U.S. Hard Line in Failed Iran Talks Driven by Israel

[Capt. Justice]

U.S. Hard Line in Failed Iran Talks Driven by Israel

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article31425.htm
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By Gareth Porter .
May 25, 2012 "Information Clearing House" -- Negotiations between Iran
and the United States and other members of the P5+1 group in Baghdad
ended in fundamental disagreement Thursday over the position of the P5+1
offering no relief from sanctions against Iran.

The two sides agreed to meet again in Moscow Jun. 18 and 19, but only
after Iran had threatened not to schedule another meeting, because the
P5+1 had originally failed to respond properly to its five-point plan.

The prospects for agreement are not likely to improve before that
meeting, however, mainly because of an inflexible U.S. diplomatic
posture that reflects President Barack Obama's need to bow to the
demands of Israel and the U.S. Congress on Iran policy.

The U.S. hard line in the Baghdad talks and the failure to set the stage
for an early agreement with Iran means that Iran will not only increase
but accelerate its accumulation of 20-percent enriched uranium, which
has been the ostensible reason for wanting to get Iran to the
negotiating table quickly.

Iran's enrichment to 20 percent, which Tehran has justified over the
past two years as needed by its Tehran Research Reactor to produce
medical isotopes, can be turned into high enriched uranium more quickly
than the 3.5 percent enriched uranium for Iran's nuclear power
programme.

But although Iran has let it be known that it is open to making a deal
to end its 20 percent enrichment and even to let go of its stockpile if
offered the right incentive, the Obama administration has opted not to
go for such a deal by refusing to offer any corresponding reduction in
sanctions.
The U.S. demand for the closure of the Fordow facility, which is now
under surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was
a direct response to pressure from Israel. Prime Minister Benjamen
Netanyahu declared that demand one of his "benchmarks" for the talks on
Mar. 2.

In discussions with the U.S. in late March, Defence Minister Ehud Barak
insisted on the closure of Fordow as one of the Israeli demands, as he
revealed Apr. 4. That was a quid pro quo for Israeli acceptance of a
focus in the first stage on halting Iran's uranium enrichment to 20
percent rather than demanding an end to all uranium enrichment, as
Reuters reported Apr. 4.
That agreement clearly implied that the Obama administration would do
nothing to dismantle any sanctions against Iran unless Iran ended all
uranium enrichment.
The administration's refusal to entertain any removal of sanctions as
part of its diplomatic strategy with Iran also recognised the fact that
it would have to pay a steep political price merely to request any
change in sanctions legislation and would be unlikely to prevail over
the deeply entrenched interests of Israel in both houses.

After being lobbied by 12,000 activists attending the conference of the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in March, the House of
Representatives passed a resolution demanding a policy of preventing
Iran from having a "nuclear weapons capability" by a vote of 401-11.
The U.S. understandings with Israel were sharply at odds with a deal
with Iran based on a "step by step" approach which had been proposed by
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Under that approach, each move
by Iran to satisfy Western concerns about its nuclear programme should
be rewarded by a relaxation of sanctions.

As Michael Adler revealed in The Daily Beast Mar. 7, however, the Obama
administration was unwilling to reduce sanctions gradually as the
Russians wanted. Adler's account implied that it could only come at the
end of the process in response to a complete suspension of all uranium
enrichment by Iran as a "confidence building measure".

For Iran, 20 percent enrichment has been largely an exercise in
increasing its bargaining leverage with the United States by creating a
level of enrichment that the U.S has said is threatening.

Iran has made a series of policy statements since it began that
enrichment suggesting that the objective has been to trade those
bargaining chips for negotiating concessions that would benefit Iran –
mainly moves to reduce sanctions and the recognition of its right to
enrich.

The demand that the 20 percent enrichment be ended and that Fordow
facility be closed without any easing of economic sanctions would
represent a double diplomatic defeat which Iran has strenuously
rejected.

"Giving up 20 percent enrichment levels in return for plane spare parts
is a joke," Iranian analyst Hasan Abadini was quoted as saying.

There was some discussion before the Baghdad meeting, initiated by
Europeans, of at least offering to suspend a European ban on insuring
oil tankers, which threatens some of Iran's oil trade with Asian
countries, in conjunction with a deal, according to the New York Times
May 18. But that was evidently rejected by Washington.

The U.S. rejection of the "step by step" approach in favour of a stance
that leans heavily toward Israeli preferences leads to apparent
contradictions in U.S. policy.
That stance is sharply at odds with the official U.S. stance suggesting
ending Iran's 20 percent enrichment is an urgent requirement. A senior
U.S. official was quoted by Associated Press Thursday as saying, "We are
urgent about this, because every day we don't figure this out, they keep
going forward with a nuclear program."

The contradiction was further highlighted by reports that Iran is
further increasing its capability for 20 percent enrichment at the
Fordow facility. A Reuters story from Vienna Thursday said that Iran may
have already put 350 more centrifuges into Fordow since February, on top
of the almost 700 already operating there.

Associated Press reported a senior U.S. official in Baghdad explaining
that sanctions were likely to increase the pressure on Iran to agree to
U.S. terms in the next round of talks. "Maximum pressure is not yet
being felt by Iran," the official was quoted as saying.

But few diplomatic observers believe that Iran's Supreme Leader, who
makes the crucial decisions, could afford to bow to the U.S. demands as
presented in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, the U.S. strategy of drawing out the talks to wait for the
impact of sanctions to work on the Iranians allows Iran to continue
adding "facts on the ground".

Ironically, U.S. strategists have argued publicly in the past that Iran
was using negotiations to "play for time" while it increased its nuclear
capabilities.

In another seeming contradiction between U.S. diplomatic posture and its
declared interest in ensuring that Iran prove the non-military character
of its nuclear programme, U.S. officials dismissed as irrelevant the
news that Iran and IAEA Director General Yukia Amano are close to an
agreement on the terms of Iranian cooperation in clarifying allegations
of past nuclear weapons work.

A "senior U.S. official" said the United States welcomed the signs of
progress, but then carefully differentiated the purpose of the P5+1
negotiations and those of the IAEA, according to Al-monitor May 22.

"The IAEA is about accounting for the past and for naming what is," the
official explained. "It is not about what is the nature of Iran's
nuclear program and what will Iran's nuclear program look like going
forward, and will it be peaceful."

That statement abruptly reversed previous U.S. insistence that Iran's
cooperation with the IAEA represented a central element in a diplomatic
settlement of the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme.

The idea that U.S. negotiations with Iran would not be affected by
whatever it did to prove allegations of past nuclear weapons work wrong
implies that Washington is firmly committed to its present diplomatic
course mainly in order to placate Israel and the U.S. Congress.

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising
in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest
book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in
Vietnam", was published in 2006.