Fw: [fm-w], {Franklin Merrell-Wolff Fel The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMW
Ron Leonard
Hi, William,
Just returned from the Great Space Center, working on various practical projects to prepare for our summer. In the interim, I have had time to absorb and reflect on your recent posts. As you have presented interesting thoughts on a wealth of diverse material, I shall not here attempt to address every issue, but rather focus on those most likely to advance our dialog, for I have enjoyed our exchange and found it very stimulating and worthwhile:
1. The most important point I wish to make concerns your interpretation of Franklin’s philosophy as Advaita Vedanta. This would have been fine until his Second Fundamental Realization (The High Indifference). However, his Realization of Consciousness without-an-object and without-a-subject required that he recast his entire philosophy on this ground. In his First Fundamental Realization (I am THAT, or Realization of the Self), the ultimate point attained was the Self (as the Pure Subject or Atman; however, in the Second Fundamental Realization, ultimately both the Self (the Subjective pole of Consciousness) and “God” (the Objective pole of Consciousness) were dissolved into Pure Consciousness Itself, which was Realized as Primordial—the Self was derivative with respect to it, though still relatively Transcendent relative to objects. This he acknowledges places him closer to Buddhism. As you have already read Franklin’s books, I would recommend that you now read my doctoral thesis on his philosophy, The Transcendental Philosophy of Franklin Merrell-Wolff, rewritten and published by SUNY Press, 1999.
2. It has dawned upon me that some of our apparent incompatibilities lie not so much in our overarching worldviews as in our personal psychologies. According to Jungian typology (currently, Myers-Briggs) your orientation seems to me to be Introverted Intuitive-Feeling Perception, whereas mine is Introverted Intuitive-Thinking Judgment. I believe that this is reflected in your tendency to move outward to explore interesting ideas and gravitate toward those that ‘feel right’ intuitively, whereas, at least in public discourse, I prefer to move more systematically, organizing and testing as I go along. Please understand that this is not a substantive criticism of your positions, as all of the Myers-Briggs categories characterize a legitimate way to approach, experience, and understand the world (although it is often difficult to see the value in typologies other than our own). Moreover, I am an essentialist—cut-to-the-chase, focus on the crux of the issue, bring to bear the relevant evidence and reasoning, make the best evaluation while leaving open the door for further input, and move on….
3. That said, in philosophical discourse (or even more broadly), communication works easiest (though not necessarily most fruitfully) whenever both individuals share the same ‘frame’, that is, a conceptual framework using a common language with shared presuppositions and known facts. It is quite helpful to know that we share an aversion to materialism (I survived a Philosophy of Mind course using Armstrong’s A Materialist Theory of Mind) as well as an appreciation of Franklin’s Introceptualism and Eastern philosophy. In discussing Berkeley, I have tried initially to use the frame of Modern Philosophy (Descartes to Kant) as the common context within which to understand his philosophical position and his relation to the other philosophers of that period. I take their common problem (in the intersection of epistemology and metaphysics) to be: How (and to what extent) is it possible to move reliably beyond our ‘subjective’ experience to knowledge of reality. I have then provided criticism both from within that frame and from a wider perspective (but not yet from my essential worldview, which I shall touch upon later on). Despite significant contributions by each of them, all have failed—the Rationalists unable to escape the dogmatism of each individual’s “innate ideas”; the Empiricists ultimately unable to escape the skepticism of phenomenalism. Without Kant’s Critical Idealism, Western philosophy would have stalled out. Still, he was unable to fulfill the requirements he set out for metaphysical knowledge (although he does not deny the possibility).
4. This sharpens the definition of metaphysics, as I take it simply to mean “the study of ultimate reality,” and leave to the domain of epistemology the questions of whether, how, and to what extent, it may be known.
5. Up until the Modern Period, the approach to metaphysics of Western philosophy had been almost exclusively speculative, that is, rarely questioning their presuppositions or assumptions, making ungrounded claims, and expressing their views in naively positive terms. Although concerned with epistemology, the Modern philosophers fell prey to their own presuppositions and favored views without adequate grounding. Only Hume and Kant maintain sufficient intellectual rigor to (mostly) avoid lapsing into speculative metaphysics. (Franklin’s account of the Kantian problem concerning metaphysical knowledge, and the notion of the noumenon, is given succinctly in Experience and Philosophy, 410-11, as is his own solution, using Introception.)
6. There are several ways that a metaphysical account may be defective. For instance, it may be internally inconsistent, without giving a satisfactory account of such inconsistency; it may conflict with known facts; it may be based in whole or in part on ungrounded speculation or conjecture; it may be grounded in Introception (mystical knowledge, by whatever name), but present the resulting formulation as exclusively true.
7. I found the article on Berkeley by Talia Mae Bettcher somewhat unhelpful. (I suppose that I have lost patience with the style of academic philosophy.) It seemed that by design she avoided dealing with many critical issues. I found insufficient definition of key terms, such as idea, soul, spirit, and self. Also, consciousness was defined as wholly derivative, so this would conflict with Franklin’s view of Consciousness as Primordial. (Incidentally, Franklin was also familiar with Berkeley, but makes only bare mention of him in Transformations in Consciousness, showing a much greater affinity for German Idealism.) The one clear point made was that there is no idea of spirit (which is similar to the insight that no objective predicate applies to the Pure Subject.); hence, spirits cannot be perceived, nor can they be known through any idea whatsoever. Despite this, Berkeley claims that spirit can be known, but gives no argument for this beyond Descartes, and commits the same fallacy, namely, characterizing the ‘I’ or self as “thinking substance,” a conceptual construct that does not share the certainty of the immediacy of perception. One further problem emerges with greater clarity for Berkeley: If spirit cannot be known by way of ideas, then how could he know that any other spirits (including God) exist apart from his own? (This is an awkward way to phrase this—what would it be that ‘owns’ a spirit, or a soul, or a mind?) How then can Subjective Idealism avoid reducing to Solipsism? If there is something more in her article that I may have missed, would you be so kind as to specify the statement and say why it would be worthwhile incorporating into my understanding of Berkeley’s philosophy.
