I understand that there are also some B2G partner requests (not sure I can name the partners) for disabling prefetching of DNS and presumably other prefetching (both things we've implemented and things we haven't implemented), to the point where I think it can probably be considered a B2G product requirement.
> Also privacy oriented bundles like Tor can or will use it, i guess.
Properly supporting something like a Tor browser requires a broader agreement across the developers working on the product that doesn't currently exist in the case of Firefox + the Tor Browser Bundle. I know within Mozilla, there are some strong advocates for the Tor browser bundle. There are also people (at least me) that think that the Tor browser bundle is not architecturally sound, and so any effort spent to support it is throwing good money after bad. Until/unless there is a sensible plan in effect, I don't think we should consider the Tor browser bundle as a factor in this kind of decision making. (Note that I think Tor and the idea of a Tor-based browser is a good thing. However, I don't think that it is sensible at all to build such a browser on top of mainstream browsers like Firefox or Chrome, because mainstream internet users and Tor users have needs/wants that are quite different from each other. Also, I think a Tor client should be an operating system, not just a
browser.)
> Mozilla have long been associated with privacy/security, so giving
> users an option to control unrequested/automatic connections is
> essential IMO.
Besides the privacy issue, we know that there are goals to minimize the network utilization of at least the mobile products. Again, my understanding is that we're already (considering) implementing this anyway, to address partner concerns regarding that.
I do think that as long as we keep the preference simple (a single "enable/disable all speculative prefetching of any kind" pref instead of dozens of individual prefs), we can probably minimize the complexity of providing the option. The article you cited is concerned that we don't have a separate option for disabling preconnections. However, I would argue that instead the complaint should be that the network.dns.disablePrefetch preference is too specific; who would ever set network.dns.disablePrefetch==false but want preconnections to still happen? Nobody, AFAICT.
> I also think Firefox should honor the pref in the case of the search
> bar.
Why? I can see why privacy-conscious people might want to disable prefetching of various sorts for links that are found within web pages. But, what privacy advantage is there in disabling DNS prefetching and/or preconnections for searches from the search box (or the address bar)? Also, regarding bandwidth utilization, I would say that the benefit of faster searching greatly outweighs the "extra bandwidth" concern; it's safe to say that if somebody is typing something into the search box, they're going to do a search--not only in the Firefox built-in search box, but even in search boxes in HTML forms, in most situations./
> Firefox privacy policy and this article
http://mzl.la/Mxv856 should
> also mention speculative pre-connections.
Regarding the SuMo article at
http://mzl.la/Mxv856, I think first it needs to be agreed upon that it should even be a goal to support what that page is trying to do. "Making connections without my permission" is something that we do all the time, because asking for permission in all cases would result in an unusable product for a variety of reasons (not just regarding performance, but also usability and security). I definitely consider a few of the items on that list to be too important to turn off for the vast majority of users. And, in general I don't think that we can hope to keep that list up to date and complete.
By the way, people are working on improvements to HTTP/SPDY that support some kinds of this prefetching in a way that reduces both the bandwidth overhead and the privacy issues. But, that is a way off.
Cheers,
Brian