. It is a temporary illusion. It is not to you that I have to defend this: space is an emerging concept.

Here we can discuss a perfect circle and a radius as imaginary vs. actually building such out of a finite set of marbles.

There is the math, and then there is doing the math.  The actual performance, which is not "all at once" by the eyes of any finite resource or known imagination to be held in evidence.

Performance is also an emerging notion, like energy, etc. The onbly thing which are assumed, at different levels is the idea that the physical brain is Turing emulable at some genuine level (genuine = keep my consciousness unchanged) and then the natural numbers + addition and multiplication laws.

So... Is the soul a third thing ? 

Yes, it is the third God of the greeks, and the third variants of provability, defined by the logic of the provable-and-true statements. It obeys formula like []p -> p, []p -> [][]p, but also the less obvious

[]([]((p -> []p) -> p) -> p (Gregorczyk).

Or is it in and of the math and the doing of the math, and itself some entity with an information horizon.

I feel like you must ultimately be suggesting the soul is the "doing' part.  The "oomph".

Yes. Like in Plotinus: matter is somehow created by the soul. And we get quantum logic, when we restricted the arithmetical interpretation of the soul's logic on the sigma_1 arithmetical propositions, which models the universal dovetailing. Indeed.

But matter is never created: it is only dreamed. All there is is 0, 1, 2, ... 

I can explain any details of this, but I am aware that people needs to do a bit of mathematical logic to get the technical points. I can explain those points, but it is obviously a long thing to do.  Do you like long poem?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

I take the soul to be the subject of the first person experience or of consciousness, that is: the intimate knower, the one who is in pain and know it.

I define knowing(p) by belief(p) & p (the "true opinion" of Theaetetus), and I define "belief" by "provable" as incompleteness makes "provable(p) -> p" unprovable by the machine. 

This is quite an oversimplification in psychology, but is natural for the study of correct machine, which is what we need to extract (correct) physics from machine's self-reference (and computationalism).

Then, well, it happens that most things asked for a soul in the greco-indian philosophy become theorems in that setting, like:

1) The soul has no name (no machine can believe its soul is a machine, or that it could be described by any third person term). In fact the soul is not a machine, and that is due to its keeping link with truth (itself not definable by the machine, although it can be approximated by the machine).

2) The soul is immortal (but this we already knew from Everett or just comp UDA). nevertheless Socrates proof of the immortality of the soul can be recast in this frame almost words by words. It is simple, but shoking for those who wish to be sure that with death we rest in peace.

3) The soul is the subject of the non communicable consciousness

4) The soul is the reason why matter eventually seems to exist (like I said to Allen, and that is common with most neopythagoreans and neoplatonists).

5) the soul has its own logic of time. In fact, like with Brouwer, the soul's logic is a subjective temporal (duration) logic.

 It is the logic of the self-extending self, with a natural tendency to dismiss the "others" (it is solipsistic, although once the machine bet on computationalism or on other, it does not need to defend "theoretical solipsism").

6) the soul defines the first person, and thus the space on which the measure must be taken to get the physics.

7) it is really Plato/Plotinus's notion of soul, and not the Aristotelian one (the form of the body, or the code, which I call sometimes the 3-soul, or the 3-1-view). Of course it differs from what the christian have elaborate on this, but here too, it depends: St-Augustin's notion of soul is quite closer (but then St-Augustin is the Christian which has re-introduced platonism in Christianity, like the Sufi did for the Muslims, and the Kaballa did for the Jews).

Bruno

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Gary

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Dec 2015, at 00:39, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Wednesday, December 9, 2015 at 5:47:25 PM UTC+1, Gary O wrote:

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

"soul" being defined by the method of Theaetetus,

This is of course the key -- whether a machine or being of any kind has a "soul" depends on what you think a "soul" is. You'll have to expand on your remark above. I suspect your definition doesn't have any connection whatsoever with eternal life, salvation, heaven, or other religious trappings, and so might be considered a misnomer by some.

It is also unclear to me, which precise meaning Bruno had in mind.

It would almost be a 1004 mistake to distinguish soul, person, consciousness and even mind too much quickly. Then later we can add nuances which distinguishes them relatively to some problem. 

Pythagorus and Xenophane defined the soul by "a number which can move itself". This is close to Aristotle's definition: the shape of the body. It is what the digital doctor can save on some hard disk, before re-up-loading 1-you in some body. 

It is immaterial, as it is a classical information pattern, like a program, waiting to be implemented in some machine (actually only relatively to you, as it is implemented in all universal and true arithmetical relations already).

This is also what I have called 3-1 persons points of view, as those admits finite 3p descriptions, to which we can ascribe some present or future first person knowledge.

I use soul in that more important sense, closer to Plotinus, your soul is the one knowing your subjective experience. That soul is purely a first person notion. It is the personal mind, the owner of your subjective life, the one able to remember personal private propositions. It is the one saying "I look at the particle and saw it running on the left side of the semi-transparent surface).

I use first person, knower, and soul basically as synonyms. Mind and Spirit are more general, and admit both non personal 3p feature, like in PI is irrationnal, but it will also admits personal feature, like "I can prove that 1+1=2", which is still 3p, even if personal. Eventually the soul is modeled by the personal []p (I can prove p) with the conjunction of the truth of p. That makes it undefinable by the machine, yet knowable, indeed we can identify the knower with what is known, structured by the logic obeyed by that notion (the "famous" S4Grz).

There's a part after Socrates shows that some narrow conception of Protagoreanism cannot be tenable in Theaetetus' idea of knowledge as perception where he asserts: More basic than the content of perception is reference to the existential property. Therefore sights, sounds, smells etc. "are/exist" in a way prior to some particular cases/content of sight, sound, smell.

The smelling ability of the universal person!

But smell is subtle chemical analysis, and relies on quantum mechanics; which needs to be derived first. Smelling leads to the most extraordinary qualia, and memories (like Marcel Proust illustrated well), but humans evolution favors the more symbolic vision and audition. I bet one day people will buy artificial brain, not for being immortal, but for extending the range of smells, as it might be the gate of the deepest qualia. 

Examples of this are concepts like  "one", "two", "different", "same" or judgements such as “fair”, "beautiful", "ugly", “foul.” with reference to what exists that is not solely dependent on sensations produced by some external world.

If computationalism is correct, all possible histories are emulated in arithmetic, but the first person itself is distributed in a complex way on all histories (by the FPI). The experiences does exist, but there is no algorithm to associate them, or not, to this or that histories, even after betting on a level.

But because we're talking "what exists", I don't think it unreasonable that whatever exists, this whatever should be able to intuit or relate to what it is made of, at least to a certain extent, even if it didn't have the symbols or language to express truth about itself and the world in said language.

Once we postulate enough to prove the existence of a universal system, then we get an ontology rich enough to develop dreams whose coherence refer to much bigger ontology. It is a Skolem-like phenomenon, also in Alice in Wonderland, or in "Yellow Submarine (the Beatles Movie), or in Philemon (a French comics): in logic, there are structure which are small from outside/3p, and transfinitely bigger from inside/1p.

From outside, the transfinite only measures the ignorance of the universal machine. Incompleteness is called "essential", because it applies to all machine or effective extensions of such machines. There is a sense to say that the relative ignorance grows with the knowledge.

Reality, assuming computationalism, is such that the more you know about it, the more you realize it is big and that you know about nothing. The less you know, the more you are near believing that you know everything, and the fixed point is the knowledge of the universal person that you can associate to (any) universal machine. 

It is the "universal soul" of Plotinus (in the lexicon suggested), the inner God, that we can awake for some time through different "religious" practice (but which is negated in most religious institutions which usually do not want that people got that knowledge (as people become immune to any argument per authority in that process).

In context of machines, e.g. when E. Post shares his flavor of incompleteness, or in his "anticipation" writing, there is a similar existential claim towards an unseeing immaterial cognition or "creative germ"

Yes. He derived this from his "law" (Post law = the future Church Thesis). I disagree with E. Post here: it is not a law, but a thesis (which is both a thesis in cognitive science, computer science and in mathematics).

as he calls it, with statements like: "The conclusion that man is not a machine is invalid"

Yes, this because some paragraph above, in his anticipation notes: he made the Lucas-Penrose mistake of deducing that man is creative and machines are not.

But then he saw what Gödel saw too formally, and which has been proved by Hilbert and Bernays the first time later, and then again made beautiful by Löb, which is that the machine can do the same reasoning, and refutes that their are machine or ... doubt their consistency. Basically Lucas and Penrose makes the assumption that they are consistent (and knows it in some way), but no machine can do that. So the use of (Gödel) incompleteness against Mechanism that Post foresaw is not valid, and Post foresaw that too!

or "The creative germ seems not to be capable of being purely presented but can be stated as consisting in constructing ever higher types." being common here.

The set of total computable functions is enumerable, but non recursively enumerable (no programs can generate it). But it is also constructively non recursively enumerable. Given any W_i trying to generate it, you can compute a function f(i) providing an element in the set, but out of the W_i. It is also what Webb calls the mechanization of Gödel's diagonal argument, and it exploited to derive Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (~[]f -> ~[]~[]f) and Löb's theorem ([]([]p->p)->[]p).

His abstract "space for symbols that enter certain relations", where "spatial" is emphasized to be not Euclidian, physical, or continuous etc. also resonates with the inability to represent the idea, similar to what is implied in the Theaetetus section I referred to.

Maybe. But Post was unaware of S4Grz. Now, S4Grz describes an epistemology of an intuitionist subject, and this makes the Theaetetus, meta-formalized in meta-arithmetic, defining a "creative germ" in the sense of Brouwer. []p is creative in the technical sense of Post, and incompleteness makes the Theaetetus defining a creative subject in Brouwer's sense. Well seen.

Post's account of the machine's creativity in this context imho blurs the line between science and art, touching upon relations between the creative process he lays out for machines and transfinite ordinal numbers, like seeing where the creative process is Principia Mathematica superimposed on types which follow each other as transfinite ordinals.

Possible. This can be related to the notion of constructive ordinals, and Turing might believe differently, but I should reread his papers on this to say more. Art might asks for more, notably on the non-communicable parts.