8. I do not know whether Berkeley had more profound insights than he presented, perhaps based on adumbrations of mystical experience…but this might also have been true of Spinoza (although a leading Spinoza scholar assured me that he was a strict rationalist) and Hegel (as Franklin suggests). However, in my critique of his articulated position, there are at least three major defects that make it unacceptable: (1) Although he rejects material substance, he retains the notion of spiritual substance, but Hume rightly points out that substance is metaphysical (By definition, it can never be a phenomenon.), and thus cannot be grounded on Empiricist principles (He is an Empiricist insofar as he accepts Locke’s principles—and criticizes Locke for not adhering to them.); (2) Berkeley’s limiting knowledge of ideas to immediately sensed particulars would make general knowledge impossible, thus undermining causal reasoning, and, indeed, any empirical science (Hume also adopted this view, despite the absurdity)…but Leibniz pointedly criticized it because we already have established general knowledge in normative science, such as mathematics and logic); (3) Given his principle of “To be is to be perceived,” Berkeley absolutely needs God (or some divine mind) to function as omniscient perceiver to save his position from absurdity, but he has no warrant for merely positing such a being without providing substantive argument for it. (The most reasonable inference one can draw from his seeking to become a Bishop in the Church is that his view of God would not conflict significantly with the orthodox understanding of Christianity.)
9. The burning candle example was not mine, but Berkeley’s. Accounting for the continued existence of such objects while no one was perceiving them was the greatest problem he needed to overcome in establishing his philosophy. I am afraid that he would recoil at alternative attempts to avoid absurdity by introducing greater absurdity that would also be incompatible with his tenets. In the first instance (that somehow some part of him was still present in the room with the candle), he would actually need to be omnipresent (i.e., God), to ensure the continued existence of everything that he (or anyone) was not actually perceiving at the time. In the case where molecules are thought to be sentient (This is a version of panpsychism.), this presupposes the prior existence of the molecule, which may/may not have the property of sentience. Further, this notion of sentience would be too rudimentary to constitute perception. The best solution is simply to acknowledge the reductio ad absurdum and dispute the original principle.
10. Toward a Resolution: (A) Phenomenology as a first step. Ordinary experience, in which we experience the world, is within the subject-object structure. Idealism errs by conferring all reality-value upon the subject; Realism errs by conferring all reality-value upon the object. As our primary principle, we note that “All knowledge is known by a consciousness of some sort,” As the speculative approach to metaphysics is flawed, we suspend our ontological and metaphysical commitments and explanations and focus instead on that of which we are most certain—appearances as they are constituted in consciousness—and describe the structures of appearing.
11. Toward a Resolution: (B) The Mystical Perspective. Phenomenology is limited to the intentional (object-directed) mode of consciousness and the two familiar sources of knowledge. The resources of Mystical Realization open a Transcendental perspective (Known by Identity, or Gnosis), but our discipline still cautions us to avoid speculation and ungrounded claims. Note that avoiding the extremes of Subject or Object continue to allow the deepest penetration, but beyond all description. Nagarjuna advocates the Middle Way (between eternalism and nihilism), and finds Reality as Suchness—although things are empty (Shunya) of inherent existence, they are Such as they are. For Franklin, consciousness is a relation between subject and object; he found neither Subject nor Object to be ultimate, as they were Transcended by Consciousness Itself (CWOWS).
12. Toward a Resolution: (C) Primordial Wisdom. As Mystical Realization reveals the nonduality of Ultimate Reality, beyond words and concepts, but not beyond individual Realization, one seeks the most efficacious Path to it. In principle, the Path is Universal. Apart from Franklin, and allowing for cultural and individual differences, the most optimal Way of which I am familiar is that of Atiyoga, or Dzogchen.
Hi Ron--
After some additional research: Hume and
Berkeley-- "Before proceeding, let me make plain that I assume Hume read
Berkeley. While this has been contested in the literature, it has now been
established beyond doubt. I assume Hume took Berkeley seriously, was influenced
by him in important ways, and was concerned to address his views. Aside from
internal evidence
which indicates Hume's highest regard for Berkeley,
commentators have shown
the influence on issues including minima, the
contrast between the vulgar and the
philosophical, the primary/secondary
distinction, and even the mind itself.?" --Talia Mae Bettcher This is important
as I think you tend to diminish Berkeley in your comment.
FMW makes a useful distinction between object and thing. Your concern about the burning candle indicates a concern about a thing which you believe Berkeley foolishly overlooks. What about Dr. Wolff? There is a simple explanation which involves taking a closer look at God's perception keeping the candle going. What we have to keep in mind is that some philosophers (A.N. Whitehead notably) have considered atoms and molecules to have a primitive sentience. I think Whitehead uses the term feeling. And prehension. So Berkeley's ideas go with Berkeley but the sentience of the molecules, etc. remain. And the candle burns. It is not my goal presently to get into a lot of detail, but I think this does it nicely.
With Berkeley we have God, spirit and idea. In Vedanta we have Brahman, Atman-Jiva and the projective power of Maya. With both Locke and Hume (?) we need the thing. Thus Berkeley is way ahead. As far as I can determine quantum physics also would be more at home with Berkeley. The famous double slit experiment definitely makes for a strange world. PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPY: The Revolution in Modern Science by Heisenberg goes into much of this. However, there are many intricacies involved in getting all this straight. And a wide range of language. Nonetheless, I think Berkeley had a basic intuition that probably has gone over the heads of recent 20th century philosophers who prefer to have the mind=the self=the brain and have no clear idea on the notion of self. Berkeley's spirit and how it is known is superior to both the ideas of Locke and Hume and makes far more sense.
Whether Berkeley had mystical experiences is not something we are apt to find out. For one thing not all mystical experiences have the sensational quality of those we may have read about. Some deep experiences are also very simple and can not be easily conveyed if at all. There seems to be a kind of trade off where those who avoid the potential for knowledge through identity end up with the thing problem. Western philosophy has been haunted by the thing. Another ghost.
