The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMW
Jack
Jack
Jon
- 'You can not walk on a spiritual path and simultaneousy be a thief, a murderer, an adulter, a dishonest academic...' You would hope that was true yet many spiritual leaders are the exact opposite. I am not not doubting Franklin Merell-Wolf, but the list of hypocritical holy men is endless. Nothing needs to be said of the Catholic Church. A popular spiritual 'man of peace', the Dalai Lama didn't mind approving the arming of the Kampas by the CIA to fight the Chinese (not that the Tibetans did not have the right to fight for independence, but that goes against all his supposed principles). India is full of holy con men and women. The list is endless.
- I could not agree more about governments being 100% free from morality. Science and technology do provide a great freedom for disseminating information, but they are neutral. I am curious about 'much needed knowledge and technology to keep a close watch on all of us.' There are positive aspects to having CCTV cameras everywhere, for example (London and Shenzen, China), lead the way, but is hard to imagine that having immoral governments keeping a close watch on us is a good thing. Is internet censorship a good? Is the jailing without trial of whistle blowers who reveal crimes against humanity, like Bradley Manning and Julian Assange ethical?
Jack
On Friday, March 8, 2013 8:03:46 PM UTC-7, Jack wrote:
William St. George
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William St. George
There is a surprising harmony between these two philosophies. Though I am not aware of what Berkeley thought about knowledge of God, I can guess that he considered it possible for some rare and priviledged individuals. Berkeley's argument against matter is the same as Franklin's (POCUWAO). I find much in Berkeley's philosophy very compelling just as I have in Wolff's. I wonder if anyone has studied this out in detail. It has been a long time since I read some of Berkeley.
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Ron Leonard
May 12, 2013
Hi, William,
Many of your statements in recent postings merit further discussion. However, were I to attempt to treat all of them my response would be much more extensive. I shall strive to be succinct.
1. Self (See Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, 48): “Atman (or paramatman, the Highest Self), for Advaita Vedanta, is that pure, undifferentiated self-shining consciousness, timeless, spaceless, and unthinkable, that is not-different from Brahman and that underlies and supports the individual human person.” It is “the pure ‘subject’ [Italics mine.] that underlies all subject/object distinctions” (49). This incisive formulation, by a Western philosopher who is an expert in Eastern philosophy, is the best that I have seen. I am sure that Franklin would not disagree. However, Franklin deliberately adapted some Eastern terms (e.g., Self and Nirvana) to best express his own Realizations. In his first Fundamental Realization (which I have called I Am That), he Realized the Self as Pure Subject, which he interpreted to be a confirmation of his view of Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta. However, in his preliminary comments to his Aphorism on the Self, he refers to Shankara as a monist (Transformations in Consciousness, 125), so this would reflect his First Fundamental Realization—Nirvana, or Consciousness-without-an-object-but-with-the-subject (Experience and Philosophy, 421-2). I contend that a more profound interpretation of Advaita Vedanta in terms of non-dualism is more accurate, but does not lend itself to the contrast that Franklin needed to express how his Second Fundamental Realization so vastly exceeded the first.
2. Shunyata (Voidness or Emptiness): In Shunyata all things are Realized as ‘empty’ of inherent existence, but this does not reduce to phenomenalism. In his tapes (composed much later than his writings) Franklin uses the Tibetan term Rigpa (Primordial Consciousness) to characterize Consciousness-without-an-object and without-a-subject (in his Second Fundamental Realization—what he called the High Indifference). However, in his primary writings he uses Shunyata, as “it comprehends both objective as well as subjective possibilities,” and thus comprehends both Samsara and Nirvana (as emphasized in his Aphorisms on CWO). Furthermore, whereas Franklin states that Nirvikalpa Samadhi is “the highest form of ecstatic Consciousness possible to man, it may be regarded as a kind of Nirvanic Consciousness.” Consequently, he would deny that this would be an accurate designation for his ultimate Realization. Other sources may employ a more exalted definition of Nirvikalpa Samadhi, but it seems best to clarify Franklin’s philosophy in his own terms first before introducing a critique that may/may not lead toward edification.
3. Kant and the Noumenon: The problems facing Kant at the end of the dispute between Rationalism and Empiricism were (1) to reclaim from Hume’s radical skepticism the knowledge that we actually have, and (2) to limit the extravagant and mutually incompatible metaphysical claims of the Rationalists. He does this by taking the Epistemological Turn (His “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy is the shift in focus from the object to the subject) to critique human knowledge, as such, to determine what it is that we can justifiably claim to know. “What is Reality?” is replaced by “What can we know of Reality?” Reality (which Kant understands as noumena, or things-as-they-are-in-themselves) may be defined as that which has being independently of any appearance to consciousness (that is, phenomena, or things as they appear to us). The metaphysical notion of the Noumenon then represents the logical possibility of a somewhat that underlies and gives rise to phenomena, but does not itself appear. It would be philosophically defective either to affirm or deny noumena without evidence. Kant is not claiming to know noumena, but rather is proposing criteria for what would constitute such evidence. Franklin contends that Introception (knowledge-through-identity) satisfies such criteria for metaphysical knowledge. He calls his shift of focus, from the subject to Consciousness Itself, a Copernican Revolution that completes that of Kant, and believes this to be his main contribution to Western philosophy.
Shine on,
Love and Light,
Ron
----- Original Message -----From: William St. GeorgeTo: Ron LeonardSent: Monday, May 06, 2013 1:01 PMSubject: Re: [fm-w], {Franklin Merrell-Wolff Fel The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMW--jTo someone with a PhD in philosophy I probably seem like the barbarian philosopher. It may even be true. I realize there is a whole industry surrounding Kant. But after 50 years of Kant in my head I can not be too enthusiastic about his philosophy though I am sure he was a good man.Paul Deussen clearly held Kant in high regard. But he held Schopenhauer in even higher regard. I am always surprised that FMW was not particularly interested in Schopenhauer who seems like an open door to somewhere, whereas Kant was a door to nowhere.Perhaps unfortunately I am coming to this discussion from the point of view of someone who would like to see a philosopher in the West say something true. Kant simply tells me that there are three areas off limit to human knowledge: the noumenal, the soul and God. Compared with Berkeley his philosophy seems opaque. Perhaps if I had come along when FMW did, studying at Stanford long before the Eastern thought would become readily available I might have fallen for Kant. Though I read him for a lengthy class in 1963 before I knew anything about Yoga or Advaita. I found him all but incomprehensible. I wondered about the noumenal Kant. As far as I can tell Kant was phenomenal to himself as well. Kant was not ding an sich for himself. Why? How did he know that he alone was not a thing in itself?According to Kant we can not know either the soul or God. Kant must imagine revelation as having dropped any knowledge about them into the human realm? I know this is taking almost a savage view of Kant--but what has Kant to offer? Some have claimed that his moral philosophy so weakly based has led to atheism, relativisim, etc. How has Kant really improved on Berkeley? We now have a candle burning in the room. Does the phenomenal have a life of its own? Does the mysterious noumenal help keep the candle burning? It seems to me that Kant simply further complicates without any elucidation.This has led philosophers to speculate about the two worlds or the two aspects. It is not clear how we can talk about a world encompassing the spaceless. Or how we can make any claims about it at all. In what way does the noumenal differ from nothing at all?Kant has the same craving that effected Hylas in The Three Dialogues. Matter, the substantial, material . . . something to support the sensuous . . . a substratum. So he pulls out of his magic hat, the noumenal (I agree with Schopenhauer that Kant ought not to have tampered with the Greek word.). Here we have the unknowable--spaceless, timeless, causeless . . . and yet Kant seems to know about it? How? For a philosopher who has severely limited the range of human knowledge, that is a kind of fatal question. Ironically the characterization is the same as sometimes given for Brahman! But Kant has no Maya.First let us take the term reality. Right away the word itself is a problem coming from the Latin for thing. And it is clear that modern philosophy looked to the physical for its reality. Science will show us the real. Reality then becomes that which is self existent and not dependent on something else for its existence. Or to that effect.j.best of luck,Reply to Ron's point (1.) regarding FMW and Advaita--also Buddhism:At the present time Pure Undifferentiated Consciousness may be the best expression. However, in the future that expression will probably become contaminated and misleading especially with all the consciousness research.