That "germ" continually transcending ever higher types by seeing previously unseen laws which give a numeric sequence and new symbols and interpretations at each turn...

In my tacky, blunt, everyday language, this is merely another flavor or way of parsing incompleteness: a machine can never specify a complete formal system as once we run the thing, we see that we could prove a theorem it doesn't prove.

The machine sees it too. The problem is that neither the machine, nor us if the machine is about as complex than us, can see if that non provable proposition is true or not, as we don't know if our beliefs, or the machine's beliefs, are consistent or not.

Human have a big non-monotonic layer, so they can be inconsistent locally, and revise their beliefs in case of contradiction. To extract physics, we don't need to rely to that non-monotonic realm. We accept that if B entails A, then B and C entails A too (as we work at the exact substitution level in a digital realm). In real life it is false, take A = "I will do ski tomorrow", B = "It is a sunny week", and C = " I broke my leg this night".

As a Jazz guitarist, this account of creativity is as humbling as it is devastating, and trying to nail some interpretation of soul or agency of recognition it rests upon, is destined to fail, given these sorts of formal systems and their constraints.

The soul of the machine refutes all 3p description of themselves, and that is why, if they understood well computationalism, they know that saying "yes" to the doctor asks necessarily for a big leap of faith. They also know that they cannot enforce computationalism or even this or that substitution level to any other person than themselves. 

But to negate "soul's existence" outright, may perhaps be a larger error because something is afoot that may not completely determine the process of proof... but we are nonetheless, as Post indicated, watching that process.

Yes. Negating the soul is the same as denying consciousness. 

Depends on our faith/theories. Apologies to Bruno if I'm completely confusing the issue for readers/posters of this group, which in these waters is more than probable. PGC    

Not too bad :)

Bruno

 

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[John Clark]

Bruno, how does your concept of the soul differ from the modern concept of information? You say "the soul has no name" but you just gave it a name "soul", I prefer the name "information". You say "the soul is immortal" but Quantum mechanics says information probably (Black Holes may be a problem) can't be destroyed. You say "the soul is the subject of the non communicable consciousness" but information {along with generic matter) creates consciousness and consciousness can not be communicated directly. You say "the soul has its own logic of time" but so do information processing machines. You say "the soul defines the first person" but the only difference between one person and another is the information on how generic matter is arranged.

You also say  "it is really Plato/Plotinus's notion of soul, and not the Aristotelian" but I have no comment on that, I've lost interest in the ancient Greeks.

 John K Clark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Dec 2015, at 17:45, John Clark wrote:

Bruno, how does your concept of the soul differ from the modern concept of information? You say "the soul has no name" but you just gave it a name "soul",

By name, I mean a formula in the language of the machine. 

Since Gödel we know that we can define "provable" in the language of arithmetic, and more generally, we can define provable by a machine M  in the language used by that machine.

Literally, the definition of Theatetus of "knowable p" is ((believable p) and  (true p)). 

But since Tarski (and Gödel) we know that we cannot define "true p" in the language of the machine.

But we can still study, from outside, the logic of []p & p, with the truth of p emulating (true p). Incompleteness guaranties that this will obey to a different logic than the logic of "beliefs" ([]p), and indeed it leads to a special logic of knowledge (S4Grz).

I say, with Dennett, that a machine believes p if the machine asserts p. (Intentional stance). I limit myself to the ideal case of machines which set of beliefs is close for the modus ponens rule, and which are rich enough to prove p -> []p when p is a sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (or the equivalent for any other universal language).

I prefer the name "information".

But "information" is quite a general term, sometimes related to the meaning, sometime not (Shannon, Landauer, Holevo ...). 

With computationalism, it is normal to relate "information processing" to "mind", but this is very general. We need a knower, to get a soul. The knower will arise here for a very special type of information processing, that we can describe using the tools in theoretical computer science and mathematical logic, like provability, truth (that we can define in second order (meta)-logic, etc. 

You say "the soul is immortal" but Quantum mechanics says information probably (Black Holes may be a problem) can't be destroyed.

But I have to NOT assumed anything in physics. Indeed, to test the machine's theory, we must derive physics from it, and compare with the empirical physics.

You say "the soul is the subject of the non communicable consciousness" but information {along with generic matter) creates consciousness and consciousness can not be communicated directly.

But then you suppose that consciousness exist and is not communicable. We suppose only that it exists and is invariant for some substitution. From that we extract that both consciousness and matter must be explained by arithmetical relations only, especially if we want benefits of the Gödelian distinction between what the machine can justify or believe rationally (from its description), and what the machine can intuit or guess, but be incapable of defining, like "truth", consciousness (knowledge of some truth).

You say "the soul has its own logic of time" but so do information processing machines.

Because you embed the machine is a reality having some time, but we can't do that. Keep in mind that the work is formal and that we assume (in the second formal part) only the axioms of Robinson arithmetic.

To get the internal semantics, we allow the machine living "in" Robinson Arithmetic to develop all the beliefs they needs, whoich can be  (and will be) richer than arithmetic.

You say "the soul defines the first person" but the only difference between one person and another is the information on how generic matter is arranged.

If that was the case, in the duplication Washington-Moscow, you would be at the two place at once, when each first person will *know* that they are at only one place (with a possible belief that they have a doppelganger at the other place).

In the math part, this difficulties is explained by the fact that G* will prove that []p is equivalent with []p & p, but the machine cannot access that truth. The knower is not the machine+its-beliefs, it is a special indexical liked to a notion of truth. Incompleteness forces us to take into account 8 different logics:

p (truth)

[]p (G and G*)

[]p & p (S4Grz)

[]p & <>t (Z, and Z*)

[]p & <>t & p (X and X*).

To get physics, (with Universal Dovetailer Argument and the First Person Indeterminacy in mind) we still need to add the formula "p -> []p", with p atomic sentences, to the logic G (and G*).  It captures comp (and some important weakenings).

The result is that the resultant logic are enough close to quantum logic(s) to have a quantization on the atomic formula (the leaves of the universal dovetailing).

You also say  "it is really Plato/Plotinus's notion of soul, and not the Aristotelian" but I have no comment on that, I've lost interest in the ancient Greeks.

We are in the Aristotelian era. It means most people believe that reality is WYSIWYG (what we see, observe, measure is the reality). For Plato and the rational mystics, what we see might only be a symptom of a different reality, may be a purely mathematical one, or a theological one. 

300 years before JC, "mathematician" meant "skeptics on Primary Matter", and an high degree in mathematics was a prerequisite for studying theology. mathematics has inspired Plato for his world of ideas, and Church thesis justifies the Pythagorean view of that world of ideas: the recursively enumerable set of machine/programs and their computations, emulated in virtue of the truth of every elementary arithmetical sentences (even just one diophantine polynomial of degree four will do).

It is not my theory, it is the theory of the universal machine which looks inward (in the precise Gödel-Kleene sense). UDA gives the intuition and can help human to get the global picture, but AUDA (Arithmetical UDA) is the same entirely translated into Arithmetic (although away other universal system could have been used instead).

The next step is to prove the equivalent of Gleason theorem for the ortho-structure Z1*, X1* and/or S4Grz1 (= S4Grz1*). Then we are close enough to Gauge invariance and Victor Stenger type of derivation of the standard model. Of course this is a program for the next generation, hoping such hot subject will be less taboo that today.

The ancient greeks were varied and held many different intuitions.

It is probably not a coincidence that those who look inward the most honestly got what *any* universal machine can discover when looking inward and staying honest/correct. 

Bruno

 John K Clark

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[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>>​

Bruno, how does your concept of the soul differ from the modern concept of information? You say "the soul has no name" but you just gave it a name "soul",

​> ​

By name, I mean a formula in the language of the machine. 

​By name I mean a way to specify something. Turing proved that most Real numbers can have no name because there is no way to specify a particular one, but you just mentions several different ways to differentiate a soul from a non-soul so it can have a name.    ​

​>>​

I prefer the name "information".

​> ​

But "information" is quite a general term, sometimes related to the meaning, sometime not

​I mean information as Shannon meant it, and so I ask again how does information differ from "soul"?​

 

​> ​

With computationalism, it is normal to relate "information processing" to "mind", but this is very general. We need a knower, to get a soul.

​And to get a knower all you need are generic atoms and the information on how to arrange them. ​That's it.

 

​

And so I ask again how does information differ from "soul"?​

 

​>> ​

You say "the soul is immortal" but Quantum mechanics says information probably (Black Holes may be a problem) can't be destroyed.

​> ​

But I have to NOT assumed anything in physics.

​But I did and I said information can not be destroyed, and you said the soul can not be destroyed. ​

S​

o I ask again how does information differ from "soul"?​

 

​>> ​

You say "the soul is the subject of the non communicable consciousness" but information {along with generic matter) creates consciousness and consciousness can not be communicated directly.

​> ​

But then you suppose that consciousness exist

​EVERYBODY supposes ​

 consciousness exist

​.​

​> ​

and is not communicable.

​And there is no way to prove you are not the only conscious being in the universe.​

 

​>>​

You say "the soul has its own logic of time" but so do information processing machines.

​> ​

Because you embed the machine is a reality having some time, but we can't do that.

​If I pause a computer during a computation and then start it up again until it finishes the answer it provides is the same answer I would have gotten if I let it run continually, and if I put you under anesthesia and then wake you up you couldn't tell if you were out for a minute or a hour of a day or a year. 

​S​

o I ask again how does information differ from "soul"?​

 

​>> ​

You say "the soul defines the first person" but the only difference between one person and another is the information on how generic matter is arranged.

​> ​

If that was the case, in the duplication Washington-Moscow, you

​Who is "you"?​

 

​> ​

would be at the two place at once

​The same thing wouldn't be at two places at once because ​the information would be different, one would have information about how Moscow looks and the other information about how Washington looks.

 

​> ​

We are in the Aristotelian era.

​If you say so, but as I said ​

I've lost interest in the ancient Greeks.

​ John K Clark​

 

[Allen Francom]

Hi Bruno,

I am trying to pin you down very specifically. If we didn't have matter would we be having this conversation ? I say no, we need some "force" and some "distinction".

As below, so above.

A CPU and some bits are a FINE analogy.