<William St. George, Mar 31, 3013>
Hi
Ron--
I can see now that we are using the term metaphysical in different
ways. By the term I mean knowledge of ultimte things, nature of reality, etc.
After Spinoza Kant seems very this worldly. And knowledge is mostly empirical
with a few dubious synthetic apriori. Now as regards Dr. Woff I have read his
three books and found them all smooth sailing. His philosophy matches Vedanta in
my opinion. Mathematics certainly trains the mind to a high concentration. And
Dr Wolff's writing is very clear, very lucid. I would say that his is the
leading Western philosophy and if Kant assisted that then three cheers for Kant.
But I feel like Kant's philosophy is full of subtle contradictions that make it
both ponderous and ultimately hard on the mind. It may be a case of a mind too
radically different from mine whereas Spinoza hit the spot. And Plato being
quite Vedantic also seems very useful. I am surprised Franklin made little use
of either Plato or Parmenides. Obviously I am not a professional philosopher--so
going on intuiton. But I would place Spinoza ahead of Kant in terms of depth and
wisdom. The high point in Greek philosophy got overshadowed by a Christianity
which became mostly a state religion. And then Greek philosophy got veiled by
Western Christen philosophy.
Best of luck. <William St. George, Mar 20,
2013>
Hi
Ron,
Now to the next paragraphs and Kant. It seems to me that Kant has
an even more serious problem(than Berkeley) with the candle he leaves burning in
his study. For one thing space and time being subject forms of human sensibility
we now no longer have a room with a candle in it--but did we ever? Kant's
"external world" has no objects in it as surely without space & time we can
not have objects. So I can not see how Kant accounts for the strong impression
of a stable world. The noumenal is no help since we are not allowed to make
claims about it--though Kant does slyly by giving it the task of somehow
undergirding the realm of appearances.
I do not think the problem has a
solution. That is, how to have an external world that behaves and at the same
time sense-perceptions that are isomorphic with it. I think it is a case of
eating one's cake and wanting to keep it also.
[ I also put an addendum
on a response above.]<William St. George, Mar 17, 2013>
In response to your second paragraph--if I were taking a philosophy course I would certainly (if I wanted a decent grade) take your point of view. However, the Indian "creation theory" most preferred by Rama Maharshi, Ajata Vada, is practically identical to Berkeley's. Here is what I think: we can not shake off the idea of the world being at least more or less they way we see it. So when Berkeley leaves the room we can not not imagine the candle continuing to burn in a human room. We are friends of Newton and company. And Schrodinger's cat is either alive or dead. But where does the conscious individual come in? Are we just largely a passive recipient? Or are we more like this: "The point of conception is the apex of creation."? We are, I believe, so locked into our language and inherited thoughts, that we assme a solid world out there . . . more or less they way we envision it. But if our physiology we very different it would be a totatlly different universe. Which we can not even imagine. So it is really a potential vast beyond reckoning. And again certainly part of Berkeley left the room--but did a part of Berkeley stay there with the burning candle. I know this sounds a bit mad. But my point is, based on about 50 years of meditating daily; nothing is as it seems . . . We do not know what Berkeley meant by God. In the 17th century people were very careful in the area of religion. Certainly Berkeley was no ordinary mind. I agree with Hume a bit in that if one now goes and eats something and talks with friends one descends into the everyday and things fit back together. One can forget about electrons and quarks and strings, about the Superconscious and a great many things . . . a profitable amnesia. But, the fact remains that the only reality (in form) that we really have is one in which we are the prinicipal creative aspect. And is there anything else besides us? I mean conscious creatures. I haven't really yet found a sensible way to talk about this stuff; and there may not be one. Now I should go read with care the essay on Berkeley I recommended to you. And then there is Don's post. The cat, the dog, and lunch!!
Addendum: source text -- SELF AND NOT--SELF * The Drigdrissyaviveka
Attributed to Samkara * Translated from the Sanskrit with Commentary by
Raphael
A few selections: from the commentary: For the Awakened, the
subtle and gross states (dream and waking) have exactly the same value: they
represent a simple idea. The world is only a 'thought' of God at various
vibratory levels.
And from the text: 11. The internal organ, which is a
modification, identifying with the reflection of Consciousness images ideas
while dreaming. While in the waking state and in relation with the sensory
organs, it imagines external objects.
This certainly seems to defy
common sense. But common sense and the common intellect have been built up from
the level of survival--and not from the level of philosophy or spiritual
pursuits. <William St. George, Sun Mar 17, 2013>
On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Thanks for your extensive response. It shows that I need to clarify my original submission, keeping firmly in mind the distinction between metaphysical, epistemological and religioius issues, namely, (1) What is real? (2) How can it be known? (3) How, and to what extent, do various philosophers provide inspiration and/or guidance along a spiritual path?
Concerning Berkeley, I have nothing against him personally, and give him credit for pointing out the inconsistencies in Locke's Representative Realism--in particular, showing that the notion of physical substance is incompatible with the Empiricist premise that "All knowledge comes from (sense) experience." However, his philosophy is simply untenable. Empiricism was supposed to be a 'common sense' response to the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalists, and the notion of 'substance' (that which underlies the experienced appearances of things, but which itself is never an appearance) is logically excluded from Empiricism as knowledge. The principle that Berkeley added, "To be is to be perceived," errs in reducing being to existence (in the sense of a particular perception at a particular time); this introduces an absurdity of which Berkeley was fully aware (He lights a candle, leaves the room and find that it has burned down when he returns.). He introduces the notion of mental substance to account for the 'reality' of the perceived "Ideas," and introduces God to account for how things can persist without people to perceive them, concluding that "the things of the world are nothing other than Ideas in the mind of God," (and God places them in our minds). This is no less metaphysical speculation than that of the Rationalists. I do not detect any hint of mysticism here...and if he had second thoughts later in life, he did not modify his views. It was left to Hume's Phenomenalism disallow any metaphysical elements and to affirm the skepticism to which a logically consistent application of Empiricism led.
