Wave/particle duality and uncertainty principle are driven by same underlying math

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Gary Oberbrunner

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Dec 24, 2014, 11:31:54 AM12/24/14
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http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/12/141219085153.htm

Doesn't explicitly reference MWI but they do take an info-theoretic viewpoint as their underlying model.

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Gary

Bruno Marchal

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Jan 12, 2015, 6:25:17 AM1/12/15
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On 24 Dec 2014, at 17:31, Gary Oberbrunner wrote:

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/12/141219085153.htm

Doesn't explicitly reference MWI but they do take an info-theoretic viewpoint as their underlying model.

Still ignoring the mind-body problem and in particular the computationalist first person indeterminacy.

Bruno




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Gary Oberbrunner

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Jan 12, 2015, 8:21:39 AM1/12/15
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On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 6:25 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 24 Dec 2014, at 17:31, Gary Oberbrunner wrote:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/12/141219085153.htm

Doesn't explicitly reference MWI but they do take an info-theoretic viewpoint as their underlying model.
Still ignoring the mind-body problem and in particular the computationalist first person indeterminacy.

IMHO they are several steps away even from the point where the the issues you point out would become relevant. Someday we will get there...

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Kermit Rose

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Jan 12, 2015, 8:56:02 AM1/12/15
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On 1/12/2015 8:21 AM, Gary Oberbrunner wrote:
>
>
> IMHO they are several steps away even from the point where the the
> issues you point out would become relevant. Someday we will get there...
>
> --
> Gary
>

In my opinion, the mind body problem is a problem only for those folks
who do not accept that matter-energy is primary and that mind is a
secondary effect.


Gary Oberbrunner

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Jan 12, 2015, 11:23:56 AM1/12/15
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Sure, except some folks think computation/Platonia is primary and matter-energy, mind and all the rest are _all_ secondary effects. 

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LizR

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Jan 12, 2015, 5:58:27 PM1/12/15
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Problem with M/E being primary is the explanatory gap. Where does M/E (and S/T) come from?

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LizR

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Jan 12, 2015, 6:03:35 PM1/12/15
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Sounds like a step in the direction of "it from bit". In a parallel universe, John Archibald Wheeler is happy.

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David Nyman

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Jan 12, 2015, 7:07:30 PM1/12/15
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On 12 January 2015 at 13:55, Kermit Rose <ker...@polaris.net> wrote:
>
> In my opinion, the mind body problem is a problem only for those folks who do not accept that matter-energy is primary and that mind is a secondary effect.

Can you give an example of a 'secondary effect' that isn't, in the final analysis, a re-description for human convenience of a 'primary effect' of matter-energy? If you can't, you're just using a linguistic device to  beg the question. In effect you're saying that, to count as something, any account of that something *must* be entirely exhausted by material and energetic processes.

As applied to the mind-body problem, that view is hardly more than a dogma masquerading as an explanation. Explanation in any useful sense can hardly entail a blatant disregard of the salient facts. However tempting it may be to sidestep or dismiss a phenomenon that appears to resist a canonical formulation, in the end it isn't likely to prove very scientifically fruitful. At least comp, whether or not it can ultimately succeed in its aim, doesn't begin by shirking the relevant explanatory burdens.

David

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Kim Jones

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Jan 13, 2015, 2:09:41 AM1/13/15
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On 13 Jan 2015, at 11:07 am, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:


On 12 January 2015 at 13:55, Kermit Rose <ker...@polaris.net> wrote:
>
> In my opinion, the mind body problem is a problem only for those folks who do not accept that matter-energy is primary and that mind is a secondary effect.

Can you give an example of a 'secondary effect' that isn't, in the final analysis, a re-description for human convenience of a 'primary effect' of matter-energy? If you can't, you're just using a linguistic device to  beg the question. In effect you're saying that, to count as something, any account of that something *must* be entirely exhausted by material and energetic processes.

