Hey there,
I think the purpose of the paper is more qualitative rather than quantitative. Using #s to justify the reasoning is probably better but I just think it might be very difficult with the complexity of TIFF. Anyhow, I found the following 3 links that, at least in my mind, provides enough of a response for his questions.
The model in question, commonly called the Yale model, is predicated
on the idea that an endowment, which supports a significant portion of
costs for most universities, is a long-term fund and should therefore
structure its portfolio to maximize future gains. It should take on risk
with investments in alternative assets such as private equity and hedge
funds, and hopefully earn a large premium from it. Even if markets take
a dip, the thinking goes, endowments can hold onto illiquid assets and
ride out the storm until asset valuations rise again.
The recent
financial bloodbath exposed holes in this theory. When financial
commitments came due in late 2008, many endowments, with their funds
tied up in illiquid investments, were unable to get cash. They had
underestimated the downside risk of the model and spent too much too
quickly. The University of Pennsylvania, one of the best-performing
endowments during the crisis, lost only 16.8% in fiscal 2009 -- about
half of what Harvard and Yale did -- precisely because the fund followed
a more value-driven approach to investing and had more than half of its
assets in stocks and treasuries.