I agree that Kant was oriented to thinking, his turgid prose made even less accessible initially by poor translations. Why Kant is important is that at the end of the modern period philosophy was at an impasse between the skepticism to which Empiricism led and the dogmatic metaphysical systems of the Rationalists. Each was one sided; Kant synthesized them. Both were naive in maintaining an objective point of view; Kant shifted focus to the knowing subject, and the capacities we have as knowers. Kant did not eliminate metaphysics, but set out the requirements needed for it to be knowledge, and not mere speculation. Franklin's graduate seminars at Harvard were in Kant and in metaphysics. Why Franklin considers his own contribution in Western philosophy to follow from the Kantian problem is that Introception satisfies these requirements (a non-sensuous content given directly to consciousness, subsequently mediated by concepts). FMW also considers Kant's "fundamental unity of pure apperception" as hinting at adumbrations of mystical experience, but the evidence here is, admittedly, rather thin. His value in providing spiritual guidance would seem to be rather minimal. Of those you list, many do have something to offer in this regard, but whereas Plotinus seems the only Westerner whose philosophy is fully steeped in mysticism, it is not readily accessible.
Franklin does say that he found his study of mathematics helpful in preparing for his realizations, and that, in fact, he has pioneered a "mathematical yoga." However, although there are numerous applications of mathematics to help to conceptualize certain Transcendental values, he is not at all systematic in providing an overarching framework. I would say that contemplating certain mathematical notions, such as the mathematics of the transfinite and transcendental numbers and hypernumbers might be helpful in loosening inhibiting ways of thinking, the primary value would be as a mental discipline that can orient consciousness without distraction. There is a payoff in allowing relative consciousness to remain present and capable of recording Realizations.
Finally, I strongly suspect that the primary reason why people are attracted to Franklin's writings is that he both provides a personal account of his Mystical Realizations. He is an inexhaustible fount of inspiration for those who are willing to engage it.
Shine on,
Love and Light,
Ron
Actually Berkeley was born in Ireland to English parents. But the Irish atmosphere may have given him a desirable boost away from the extreme materialism of the English. <William St. George, Tue, Mar 12, 2013>
On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 4:59 PM, Jack <alethe...@gmail.com> wrote:
The Buddhist School, Yogachara or Vijnanavada, has similarities to Berkeley that seem worth pursuing. Berkeley is primarily an idealist. To also consider him an empiricist seems mistaken. His ideas are very different from Locke's sense impressions. Again language can become a trap for the unsuspecting. I am intending to do some additional study of Berkeley. Yogachara's mind only or consciousness only position seems quite attractive and would, I believe, harmonize with Berkeley in many respects. Finally it is never easy to know for certain what any of these persons thought. What happens if an advanced Buddhist soul reincarnates in 17th century England? Berkeley? Maybe so.
On Friday, March 8, 2013 8:03:46 PM UTC-7, Jack
wrote:
There is a surprising harmony between these two philosophies. Though I am not aware of what Berkeley thought about knowledge of God, I can guess that he considered it possible for some rare and priviledged individuals. Berkeley's argument against matter is the same as Franklin's (POCUWAO). I find much in Berkeley's philosophy very compelling just as I have in Wolff's. I wonder if anyone has studied this out in detail. It has been a long time since I read some of Berkeley.
---
Thanks Ron. In the meantime while I digest your
response, here is something to consider:
"Berkeley on Self-Consciousness" by
Talia Bettcher. http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/tbettch/Berkeley%20on%20Self-Consciousness.pdf The interesting part begins shortly at 1.
Self-Knowledge and Notions. I think you will find this quite interesting.
Additionally, it seems to me that Berkeley was a step ahead of Kant.
Locke is attached to matter. Kant perhaps less so, but he contrives the noumenal
which he hopes will "support" the phenomenal, though he admits we can know
nothing about it. It is not clear whether he wants the noumenal to be causally
engaged or to be in space and time. Since we know nothing about it, it could be
all three or none. I believe Berkeley chose more wisely in eliminating the idea
of matter which comes naturally from naive realism and Locke with his primary
qualities. Unless I am mis-remembering, FMW in "Philosophy Without An Object . .
. " also dismisses matter as a nonsense or self-contradictory notion. In any
case the above essay makes it clear that Berkeley had in mind another sort of
knowing but had no name for it. Good luck.
On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Thanks for your extensive response. It shows that I need to clarify my original submission, keeping firmly in mind the distinction between metaphysical, epistemological and religioius issues, namely, (1) What is real? (2) How can it be known? (3) How, and to what extent, do various philosophers provide inspiration and/or guidance along a spiritual path?
Concerning Berkeley, I have nothing against him personally, and give him credit for pointing out the inconsistencies in Locke's Representative Realism--in particular, showing that the notion of physical substance is incompatible with the Empiricist premise that "All knowledge comes from (sense) experience." However, his philosophy is simply untenable. Empiricism was supposed to be a 'common sense' response to the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalists, and the notion of 'substance' (that which underlies the experienced appearances of things, but which itself is never an appearance) is logically excluded from Empiricism as knowledge. The principle that Berkeley added, "To be is to be perceived," errs in reducing being to existence (in the sense of a particular perception at a particular time); this introduces an absurdity of which Berkeley was fully aware (He lights a candle, leaves the room and find that it has burned down when he returns.). He introduces the notion of mental substance to account for the 'reality' of the perceived "Ideas," and introduces God to account for how things can persist without people to perceive them, concluding that "the things of the world are nothing other than Ideas in the mind of God," (and God places them in our minds). This is no less metaphysical speculation than that of the Rationalists. I do not detect any hint of mysticism here...and if he had second thoughts later in life, he did not modify his views. It was left to Hume's Phenomenalism disallow any metaphysical elements and to affirm the skepticism to which a logically consistent application of Empiricism led.