Hi Don,
Rather than present any more arguement for Self meaning this or that, I have simply collected some quotes from various sources. It certainly seems to me like there is some variation in how the word is used in Eastern spirituality in translation.
"Things are not as they seem - and nor are they otherwise."--Lankavatara Sutra
"Words and sentences are produced by the law of causation and are mutually conditioning-they cannot express the highest Reality."--Lankavatara Sutra
1. Definition for Self
Same as Self-God or Parasivam. God Siva's perfection of Absolute Reality, Parashiva -- That which abides at the core of every soul. The term self in lower case denotes the personal ego, one's individual identity or personality in contrast with the Divine Self.
"True Jnana -- the Unspeakable Knowledge of Nirvikalpa Samadhi" http://www.himalayanacademy.com/site/search/query/Self
[Himalayan Academy: in the audio quotes from Vivekananda, Upanishads and Yogaswami]
Definition for Parasivam: "Transcendent Siva." Siva's Absolute Reality. That which transcends time, form and space and defies description; the Self-God.
2. "With the transcendence of the knowledge ‘I am’, the Absolute prevails. The state is called ‘Parabrahman’, while the knowledge ‘I am’ is termed Brahman. This knowledge ‘I am’ or the beingness is illusion only. Therefore, when Brahman is transcended, only the ‘Parabrahman’ is, in which there is not even a trace of the knowledge ‘I am’" -- Sri Nisargadatta Maharaj
The Aitareya Upanishad (The Microcosm of Man) inquires into the exact nature of the Self, and answers:
Is it the Self by which we see, hear, smell, and taste,
Through which we speak in words? Is Self the mind
By which we perceive, direct, understand,
Know, remember, think, will, desire, and love?
These are but servants of the Self, who is
Pure consciousness. This Self is in all. (129-130)
3. Arthur Schopenhauer referred to one of Sir William Jones's publications in §1 of The World as Will and Representation (1819). Schopenhauer was trying to support the doctrine that "everything that exists for knowledge, and hence the whole of this world, is only object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver, in a word, representation." He quoted Jones's original English:
... how early this basic truth was recognized by the sages of India, since it appears as the fundamental tenet of the Vedânta philosophy ascribed to Vyasa, is proved by Sir William Jones in the last of his essays: "On the Philosophy of the Asiatics" (Asiatic Researches, vol. IV, p. 164): "The fundamental tenet of the Vedânta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms."
Schopenhauer used Jones's authority to relate the basic principle of his philosophy to what was, according to Jones, the most important underlying proposition of Vedânta. He made more passing reference to Sir William Jones's writings elsewhere in his works.
4. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra draws upon the concepts and doctrines of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha.[1] The most important doctrine issuing from the Lankāvatāra Sūtra is that of the primacy of consciousness (Skt. vijñāna) and the teaching of consciousness as the only reality. The sūtra asserts that all the objects of the world, and the names and forms of experience, are merely manifestations of the mind. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra describes the various tiers of consciousness in the individual, culminating in the "storehouse consciousness" (Skt. Ālayavijñāna), which is the base of the individual's deepest awareness and his tie to the cosmic.
Those who argue and discuss without understanding the truth are lost amid all the forms of relative knowledge, running about here and there and trying to justify their view of the substance of ego. If you realize the self in your inmost consciousness, it will appear in its purity. This is the womb of wonder, which is not the realm of those who live only by reason. Pure in its own nature and free from the categories of finite and infinite, Universal Mind is the undefiled wonder, which is wrongly apprehended by many.--Lankavatara Sutra
5. Furthermore, the Tibetan Buddhist scripture entitled The Expression of Manjushri's Ultimate Names (Mañjuśrī-nāma-saṅgīti), as quoted by the Tibetan Buddhist master, Dolpopa,[31] applies the following terms to the Ultimate Buddhic Reality:
"Pervasive Lord"
"Supreme Guardian of the world"
"Buddha-Self"
"Beginningless Self"
"Self of Thusness"
"Self of primordial purity"
"Source of all"
"Single Self"
"Diamond Self"
"Solid Self"
"Holy, Immovable Self"
"Supreme Self"
"Supreme Self of All Creatures".
Moreover, with reference to one of Vasubandhu's commentarial works, Dolpopa affirms the reality of the pure self, which is not the worldly ego, in the following terms:[32]
... the uncontaminated element is the buddhas' supreme Self ... because buddhas have attained pure Self, they have become the Self of great Selfhood. Through this consideration, the uncontaminated is posited as the supreme Self of buddhas.
* As one can see there is no real uniformity regarding English terms and terms from Eastern spirituality. Therefore, one is left to carefully define them for the reader to the extent that they can be rendered in English. In the 1930's it would have been quite a job finding this material or similar without access to one of the nation's best libraries. And then it would have taken weeks or months. A really good book could be written about the translation of Buddhist, Vedantic, Taoist literature into English.
HI Ron,Having responded enough I hope to 1. and 2. I will go on to 3. and 4. What we might call modern philosophy reminds me of the parable of the blind men examing an elephant.
On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 12:15 AM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Hi, William,
Just returned from the Great Space Center, working on various practical projects to prepare for our summer. In the interim, I have had time to absorb and reflect on your recent posts. As you have presented interesting thoughts on a wealth of diverse material, I shall not here attempt to address every issue, but rather focus on those most likely to advance our dialog, for I have enjoyed our exchange and found it very stimulating and worthwhile:
1. The most important point I wish to make concerns your interpretation of Franklin’s philosophy as Advaita Vedanta. This would have been fine until his Second Fundamental Realization (The High Indifference). However, his Realization of Consciousness without-an-object and without-a-subject required that he recast his entire philosophy on this ground. In his First Fundamental Realization (I am THAT, or Realization of the Self), the ultimate point attained was the Self (as the Pure Subject or Atman; however, in the Second Fundamental Realization, ultimately both the Self (the Subjective pole of Consciousness) and “God” (the Objective pole of Consciousness) were dissolved into Pure Consciousness Itself, which was Realized as Primordial—the Self was derivative with respect to it, though still relatively Transcendent relative to objects. This he acknowledges places him closer to Buddhism. As you have already read Franklin’s books, I would recommend that you now read my doctoral thesis on his philosophy, The Transcendental Philosophy of Franklin Merrell-Wolff, rewritten and published by SUNY Press, 1999.