Starting there, either the soul is inherent in the CPU "oomph" or the soul is Engineer-able in an emergent 'realm-on-tape'.  You said perhaps over-simply "yes".  So, to be sure...  the oomph and also distinction are always present at all levels, you can't have one without the other.  It is chicken and egg here.  Which comes first.

In the end, it does not have to be more complicated unless we want to invoke a God's eyes watching his computer screen as some sort of separate from the creation... but then where is the linkage..  to be spoken of the God must be also part of "the universe", something that "is".

Point being, there is no escape.  The CPU and the bits is a FINE analogy.  Now, either you have to engineer realms or lay-out more properties of CPU.

Or, you need to explain a magic trick beyond the minimalist two principles.

I am trying very hard not to allow the conversation to jump on to different train tracks before arriving at the station or heading back for repairs.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Dec 2015, at 20:59, Allen Francom wrote:

Hi Bruno,

I am trying to pin you down very specifically. If we didn't have matter would we be having this conversation ?

If the number 667 did not exist, would we have this conversation?

The existence of matter, or of the "illusion of matter" must be explained from arithmetic, and so must be a consequence of arithmetic, so, if we did not have matter, computationalism would be false, and in that case we would have this conversation for some unknown reason.

Have you study the UDA, which sums well the reason why physics is emergent from arithmetic (actually physics is a part of theology, and it is the theology, including physics, which emerge from arithmetic.

I say no, we need some "force" and some "distinction".

We need to assume only classical logic + the non-logical axioms (of RA: Robinson arithmetic):

0 ≠ s(x)                     (= 0 is not the successor of a number)

s(x) = s(y) -> x = y     (different numbers have different successors)

x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))    (except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)

x+0 = x                      (if you add zero to a number, you get that number)

x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to a successor of a number y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0                   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)

x*s(y)=(x*y)+x    (exercise)

"force" and physical distinction emerge from this (in the way I explain by using the Göel-Löb-Solovay logics G and G*).

As below, so above.

A CPU and some bits are a FINE analogy.

Starting there,

?

A CPU is a material object. We can start there for the UD-Argument, but not for the translation of the UDA in arithmetic.

either the soul is inherent in the CPU "oomph" or the soul is Engineer-able in an emergent 'realm-on-tape'.  You said perhaps over-simply "yes".  So, to be sure...  the oomph and also distinction are always present at all levels, you can't have one without the other.  It is chicken and egg here.  Which comes first.

We assume one universal system, and I use elementary (Robinson) Arithmetic to fix the thing. It is not entirely trivial that it is Turing universal, but you can find a proof in Boolos and Jeffrey book, or in Epstein & Carnielli book. It is "well known" (by logicians). 

In the end, it does not have to be more complicated unless we want to invoke a God's eyes watching his computer screen as some sort of separate from the creation... but then where is the linkage..  to be spoken of the God must be also part of "the universe", something that "is".

Which universe? The physical one? The whole point of the UD reasoning is that this cannot work. 

Point being, there is no escape.  The CPU and the bits is a FINE analogy.  Now, either you have to engineer realms or lay-out more properties of CPU.

The only CPU I have is given by the axioms given above.

Or, you need to explain a magic trick beyond the minimalist two principles.

Which principles?

I am trying very hard not to allow the conversation to jump on to different train tracks before arriving at the station or heading back for repairs.

Do you want me to explain the UD-Argument? My feeling is that you don't take it into account. It is not clear what are your assumptions. Are you OK with the first two steps, or just with the first(*)? 

Bruno

(*) you can find the 8th step version here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

John,

The difference between information and soul, is that information is a 3p notion, and soul is an 1p notion. Then look again at our conversation on step 3, which understanding is pre-supposed here. But I see you come back with your rhetorical tricks so I will not insist.

Bruno

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[Allen Francom]

Hi Bruno.

Let me start again.  By saying "No."

The "CPU" and the "Bits" are merely words that represent the primary principles.  Something goes, and whatever it is has distinctions.

The key thought though is that it is "going".

The analogy is fine.  CPU and Bits.

They are just words to us, within the model.

Pick any other words and the principles will stack up similarly.

We're not arguing over whose symbols are more realistic.

We are discussing that the symbols must be "kinetic" and also "distinct"

And or we must also prescribe what it is that is there prior to "the universe" that can provide for the operating logic "".

[Gary Oberbrunner]

On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

I take the soul to be the subject of the first person experience or of consciousness, that is: the intimate knower, the one who is in pain and know it.

I define knowing(p) by belief(p) & p (the "true opinion" of Theaetetus), and I define "belief" by "provable" as incompleteness makes "provable(p) -> p" unprovable by the machine. 

This is quite an oversimplification in psychology, but is natural for the study of correct machine, which is what we need to extract (correct) physics from machine's self-reference (and computationalism).

... and then you give some properties of this concept. Then you create an implicit equivalence in the mind of the reader between your concept of "soul" which is logical and information-theoretic and the commonly-accepted use of the word (mostly religious), by implying (more than implying, really) that the shared properties create that equivalence.

But in fact there is no such equivalence. Let's for the moment call your concept "machine-subject" (you define it as a subject). The question then becomes how is a machine-subject related to what we commonly think of as a soul? (I'm deliberately avoiding the question of whether that thing, as commonly understood, exists or could exist.) You say that they share some properties (immortality, having no name, being the subject of consciousness and so on), and then imply that they are identical. But that is not even an argument, much less a valid argument.

The problem is not with your concept of machine-subject, which is interesting in itself. It's the way you use language to make that concept seem grander or more relevant to human experience.

In short, I don't think (from what I've read of your writings, including the wonderful Amoeba's Secret (for which, translation thanks to Russel!)) your work bears on what we think of as the soul at all. In particular it sheds no light on whether that thing (the religious thing) exists, can affect matter, or anything else.

--

Gary

[John Clark]

On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

The difference between information and soul, is that information is a 3p notion, and soul is an 1p notion.

​You've never been clear about what "3p" means (the view of the multiverse from the 3p??)  but clearly "1p" means "I",  and I know what information means and use it every day.​ You should give it a try too.

  John K Clark

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 5:44 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 10 Dec 2015, at 00:39, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote

There's a part after Socrates shows that some narrow conception of Protagoreanism cannot be tenable in Theaetetus' idea of knowledge as perception where he asserts: More basic than the content of perception is reference to the existential property. Therefore sights, sounds, smells etc. "are/exist" in a way prior to some particular cases/content of sight, sound, smell.

The smelling ability of the universal person!

But smell is subtle chemical analysis, and relies on quantum mechanics; which needs to be derived first. Smelling leads to the most extraordinary qualia, and memories (like Marcel Proust illustrated well), but humans evolution favors the more symbolic vision and audition. I bet one day people will buy artificial brain, not for being immortal, but for extending the range of smells, as it might be the gate of the deepest qualia. 

Indeed, judging by the relative size of relevant brain machinery, smell tops the list. Unfortunately, this seems to be of little use to artists and creative types (not in the Post sense, I mean people working in creative industries). First it would seem that there's a huge technological barrier but it's a difficult question even if we master that. Say we do manage to find an index of smells that lights up the appropriate sections of the vast corresponding brain regions in question in scans, and consider the technological problem to deliver these through some technology to be solved: what symphony, film, or smells game would we enjoy or appreciate?

Even if we could reproduce every smell with molecular accuracy, there is no way for the smell artist to know that some sandalwood variant reminds a person of their grandparents' attic when they were infants, while to the next person it's a reminder of how some temple smelled when they made a trip to India in their twenties. No doubt that it would get us closer to qualia and that in the competition for virtual worlds the question will remain an elephant in the room just because of vast subtle neuro-chemical analysis going on.

 

In context of machines, e.g. when E. Post shares his flavor of incompleteness, or in his "anticipation" writing, there is a similar existential claim towards an unseeing immaterial cognition or "creative germ"

Yes. He derived this from his "law" (Post law = the future Church Thesis). I disagree with E. Post here: it is not a law, but a thesis (which is both a thesis in cognitive science, computer science and in mathematics).

That seems absolutist even if he often indicates that with regard to mathematics he isn't. 

 

as he calls it, with statements like: "The conclusion that man is not a machine is invalid"

Yes, this because some paragraph above, in his anticipation notes: he made the Lucas-Penrose mistake of deducing that man is creative and machines are not.

But then he saw what Gödel saw too formally, and which has been proved by Hilbert and Bernays the first time later, and then again made beautiful by Löb, which is that the machine can do the same reasoning, and refutes that their are machine or ... doubt their consistency. Basically Lucas and Penrose makes the assumption that they are consistent (and knows it in some way), but no machine can do that. So the use of (Gödel) incompleteness against Mechanism that Post foresaw is not valid, and Post foresaw that too!

And he saw and raises duplication as "machine man" to make the point that man can't construct a machine that he can prove to preside over the same mental acts that he performs, but that we can construct machines that would prove similar theorems for their mental activity. This is often ignored in relevant discussions surrounding Lucas and Penrose.  

 

His abstract "space for symbols that enter certain relations", where "spatial" is emphasized to be not Euclidian, physical, or continuous etc. also resonates with the inability to represent the idea, similar to what is implied in the Theaetetus section I referred to.

Maybe. But Post was unaware of S4Grz. Now, S4Grz describes an epistemology of an intuitionist subject, and this makes the Theaetetus, meta-formalized in meta-arithmetic, defining a "creative germ" in the sense of Brouwer. []p is creative in the technical sense of Post, and incompleteness makes the Theaetetus defining a creative subject in Brouwer's sense. Well seen.

In the Davis edition there are parenthesis that state "All of the above before reading Brouwer". I wonder whether this was Davis or Post, lol.

 

As a Jazz guitarist, this account of creativity is as humbling as it is devastating, and trying to nail some interpretation of soul or agency of recognition it rests upon, is destined to fail, given these sorts of formal systems and their constraints.

The soul of the machine refutes all 3p description of themselves, and that is why, if they understood well computationalism, they know that saying "yes" to the doctor asks necessarily for a big leap of faith. They also know that they cannot enforce computationalism or even this or that substitution level to any other person than themselves. 