I agree that Kant was oriented to thinking, his turgid prose made even less accessible initially by poor translations. Why Kant is important is that at the end of the modern period philosophy was at an impasse between the skepticism to which Empiricism led and the dogmatic metaphysical systems of the Rationalists. Each was one sided; Kant synthesized them. Both were naive in maintaining an objective point of view; Kant shifted focus to the knowing subject, and the capacities we have as knowers. Kant did not eliminate metaphysics, but set out the requirements needed for it to be knowledge, and not mere speculation. Franklin's graduate seminars at Harvard were in Kant and in metaphysics. Why Franklin considers his own contribution in Western philosophy to follow from the Kantian problem is that Introception satisfies these requirements (a non-sensuous content given directly to consciousness, subsequently mediated by concepts). FMW also considers Kant's "fundamental unity of pure apperception" as hinting at adumbrations of mystical experience, but the evidence here is, admittedly, rather thin. His value in providing spiritual guidance would seem to be rather minimal. Of those you list, many do have something to offer in this regard, but whereas Plotinus seems the only Westerner whose philosophy is fully steeped in mysticism, it is not readily accessible.
Franklin does say that he found his study of mathematics helpful in preparing for his realizations, and that, in fact, he has pioneered a "mathematical yoga." However, although there are numerous applications of mathematics to help to conceptualize certain Transcendental values, he is not at all systematic in providing an overarching framework. I would say that contemplating certain mathematical notions, such as the mathematics of the transfinite and transcendental numbers and hypernumbers might be helpful in loosening inhibiting ways of thinking, the primary value would be as a mental discipline that can orient consciousness without distraction. There is a payoff in allowing relative consciousness to remain present and capable of recording Realizations.
Finally, I strongly suspect that the primary reason why people are attracted to Franklin's writings is that he both provides a personal account of his Mystical Realizations. He is an inexhaustible fount of inspiration for those who are willing to engage it.
Shine on,
Love and Light,
Ron
I must say that your reading of Berkeley is
very unsympathetic. However, as a professor of philosophy you are naturally
going to see him within a particular context. My approach was quick and
hopefully intuitive. Unlike Kant Berkeley does not actually eliminate all
metaphysical knowledge. Maybe he does contradict himself. Of the two
philosophers Berkeley most likely was the mystically inclined. I see nothing in
Kant of the mystical. In fact it is not easy to see Kant as a starting point for
the pursuit of a Realization. Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza would be far better
choices.
Kant's thing in itself seems contradtictory. Unknowable--but
then how would we know if it could function as the substratum of the world. In
any case it is spaceless and timeless. And worst of all Kant forgets himself as
a potential thing in itself--something that Schopenhauer noted. Kant was
primarily a thinker. One needs to keep in mind that Berkeley was a very young
man when he did most of his philosophy. Obviously a very bright and gifted one.
Schopenhauer was similar in doing his major work in his twenties. Kant was
getting along in years before the Critique of Pure Reason occurred. And as he
wrote it his writing style degenerated.
I think we have to be careful
not to consider mathematical ability as in some sense mystical ability. It may
be an aid for some but certainly not for all. I am good at mathematics but do
not find studying more does much besides give me nerves! The same with science.
Most men are rather too left brained. They would benefit from cooking,
gardening, taking care of animals, etc. As far as I can tell Newton who was
certainly a math genuius was also a rather hard hearted individual. Riemann
might be a better candidate for the mystical--but we don't have much
biographical informaton about him.
In short I can not endorse Kant as
the philosopher par excellance. Neither can I recommend mathematics as a path to
mystical realizations. These are clearly personal choices and inclinations and
not guarantees. Of course if someone suffers from innumeracy it might be quite
liberating to learn some math.
P.S. I suppose there is some truth in
your statement about Kant shifting emphasis to the subject but he did this in a
very mental and theoretic way. That fact that he never seemed to grasp that he
himself was something that might qualify as thing in itself is an example of his
excessively mental way. At some point in my study and practice of Yoga I began
to ponder this and many years later read that Schopenhauer had had the same
thought. Schopenhauer's knowledge of Kant was very thorough; he did appreciate
Kant but was aware of his limitations. Again I just can not see telling someone
interested in the spiritual life to read Kant! Or to study advanced mathematics.
I would recommend Plato & Parmenides. But also FMW's books if I thought they
had that kind of mind. His tapes might be best for most persons. Certainly Thich
Nhat Hanh. But then this is largely theoretical as few Americans are readers or
thinkers. I think women have a potential advantage over men as they have less
intellect often (though that is less and less the case now). And the intellect
can be a formidible barrier to higher consciousness. <William St. George,
Sun., March 10, 2013>
On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Much as I would wish to respond to a number of recent postings, I must hold these in abeyance for the moment. However, the contrast between Bishop Berkeley and FMW seems much more succinct and easy to help clarify. Berkeley was the second of three philosophers (along with Locke and Hume) in the Modern period from the school of Empiricism. As such, he rejects the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalist School (represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Christian Wolff), but accepts Locke's primary thesis that "All knowledge begins with experience," by which Locke means SENSE EXPERIENCE. This could hardly be further at odds with FMW.
Furthermore, Berkeley's rejection of Locke's notion of material substance in favor of mental substance (Remember, the metaphysical notion of substance is that which exists in and for itself.) is no less speculative than the metaphysics of the Rationalists, and can only be maintained in conflict with the Empiricists' fundamental principle, for no substance can be known by sense experience. Worse, Berkeley's dictum, "Esse est percipe," (To be is to be perceived.) reduces the reality of anything to its immediate perception as an "Idea," but when he attempts to guarantee the common sense beliefs in the existence of ourselves and the things of the world by claiming that they really exist because they are perceived by God, this begs the question: Who perceives God to guarantee his existence? Since, by definition, God can never be an object of sense experience, God's existence (and Berkeley conceives this notion wholly consistently with Christian theology, without bothering to argue for it) is wholly speculative. Moreover, there is no hint that Berkeley ever had a Fundamental Realization, so his whole philosophy of Subjective Idealism is without adequate epistemological foundation.