2. It has dawned upon me that some of our apparent incompatibilities lie not so much in our overarching worldviews as in our personal psychologies. According to Jungian typology (currently, Myers-Briggs) your orientation seems to me to be Introverted Intuitive-Feeling Perception, whereas mine is Introverted Intuitive-Thinking Judgment. I believe that this is reflected in your tendency to move outward to explore interesting ideas and gravitate toward those that ‘feel right’ intuitively, whereas, at least in public discourse, I prefer to move more systematically, organizing and testing as I go along. Please understand that this is not a substantive criticism of your positions, as all of the Myers-Briggs categories characterize a legitimate way to approach, experience, and understand the world (although it is often difficult to see the value in typologies other than our own). Moreover, I am an essentialist—cut-to-the-chase, focus on the crux of the issue, bring to bear the relevant evidence and reasoning, make the best evaluation while leaving open the door for further input, and move on….
3. That said, in philosophical discourse (or even more broadly), communication works easiest (though not necessarily most fruitfully) whenever both individuals share the same ‘frame’, that is, a conceptual framework using a common language with shared presuppositions and known facts. It is quite helpful to know that we share an aversion to materialism (I survived a Philosophy of Mind course using Armstrong’s A Materialist Theory of Mind) as well as an appreciation of Franklin’s Introceptualism and Eastern philosophy. In discussing Berkeley, I have tried initially to use the frame of Modern Philosophy (Descartes to Kant) as the common context within which to understand his philosophical position and his relation to the other philosophers of that period. I take their common problem (in the intersection of epistemology and metaphysics) to be: How (and to what extent) is it possible to move reliably beyond our ‘subjective’ experience to knowledge of reality. I have then provided criticism both from within that frame and from a wider perspective (but not yet from my essential worldview, which I shall touch upon later on). Despite significant contributions by each of them, all have failed—the Rationalists unable to escape the dogmatism of each individual’s “innate ideas”; the Empiricists ultimately unable to escape the skepticism of phenomenalism. Without Kant’s Critical Idealism, Western philosophy would have stalled out. Still, he was unable to fulfill the requirements he set out for metaphysical knowledge (although he does not deny the possibility).
4. This sharpens the definition of metaphysics, as I take it simply to mean “the study of ultimate reality,” and leave to the domain of epistemology the questions of whether, how, and to what extent, it may be known.
5. Up until the Modern Period, the approach to metaphysics of Western philosophy had been almost exclusively speculative, that is, rarely questioning their presuppositions or assumptions, making ungrounded claims, and expressing their views in naively positive terms. Although concerned with epistemology, the Modern philosophers fell prey to their own presuppositions and favored views without adequate grounding. Only Hume and Kant maintain sufficient intellectual rigor to (mostly) avoid lapsing into speculative metaphysics. (Franklin’s account of the Kantian problem concerning metaphysical knowledge, and the notion of the noumenon, is given succinctly in Experience and Philosophy, 410-11, as is his own solution, using Introception.)
6. There are several ways that a metaphysical account may be defective. For instance, it may be internally inconsistent, without giving a satisfactory account of such inconsistency; it may conflict with known facts; it may be based in whole or in part on ungrounded speculation or conjecture; it may be grounded in Introception (mystical knowledge, by whatever name), but present the resulting formulation as exclusively true.
7. I found the article on Berkeley by Talia Mae Bettcher somewhat unhelpful. (I suppose that I have lost patience with the style of academic philosophy.) It seemed that by design she avoided dealing with many critical issues. I found insufficient definition of key terms, such as idea, soul, spirit, and self. Also, consciousness was defined as wholly derivative, so this would conflict with Franklin’s view of Consciousness as Primordial. (Incidentally, Franklin was also familiar with Berkeley, but makes only bare mention of him in Transformations in Consciousness, showing a much greater affinity for German Idealism.) The one clear point made was that there is no idea of spirit (which is similar to the insight that no objective predicate applies to the Pure Subject.); hence, spirits cannot be perceived, nor can they be known through any idea whatsoever. Despite this, Berkeley claims that spirit can be known, but gives no argument for this beyond Descartes, and commits the same fallacy, namely, characterizing the ‘I’ or self as “thinking substance,” a conceptual construct that does not share the certainty of the immediacy of perception. One further problem emerges with greater clarity for Berkeley: If spirit cannot be known by way of ideas, then how could he know that any other spirits (including God) exist apart from his own? (This is an awkward way to phrase this—what would it be that ‘owns’ a spirit, or a soul, or a mind?) How then can Subjective Idealism avoid reducing to Solipsism? If there is something more in her article that I may have missed, would you be so kind as to specify the statement and say why it would be worthwhile incorporating into my understanding of Berkeley’s philosophy.
8. I do not know whether Berkeley had more profound insights than he presented, perhaps based on adumbrations of mystical experience…but this might also have been true of Spinoza (although a leading Spinoza scholar assured me that he was a strict rationalist) and Hegel (as Franklin suggests). However, in my critique of his articulated position, there are at least three major defects that make it unacceptable: (1) Although he rejects material substance, he retains the notion of spiritual substance, but Hume rightly points out that substance is metaphysical (By definition, it can never be a phenomenon.), and thus cannot be grounded on Empiricist principles (He is an Empiricist insofar as he accepts Locke’s principles—and criticizes Locke for not adhering to them.); (2) Berkeley’s limiting knowledge of ideas to immediately sensed particulars would make general knowledge impossible, thus undermining causal reasoning, and, indeed, any empirical science (Hume also adopted this view, despite the absurdity)…but Leibniz pointedly criticized it because we already have established general knowledge in normative science, such as mathematics and logic); (3) Given his principle of “To be is to be perceived,” Berkeley absolutely needs God (or some divine mind) to function as omniscient perceiver to save his position from absurdity, but he has no warrant for merely positing such a being without providing substantive argument for it. (The most reasonable inference one can draw from his seeking to become a Bishop in the Church is that his view of God would not conflict significantly with the orthodox understanding of Christianity.)
9. The burning candle example was not mine, but Berkeley’s. Accounting for the continued existence of such objects while no one was perceiving them was the greatest problem he needed to overcome in establishing his philosophy. I am afraid that he would recoil at alternative attempts to avoid absurdity by introducing greater absurdity that would also be incompatible with his tenets. In the first instance (that somehow some part of him was still present in the room with the candle), he would actually need to be omnipresent (i.e., God), to ensure the continued existence of everything that he (or anyone) was not actually perceiving at the time. In the case where molecules are thought to be sentient (This is a version of panpsychism.), this presupposes the prior existence of the molecule, which may/may not have the property of sentience. Further, this notion of sentience would be too rudimentary to constitute perception. The best solution is simply to acknowledge the reductio ad absurdum and dispute the original principle.