Those guys think it to be some flaky new age nonsense, which may or may not constitute merely evidence for character of theological prejudice, but such question is irrelevant when it's common practice to deny consciousness as materialists. That marks the end of rational discussion, and the hijacking of such discussion for some advertisement that "scientific practice" can pose as, without genuine exchange, often with some syntax like "actually there exists or not x,y,z, therefore you are wrong" that doesn't specify the theory they're working with. PGC

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Dec 2015, at 19:15, Gary Oberbrunner wrote:

On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

I take the soul to be the subject of the first person experience or of consciousness, that is: the intimate knower, the one who is in pain and know it.

I define knowing(p) by belief(p) & p (the "true opinion" of Theaetetus), and I define "belief" by "provable" as incompleteness makes "provable(p) -> p" unprovable by the machine. 

This is quite an oversimplification in psychology, but is natural for the study of correct machine, which is what we need to extract (correct) physics from machine's self-reference (and computationalism).

... and then you give some properties of this concept. Then you create an implicit equivalence in the mind of the reader between your concept of "soul" which is logical and information-theoretic

I just define the soul by the knower. There is a long tradition of doing this. It is very natural as consciousness is at the least a knowledge of some truth. 

It is not obvious that it is logical and information theoretic, because those notions are 3p notions, and the soul of the machine (accepting to identify the soul with the knower) will be proved to have no third person description at all expressible by the machine itself. It is more related to truth and semantics. 

You might thought that "[]p & p" describes the soul, but it does not, as you can't define the idea that p is true (for any p) to the machine. I can explain more, but everything I say relies on a good understanding of Gödel and Löb's theorem. 

Then why define the knower by []p & p, well that is the ingenuous idea of Theaetetus, it is when the machine believe/assert p, when p is actually true. It makes the new modal logic obeying S4, which is accepted as a logic of knowledge or knowability in the standard literature. 

and the commonly-accepted use of the word (mostly religious), by implying (more than implying, really) that the shared properties create that equivalence.

In conscience and mechanism, I give more explanation about this. But when we apply theory, we do accept definition. None are mine. What is mine is the simple showing that those definition make sense in term of a machine which observe itself. G is the logic of self-reference of the Löbian machine, and it imposes that the logic of [*]p defined (recursively) by []p & p in G, obeys a precise logic S4Grz.

So, it does attribute a knower to the machine, and that knower obeys S4Grz, not G. It can be shwon that the knower does not recognize itself in any 3p description, that it has no name, etc.

So, an antic definition of the knower/soul works in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine (and more general entities).

But in fact there is no such equivalence.

How do you know that. I use the semi-axiomatic method, not defining a concept in a more precise way than needed. So at the level where the things is described, the equivalence used are due to representation theorem. I don'r leave at any moment the initial theory: I work in RA, and i Inyerview PA and its consistent (or sound) extensions.

Let's for the moment call your concept "machine-subject" (you define it as a subject). The question then becomes how is a machine-subject related to what we commonly think of as a soul?

It obeys to the axiom defining a knower: that is: it knows only truth (that is part of the common axiom accepted for knoweldge in analytical philosophy): the axiom Know(p) -> p. It has some self-knowledge: if it knows p then it knows that it knows p. 

It is a knower. Some people have argue that a machine cannot be a knower, because Gödel's theorem, or G, makes it impossible to obey a logic of knowledge. But the Theatetical knower defined in the the logic of self-reference argues the same, and refuse to identify itself with its body/machine/description/name.So we understand how hard is the computationalist assumption for a machine. It remains consistent, the G* of the machine can proves this, and that explain how the machine can intuit (produce as true by some abductive inference) soon or later.

Then the lexicon given between Plato and arithmetic extends to the Soul theory of Plato. 

As a  scientist, I do not pretend that this theory is true. Just that it is the canonical classical theory of the machine itself, using the most standard semi-axiomatic definition.

(I'm deliberately avoiding the question of whether that thing, as commonly understood, exists or could exist.)

If you agree that Peano Arithmetic is sound, then it exists. If you agree that some Turing universal machine can develop sound beliefs on themselves, then it exists. 

You say that they share some properties (immortality, having no name, being the subject of consciousness and so on), and then imply that they are identical.

They are necessarily identical IF we assume classical computationalism. That is "computationalism" + classical philosophy.

But that is not even an argument, much less a valid argument.

What would be the difference? people arguing against the usual definition are sometimes people arguing against mechanism, or against the idea that it is impossible to distinguish dream and reality. 

I just show that incompleteness automatical associate a first person notion to the machine, which explains the difficulty we have to define it, to associate it to a machine, ... 

At the least I give a tool showing the non validity of arguments in Plato, etc. There is no claim of identity, only claim that the definition works for what is asked. 

The problem is not with your concept of machine-subject, which is interesting in itself. It's the way you use language to make that concept seem grander or more relevant to human experience.

It is the simplest definition (and the most old, and debated, which is normal as it leads to Plato against Aristotle theology).

It associates a first person point of view of the machine. You might have a different theory, equivalent or not. But that antic idea just work fine for the non obvious reason of incompleteness). 

keep in mind that we must extract physics from a statistic of the computation *as seen from the first person view". 

I do identify "soul", "person/first person" "knower", because to introduce distinction here is not necessary. There is no claim of definitive equivalence. The notion are based on indexicals, and will have different colors for different axioms or system of belief (their "beweisbar predicate).

In short, I don't think (from what I've read of your writings, including the wonderful Amoeba's Secret (for which, translation thanks to Russel!)) your work bears on what we think of as the soul at all. In particular it sheds no light on whether that thing (the religious thing) exists, can affect matter, or anything else.

You must understand all the theorems, or read Plotinus:  the soul *is* at the origin of matter. It is a key step toward the explanation of the emergence of matter from the knowledge and the consistent belief (and also the consistent knowledge) of the (true) sigma_1 sentences (which is equivalent (in some technical sense) to the leaves of the universal dovetailing. 

The soul is just the mathematical meta-definition of the first person, which we need for the statistics on the first persons, to which UDA has reduced physics to be.

And then it works. The sigma_1 restriction leads to the logic S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* which define canonically classical and intuitionist quantum logic for the notion of observable, and sensible.

This makes Plato consistent, but also necessary if we bet on classical computationalism. And we can test the quantum logics obtained with the empiric quantum logic. Up to now, it fits remarkably well. The next step is to prove the "arithmetical Gleason theorem", and get the relevant group theories.

Nowhere I claim that the self-referentially correct universal machine has the correct theology, I claim only

that it is a (neo)platonist theory including physics and so that we can test that theology. And I derived the propositional logic of the observable already. I was sure that it would be refuted before 2000, which would be nice as we would have learn something, and try less classical theories.

All the work is made possible by the existence of equivalence at the G* level (true but not justifiable or knowable) by the machine.

In my modest opinion, this is the first explanation of consciousness and matter, which fits the facts, and which is derived from very old simple idea (Plato, to be short) interpreted in arithmetic.

I can explain more, but then I might need to come back to some basic logical notion before (modal logic, recursion theory, the link between, self-reference, ...).

May be I misunderstood your critics, feel free to elaborate if this answer missed the point.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Dec 2015, at 19:25, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

The difference between information and soul, is that information is a 3p notion, and soul is an 1p notion.

​You've never been clear about what "3p" means (the view of the multiverse from the 3p??)  

In UDA: 3p means the content of an observer's diary or memory describing some duplication experience, without participating himself (that is without entreing the duplication device).

In UDA, 1p means the content of the diary of the experiencer of the duplication. It contains histories like WWMWMMMWWWWM when he is duplicated repeatedly.

In AUDA 3p is basically arithmetic, and the 1p are defined by the theaetetical variant of the logic of self-reference. 

but clearly "1p" means "I",  

No. "I" admits two interpretations (or more). Natural language is ambiguous on this, even more when self-duplication is introduced. Sometimes it means the knower: the one who knows that he has some toothache despite the dentist claims everything is OK. Sometimes it means the body of the knower; like in "I lost my tooth".

Paradigmatical example: the WM-duplication. The 3p I can be said to be in two city after the duplication, but the 1-I is never in two city at once, which explains its histories of encountering precise cities all the times in the self-duplication, and having sometimes random histories: like WWWWWMWMM.

Bruno

and I know what information means and use it every day.​ You should give it a try too.

  John K Clark

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Dec 2015, at 20:01, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 5:44 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 10 Dec 2015, at 00:39, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote

There's a part after Socrates shows that some narrow conception of Protagoreanism cannot be tenable in Theaetetus' idea of knowledge as perception where he asserts: More basic than the content of perception is reference to the existential property. Therefore sights, sounds, smells etc. "are/exist" in a way prior to some particular cases/content of sight, sound, smell.

The smelling ability of the universal person!

But smell is subtle chemical analysis, and relies on quantum mechanics; which needs to be derived first. Smelling leads to the most extraordinary qualia, and memories (like Marcel Proust illustrated well), but humans evolution favors the more symbolic vision and audition. I bet one day people will buy artificial brain, not for being immortal, but for extending the range of smells, as it might be the gate of the deepest qualia. 

Indeed, judging by the relative size of relevant brain machinery, smell tops the list. Unfortunately, this seems to be of little use to artists and creative types (not in the Post sense, I mean people working in creative industries). First it would seem that there's a huge technological barrier but it's a difficult question even if we master that. Say we do manage to find an index of smells that lights up the appropriate sections of the vast corresponding brain regions in question in scans, and consider the technological problem to deliver these through some technology to be solved: what symphony, film, or smells game would we enjoy or appreciate?

Soon or later, I guess we will explore this. Assuming we don't destroy ourselves and default hypothesis. It is not for tomorrow, I would say. 

Even if we could reproduce every smell with molecular accuracy, there is no way for the smell artist to know that some sandalwood variant reminds a person of their grandparents' attic when they were infants, while to the next person it's a reminder of how some temple smelled when they made a trip to India in their twenties.

That is true. But that is true for the sound too, even if there are perhaps objective relation between harmony, frequence and beauty. I know a music which I dislike because it was a tube during a bad period, and my "stupid" neurons have not avoid building some association/connotations. To be sure, there are also good association: I do love some music because it reminds me good time.

No doubt that it would get us closer to qualia and that in the competition for virtual worlds the question will remain an elephant in the room just because of vast subtle neuro-chemical analysis going on.