In addition, Berkeley was an exceptionally concrete thinker, who literally could not grasp mathematical abstraction. For example, in attempting to think of the abstract concept of "triangle," all he could do was to imagine a particular triangle. Note that Franklin is much closer in temperament and approach to the Rationalists--Descartes and Leibniz were brilliant mathematicians, to whom we owe the invention of analytic geometry and calculus, respectively (and Spinoza's profession as a lens grinder required practical geometrical skill) than to the Empiricists, none of whom exhibited either skill or interest in mathematics. Still, whereas Rationalist metaphysics is merely speculative, FMW is able to ground his metaphysics in Introception--the noetic formulations derived from the nondual CWOWS.
Finally, Franklin considers his major contribution to Western philosophy to follow from Kant (who synthesized the two schools of Modern Philosophy), and show the possibility of metaphysical knowledge inherent in Fundamental Realization, and to complete Kant's Copernican Revolution in Philosophy (Whereas Kant shifted focus from the object of consciousness to the subject-to-consciousness, FMW shifts it to Consciousness Itself.).
Hope that this moves the dialog further along...
Shine on, in 'love of wisdom,"
Love and Light,
Ron
I have an entirely different take on Berkeley.
Clearly an unorthodox one. However, I have been reflecting on this whole area
since I studied philosophy at Stanford in the early 1960's. I will take some
time now and give your response a careful scrutiny. In the meantime I would say
this, most languages operate as a barrier to a very deep understanding of the
nature of reality. English is clearly based on a natural or naive realism which
is so deeply embeded in our thinking and feeling that it is almost impossible to
set aside. For example, some philosophers have ended up taking about 'seeing'
sense data. I guestion whether the notion of perception itself is not a part of
this illusion. In a contemplative state the whole operation of experience
appears very differently. I take the position that the world is an Appearance in
the Self. And so it seems in a deep state of mind. Reading Berkeley rather
differently than you it seems he was almost articulating something similar.
Since it was philosophers like Donald Davdison and David Armstrong that
drove me into Yoga, I am reluctant now to accept any orthodox position without
first finding out what I make of it without someone else's interpretation
influencing me. For example, Kant in many respects seems like a poor start for
ending up with the Fundamental Realization as he allowed for only two sources of
knowledge. Spinoza allows for three.
Berkeley's Esse est percipe comes
close to what Professor Amit Goswami has to say.
Thanks for taking the time
to respond. Later I will attempt to answer your objections which seem fatal but
which I think are due to a certain way of reading Berkeley who may have
mis-presented his position even to himself!! [Sometimes an intuitive glimpse of
a position gives a clearer picture of what it is than after prolonged viewing. A
recent glimpse of Berkeley certainly reminded me of FMW whereas glimpses and
prolonged viewings of Kant get me almost nowhere except for relief to
Schopenhauer --who has his problematic positions also!]
Realization is so
radical that nothing much seems to change--and yet everything is different as
well. To use Yogic terminology, the Self is too simple for words. And was too
simple to be realized until the fateful moment. Or Pure Undifferentiated
Consciouness is just too obvious for the mind entangled in nama and rupa.
<William St. George, Sat. March 9,
2013>
On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Much as I would wish to respond to a number of recent postings, I must hold these in abeyance for the moment. However, the contrast between Bishop Berkeley and FMW seems much more succinct and easy to help clarify. Berkeley was the second of three philosophers (along with Locke and Hume) in the Modern period from the school of Empiricism. As such, he rejects the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalist School (represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Christian Wolff), but accepts Locke's primary thesis that "All knowledge begins with experience," by which Locke means SENSE EXPERIENCE. This could hardly be further at odds with FMW.
Furthermore, Berkeley's rejection of Locke's notion of material substance in favor of mental substance (Remember, the metaphysical notion of substance is that which exists in and for itself.) is no less speculative than the metaphysics of the Rationalists, and can only be maintained in conflict with the Empiricists' fundamental principle, for no substance can be known by sense experience. Worse, Berkeley's dictum, "Esse est percipe," (To be is to be perceived.) reduces the reality of anything to its immediate perception as an "Idea," but when he attempts to guarantee the common sense beliefs in the existence of ourselves and the things of the world by claiming that they really exist because they are perceived by God, this begs the question: Who perceives God to guarantee his existence? Since, by definition, God can never be an object of sense experience, God's existence (and Berkeley conceives this notion wholly consistently with Christian theology, without bothering to argue for it) is wholly speculative. Moreover, there is no hint that Berkeley ever had a Fundamental Realization, so his whole philosophy of Subjective Idealism is without adequate epistemological foundation.
In addition, Berkeley was an exceptionally concrete thinker, who literally could not grasp mathematical abstraction. For example, in attempting to think of the abstract concept of "triangle," all he could do was to imagine a particular triangle. Note that Franklin is much closer in temperament and approach to the Rationalists--Descartes and Leibniz were brilliant mathematicians, to whom we owe the invention of analytic geometry and calculus, respectively (and Spinoza's profession as a lens grinder required practical geometrical skill) than to the Empiricists, none of whom exhibited either skill or interest in mathematics. Still, whereas Rationalist metaphysics is merely speculative, FMW is able to ground his metaphysics in Introception--the noetic formulations derived from the nondual CWOWS.
Finally, Franklin considers his major contribution to Western philosophy to follow from Kant (who synthesized the two schools of Modern Philosophy), and show the possibility of metaphysical knowledge inherent in Fundamental Realization, and to complete Kant's Copernican Revolution in Philosophy (Whereas Kant shifted focus from the object of consciousness to the subject-to-consciousness, FMW shifts it to Consciousness Itself.).
Hope that this moves the dialog further along...