10. Toward a Resolution: (A) Phenomenology as a first step. Ordinary experience, in which we experience the world, is within the subject-object structure. Idealism errs by conferring all reality-value upon the subject; Realism errs by conferring all reality-value upon the object. As our primary principle, we note that “All knowledge is known by a consciousness of some sort,” As the speculative approach to metaphysics is flawed, we suspend our ontological and metaphysical commitments and explanations and focus instead on that of which we are most certain—appearances as they are constituted in consciousness—and describe the structures of appearing.
11. Toward a Resolution: (B) The Mystical Perspective. Phenomenology is limited to the intentional (object-directed) mode of consciousness and the two familiar sources of knowledge. The resources of Mystical Realization open a Transcendental perspective (Known by Identity, or Gnosis), but our discipline still cautions us to avoid speculation and ungrounded claims. Note that avoiding the extremes of Subject or Object continue to allow the deepest penetration, but beyond all description. Nagarjuna advocates the Middle Way (between eternalism and nihilism), and finds Reality as Suchness—although things are empty (Shunya) of inherent existence, they are Such as they are. For Franklin, consciousness is a relation between subject and object; he found neither Subject nor Object to be ultimate, as they were Transcended by Consciousness Itself (CWOWS).
12. Toward a Resolution: (C) Primordial Wisdom. As Mystical Realization reveals the nonduality of Ultimate Reality, beyond words and concepts, but not beyond individual Realization, one seeks the most efficacious Path to it. In principle, the Path is Universal. Apart from Franklin, and allowing for cultural and individual differences, the most optimal Way of which I am familiar is that of Atiyoga, or Dzogchen.
Hi Ron--
After some additional research: Hume and Berkeley-- "Before proceeding, let me make plain that I assume Hume read Berkeley. While this has been contested in the literature, it has now been established beyond doubt. I assume Hume took Berkeley seriously, was influenced by him in important ways, and was concerned to address his views. Aside from internal evidence
which indicates Hume's highest regard for Berkeley, commentators have shown
the influence on issues including minima, the contrast between the vulgar and the
philosophical, the primary/secondary distinction, and even the mind itself.?" --Talia Mae Bettcher This is important as I think you tend to diminish Berkeley in your comment.FMW makes a useful distinction between object and thing. Your concern about the burning candle indicates a concern about a thing which you believe Berkeley foolishly overlooks. What about Dr. Wolff? There is a simple explanation which involves taking a closer look at God's perception keeping the candle going. What we have to keep in mind is that some philosophers (A.N. Whitehead notably) have considered atoms and molecules to have a primitive sentience. I think Whitehead uses the term feeling. And prehension. So Berkeley's ideas go with Berkeley but the sentience of the molecules, etc. remain. And the candle burns. It is not my goal presently to get into a lot of detail, but I think this does it nicely.
With Berkeley we have God, spirit and idea. In Vedanta we have Brahman, Atman-Jiva and the projective power of Maya. With both Locke and Hume (?) we need the thing. Thus Berkeley is way ahead. As far as I can determine quantum physics also would be more at home with Berkeley. The famous double slit experiment definitely makes for a strange world. PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPY: The Revolution in Modern Science by Heisenberg goes into much of this. However, there are many intricacies involved in getting all this straight. And a wide range of language. Nonetheless, I think Berkeley had a basic intuition that probably has gone over the heads of recent 20th century philosophers who prefer to have the mind=the self=the brain and have no clear idea on the notion of self. Berkeley's spirit and how it is known is superior to both the ideas of Locke and Hume and makes far more sense.
Whether Berkeley had mystical experiences is not something we are apt to find out. For one thing not all mystical experiences have the sensational quality of those we may have read about. Some deep experiences are also very simple and can not be easily conveyed if at all. There seems to be a kind of trade off where those who avoid the potential for knowledge through identity end up with the thing problem. Western philosophy has been haunted by the thing. Another ghost.
<William St. George, Mar 31, 3013>
Hi Ron--Best of luck. <William St. George, Mar 20, 2013>
I can see now that we are using the term metaphysical in different ways. By the term I mean knowledge of ultimte things, nature of reality, etc. After Spinoza Kant seems very this worldly. And knowledge is mostly empirical with a few dubious synthetic apriori. Now as regards Dr. Woff I have read his three books and found them all smooth sailing. His philosophy matches Vedanta in my opinion. Mathematics certainly trains the mind to a high concentration. And Dr Wolff's writing is very clear, very lucid. I would say that his is the leading Western philosophy and if Kant assisted that then three cheers for Kant. But I feel like Kant's philosophy is full of subtle contradictions that make it both ponderous and ultimately hard on the mind. It may be a case of a mind too radically different from mine whereas Spinoza hit the spot. And Plato being quite Vedantic also seems very useful. I am surprised Franklin made little use of either Plato or Parmenides. Obviously I am not a professional philosopher--so going on intuiton. But I would place Spinoza ahead of Kant in terms of depth and wisdom. The high point in Greek philosophy got overshadowed by a Christianity which became mostly a state religion. And then Greek philosophy got veiled by Western Christen philosophy.Hi Ron,[ I also put an addendum on a response above.]<William St. George, Mar 17, 2013>
Now to the next paragraphs and Kant. It seems to me that Kant has an even more serious problem(than Berkeley) with the candle he leaves burning in his study. For one thing space and time being subject forms of human sensibility we now no longer have a room with a candle in it--but did we ever? Kant's "external world" has no objects in it as surely without space & time we can not have objects. So I can not see how Kant accounts for the strong impression of a stable world. The noumenal is no help since we are not allowed to make claims about it--though Kant does slyly by giving it the task of somehow undergirding the realm of appearances.
I do not think the problem has a solution. That is, how to have an external world that behaves and at the same time sense-perceptions that are isomorphic with it. I think it is a case of eating one's cake and wanting to keep it also.In response to your second paragraph--if I were taking a philosophy course I would certainly (if I wanted a decent grade) take your point of view. However, the Indian "creation theory" most preferred by Rama Maharshi, Ajata Vada, is practically identical to Berkeley's. Here is what I think: we can not shake off the idea of the world being at least more or less they way we see it. So when Berkeley leaves the room we can not not imagine the candle continuing to burn in a human room. We are friends of Newton and company. And Schrodinger's cat is either alive or dead. But where does the conscious individual come in? Are we just largely a passive recipient? Or are we more like this: "The point of conception is the apex of creation."? We are, I believe, so locked into our language and inherited thoughts, that we assme a solid world out there . . . more or less they way we envision it. But if our physiology we very different it would be a totatlly different universe. Which we can not even imagine. So it is really a potential vast beyond reckoning. And again certainly part of Berkeley left the room--but did a part of Berkeley stay there with the burning candle. I know this sounds a bit mad. But my point is, based on about 50 years of meditating daily; nothing is as it seems . . . We do not know what Berkeley meant by God. In the 17th century people were very careful in the area of religion. Certainly Berkeley was no ordinary mind. I agree with Hume a bit in that if one now goes and eats something and talks with friends one descends into the everyday and things fit back together. One can forget about electrons and quarks and strings, about the Superconscious and a great many things . . . a profitable amnesia. But, the fact remains that the only reality (in form) that we really have is one in which we are the prinicipal creative aspect. And is there anything else besides us? I mean conscious creatures. I haven't really yet found a sensible way to talk about this stuff; and there may not be one. Now I should go read with care the essay on Berkeley I recommended to you. And then there is Don's post. The cat, the dog, and lunch!!