As applied to the mind-body problem, that view is hardly more than a dogma masquerading as an explanation. Explanation in any useful sense can hardly entail a blatant disregard of the salient facts. However tempting it may be to sidestep or dismiss a phenomenon that appears to resist a canonical formulation, in the end it isn't likely to prove very scientifically fruitful. At least comp, whether or not it can ultimately succeed in its aim, doesn't begin by shirking the relevant explanatory burdens.

David



Yes. As I said recently - the world is divided into Platonists and Aristotelians. These can actually be taken by now as personality descriptors. Platonists have never started a war over their beliefs, I believe. Aristotelians of every shape and hue have been waging war on each other since before Plato or Aristotle’s day.

What we have here are the two major belief contenders that Homo Sapiens are able to conceive of. There may be otyhers, but we probably cannot conceive of them.

1. The world is WYSIWYG

2. The World is not WYSIWYG

You will know which club you are currently paying your dues to. You can switch clubs is the good news. I have switched clubs several times, for example. I currently belong to 2 but belonged to 1 for most of my early life but strangely felt ill at ease with the thought that “The World Is All There Is”.

Kim




On 1/12/2015 8:21 AM, Gary Oberbrunner wrote:


IMHO they are several steps away even from the point where the the issues you point out would become relevant. Someday we will get there...

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Gary


In my opinion, the mind body problem is a problem only for those folks who do not accept that matter-energy is primary and that mind is a secondary effect.


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Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL

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Im not saying there arent a lot of dangerous people out there. I am saying a lot of them are in government" - Russell Brand





Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL

Email:      kimj...@ozemail.com.au
Mobile:    0450 963 719
Landline: 02 9389 4239

Im not saying there arent a lot of dangerous people out there. I am saying a lot of them are in government" - Russell Brand





Kim Jones

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Jan 13, 2015, 2:31:17 AM1/13/15
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> On 13 Jan 2015, at 6:09 pm, Kim Jones <kmjc...@me.com> wrote:
>
> You will know which club you are currently paying your dues to. You can switch clubs is the good news. I have switched clubs several times, for example. I currently belong to 2 but belonged to 1 for most of my early life but strangely felt ill at ease with the thought that “The World Is All There Is”.
>
> Kim


Aristotelians: "The World Is All There Is"

Platonists: "The World Is Not Enough"

Couldn't resist it....

K

Allen Francom

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Jan 13, 2015, 2:42:28 AM1/13/15
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++ where does that come from

the great equalizer

no matter your choice of decomposition you Don't have enough to put humpty dumpy all the way back together.   listen up Darwin,  listen up God.  

Whose chicken comes from what egg

and where did that come from

... the multiverse of unnecessary resource allocation and the death of occam...

no...

not that either




Bruno Marchal

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Jan 13, 2015, 7:33:28 AM1/13/15
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If matter/energy is primary, then you need to introduce actual
infinities in nature to associate a mind to a piece of matter. In that
case our bodies cannot obeys known laws of physics (as all known laws
are Turing emulable). See mu URL for the proof of this (it is not that
simple).

But intuitively, assuming monism, it is more easy to explain the
illusion of matter to a mind, than an illusion of mind to matter.

With computationalism, you can easily associate a mechanism to a
mind, but you cannot attach a mind to a mechanism: you need to attach
a mind to an infinity of mechanism. But this leads to an explanation
of where the laws of physics come from, and which does not eliminate
consciousness.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



David Nyman

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Jan 13, 2015, 8:51:12 AM1/13/15
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On 13 January 2015 at 07:09, Kim Jones <kmjc...@me.com> wrote:

1. The world is WYSIWYG

2. The World is not WYSIWYG

But this matter is already decided in favour of 2. It is already obvious that what we take to be 'the world' cannot in principle be the 'thing itself'. What we take to be 'observation of the physical world' might more appropriately be termed a species of virtualisation, or as Bruno says, a sum on first-person plural appearances. Consequently - and ironically - our 'stuffy' intuitions would appear themselves to be constructed from 'airy nothings', at least when contrasted with misplaced concreteness (as somebody or other called it). Shakespeare, it would seem, was right in this as in much else: we are indeed such stuff as dreams are made on.