Shine on, in 'love of wisdom,"
Love and Light,
Ron
----- Original Message -----
From: Jack
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 8:03 PM
Subject: [fm-w], {Franklin Merrell-Wolff Fel The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMW
There is a surprising harmony between these two philosophies. Though I am not aware of what Berkeley thought about knowledge of God, I can guess that he considered it possible for some rare and priviledged individuals. Berkeley's argument against matter is the same as Franklin's (POCUWAO). I find much in Berkeley's philosophy very compelling just as I have in Wolff's. I wonder if anyone has studied this out in detail. It has been a long time since I read some of Berkeley.
----- Original Message -----From: William St. GeorgeTo: Ron LeonardSent: Sunday, March 31, 2013 12:07 PMSubject: Re: [fm-w], {Franklin Merrell-Wolff Fel The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMWHi Ron--After some additional research: Hume and Berkeley-- "Before proceeding, let me make plain that I assume Hume read Berkeley. While this has been contested in the literature, it has now been established beyond
doubt. I assume Hume took Berkeley seriously, was influenced by him in important ways, and was concerned to address his views. Aside from internal evidence
which indicates Hume's highest regard for Berkeley, commentators have shown
the influence on issues including minima, the contrast between the vulgar and the
philosophical, the primary/secondary distinction, and even the mind itself.?" --Talia Mae Bettcher This is important as I think you tend to diminish Berkeley in your comment.FMW makes a useful distinction between object and thing. Your concern about the burning candle indicates a concern about a thing which you believe Berkeley foolishly overlooks. What about Dr. Wolff? There is a simple explanation which involves taking a closer look at God's perception keeping the candle going. What we have to keep in mind is that some philosophers (A.N. Whitehead notably) have considered atoms and molecules to have a primitive sentience. I think Whitehead uses the term feeling. And prehension. So Berkeley's ideas go with Berkeley but the sentience of the molecules, etc. remain. And the candle burns. It is not my goal presently to get into a lot of detail, but I think this does it nicely.With Berkeley we have God, spirit and idea. In Vedanta we have Brahman, Atman-Jiva and the projective power of Maya. With both Locke and Hume (?) we need the thing. Thus Berkeley is way ahead. As far as I can determine quantum physics also would be more at home with Berkeley. The famous double slit experiment definitely makes for a strange world. PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPY: The Revolution in Modern Science by Heisenberg goes into much of this. However, there are many intricacies involved in getting all this straight. And a wide range of language. Nonetheless, I think Berkeley had a basic intuition that probably has gone over the heads of recent 20th century philosophers who prefer to have the mind=the self=the brain and have no clear idea on the notion of self. Berkeley's spirit and how it is known is superior to both the ideas of Locke and Hume and makes far more sense.Whether Berkeley had mystical experiences is not something we are apt to find out. For one thing not all mystical experiences have the sensational quality of those we may have read about. Some deep experiences are also very simple and can not be easily conveyed if at all. There seems to be a kind of trade off where those who avoid the potential for knowledge through identity end up with the thing problem. Western philosophy has been haunted by the thing. Another ghost.
On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Ron Leonard <pler...@cox.net> wrote:
Much as I would wish to respond to a number of recent postings, I must hold these in abeyance for the moment. However, the contrast between Bishop Berkeley and FMW seems much more succinct and easy to help clarify. Berkeley was the second of three philosophers (along with Locke and Hume) in the Modern period from the school of Empiricism. As such, he rejects the speculative metaphysics of the Rationalist School (represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Christian Wolff), but accepts Locke's primary thesis that "All knowledge begins with experience," by which Locke means SENSE EXPERIENCE. This could hardly be further at odds with FMW.Furthermore, Berkeley's rejection of Locke's notion of material substance in favor of mental substance (Remember, the metaphysical notion of substance is that which exists in and for itself.) is no less speculative than the metaphysics of the Rationalists, and can only be maintained in conflict with the Empiricists' fundamental principle, for no substance can be known by sense experience. Worse, Berkeley's dictum, "Esse est percipe," (To be is to be perceived.) reduces the reality of anything to its immediate perception as an "Idea," but when he attempts to guarantee the common sense beliefs in the existence of ourselves and the things of the world by claiming that they really exist because they are perceived by God, this begs the question: Who perceives God to guarantee his existence? Since, by definition, God can never be an object of sense experience, God's existence (and Berkeley conceives this notion wholly consistently with Christian theology, without bothering to argue for it) is wholly speculative. Moreover, there is no hint that Berkeley ever had a Fundamental Realization, so his whole philosophy of Subjective Idealism is without adequate epistemological foundation.In addition, Berkeley was an exceptionally concrete thinker, who literally could not grasp mathematical abstraction. For example, in attempting to think of the abstract concept of "triangle," all he could do was to imagine a particular triangle. Note that Franklin is much closer in temperament and approach to the Rationalists--Descartes and Leibniz were brilliant mathematicians, to whom we owe the invention of analytic geometry and calculus, respectively (and Spinoza's profession as a lens grinder required practical geometrical skill) than to the Empiricists, none of whom exhibited either skill or interest in mathematics. Still, whereas Rationalist metaphysics is merely speculative, FMW is able to ground his metaphysics in Introception--the noetic formulations derived from the nondual CWOWS.Finally, Franklin considers his major contribution to Western philosophy to follow from Kant (who synthesized the two schools of Modern Philosophy), and show the possibility of metaphysical knowledge inherent in Fundamental Realization, and to complete Kant's Copernican Revolution in Philosophy (Whereas Kant shifted focus from the object of consciousness to the subject-to-consciousness, FMW shifts it to Consciousness Itself.).Hope that this moves the dialog further along...Shine on, in 'love of wisdom,"Love and Light,Ron----- Original Message -----From: JackSent: Friday, March 08, 2013 8:03 PMSubject: [fm-w], {Franklin Merrell-Wolff Fel The Interesting Similarity Between The Philosophies of Bishop Berkeley and FMWThere is a surprising harmony between these two philosophies. Though I am not aware of what Berkeley thought about knowledge of God, I can guess that he considered it possible for some rare and priviledged individuals. Berkeley's argument against matter is the same as Franklin's (POCUWAO). I find much in Berkeley's philosophy very compelling just as I have in Wolff's. I wonder if anyone has studied this out in detail. It has been a long time since I read some of Berkeley.