Addendum: source text -- SELF AND NOT--SELF * The Drigdrissyaviveka Attributed to Samkara * Translated from the Sanskrit with Commentary by RaphaelThis certainly seems to defy common sense. But common sense and the common intellect have been built up from the level of survival--and not from the level of philosophy or spiritual pursuits. <William St. George, Sun Mar 17, 2013>
A few selections: from the commentary: For the Awakened, the subtle and gross states (dream and waking) have exactly the same value: they represent a simple idea. The world is only a 'thought' of God at various vibratory levels.
And from the text: 11. The internal organ, which is a modification, identifying with the reflection of Consciousness images ideas while dreaming. While in the waking state and in relation with the sensory organs, it imagines external objects.On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Thanks for your extensive response. It shows that I need to clarify my original submission, keeping firmly in mind the distinction between metaphysical, epistemological and religioius issues, namely, (1) What is real? (2) How can it be known? (3) How, and to what extent, do various philosophers provide inspiration and/or guidance along a spiritual path?
Concerning Berkeley, I have nothing against him personally, and give him credit for pointing out the inconsistencies in Locke's Representative Realism--in particular, showing that the notion of physical substance is incompatible with the Empiricist premise that "All knowledge comes from (sense) experience." However, his philosophy is simply untenable. Empiricism was supposed to be a 'common sense' response to the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalists, and the notion of 'substance' (that which underlies the experienced appearances of things, but which itself is never an appearance) is logically excluded from Empiricism as knowledge. The principle that Berkeley added, "To be is to be perceived," errs in reducing being to existence (in the sense of a particular perception at a particular time); this introduces an absurdity of which Berkeley was fully aware (He lights a candle, leaves the room and find that it has burned down when he returns.). He introduces the notion of mental substance to account for the 'reality' of the perceived "Ideas," and introduces God to account for how things can persist without people to perceive them, concluding that "the things of the world are nothing other than Ideas in the mind of God," (and God places them in our minds). This is no less metaphysical speculation than that of the Rationalists. I do not detect any hint of mysticism here...and if he had second thoughts later in life, he did not modify his views. It was left to Hume's Phenomenalism disallow any metaphysical elements and to affirm the skepticism to which a logically consistent application of Empiricism led.
I agree that Kant was oriented to thinking, his turgid prose made even less accessible initially by poor translations. Why Kant is important is that at the end of the modern period philosophy was at an impasse between the skepticism to which Empiricism led and the dogmatic metaphysical systems of the Rationalists. Each was one sided; Kant synthesized them. Both were naive in maintaining an objective point of view; Kant shifted focus to the knowing subject, and the capacities we have as knowers. Kant did not eliminate metaphysics, but set out the requirements needed for it to be knowledge, and not mere speculation. Franklin's graduate seminars at Harvard were in Kant and in metaphysics. Why Franklin considers his own contribution in Western philosophy to follow from the Kantian problem is that Introception satisfies these requirements (a non-sensuous content given directly to consciousness, subsequently mediated by concepts). FMW also considers Kant's "fundamental unity of pure apperception" as hinting at adumbrations of mystical experience, but the evidence here is, admittedly, rather thin. His value in providing spiritual guidance would seem to be rather minimal. Of those you list, many do have something to offer in this regard, but whereas Plotinus seems the only Westerner whose philosophy is fully steeped in mysticism, it is not readily accessible.
Franklin does say that he found his study of mathematics helpful in preparing for his realizations, and that, in fact, he has pioneered a "mathematical yoga." However, although there are numerous applications of mathematics to help to conceptualize certain Transcendental values, he is not at all systematic in providing an overarching framework. I would say that contemplating certain mathematical notions, such as the mathematics of the transfinite and transcendental numbers and hypernumbers might be helpful in loosening inhibiting ways of thinking, the primary value would be as a mental discipline that can orient consciousness without distraction. There is a payoff in allowing relative consciousness to remain present and capable of recording Realizations.
Finally, I strongly suspect that the primary reason why people are attracted to Franklin's writings is that he both provides a personal account of his Mystical Realizations. He is an inexhaustible fount of inspiration for those who are willing to engage it.
Shine on,
Love and Light,
Ron
Actually Berkeley was born in Ireland to English parents. But the Irish atmosphere may have given him a desirable boost away from the extreme materialism of the English. <William St. George, Tue, Mar 12, 2013>
On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 4:59 PM, Jack <alethe...@gmail.com> wrote:
The Buddhist School, Yogachara or Vijnanavada, has similarities to Berkeley that seem worth pursuing. Berkeley is primarily an idealist. To also consider him an empiricist seems mistaken. His ideas are very different from Locke's sense impressions. Again language can become a trap for the unsuspecting. I am intending to do some additional study of Berkeley. Yogachara's mind only or consciousness only position seems quite attractive and would, I believe, harmonize with Berkeley in many respects. Finally it is never easy to know for certain what any of these persons thought. What happens if an advanced Buddhist soul reincarnates in 17th century England? Berkeley? Maybe so.
On Friday, March 8, 2013 8:03:46 PM UTC-7, Jack wrote:
There is a surprising harmony between these two philosophies. Though I am not aware of what Berkeley thought about knowledge of God, I can guess that he considered it possible for some rare and priviledged individuals. Berkeley's argument against matter is the same as Franklin's (POCUWAO). I find much in Berkeley's philosophy very compelling just as I have in Wolff's. I wonder if anyone has studied this out in detail. It has been a long time since I read some of Berkeley.
---
Thanks Ron. In the meantime while I digest your response, here is something to consider:The interesting part begins shortly at 1. Self-Knowledge and Notions. I think you will find this quite interesting.
"Berkeley on Self-Consciousness" by Talia Bettcher. http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/tbettch/Berkeley%20on%20Self-Consciousness.pdf
Additionally, it seems to me that Berkeley was a step ahead of Kant. Locke is attached to matter. Kant perhaps less so, but he contrives the noumenal which he hopes will "support" the phenomenal, though he admits we can know nothing about it. It is not clear whether he wants the noumenal to be causally engaged or to be in space and time. Since we know nothing about it, it could be all three or none. I believe Berkeley chose more wisely in eliminating the idea of matter which comes naturally from naive realism and Locke with his primary qualities. Unless I am mis-remembering, FMW in "Philosophy Without An Object . . . " also dismisses matter as a nonsense or self-contradictory notion. In any case the above essay makes it clear that Berkeley had in mind another sort of knowing but had no name for it. Good luck.On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Thanks for your extensive response. It shows that I need to clarify my original submission, keeping firmly in mind the distinction between metaphysical, epistemological and religioius issues, namely, (1) What is real? (2) How can it be known? (3) How, and to what extent, do various philosophers provide inspiration and/or guidance along a spiritual path?