We can hope for the best, and try to avoid the worst. The basic idea is harm reduction, and hell is paved of good intention. We might need to be egoist if only for altruist reason! 

 

In context of machines, e.g. when E. Post shares his flavor of incompleteness, or in his "anticipation" writing, there is a similar existential claim towards an unseeing immaterial cognition or "creative germ"

Yes. He derived this from his "law" (Post law = the future Church Thesis). I disagree with E. Post here: it is not a law, but a thesis (which is both a thesis in cognitive science, computer science and in mathematics).

That seems absolutist even if he often indicates that with regard to mathematics he isn't. 

Church thesis is miraculous, and introduce a form of absolute in mathematics, or it reintroduces it, as the natural numbers do that too. 

 

as he calls it, with statements like: "The conclusion that man is not a machine is invalid"

Yes, this because some paragraph above, in his anticipation notes: he made the Lucas-Penrose mistake of deducing that man is creative and machines are not.

But then he saw what Gödel saw too formally, and which has been proved by Hilbert and Bernays the first time later, and then again made beautiful by Löb, which is that the machine can do the same reasoning, and refutes that their are machine or ... doubt their consistency. Basically Lucas and Penrose makes the assumption that they are consistent (and knows it in some way), but no machine can do that. So the use of (Gödel) incompleteness against Mechanism that Post foresaw is not valid, and Post foresaw that too!

And he saw and raises duplication as "machine man" to make the point that man can't construct a machine that he can prove to preside over the same mental acts that he performs, but that we can construct machines that would prove similar theorems for their mental activity. This is often ignored in relevant discussions surrounding Lucas and Penrose.

Yes. They don't realize that the machine can do their reasoning, and refute it. 

 

 

His abstract "space for symbols that enter certain relations", where "spatial" is emphasized to be not Euclidian, physical, or continuous etc. also resonates with the inability to represent the idea, similar to what is implied in the Theaetetus section I referred to.

Maybe. But Post was unaware of S4Grz. Now, S4Grz describes an epistemology of an intuitionist subject, and this makes the Theaetetus, meta-formalized in meta-arithmetic, defining a "creative germ" in the sense of Brouwer. []p is creative in the technical sense of Post, and incompleteness makes the Theaetetus defining a creative subject in Brouwer's sense. Well seen.

In the Davis edition there are parenthesis that state "All of the above before reading Brouwer". I wonder whether this was Davis or Post, lol.

It is by Post. But here Post falls in the idea that we must only construct the mathematical verity. For theology we need the classical third excluded middle, which should be better called the embracing of the third person principle. 

I describe the hypostases/points of view usually in this order:

p

[]p

[]p & p

...

But from the first person point of view of the machine it is:

p

[]p & p  (the solipsist who confuse reality with the everything in which it extends itself)

And then come the "civilized scientist, rational believer/reasoner, []p which dissociates itself from the truth. Of course that can go wrong too, but it comes after.

 

As a Jazz guitarist, this account of creativity is as humbling as it is devastating, and trying to nail some interpretation of soul or agency of recognition it rests upon, is destined to fail, given these sorts of formal systems and their constraints.

The soul of the machine refutes all 3p description of themselves, and that is why, if they understood well computationalism, they know that saying "yes" to the doctor asks necessarily for a big leap of faith. They also know that they cannot enforce computationalism or even this or that substitution level to any other person than themselves. 

Those guys think it to be some flaky new age nonsense, which may or may not constitute merely evidence for character of theological prejudice, but such question is irrelevant when it's common practice to deny consciousness as materialists. That marks the end of rational discussion, and the hijacking of such discussion for some advertisement that "scientific practice" can pose as, without genuine exchange, often with some syntax like "actually there exists or not x,y,z, therefore you are wrong" that doesn't specify the theory they're working with. PGC

Especially that before Gödel, we though that [] is equivalent to p, making all points of view collapsing, and indeed some philosophers, like Quine, considered that modal logic was invented through a sin.

Then Gödel's theorem not only redeemed Modal logic, but shows that for a Quinean philosophers, he should believe only in the mathematical logic of self-reference and its intensional nuances.

Note that some points against modal logic made by Quine reappear in the self-reference logic of machine believing in too much set theory or analysis or physics ...

Bruno

 

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[Gary Oberbrunner]

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

feel free to elaborate if this answer missed the point.

I don't want to belabor it, but to put it simply: go to a church. I am not religious, I'm not defending that point of view (far from it), but the church is for almost all humans the arbiter of what is a soul and what has a soul. If you tell any religious person that any machine has a soul, they will laugh at you. They think you are making a category error at best.

My point is almost nobody will truly understand what you're talking about if you use the word "soul" because that word has _way_ too much religious baggage. And not only will they not understand you, they will have a visceral reaction against you. Some will even consider it an attack on their faith. That battle isn't one you need, IMHO.

 > I just define the soul by the knower. 

My point exactly. You'll lose every judeo-christian believer right there at the beginning. Maybe you don't care? Ask a religious person, they'll say something like "the spiritual, immaterial part of a human" or "the divine energy animating us" or "our immortal connection to God" or some such stuff.

I'm not saying that your definition is worse, in fact I like it a lot -- but you need to be aware when you're hijacking the language.

--

Gary

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Gary,

I hope you will not mind that I belabor a few bit, and try to defend the use, if not the need, of the theological vocabulary. Without hiding the reasons of the heart :)

I put the Everything-List in cc, as some people might be interested, sorry for the doubling for those in both lists.

On 13 Dec 2015, at 15:30, Gary Oberbrunner wrote:

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

feel free to elaborate if this answer missed the point.

I don't want to belabor it, but to put it simply: go to a church. I am not religious, I'm not defending that point of view (far from it), but the church is for almost all humans the arbiter of what is a soul and what has a soul. If you tell any religious person that any machine has a soul, they will laugh at you.

Yes, at least in the Aristotelian era. But those "religious" person will laugh at the start with the idea that a machine can be conscious, or can think, etc.

Jacques Arsac is a french catholic who wrote a book ("the sense crisis") where he said "I am a catholic so I cannot believe in Artificial Intelligence". 

Sometimes people infer that Mechanism is materialism, and that if some machine can think, it means theology makes no more sense. It helps them to see that on the contrary, Mechanism makes possible to reread the theological texts with a transparent (mathematical) interpretation (true or not for us). Then the shock should be re-situated in the history of theology. The greek have introduced all the terms (god, soul, divine, etc.) but just for making it possible to doubt the theories about them and discuss/do-science. It is well known that the Aristotelian metaphysics has been imposed by violence. So we have to take distance with the dogma, once we do science.

My ten first papers did not use theological vocabulary, but this did not prevent some people to laugh at terms like "consciousness", even "mind", or even "philosophy" or "computer" (sic), without mentioning "quantum"!).

The real problem is that since 1500 years, we use Aristotelian theology (with a " Creation/universe" and with or without a Creator), and we have forgotten that theology-the-science is born from doubting, not God, but the  Creation, the Primary Matter.  

Mathematics as a science is born in that process, and was the main prerequisite in theology. 

In Occident, this has evolved and lasted 1000 years, from -500 (Pythagorus) to +500 (Damascius), then *all* sciences have been hijacked by the pseudo-religious authorities (the Christian Roman Empire). 

With the Enlightenment Period, the (mainly natural) sciences have been given back to the free researchers, but not yet theology.

By mocking the idea to come back to the scientific attitude in theology, the atheists (which very often take for granted the second God of Aristotle: "Primary Matter") are accomplices of the Churches and the use of authoritarian attitude in theology and religion (which is *the* blasphem in many mystical (experiential) grounded theologies, btw).

They think you are making a category error at best.

My point is almost nobody will truly understand what you're talking about if you use the word "soul" because that word has _way_ too much religious baggage.

It is used by Plato and Aristotle. And the christians, despite authoritarianism, might be much less wrong than non-agnostic atheists (the only one which are often annoyed by the use of the greek theological terms). 

But then they mocked already the "mind-body problem" as much, or even (when I was young) cognitive science and "artificial intelligence". 

Christians are less wrong (relatively to the universal machine) thanks to the work of St-Augustin, Jews are less wrong thanks to the Cabbala, Muslims are less wrong thanks to Sufism: those groups have kept a part of Platonism (which seems right with still alive in their theologies. But they have also hidden it, ... to avoid being burned alive or banished).

It is only when I discovered the arithmetical interpretation of Lao-ze and Plotinus, that I decided to no more hide that what the universal machine discover when looking inside was not just the "psyche" (soul in greek) but a secret discourse, which is wrong when communicated, but still points about some reality escaping reason, and for which the machine will build approximation like "Universe", "Reality", "Truth", "God", "the One", etc.

Some people, in fact even some atheists, have only begun to understand what I am talking about when they get that point. 

The term "theology" helps, because it concerns *all* the truth about a machine, including the infinitely many truth *about* the machine that the machine cannot prove but that it can still assert with interrogation marks, and can build theories. 

By the fact that the machine can prove their own incompleteness, you can understand how reason can understand its own limitation with respect to "the truth", or "the possible truth", etc.

The greeks, and the indians, and the chinese, they have all seen this. It is hardly a coincidence, if computationalism is true, as *all* machine can see this: it asks only for courage, patience, modesty, honesty, etc.

That Parmenides, Pythagorus, Moderatus of Gades, Plotinus, Proclus, Damascius are so close to the universal machine means probably that they got enough courage, modesty, to introspect themselves.

And not only will they not understand you, they will have a visceral reaction against you. Some will even consider it an attack on their faith. That battle isn't one you need, IMHO.

They have fought before I use that vocabulary, much before. 

Yet, only the fundamentalist non agnostic sort of atheists get insulting and violent. 

 > I just define the soul by the knower. 

My point exactly.

Except that the whole point is that incompleteness makes the knower into a soul, with notion like the 3p-self which fits Aristotle definition of the Soul in its "De Anima", and a notion of 1p-self which fits the "Inner God" of the mystics, the "universal-soul" of Plotinus, and plays the role of the subject in classical duplication and quantum superposition.

The non-trivial fact is that the  incompleteness theorem makes the knower into a soul in the platonist theologies. From the machine's point of view, her soul has a scientific 3p part and a necessarily non scientific part, itself divided into a known and undoubtable part, and a "only hoped" part, and much beyond. 