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Ron Leonard
Don Salmon
William St. George
Since in every [true spiritual] treatise it is said that for attaining mukti [spiritual emancipation, liberation or salvation] it is necessary [for us] to restrain [our] mind, after knowing that mano-nigraha [holding down, holding within, restraining, subduing, suppressing or destroying our mind] is the ultimate intention [or purpose] of [such] treatises, there is no benefit [to be gained] by studying without limit [a countless number of] treatises. For restraining [our] mind it is necessary [for us] to investigate ourself [in order to know] who [we really are], [but] instead [of doing so] how [can we know ourself by] investigating in treatises? It is necessary [for us] to know ourself only by our own eye of jñana [true knowledge, that is, by our own selfward-turned consciousness]. Does [a person called] Raman need a mirror to know himself as Raman? [Our] 'self' is within the pancha-kosas [the 'five sheaths' with which we seem to have covered and obscured our true being, namely our physical body, our prana or life force, our mind, our intellect and the seeming darkness or ignorance of sleep], whereas treatises are outside them. Therefore investigating in treatises [hoping to be able thereby to know] ourself, whom we should investigate [with an inward-turned attention] having removed [set aside, abandoned or separated] all the pancha-kosas, is useless [or unprofitable]. Knowing our yathartha svarupa [our own real self or essential being] having investigated who is [our false individual] self, who is in bondage [being bound within the imaginary confines of our mind], is mukti [emancipation]. The name 'atma-vichara' [is truly applicable] only to [the practice of] always being [abiding or remaining] having put [placed, kept, seated, deposited, detained, fixed or established our] mind in atma [our own real self], whereas dhyana [meditation] is imagining ourself to be sat-chit-ananda brahman [the absolute reality, which is being-consciousness-bliss]. At one time it will become necessary [for us] to forget all that [we] have learnt.16
Don Salmon
Hey Jack:
Your letter inspired me to reflect a bit more on my attitude toward people who (to me) appear to be “awake”. (or more intelligent, wiser, more mature,) etc than me in any way
Take me and Franklin. For example.
Just speaking of pure intellectual ability, I could say, from a purely professional view as a psychologist (and perhaps a bit swayed by that whole Harvard/Stanford/mathematician/philosopher thing), that, if I could have given Franklin a WAIS-IV IQ test, he’d definitely score higher than me (than “I”?).
Now, the next thing I know will shock you all, so you should prepare yourself.
Yes, I actually think – really and truly – that Franklin was…. How can I saw
this…. More awake than me.
Really,
Truly.
I know you’ll all want to argue with me, but I insist.
So having established at least my own personal, unbiased, unprejudiced opinion of the relative intelligence and “wakefulness” of Franklin vs me, I offer this.
When I come across someone – in person, or in writing – who appears (at least to me) to be far wiser (ok, the cat’s out of the bag; I suspect he was just a heck of a lot more wiser than I/me), I always like to pause – a long time – when they say something I don’t agree with.
I first thought of this when Joseph was writing a few months ago about Franklin’s allegedly “conservative” views. I’ve read the transcripts of his talks on politics, and – perhaps I’m being a bit too hard on myself here? – I just get the feeling that there are some subtleties of perception – introception? – in Franklin’s words that make me think I may not be getting the full import of his perspective.
Or is this just too much guru-worship, and
making allowances for what I might otherwise just see as Franklin’s
limitations?
Well, I don’t think so, but then, who am I? I’m not even as smart or awake as Franklin:>))) (and who
knows how my awakeness or IQ compares to others in this group??)
So I had thoughts along similar lines in reading your letter about Franklin’s use of the word “Self.” I must have had hundreds of conversations with people much smarter and wiser than me over the last several decades about this topic of “the Self.” I’m still sure that I’m right and psychiatrist (and well published author and much smarter guy than me even though he was willing to endorse our yoga psych book and even said we’re pretty good writers) Jeffrey Schwartz is wrong. But gee, I sure took some time after we had a brief email exchange exploring our differences to think through what it was he was trying to say and to check to see if it was just black and white he’s wrong I’m right, or if there was something else to it (there was).)
So I’m not going to express any opinion on the particular topic you brought up. I’ve already been humbled this week by reading that last letter from Ron (geez Ron – you have to show us up by writing so lucidly and even in an inspiring manner?) so I’m not going to risk appearing foolish by offering a counter opinion about how Franklin used the term “Self”.
Just a few cents worth of observations about my feeling about exchanging different views with people much smarter and wiser than me. It’s humbling, in a nice way.
William St. George
"This translation, though it attracted considerable interest among scholars, was written in so utterly unintelligible a style, that it required the lynxlike perspicacity of an intrepid
philosopher, such as Schopenhauer, to discover a thread through such a labyrinth. Schopenhauer, however, not only found and followed such a thread, but he had the courage to proclaim to an incredulous age the vast treasures of thought which were lying buried beneath that fearful jargon."
William St. George
William St. George
Moksha is attained by realizing the identity of Atman and Brahman. According to Potter,
8. The true Self is itself just that pure consciousness, without which nothing can be known in any way.
9. And that same true Self, pure consciousness, is not different from the ultimate world Principle, Brahman [...]
11. [...] Brahman (=the true Self, pure consciousness) is the only Reality (sat), since It is untinged by difference, the mark of ignorance, and since It is the one thing that is not sublatable.[14]
Western scholars like N.V. Isaeva state that the Advaita and Buddhist philosophies, after being purified of accidental or historical accretions, can be safely regarded as different expressions of the same eternal absolute truth.[165]
Ninian Smart, a historian of religion, noted that the differences between Shankara and Mahayana doctrines are largely a matter of emphasis and background, rather than essence.[166][note 46]
It should be obvious that Self is not to be taken like our normal usage. It does seem like an odd choice by early translators though their reason is not too obscure. What other terms were available?