Concerning Berkeley, I have nothing against him personally, and give him credit for pointing out the inconsistencies in Locke's Representative Realism--in particular, showing that the notion of physical substance is incompatible with the Empiricist premise that "All knowledge comes from (sense) experience." However, his philosophy is simply untenable. Empiricism was supposed to be a 'common sense' response to the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalists, and the notion of 'substance' (that which underlies the experienced appearances of things, but which itself is never an appearance) is logically excluded from Empiricism as knowledge. The principle that Berkeley added, "To be is to be perceived," errs in reducing being to existence (in the sense of a particular perception at a particular time); this introduces an absurdity of which Berkeley was fully aware (He lights a candle, leaves the room and find that it has burned down when he returns.). He introduces the notion of mental substance to account for the 'reality' of the perceived "Ideas," and introduces God to account for how things can persist without people to perceive them, concluding that "the things of the world are nothing other than Ideas in the mind of God," (and God places them in our minds). This is no less metaphysical speculation than that of the Rationalists. I do not detect any hint of mysticism here...and if he had second thoughts later in life, he did not modify his views. It was left to Hume's Phenomenalism disallow any metaphysical elements and to affirm the skepticism to which a logically consistent application of Empiricism led.
I agree that Kant was oriented to thinking, his turgid prose made even less accessible initially by poor translations. Why Kant is important is that at the end of the modern period philosophy was at an impasse between the skepticism to which Empiricism led and the dogmatic metaphysical systems of the Rationalists. Each was one sided; Kant synthesized them. Both were naive in maintaining an objective point of view; Kant shifted focus to the knowing subject, and the capacities we have as knowers. Kant did not eliminate metaphysics, but set out the requirements needed for it to be knowledge, and not mere speculation. Franklin's graduate seminars at Harvard were in Kant and in metaphysics. Why Franklin considers his own contribution in Western philosophy to follow from the Kantian problem is that Introception satisfies these requirements (a non-sensuous content given directly to consciousness, subsequently mediated by concepts). FMW also considers Kant's "fundamental unity of pure apperception" as hinting at adumbrations of mystical experience, but the evidence here is, admittedly, rather thin. His value in providing spiritual guidance would seem to be rather minimal. Of those you list, many do have something to offer in this regard, but whereas Plotinus seems the only Westerner whose philosophy is fully steeped in mysticism, it is not readily accessible.
Franklin does say that he found his study of mathematics helpful in preparing for his realizations, and that, in fact, he has pioneered a "mathematical yoga." However, although there are numerous applications of mathematics to help to conceptualize certain Transcendental values, he is not at all systematic in providing an overarching framework. I would say that contemplating certain mathematical notions, such as the mathematics of the transfinite and transcendental numbers and hypernumbers might be helpful in loosening inhibiting ways of thinking, the primary value would be as a mental discipline that can orient consciousness without distraction. There is a payoff in allowing relative consciousness to remain present and capable of recording Realizations.
Finally, I strongly suspect that the primary reason why people are attracted to Franklin's writings is that he both provides a personal account of his Mystical Realizations. He is an inexhaustible fount of inspiration for those who are willing to engage it.
Shine on,
Love and Light,
Ron
I must say that your reading of Berkeley is very unsympathetic. However, as a professor of philosophy you are naturally going to see him within a particular context. My approach was quick and hopefully intuitive. Unlike Kant Berkeley does not actually eliminate all metaphysical knowledge. Maybe he does contradict himself. Of the two philosophers Berkeley most likely was the mystically inclined. I see nothing in Kant of the mystical. In fact it is not easy to see Kant as a starting point for the pursuit of a Realization. Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza would be far better choices.
I think we have to be careful not to consider mathematical ability as in some sense mystical ability. It may be an aid for some but certainly not for all. I am good at mathematics but do not find studying more does much besides give me nerves! The same with science. Most men are rather too left brained. They would benefit from cooking, gardening, taking care of animals, etc. As far as I can tell Newton who was certainly a math genuius was also a rather hard hearted individual. Riemann might be a better candidate for the mystical--but we don't have much biographical informaton about him.
Kant's thing in itself seems contradtictory. Unknowable--but then how would we know if it could function as the substratum of the world. In any case it is spaceless and timeless. And worst of all Kant forgets himself as a potential thing in itself--something that Schopenhauer noted. Kant was primarily a thinker. One needs to keep in mind that Berkeley was a very young man when he did most of his philosophy. Obviously a very bright and gifted one. Schopenhauer was similar in doing his major work in his twenties. Kant was getting along in years before the Critique of Pure Reason occurred. And as he wrote it his writing style degenerated.
P.S. I suppose there is some truth in your statement about Kant shifting emphasis to the subject but he did this in a very mental and theoretic way. That fact that he never seemed to grasp that he himself was something that might qualify as thing in itself is an example of his excessively mental way. At some point in my study and practice of Yoga I began to ponder this and many years later read that Schopenhauer had had the same thought. Schopenhauer's knowledge of Kant was very thorough; he did appreciate Kant but was aware of his limitations. Again I just can not see telling someone interested in the spiritual life to read Kant! Or to study advanced mathematics. I would recommend Plato & Parmenides. But also FMW's books if I thought they had that kind of mind. His tapes might be best for most persons. Certainly Thich Nhat Hanh. But then this is largely theoretical as few Americans are readers or thinkers. I think women have a potential advantage over men as they have less intellect often (though that is less and less the case now). And the intellect can be a formidible barrier to higher consciousness. <William St. George, Sun., March 10, 2013>
In short I can not endorse Kant as the philosopher par excellance. Neither can I recommend mathematics as a path to mystical realizations. These are clearly personal choices and inclinations and not guarantees. Of course if someone suffers from innumeracy it might be quite liberating to learn some math.
On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Much as I would wish to respond to a number of recent postings, I must hold these in abeyance for the moment. However, the contrast between Bishop Berkeley and FMW seems much more succinct and easy to help clarify. Berkeley was the second of three philosophers (along with Locke and Hume) in the Modern period from the school of Empiricism. As such, he rejects the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalist School (represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Christian Wolff), but accepts Locke's primary thesis that "All knowledge begins with experience," by which Locke means SENSE EXPERIENCE. This could hardly be further at odds with FMW.
Furthermore, Berkeley's rejection of Locke's notion of material substance in favor of mental substance (Remember, the metaphysical notion of substance is that which exists in and for itself.) is no less speculative than the metaphysics of the Rationalists, and can only be maintained in conflict with the Empiricists' fundamental principle, for no substance can be known by sense experience. Worse, Berkeley's dictum, "Esse est percipe," (To be is to be perceived.) reduces the reality of anything to its immediate perception as an "Idea," but when he attempts to guarantee the common sense beliefs in the existence of ourselves and the things of the world by claiming that they really exist because they are perceived by God, this begs the question: Who perceives God to guarantee his existence? Since, by definition, God can never be an object of sense experience, God's existence (and Berkeley conceives this notion wholly consistently with Christian theology, without bothering to argue for it) is wholly speculative. Moreover, there is no hint that Berkeley ever had a Fundamental Realization, so his whole philosophy of Subjective Idealism is without adequate epistemological foundation.