You'll lose every judeo-christian believer right there at the beginning.

I lose only the fundamentalist, those who cannot doubt. But I lose them even more with any other vocabulary. 

The point is that incompleteness makes the notion of knower obeying the generally admitted ideas on the soul. I don't just define soul by knower, I show that the knower in the sense of theaetetus ("well known" by the philosophers) when define in the logic of machine's self-reference, leads to entity satisfying what the theologian say on the soul, doubly so with the platonist theologians.

Maybe you don't care? Ask a religious person, they'll say something like "the spiritual, immaterial part of a human"

Excellent, except it is ambiguous if that is the 1-soul (the conscious subject from its private personal point of view), or the 3-soul (the software, what is teleported ...). The 3-soul *is* an immaterial part associated to the human or to the machine, but the spiritual is only in the 1-soul. It is connected to something highly non computable, and even undefinable: truth (as enough big to encompasse itself). We get it, by the incompleteness "miracle" simply by connecting the 3p self-believer []p to the truth of the proposition he believes it: []p & p.

or "the divine energy animating us"

The term "divine energy" is spiritual materialism, and there are excellent tibetan books explaining how much this is wrong, a bit like dualism. 

or "our immortal connection to God" or some such stuff.

The God of Plato is Truth. Hirchberger concludes so in its tutorial on the History of Occidental Philosophy.

And it makes our immortal connection to God, indeed. Just by using the greek-indian-chinese definitions, starting from Gödel's beweisbar predicate, which applies to all platonist machine (meaning that such machine agrees on classical logic). 

I don't pretend this to be true, but it follows from classical computationalism.

I'm not saying that your definition is worse, in fact I like it a lot -- but you need to be aware when you're hijacking the language.

I am not. I just come back to the scientific attitude on the mind-body problem, without taking any theology for granted, but by using computationalism (that is mainly Church-Turing thesis, and an invariance of consciousness/soul for some transformation) and a tiny part of arithmetic, we get quickly a reasonable and testable arithmetical interpretation of Plato.

The problem is perhaps that 

1) I have developed that theory in an environment of free-thinkers which have encouraged such analysis, even the vocabulary (like "consciousness" which at that time, was taboo in some circles, at that time. Well, even "Gödel" was a taboo term for a local mathematician). 

2) they didn't know that there are was an influent (and secret!) group of fundamentalist non-agnostic atheists, .... oh, well, without counting moral harassment, and that type of things of life, jealousy, etc.

I don't know Gary. The type of person which are visceral about the theological notions, are already visceral on thought experiments, on "consciousness", on "mind", and they are visceral against anything capable of generating a bit of a doubt on Aristotle theology (with or without a "creator"). 

The God/Not-God debate hides the real original debate Universe/Not-Universe, that is the debate between the Aristotelian conception of Reality or the Platonist conception of Reality (put under the rug by violent means since 1500 years).

I like to say that science has begun in -500 and ended in +500. Since then we live in the Middle-age, despite some progress in the half Enlightenment Period. Today we live the fear selling period, and we invest in people credulity, instead of the constructive doubt.

Theology must go back to the faculty of science, with or without the help of the religious institutions. If not, obscurity will continue, with its bloody consequences. I think. I don't see any other way to fight against the fundamentalists, on *all* sides.

Computationalism is theological: it is honesty to admit this: as no scientist can ever tell you that your survival can be a demonstrated fact, so it is a belief in a sort of re-incarnation. This implies the important ethic which is in the right to say "No" to the doctor, and that computationalist practice cannot be enforced by laws, nor can their interdiction. 

When we discovered that Earth is not flat: we didn't say "Earth does not exist". And that is science. So if we discover that in some theory (like computationalism) God is not omnipotent, nor omniscient, nor good, etc. We don't have to say God does not exist, we let the notion evolve, as it is the only way to make progress. If we don't allow refutable theories in a field, that field cannot evolve. Then in the case of the machine, accepting mechanism or strong AI,we don't have the choice: what is true about them escapes what they can believe and know, and they already know that.

I have participated recently to a meeting between theologians and scientists, and I was very glad seeing that many are very open minded(*). Very few theologians are unaware of Plato and Pythagorus, and of the insidious sort of blaspheme of those using violent means to "convince" the others. So let us try the modest non violent science, in principle at least, and let us get the courage to doubt our certainties in that domain too, and let the concepts evolve and adapt. 

Sorry for the long post.  But I love so much theology. One fourth of my books at home are by theologians, ancient and contemporary, from West and East, (and the remaining are: one fourth on number theory, one fourth on mathematical logic, one fourth on quantum mechanics. 

It is really the theology which fits the best the puzzle and put some light on the mystery. Oh! I forgot to mention my books on bacteria, protozoans, invertebrates, and molecular genetics, and plants of all sorts.

Bruno

(*) I wrote a paper on that occasion: "NeoNeoplatonism: can we do theology with the scientific attitude?" 

http://www.dialogo-conf.com/archive/?vid=1&aid=2&kid=170201-30

(NeoNeoPlatonism is Neoplatonism + Church-Turing thesis (the original mathematical one)).

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Gary

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[John Clark]

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 2:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

You've never been clear about what "3p" means (the view of the multiverse from the 3p??)  

​> ​

In UDA: 3p means the content of an observer's diary

​A diary is information, it's just a number, a sequence of ASCII ​

 

​characters. ​

 

​> ​

or memory

​Memory is a function of the information on how generic atoms in the brain are arranged. ​

 

​There are​ only 3 ways information is different from the traditional concept of the soul:

​1) A soul is unique but information can be duplicated. 

2) The soul is and will always remain unfathomable, but information is understandable, in fact information is the ONLY thing that is understandable. 

3) Information unambiguously exists, I don't think anyone would deny that, but even if the soul exists it will never be proven scientifically.

 John K Clark

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Dec 2015, at 22:48, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 2:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

You've never been clear about what "3p" means (the view of the multiverse from the 3p??)  

​> ​

In UDA: 3p means the content of an observer's diary

​A diary is information, it's just a number, a sequence of ASCII ​

 

​characters. ​

A 3p information is a larger notion than the 3p information in the diary of the the guy not entering in the teleportation. 

 

​> ​

or memory

​Memory is a function of the information on how generic atoms in the brain are arranged. ​

 

​There are​ only 3 ways information is different from the traditional concept of the soul:

​1) A soul is unique but information can be duplicated. 

Yes, like the first person which feel unique no matter often it is duplicated. So the first person type of definition of the soul meet that request.

2) The soul is and will always remain unfathomable, but information is understandable, in fact information is the ONLY thing that is understandable. 

Yes, like the concept of truth (Tarski, Gödel) and knowledge (Kaplan, Montague, Thomason, myself, ...).

In metamathematics we are used to define in a precise way some concept, and then show why from some perspective they are indeed provably unfathomable, in the frame of some theories (like Mechanism). Again, by defining the soul as the (rational) knower, and the knower by Theaetus' method, this requirement becomes a theorem.

3) Information unambiguously exists, I don't think anyone would deny that, but even if the soul exists it will never be proven scientifically.

A machine indeed cannot prove the existence of its own soul, but a computationalist machine can define the soul by the knower, and then deduce that a soul is automatically associated to any correct machine, and this by using a well known (by the expert in the field) definition of knowledge. Most critics on that definition can be shown invalid in the computationalist frame.

What is *your* definition of "soul" which makes you sure that we cannot prove its existence? We can't prove the existence of our soul, because we cannot prove that we are correct/sound. But we can prove that simpler machine than us have a soul.

With the definition of Theatetus applied to Gödel's beweisbar predicate, we have a counter-example to your claim: all correct machine have a soul is an unexpected theorem of arithmetic (with induction). Penrose and Lucas' uses of Gödel's theorem aganist Mechanism are made invalid by such a theorem, as explained in all detail in "Conscience et Mécanisme". Penrose somehow acknowledge his mistake, but seem to not take the needed correction fully into account.

Bruno

 John K Clark

 

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[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrot

​>

​>>​

​n UDA: 3p means the content of an observer's diary

​

​>> ​

A diary is information, it's just a number, a sequence of ASCII ​characters. ​

​> ​

A 3p information is a larger notion than the 3p information in the diary

​Then you were incorrect when you said "​

 3p means the content of an observer's diary

​" and I still don't know what 3p means.​

​

​>>

 A soul is unique but information can be duplicated. 

Yes, like the first person which feel unique no matter often it is duplicated. So the first person type of definition of the soul meet that request.

​OK, but a soul can certainly change (your memories, ideas and opinions are not identical to those you had a year ago), so why can't a duplicate be made? ​

 

​And how big a change can be ​made before it's no longer the same soul? The religious can not answer either of those questions or even come close.

 ​

 

 

​> ​

What is *your* definition of "soul" which makes you sure that we cannot prove its existence?

​My definition of the soul can in principle be proven or disproven, although it is not the traditional religious definition. I 

define a soul as the most important part of me, the thing that produces intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness. If

​ ​

intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness

​ ​

is what is produced when generic atoms are arranged in particular complex ways, and ALL empirical evidence points in that direction, then my definition of

​the ​

soul is indistinguishable from

​information; and the existence of information is not in dispute. ​

 

​Let me know what you mean by "the soul" and I'll tell you if it could also be proven or disproven, that is to say ​if it is a scientific concept or just philosophical bafflegab. 

> from some perspective they are indeed provably unfathomable, in the frame of some theories (like Mechanism). Again,

​ ​

by defining the soul as the (rational) knower, and the knower

​That's a useless definition. If the soul is defined as "the knower" then a proof of the existence of my soul is totally unnecessary because I already have something much better than a proof, direct experience. Is my big toe part of my soul, is my hair? The only point in defining anything is in the hope that it will lead to better understanding, your definition can't do that but mine can.   ​

 

 

​> ​

With the definition of Theatetus

​ [...]​

When I can read about the latest developments at the LHC hearing about ​the beliefs of the ancient Greeks bores me, as do the beliefs of all people who didn't even know where the sun went to at night.