The interesting questions then are really about what might lie behind such 'airy nothings'; what, indeed, they purport to refer to. Here too we must be on our guard against our instinctive tendency to stuffiness. Consequently I think it is simply misleading to contrast any supposedly 'ethereal' status of Platonia with the supposedly 'concrete' nature of the material. What is at issue, rather, is the distinctive ontological assumptions necessitated by a particular TOE and such assumptions always turn out to be, in the final analysis, mathematical.

As such, they are, broadly, both relational and 'cosmological'. That is, they are are stipulations, in the first place, about some restrictive set of basic entities and relations that purportedly could account for what is, or could be, observed (roughly, the 'laws') and, secondly, an extended relational structure resulting from such relations (roughly, the 'cosmos'). In comp terms, motivated by the computational theory of mind (CTM), these starting assumptions are, for example, PA and the set of Sigma_1 sentences.

The challenge then is to recover all the necessary 'appearances' (or in certain cases justify their irrecoverability) exclusively from this basis, with the minimum set of auxiliary axioms. The disagreement, between comp-ists and physicalists, tends to lie in just which appearances demand to be recovered. In the former case, given that CTM explicitly necessitates the acceptance that 'physical reality' is a set of appearances, the scope of the theory must encompass not only that physical reality but how 'we' might come to 'observe' it. In the second case, despite a similar, though usually tacit, acceptance, the mechanism by which physics might come under 'observation' has traditionally been left in abeyance as a secondary and presumably non-fundamental issue.

Consequently only mathematical structures that might be adequate in explaining the appearances themselves are, typically, considered to be the explicit scope of the theory. This approach has been rather successful in this restricted aim, especially as contrasted with earlier efforts in the history of thought. But it shouldn't really be surprising that rather basic conceptual problems would arise in trying to jam what was excluded at the outset into this deliberately restricted theoretical scope. Far easier then to trivialise, dismiss, or just ignore what doesn't fit.

David

David Nyman

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Jan 13, 2015, 9:19:09 AM1/13/15
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On 13 January 2015 at 12:33, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

If matter/energy is primary, then you need to introduce actual infinities in nature to associate a mind to a piece of matter.

At one point I remember thinking that I had grasped your rationale for this, but alas I seem to have forgotten it! Could you remind me?

David 


Bruno Marchal

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Jan 14, 2015, 4:06:31 AM1/14/15
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The UD Argument shows that if you survive through a finite copy made at some level n, then your future is determined by the set of all computations going through that finite copy "states", and "matter" is determined by the law governing the general statistics on your consistent extensions (in a sense slightly more general than in the literature)
The *consistent* extensions, are modalized through the relation with truth, the nth person views, etc..

Now, imagine you want to obtain a notion of well-defined primitive matter. As long as the copy is finite, you will miss it, as you can't distinguish that "primitive matter" from the infinities of its diophantine approximations.

Somehow, the subject needs to add more and more axioms or beliefs in the mind of the subject, to restrict his/her/it self on that primitive matter, and this will work and converge only if you tend to infinities of axioms, both for the mind of the subject,  and for the piece of primitive matter which embodies and singularized that consciousness (or some equivalence classes).

As long as we are supported by locally consistent *machines* we can't localized ourselves in the arithmetical reality, even with the help of oracles. 

I am not sure if non-machine can do this, but machines can't, no more than we can capture the entire arithmetical truth with a finite or recursively enumerable set of axioms. Those limitations are related, notably by the use of the []p & p definition, for the notion of first person knowledge.

If this does not help, feel free to ask more, just be patient and indulgent for the answer. It is not a trivial subject, and what I say relies on computer science and mathematical logic, (and the uda).  I might have given a different explanation before, fell free to say so, better: find it in the archive! Well, that might be like finding a needle in an haystack I 'm afraid, especially if it was on the everything list).

Bruno




David 



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