In addition, Berkeley was an exceptionally concrete thinker, who literally could not grasp mathematical abstraction. For example, in attempting to think of the abstract concept of "triangle," all he could do was to imagine a particular triangle. Note that Franklin is much closer in temperament and approach to the Rationalists--Descartes and Leibniz were brilliant mathematicians, to whom we owe the invention of analytic geometry and calculus, respectively (and Spinoza's profession as a lens grinder required practical geometrical skill) than to the Empiricists, none of whom exhibited either skill or interest in mathematics. Still, whereas Rationalist metaphysics is merely speculative, FMW is able to ground his metaphysics in Introception--the noetic formulations derived from the nondual CWOWS.
Finally, Franklin considers his major contribution to Western philosophy to follow from Kant (who synthesized the two schools of Modern Philosophy), and show the possibility of metaphysical knowledge inherent in Fundamental Realization, and to complete Kant's Copernican Revolution in Philosophy (Whereas Kant shifted focus from the object of consciousness to the subject-to-consciousness, FMW shifts it to Consciousness Itself.).
Hope that this moves the dialog further along...
Shine on, in 'love of wisdom,"
Love and Light,
Ron
I have an entirely different take on Berkeley. Clearly an unorthodox one. However, I have been reflecting on this whole area since I studied philosophy at Stanford in the early 1960's. I will take some time now and give your response a careful scrutiny. In the meantime I would say this, most languages operate as a barrier to a very deep understanding of the nature of reality. English is clearly based on a natural or naive realism which is so deeply embeded in our thinking and feeling that it is almost impossible to set aside. For example, some philosophers have ended up taking about 'seeing' sense data. I guestion whether the notion of perception itself is not a part of this illusion. In a contemplative state the whole operation of experience appears very differently. I take the position that the world is an Appearance in the Self. And so it seems in a deep state of mind. Reading Berkeley rather differently than you it seems he was almost articulating something similar.
Since it was philosophers like Donald Davdison and David Armstrong that drove me into Yoga, I am reluctant now to accept any orthodox position without first finding out what I make of it without someone else's interpretation influencing me. For example, Kant in many respects seems like a poor start for ending up with the Fundamental Realization as he allowed for only two sources of knowledge. Spinoza allows for three.Realization is so radical that nothing much seems to change--and yet everything is different as well. To use Yogic terminology, the Self is too simple for words. And was too simple to be realized until the fateful moment. Or Pure Undifferentiated Consciouness is just too obvious for the mind entangled in nama and rupa. <William St. George, Sat. March 9, 2013>
Berkeley's Esse est percipe comes close to what Professor Amit Goswami has to say.
Thanks for taking the time to respond. Later I will attempt to answer your objections which seem fatal but which I think are due to a certain way of reading Berkeley who may have mis-presented his position even to himself!! [Sometimes an intuitive glimpse of a position gives a clearer picture of what it is than after prolonged viewing. A recent glimpse of Berkeley certainly reminded me of FMW whereas glimpses and prolonged viewings of Kant get me almost nowhere except for relief to Schopenhauer --who has his problematic positions also!]On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Much as I would wish to respond to a number of recent postings, I must hold these in abeyance for the moment. However, the contrast between Bishop Berkeley and FMW seems much more succinct and easy to help clarify. Berkeley was the second of three philosophers (along with Locke and Hume) in the Modern period from the school of Empiricism. As such, he rejects the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalist School (represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Christian Wolff), but accepts Locke's primary thesis that "All knowledge begins with experience," by which Locke means SENSE EXPERIENCE. This could hardly be further at odds with FMW.
Furthermore, Berkeley's rejection of Locke's notion of material substance in favor of mental substance (Remember, the metaphysical notion of substance is that which exists in and for itself.) is no less speculative than the metaphysics of the Rationalists, and can only be maintained in conflict with the Empiricists' fundamental principle, for no substance can be known by sense experience. Worse, Berkeley's dictum, "Esse est percipe," (To be is to be perceived.) reduces the reality of anything to its immediate perception as an "Idea," but when he attempts to guarantee the common sense beliefs in the existence of ourselves and the things of the world by claiming that they really exist because they are perceived by God, this begs the question: Who perceives God to guarantee his existence? Since, by definition, God can never be an object of sense experience, God's existence (and Berkeley conceives this notion wholly consistently with Christian theology, without bothering to argue for it) is wholly speculative. Moreover, there is no hint that Berkeley ever had a Fundamental Realization, so his whole philosophy of Subjective Idealism is without adequate epistemological foundation.
In addition, Berkeley was an exceptionally concrete thinker, who literally could not grasp mathematical abstraction. For example, in attempting to think of the abstract concept of "triangle," all he could do was to imagine a particular triangle. Note that Franklin is much closer in temperament and approach to the Rationalists--Descartes and Leibniz were brilliant mathematicians, to whom we owe the invention of analytic geometry and calculus, respectively (and Spinoza's profession as a lens grinder required practical geometrical skill) than to the Empiricists, none of whom exhibited either skill or interest in mathematics. Still, whereas Rationalist metaphysics is merely speculative, FMW is able to ground his metaphysics in Introception--the noetic formulations derived from the nondual CWOWS.
Finally, Franklin considers his major contribution to Western philosophy to follow from Kant (who synthesized the two schools of Modern Philosophy), and show the possibility of metaphysical knowledge inherent in Fundamental Realization, and to complete Kant's Copernican Revolution in Philosophy (Whereas Kant shifted focus from the object of consciousness to the subject-to-consciousness, FMW shifts it to Consciousness Itself.).
Hope that this moves the dialog further along...
Shine on, in 'love of wisdom,"
Love and Light,
Ron
----- Original Message -----
From: Jack
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 8:03 PM
Subject: [fm-w], {Franklin Merrell-Wolff Fel The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMW
There is a surprising harmony between these two philosophies. Though I am not aware of what Berkeley thought about knowledge of God, I can guess that he considered it possible for some rare and priviledged individuals. Berkeley's argument against matter is the same as Franklin's (POCUWAO). I find much in Berkeley's philosophy very compelling just as I have in Wolff's. I wonder if anyone has studied this out in detail. It has been a long time since I read some of Berkeley.