 

​ John K Clark​

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Dec 2015, at 18:52, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrot

​>

​>>​

​n UDA: 3p means the content of an observer's diary

​

​>> ​

A diary is information, it's just a number, a sequence of ASCII ​characters. ​

​> ​

A 3p information is a larger notion than the 3p information in the diary

​Then you were incorrect when you said "​

 3p means the content of an observer's diary

​" and I still don't know what 3p means.​

I have no clue of what you don't understand. You need to restituate the context perhaps.

​

​>>

 A soul is unique but information can be duplicated. 

Yes, like the first person which feel unique no matter often it is duplicated. So the first person type of definition of the soul meet that request.

​OK, but a soul can certainly change (your memories, ideas and opinions are not identical to those you had a year ago), so why can't a duplicate be made? ​

You can duplicate a body (the 3-soul), and even the subjective content of the personal diary (the 3-1 soul), but you can't duplicate the first person experience viewed by the person itself. The duplicates will say "I am in W", or "I am in M", but never both at once: the 1-soul remains unique in the duplication.

 

​And how big a change can be ​made before it's no longer the same soul? The religious can not answer either of those questions or even come close.

 ​

 

In our context, we have decided that the soul is the one remembering the past of its body. That follows directly from the teleportation/diary definition. 

"the religious" is ambiguous. We are all religious, when we take the defifnition of the pre-christian theologian. You believe in some reality beyond yourself, and that is not a rational belief, by a surrational one, like a sort of self-consistency belief. We would not go out of the bed if we were not believing in some reality. 

 

​> ​

What is *your* definition of "soul" which makes you sure that we cannot prove its existence?

​My definition of the soul can in principle be proven or disproven, although it is not the traditional religious definition. I 

define a soul as the most important part of me,

Good!

the thing that produces intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness.

OK. With computationalism it produces matter, also. That is why []p & p has to give quantum logic when p is restricted to the leaves of the Universal Dovetailing, that is when p is restricted to the sigma_1 sentence in arithmetic. I can explain more on this if people ask.

If

​ ​

intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness

​ ​

is what is produced when generic atoms are arranged in particular complex ways, and ALL empirical evidence points in that direction, then my definition of

​the ​

soul is indistinguishable from

​information;

The information is the 3-soul, not the the 1-soul. You confuse []p and []p & p.

G* proves []p <-> []p & p, but G does not. Indeed, that is why []p and []p & p obeys different logic, and why the definition of Theaeteus makes the knower into a soul, in the greek (and in the mundane) sense.

and the existence of information is not in dispute. ​

 

​Let me know what you mean by "the soul" and I'll tell you if it could also be proven or disproven, that is to say ​if it is a scientific concept or just philosophical bafflegab. 

It is the knower, the person aware of its experience. 

> from some perspective they are indeed provably unfathomable, in the frame of some theories (like Mechanism). Again,

​ ​

by defining the soul as the (rational) knower, and the knower

​That's a useless definition. If the soul is defined as "the knower" then a proof of the existence of my soul is totally unnecessary because I already have something much better than a proof, direct experience.

But we don't talk about the existence of your soul, but of the machine's soul.

Is my big toe part of my soul, is my hair?

Probably not. It depends on the computationalist substitution level. But the reasoning and the mathematical consequences are the same whatever the choice of the substitution level.

The only point in defining anything is in the hope that it will lead to better understanding, your definition can't do that but mine can.   ​

 

You just showed that your definition is recovered by mine, which is just more precise, in both UDA and AUDA. The one in AUDA ([]p & p, ...) is enough precise to get the the quantum logic for the matter "produced/dreamed" by the souls. 

 

​> ​

With the definition of Theatetus

​ [...]​

When I can read about the latest developments at the LHC hearing about ​the beliefs of the ancient Greeks bores me, as do the beliefs of all people who didn't even know where the sun went to at night.

 

The LHC does not tackle the mind-body problem, except by using the mind-brain identity link which has shown to be contradicted by computationalism. Computationalism explains why we can afford that metaphysical error when doing physics, but of course not when doing metaphysics and the extraction of physics from machine's psychology or theology.

Bruno

​ John K Clark​

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Dec 2015, at 18:05, Allen Francom wrote:

Hi Bruno.

Let me start again.  By saying "No."

OK.

The "CPU" and the "Bits" are merely words that represent the primary principles.  Something goes, and whatever it is has distinctions.

In which theory?

Sometimes you talk like if you knew some truth. I might ask you if you do or not suppose a primary physical universe.

The key thought though is that it is "going".

The analogy is fine.  CPU and Bits.

They are just words to us, within the model.

Which model? Which theory?

Pick any other words and the principles will stack up similarly.

We're not arguing over whose symbols are more realistic.

We are discussing that the symbols must be "kinetic" and also "distinct"

Those are not primary concept. Distinction and kinetic will be defined through statistic on number relations.

And or we must also prescribe what it is that is there prior to "the universe" that can provide for the operating logic "".

Logic +

0 ≠ (x + 1)

((x + 1) = (y + 1))  -> x = y

x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)

x + 0 = x

x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

x * 0 = 0

x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x

Nothing more is assumed. UDA explains why eventually we *cannot* assumes more than this (or something Turing equivalent). 

We need only to believe in one universal number or machine, but their existence, and the existence of their computations, is already a theorem in the theory above. I can give you all the intermediate steps.

You seem OK that space is not a primary notion, but it looks like you are sure that time must be primary. Usually most physicists can agree that time does not exist (cf Einstein), but that space would be primary. With computationalism, only 0 and its successors are primary, with addition and mutltiplication assumed, like above. Put it very simply, we have 

NUMBER ===> DREAMS ===> PHYSICS

But the physics is not dreamed, it is a statistics on all number's dreams. 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Allen,

Just some more remarks and questions. By rereading what you are saying, I can agree at each line, and make my question more specific.

What are your primary entities and primary principles? 

I am a logician, interested in the mind/body relations, or in the first-person/third person pov relations.

As a logician, I suggest we start from the empty theory. Well, that is satisfied by everything, and so it is not so much interesting if we want more light.

As a classical logician, I ask you if you are OK with the classical tautologies, like

((p & q) -> p),  (p -> (q -> p)), etc.

A a computer scientist, I also hope you understand and "agree" with elementary arithmetical statements, like the fact that each number n, when added to zero gives n itself.

As scientist we must share some beliefs and build from them.

Thanks to the fundamental, and mathematical, discovery of the universal numbers, all what I say is derived from definitions and from the assumptions:

0 ≠ (x + 1)

((x + 1) = (y + 1))  -> x = y

x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)

x + 0 = x

x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

x * 0 = 0

x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x

What adds the 1p color is then only the belief in your own consciousness, and in its invariance for the functional substitution at some level. This seems to explain why the digital seen by the digital has a quantum aspect, and why maybe only quantum randomization can stabilize consciousness on the normal histories. 

I do not challenge the physical sciences, I claim that self-referentially correct machines challenge, not the physical sciences, but physicalism, all by themselves, and discover that the challenge is empirically testable (modulo some simulation conspiracy theories).

I exploit fully the fact that with the computationalist hypothesis in cognitive science, we do have a powerful theory of mind: computer science and mathematical logic. I am not the one having done the hard work, it is Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, Gödel, Löb, Solovay, Visser, etc. 

Are you OK with the Universal Dovetailer Argument which shows that a believer in computationalism can no more consistently believe in materialism (in the weak sense of the beliefs in some primary physical being)?

It is the motivation for studying what the machine says themselves about that. That is more demanding in the math work to do.

I can also explain in plain language, but then it looks like those crazy platonists, or salvia divinorum smoker (often), who conceive the view that Aristotle already mocks in its metaphysics.

I don't try to convince people on some truth, just share deductions. Note that most of them remains true for more general self-referentially correct entities than machines, but the proofs are simpler for the machines, and the definitions too. The main key is self-reference and the diverse notions of self made possible by incompleteness, which concerns not just the machines.

Bruno

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[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 5:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

I have no clue of what you don't understand. You need to restituate the context perhaps.

​

You said

​ "​

3p means the content of an observer's diary

​" and then you said ​"

3p information is a larger notion than the 3p information in the diary

​". ​

The contents of an observer's diary

​,​

​ or the content of any book, is just the information in it. I don't know what "3p information" means but whatever it means I don't see how 3p information is not equal to 3p information. 

Perhaps now you have a clue why I don't understand what you're saying.

​> ​

You can duplicate a body (the 3-soul), and even the subjective content of the personal diary (the 3-1 soul), but you can't duplicate the first person experience viewed by the person itself.

 

​

Why not? "T

​he​

 first person experience viewed by the person itself

​"​ 

changes continually, that's what it means to be alive; so if a change can be made why can't a duplicate be made?  

 

​> ​

The duplicates will say "I am in W", or "I am in M",

​If the generic atoms in their bodies are arranged in exactly the same way then they will make exactly the same noise with their mouth and think exactly the same thoughts with their brain, UNLESS they see different things (like different cities) because then the generic atoms in their bodies (especially their brain) will not be  arranged in exactly the same way anymore. This all seems pretty straightforward to me and I don't see what additional enlightenment either the soul or peepee can bring to this matter.  

​> ​

You believe in some reality beyond yourself,

​I am not incarcerated in a mental institution so yes I believe in some reality beyond myself.

 

​> ​

and that is not a rational belief

​So a rationalist must also be a solipsist?  ​

 

​I don't think so​

 

 

​>> ​

I 

define a soul as the most important part of me,

​ t

he thing that produces intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness.

​> ​

OK. With computationalism it produces matter, also.

As the name suggests computationalism means that intelligence and consciousness is produced by computations, but nobody in the entire history of the world has ever made one single calculation without using matter that obeys the laws of physics.That's why it's called Silicon Valley and not Robinson Arithmetic Valley.

 

​>> ​

If

​ ​

intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness

​ ​

is what is produced when generic atoms are arranged in particular complex ways, and ALL empirical evidence points in that direction, then my definition of

​the ​

soul is indistinguishable from

​information;

​> ​

The information is the 3-soul, not the the 1-soul.

​Perhaps I can figure out what on earth you're talking about if you explain how things would be different ​if the information in the 3-soul (whatever the hell that is) WAS the same as the information in the 1-soul (whatever the hell that is).

