5.5.x Exploit
Saundra Balock
The Exploit Database is maintained by OffSec, an information security training company that provides various Information Security Certifications as well as high end penetration testing services. The Exploit Database is a non-profit project that is provided as a public service by OffSec.
The Exploit Database is a CVE compliant archive of public exploits and corresponding vulnerable software, developed for use by penetration testers and vulnerability researchers. Our aim is to serve the most comprehensive collection of exploits gathered through direct submissions, mailing lists, as well as other public sources, and present them in a freely-available and easy-to-navigate database. The Exploit Database is a repository for exploits and proof-of-concepts rather than advisories, making it a valuable resource for those who need actionable data right away.
The Google Hacking Database (GHDB) is a categorized index of Internet search engine queries designed to uncover interesting, and usually sensitive, information made publicly available on the Internet. In most cases, this information was never meant to be made public but due to any number of factors this information was linked in a web document that was crawled by a search engine that subsequently followed that link and indexed the sensitive information.
After nearly a decade of hard work by the community, Johnny turned the GHDB over to OffSec in November 2010, and it is now maintained as an extension of the Exploit Database. Today, the GHDB includes searches for other online search engines such as Bing, and other online repositories like GitHub, producing different, yet equally valuable results.
The goal of this guide is to enable an unmodified Wii U to run homebrew apps and backup games. The exploit does not make permanent changes so there is no risk of damaging your console. However you do need to run the exploit again if you reboot your console or run the System Settings app.
Feel free to press the HOME button to go to the Wii U Menu. To start HBL again, simply run the Mii Maker app. However if you have run the System Settings app or turned off the console, you will need to run the exploit again to start HBL.
The Wii U titles section allows you to download content from the Wii U CDN to your computer. Copy the downloaded install folder to the root of the SD card. The SD card folder stucture should look like:
WordPress is prone to multiple vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, privilege escalation, security bypass, Denial of Service and PHP object injection vulnerabilities. Exploiting these issues could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site, allowing the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks, to bypass the expected capabilities check, to perform otherwise restricted actions and subsequently delete arbitrary files, to deny service to legitimate users, or to possibly execute arbitrary PHP code within the context of the affected webserver process. WordPress versions 5.5.x ranging from 5.5 and up to (and including) 5.5.1 are vulnerable.
We will cover how to exclude 'known' applications (applications that the Sophos Endpoint detects as installed business applications) and 'unknown' applications (applications that are not categorised by the Sophos Endpoint as business applications but may still require exclusion).
Please note: Sophos does not suggest excluding any applications from any of our protection methods unless the application is fully trusted by the customer. Customers excluding applications do so at their own risk.
However anything that changes the behaviour in some way (different paths involved, different files involved, different application, etc) will change the Thumbprint and will therefore require a separate exclusion.
This method is useful if you have an application that either reports a large number of unexpected exploit mitigation detections or suffers from performance issues when the exploit mitigation functionality is active.
Note: Vulnerabilities that are not Tomcat vulnerabilities but have either been incorrectly reported against Tomcat or where Tomcat provides a workaround are listed at the end of this page.
Please note that Tomcat 5.0.x and 5.5.x are no longer supported. Further vulnerabilities in the 5.0.x and 5.5.x branches will not be fixed. Users should upgrade to 8.5.x or later to obtain security fixes. Vulnerabilities fixed in Tomcat 5.5.26 onwards have not been assessed to determine if they are present in the 5.0.x branch.
Please note that binary patches are never provided. If you need to apply a source code patch, use the building instructions for the Apache Tomcat version that you are using. For Tomcat 5.5 those are building.html in documentation (webapps/tomcat-docs subdirectory of a binary distributive) and BUILDING.txt file in a source distributive.
If you need help on building or configuring Tomcat or other help on following the instructions to mitigate the known vulnerabilities listed here, please send your questions to the public Tomcat Users mailing list
If you have encountered an unlisted security vulnerability or other unexpected behaviour that has security impact, or if the descriptions here are incomplete, please report them privately to the Tomcat Security Team. Thank you.
The first issue was reported by Tilmann Kuhn to the Tomcat security team on 19 July 2012. The second and third issues were discovered by the Tomcat security team during the resulting code review. All three issues were made public on 5 November 2012.
Analysis of the recent hash collision vulnerability identified unrelated inefficiencies with Apache Tomcat's handling of large numbers of parameters and parameter values. These inefficiencies could allow an attacker, via a specially crafted request, to cause large amounts of CPU to be used which in turn could create a denial of service. The issue was addressed by modifying the Tomcat parameter handling code to efficiently process large numbers of parameters and parameter values.
When using the MemoryUserDatabase (based on tomcat-users.xml) and creating users via JMX, an exception during the user creation process may trigger an error message in the JMX client that includes the user's password. This error message is also written to the Tomcat logs. User passwords are visible to administrators with JMX access and/or administrators with read access to the tomcat-users.xml file. Users that do not have these permissions but are able to read log files may be able to discover a user's password.
Tomcat provides support for sendfile with the HTTP APR connector. sendfile is used automatically for content served via the DefaultServlet and deployed web applications may use it directly via setting request attributes. These request attributes were not validated. When running under a security manager, this lack of validation allowed a malicious web application to do one or more of the following that would normally be prevented by a security manager:
Due to a bug in the capabilities code, jsvc (the service wrapper for Linux that is part of the Commons Daemon project) does not drop capabilities allowing the application to access files and directories owned by superuser. This vulnerability only occurs when all of the following are true:
Apache Tomcat supports the AJP protocol which is used with reverse proxies to pass requests and associated data about the request from the reverse proxy to Tomcat. The AJP protocol is designed so that when a request includes a request body, an unsolicited AJP message is sent to Tomcat that includes the first part (or possibly all) of the request body. In certain circumstances, Tomcat did not process this message as a request body but as a new request. This permitted an attacker to have full control over the AJP message permitting authentication bypass and information disclosure. This vulnerability only occurs when all of the following are true:
The HTML Manager interface displayed web application provided data, such as display names, without filtering. A malicious web application could trigger script execution by an administrative user when viewing the manager pages.
When running under a SecurityManager, access to the file system is limited but web applications are granted read/write permissions to the work directory. This directory is used for a variety of temporary files such as the intermediate files generated when compiling JSPs to Servlets. The location of the work directory is specified by a ServletContect attribute that is meant to be read-only to web applications. However, due to a coding error, the read-only setting was not applied. Therefore, a malicious web application may modify the attribute before Tomcat applies the file permissions. This can be used to grant read/write permissions to any area on the file system which a malicious web application may then take advantage of. This vulnerability is only applicable when hosting web applications from untrusted sources such as shared hosting environments.
Several flaws in the handling of the 'Transfer-Encoding' header were found that prevented the recycling of a buffer. A remote attacker could trigger this flaw which would cause subsequent requests to fail and/or information to leak between requests. This flaw is mitigated if Tomcat is behind a reverse proxy (such as Apache httpd 2.2) as the proxy should reject the invalid transfer encoding header.
The WWW-Authenticate HTTP header for BASIC and DIGEST authentication includes a realm name. If a element is specified for the application in web.xml it will be used. However, a is not specified then Tomcat will generate realm name using the code snippet request.getServerName() + ":" + request.getServerPort(). In some circumstances this can expose the local host name or IP address of the machine running Tomcat.
When deploying WAR files, the WAR files were not checked for directory traversal attempts. This allows an attacker to create arbitrary content outside of the web root by including entries such as ../../bin/catalina.sh in the WAR.
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