Sent: Sunday, March 31, 2013 12:07 PMSubject: Re: [fm-w], {Franklin Merrell-Wolff Fel The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMWHi Ron--After some additional research: Hume and Berkeley-- "Before proceeding, let me make plain that I assume Hume read Berkeley. While this has been contested in the literature, it has now been established beyond
doubt. I assume Hume took Berkeley seriously, was influenced by him in important ways, and was concerned to address his views. Aside from internal evidence
which indicates Hume's highest regard for Berkeley, commentators have shown
the influence on issues including minima, the contrast between the vulgar and the
philosophical, the primary/secondary distinction, and even the mind itself.?" --Talia Mae Bettcher This is important as I think you tend to diminish Berkeley in your comment.FMW makes a useful distinction between object and thing. Your concern about the burning candle indicates a concern about a thing which you believe Berkeley foolishly overlooks. What about Dr. Wolff? There is a simple explanation which involves taking a closer look at God's perception keeping the candle going. What we have to keep in mind is that some philosophers (A.N. Whitehead notably) have considered atoms and molecules to have a primitive sentience. I think Whitehead uses the term feeling. And prehension. So Berkeley's ideas go with Berkeley but the sentience of the molecules, etc. remain. And the candle burns. It is not my goal presently to get into a lot of detail, but I think this does it nicely.With Berkeley we have God, spirit and idea. In Vedanta we have Brahman, Atman-Jiva and the projective power of Maya. With both Locke and Hume (?) we need the thing. Thus Berkeley is way ahead. As far as I can determine quantum physics also would be more at home with Berkeley. The famous double slit experiment definitely makes for a strange world. PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPY: The Revolution in Modern Science by Heisenberg goes into much of this. However, there are many intricacies involved in getting all this straight. And a wide range of language. Nonetheless, I think Berkeley had a basic intuition that probably has gone over the heads of recent 20th century philosophers who prefer to have the mind=the self=the brain and have no clear idea on the notion of self. Berkeley's spirit and how it is known is superior to both the ideas of Locke and Hume and makes far more sense.Whether Berkeley had mystical experiences is not something we are apt to find out. For one thing not all mystical experiences have the sensational quality of those we may have read about. Some deep experiences are also very simple and can not be easily conveyed if at all. There seems to be a kind of trade off where those who avoid the potential for knowledge through identity end up with the thing problem. Western philosophy has been haunted by the thing. Another ghost.
On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Much as I would wish to respond to a number of recent postings, I must hold these in abeyance for the moment. However, the contrast between Bishop Berkeley and FMW seems much more succinct and easy to help clarify. Berkeley was the second of three philosophers (along with Locke and Hume) in the Modern period from the school of Empiricism. As such, he rejects the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalist School (represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Christian Wolff), but accepts Locke's primary thesis that "All knowledge begins with experience," by which Locke means SENSE EXPERIENCE. This could hardly be further at odds with FMW.Furthermore, Berkeley's rejection of Locke's notion of material substance in favor of mental substance (Remember, the metaphysical notion of substance is that which exists in and for itself.) is no less speculative than the metaphysics of the Rationalists, and can only be maintained in conflict with the Empiricists' fundamental principle, for no substance can be known by sense experience. Worse, Berkeley's dictum, "Esse est percipe," (To be is to be perceived.) reduces the reality of anything to its immediate perception as an "Idea," but when he attempts to guarantee the common sense beliefs in the existence of ourselves and the things of the world by claiming that they really exist because they are perceived by God, this begs the question: Who perceives God to guarantee his existence? Since, by definition, God can never be an object of sense experience, God's existence (and Berkeley conceives this notion wholly consistently with Christian theology, without bothering to argue for it) is wholly speculative. Moreover, there is no hint that Berkeley ever had a Fundamental Realization, so his whole philosophy of Subjective Idealism is without adequate epistemological foundation.In addition, Berkeley was an exceptionally concrete thinker, who literally could not grasp mathematical abstraction. For example, in attempting to think of the abstract concept of "triangle," all he could do was to imagine a particular triangle. Note that Franklin is much closer in temperament and approach to the Rationalists--Descartes and Leibniz were brilliant mathematicians, to whom we owe the invention of analytic geometry and calculus, respectively (and Spinoza's profession as a lens grinder required practical geometrical skill) than to the Empiricists, none of whom exhibited either skill or interest in mathematics. Still, whereas Rationalist metaphysics is merely speculative, FMW is able to ground his metaphysics in Introception--the noetic formulations derived from the nondual CWOWS.Finally, Franklin considers his major contribution to Western philosophy to follow from Kant (who synthesized the two schools of Modern Philosophy), and show the possibility of metaphysical knowledge inherent in Fundamental Realization, and to complete Kant's Copernican Revolution in Philosophy (Whereas Kant shifted focus from the object of consciousness to the subject-to-consciousness, FMW shifts it to Consciousness Itself.).Hope that this moves the dialog further along...Shine on, in 'love of wisdom,"Love and Light,Ron
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P.S. Our great and irrepressible desire to name and label runs into a problem with the zone beyond which words may not go. Going with words beyond this point or believing that one has done that is where all the terms have come from. They may help; they may not help. I notice in Zen words are often omitted entirely. This works for some. The word consciousness is already becoming a problem I think. Our language from the beginning imposes on us a way of viewing things. We can work with the language but at some point it gives out and is no further use.
mt
William St. George wrote:
“After all the self is itself a thing, a form, an object--though very subtle indeed. To tell the devotee you will give up your vrey self might engender panic. I have read that people really do fear annihilation. Some natures respond to the thought of losing themselves with great alarm. I know such a person. I think having a mild Catholic upbringing was an asset here. Why not give up the Will and the Self to God? Become a saint. Best option.”
The whole point of the egoic-self is to defend the self-identity (consciousness) as a self-survival function (no doubt originally related to survival functions, but developmentally more sophisticated now as mental defense mechanisms). But the distinction between physical survival and psychological survival (identity) is not so clear as the strings that hold it together are also not so clear to many, depending to a large extent upon the sophistication and development of the self (perhaps suggesting the number of physical pathways in the brain that communicate with each other in a developmental sense).
To die (psychically), and then be reborn at a wider sense of consciousness, essentially involves a shift from one mental level of processing the data stream to another more subtle level of data stream: to Know, Higher consciousness, Christ consciousness, Buddha consciousness, et al, means the egoic-self no longer functions in the same way, as it is unable to process AT THE LEVEL OF HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS, but this does not mean the annihilation of the egoic-self or self-identity (it’s taken many thousands-millions) of years of brain development to even get this far). Rather, the former “self-controller of all, in its exclusive-identity of importance now takes second-place as it is no longer processing the SUBTLE DATA, only recording it the best it can.
However, the clinging of the self to its often life-long obsession of control and importance, and fusion of this self (almost entirely composed of defense mechanisms that defend but distort reality), often has great difficulty “letting go” as this is perceived as a death of itself. It often has to feel “all is well and all will be well” in the midst of some major demise of its self in order for a new consciousness (subtle, wider, more aware, higher, the Kingdom of new Things, et al) to be Known.
But in fact, the self cannot actually “let go.” That itself is an illusion of its own control. Why in the world have not more people Understood Imperance or Preception or of What Franklin-Merrell Wolff and many, many others point and Know of higher consciousness? Fear is one element behind that ignorance. The thought-brain itself seems even to fear a “space” and so goes from one thought to the next, quickly before awareness of the gap registers, almost like that space is a death of itself, or certainly of the thought-identity (to which the “self” and even the “Self” as Subtle Thought is composed).
Homo sapiens are massively unconsciousness, not only in the extent to which they distort reality moment to moment just by the operational nature of their egoic-self, but in terms of higher consciousness or of a potential shift to another way of Knowing altogether. THEY CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH, apparently, until the illusions created by the self are so grotesque as to self-destruct and something else emerges from the ashes, perhaps a more inclusive truth than the one (myth) before: thus the worn history of evolution over and over. In miniature, in a sense, is that which appears as a function “within” the psyche of a man or humankind crawling its way toward a higher consciousness of Bethlehem, Nirvana, or Nivrikalpa, et al.
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