​> ​

The LHC does not tackle the mind-body problem

​

Vast amounts of verbiage has been generated but nobody has successfully tackled it. The reason nobody has found universally accepted answer to the

​ 

problem is that there is no universal agreement on what the question is.

​ John K Clark​

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Dec 2015, at 00:19, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 5:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

I have no clue of what you don't understand. You need to restituate the context perhaps.

​

You said

​ "​

3p means the content of an observer's diary

​" and then you said ​"

3p information is a larger notion than the 3p information in the diary

​". ​

The contents of an observer's diary

​,​

​ or the content of any book, is just the information in it. I don't know what "3p information" means but whatever it means I don't see how 3p information is not equal to 3p information. 

Perhaps now you have a clue why I don't understand what you're saying.

Yes, the clue is that you don't read the post. I have explained this in all my papers and in many post to you,  and that is why I shortened my last explanation, but you seem to play deaf with the explanation.

​> ​

You can duplicate a body (the 3-soul), and even the subjective content of the personal diary (the 3-1 soul), but you can't duplicate the first person experience viewed by the person itself.

 

​

Why not? "T

​he​

 first person experience viewed by the person itself

​"​ 

changes continually, that's what it means to be alive; so if a change can be made why can't a duplicate be made?  

Because, by computationalism and the definition given, that is just impossible. You can't feel being at both Washington and Moscow at the same time.

 

​> ​

The duplicates will say "I am in W", or "I am in M",

​If the generic atoms in their bodies are arranged in exactly the same way then they will make exactly the same noise with their mouth and think exactly the same thoughts with their brain, UNLESS they see different things (like different cities) because then the generic atoms in their bodies (especially their brain) will not be  arranged in exactly the same way anymore. This all seems pretty straightforward to me and I don't see what additional enlightenment either the soul or peepee can bring to this matter.  

But that contradict the fact that you already accepted, which is that it is the same person who survived in the two cities. Do you remember? That is the place where we can see that personal identity is an intensiuonal modal notion. Leibniz identity rule does not work. The W-guy and the M-guy are the Helsinki-Guy, but the W-guy and the M-guy are different. That is why we have to use modal logic and intensional mathematics, which handle well such case. 

​> ​

You believe in some reality beyond yourself,

​I am not incarcerated in a mental institution so yes I believe in some reality beyond myself.

That needs some act of faith. We usually are not conscious of it, because we are "programmed" by evolution to make it. 

 

​> ​

and that is not a rational belief

​So a rationalist must also be a solipsist?  ​

 

​I don't think so​

So a rationalist can understand that reason is not enough. Rationalism invites to escape rationalism, like Peano Arithmetic can justify the existence of truth entailing the impossibility to justify those truth.

No need to become irrationalist. The need is only in accepting some surrationalism. With classical computationalisme, that surrationalism is formalized completely, at the propositional level, by G* (G1*, or X1*, Z1*, ...), which properly extends G (G1, Z1, X1).

 

 

​>> ​

I 

define a soul as the most important part of me,

​ t

he thing that produces intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness.

​> ​

OK. With computationalism it produces matter, also.

As the name suggests computationalism means that intelligence and consciousness is produced by computations, but nobody in the entire history of the world has ever made one single calculation without using matter that obeys the laws of physics.That's why it's called Silicon Valley and not Robinson Arithmetic Valley.

But Silicon valley's goal is to sell physical computer. Today, the arithmetical one are not yet taxed, and we have to emulate it in our brain to get its answer. That is not practical, and belongs to mathematics. But mathematics kicks back, and if you can distinguish proof and truth, you can understand eventually why the computation are executed, in the Church-Turing sense, in a tiny part of the arithmetical reality. It is not controversial, it is a standard results. I already gave you many references on this.

It is up to you to explain how a universal Turing machine can make a difference between being emulated by a primary physical universe, and being emulated by Robinson Arithmetic. If primary matter is needed, it is not clear that we can survive in virtue of being Turing emulated at some correct level.

 

​>> ​

If

​ ​

intelligence and

​memory and ​

consciousness

​ ​

is what is produced when generic atoms are arranged in particular complex ways, and ALL empirical evidence points in that direction, then my definition of

​the ​

soul is indistinguishable from

​information;

​> ​

The information is the 3-soul, not the the 1-soul.

​Perhaps I can figure out what on earth you're talking about if you explain how things would be different ​if the information in the 3-soul (whatever the hell that is) WAS the same as the information in the 1-soul (whatever the hell that is).

The information in the 3-soul can be shared, put on a disk, etc. 

The "information" in the 1-soul cannot. You can communicate it only to someone having lived a similar experience, and you can only hope for that. 

It is about the difference between a hole in a teeth and an toothache. 

​> ​

The LHC does not tackle the mind-body problem

​

Vast amounts of verbiage has been generated but nobody has successfully tackled it. The reason nobody has found universally accepted answer to the

​ 

problem is that there is no universal agreement on what the question is.

There is no agreement on the solutions, but kids can understand the question easily, and there are plenty of good books on that subject. Right, some people have some problem, but it is a minority, and usually they can't doubt materialism, like if the dream argument did not exist (for them). Indeed, they usually claim that they can be sure of being awake. 

All what you tell me, John, is that you are not interested in the subject, and that is the reason why you don't inform yourself on it. You can find many references on quite accepted formulation of the problem in my papers, and then UDA provides a reformulation of the problem in the frame of computationalism.

Oh but wait, you stopped at step 3. Like I said on the everything-list, try to convince anyone else of the reason why you stop at step 3 in the UDA, and let him or her explain this to the other.

I really think we are back on our old dialog, so I am not sure I will answer anything on this before you succeed in explaining why you think step 3 is invalid in a way that others can understand, as you have failed on this since many years now.

Bruno

​ John K Clark​

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[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>

​>>​

You can duplicate a body (the 3-soul), and even the subjective content of the personal diary (the 3-1 soul), but you can't duplicate the first person experience viewed by the person itself.

 

​>> ​

Why not? "T

​he​

 first person experience viewed by the person itself

​"​ 

changes continually, that's what it means to be alive; so if a change can be made why can't a duplicate be made?  

​> ​

Because, by computationalism and the definition given, that is just impossible.

​So you're unique insight

is it's ​

impossible

​ because it's ​

impossible

​.​

​>> ​

​If the generic atoms in their bodies are arranged in exactly the same way then they will make exactly the same noise with their mouth and think exactly the same thoughts with their brain, UNLESS they see different things (like different cities) because then the generic atoms in their bodies (especially their brain) will not be arranged in exactly the same way anymore. This all seems pretty straightforward to me and I don't see what additional enlightenment either the soul or peepee can bring to this matter.  

​> ​

But that contradict the fact that you already accepted, which is that it is the same person who survived in the two cities.

​T​

he same person

​ as who? I never said the same person was seeing 2 different cities, ​I said they remembered being the same person but no longer are the same anymore because they are now seeing different things. Is the concept of a branch really that hard to grasp?

 

​> ​

Do you remember? That is the place where we can see that personal identity is an intensiuonal modal notion.

​No, I don't remember what a "​intensiuonal modal" is and in fact I don't think I ever knew.

 

​> ​

Leibniz identity rule does not work.

​Leibniz Identity of Indiscernibles 

always works. If I duplicate both you and the entire city you are in and then exchange the positions of the original and duplicate 

Bruno Marchal

​ and nobody can detect a objective or subjective difference then there is no difference between ​

Bruno Marchal

​ and the duplicate

​

Bruno Marchal

​. ​

 

 

​> ​

The W-guy and the M-guy are the Helsinki-Guy,

​They remember being the guy who experienced Helsinki, but currently nobody ​is experiencing Helsinki anymore. Things have changed as they always do in life. 

 

 

​> ​

but the W-guy and the M-guy are different. 

​Exactly, and that is why despite what you said  I NEVER ​

accepted

​

 

​"​

that it is the same person who survived in the two cities

"​

.

​>> ​

​I am not incarcerated in a mental institution so yes I believe in some reality beyond myself.

​> ​

That needs some act of faith.

​The there is no reality beyond myself theory ​

can make predictions and one of them 

​is that I will never be surprised. Would you would be surprised if I said that theory's prediction was correct? I think you would be.

​>> ​

As the name suggests computationalism means that intelligence and consciousness is produced by computations, but nobody in the entire history of the world has ever made one single calculation without using matter that obeys the laws of physics.That's why it's called Silicon Valley and not Robinson Arithmetic Valley.

​​

​> ​

But Silicon valley's goal is to sell physical computer.

​Yes, and they can sell Silicon computers because people want them and people want them because they can make trillions of calculations a second; and they can't sell Robinson computers because nobody wants them and nobody wants them because Robinson computers can't calculate diddly squat. ​

 

​

​>> ​

Perhaps I can figure out what on earth you're talking about if you explain how things would be different ​if the information in the 3-soul (whatever the hell that is) WAS the same as the information in the 1-soul (whatever the hell that is).

​> ​

The information in the 3-soul can be shared, put on a disk, etc. 

​Yes, the information on the location of generic atoms is no different from the information about anything else. ​

 

 

​> ​

The "information" in the 1-soul cannot.

​Then it's not information and if it's not information then the key to the "1-soul", the reason that you are different from me must be that atoms are not generic after all. Do you think that is a reasonable hypothesis? Do you really believe that the hydrogen atoms in your body have the name ​"Bruno Marchal" scratched onto them while the hydrogen atoms in my body have "John Clark" scratched onto them?

 

​> ​

You can communicate it only to someone having lived a similar experience,

​If somebody's generic atoms are arranged in exactly the same way as my generic atoms are arranged then we are having identical experiences and there would be no need to communicate with such a person because you'd already know what he wants to say.      ​

 

​> ​

It is about the difference between a hole in a teeth and an toothache. 

​The difference is not profound, or at least no more profound than the difference between a noun and a verb and a adjective. Calculations determine what a noun does, and m

ind is what a noun like the brain does.​

 

​> ​

You can't feel being at both Washington and Moscow at the same time.

Always with the

​damn ​

mystery pronouns! And Bruno Marchal wonders why

​John Clark​

 can't get past step

​ ​

3.

 John K Clark