Tamper Data For Ff Quantum

[Mario Davis]

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A schematic of a tamper-indicating quantum-optical seal showing four major components: (a) an entangled-photon source, (b) reference and active fiber-optic links, (c) an entanglement-verification measurement, and (d) a monitoring system that process time-stamped single-photon detections.

A Bell-state analyzer (BSA) consists of two modes labeled 0 and 1 input to a symmetric beam splitter, whose output modes 2 and 3 direct to a pair of polarization analyzers and single-photon detectors. A beam splitter after the polarization analyzer allow probabilistic detection of each coincidence type.

A contour plot of the entanglement parameter E presented in Eq. (28) with respect to the pure-state coefficients bc*+b*c and time delay td. The parameter E has extremal values when the input state is maximally polarized, and there is no relative delay between the photons.

The receiver operating characteristic curves display a parametric plot of the probability of detection PD versus the false-alarm rate PFAR. Assuming that tampering yields E0=1/2 with uncertainty σ=0.1, we plot the behavior for baseline entanglement values of E1=0.55, 0.7, and 0.85. Our experimental prototype exhibits much smaller uncertainty and higher baseline entanglement.

The experimental schematic for our prototype tamper-indicating quantum seal showing its four major components: (a) a polarization-entangled photon source, (b) 20-m single-mode fiber-optic channels for the reference and active links, (c) polarization-entanglement verification based on a Bell-state analyzer, and (d) time-stamping electronics integrated with a processor to transmit observed coincidences to a host computer for parameter estimation.

Some companies have taken advantage of this property to create networks for transmitting highly sensitive data based on a process called quantum key distribution, or QKD. In theory, at least, these networks are ultra-secure.

Various approaches, or protocols, have been developed for implementing QKD. A widely used one known as BB84 works like this. Imagine two people, Alice and Bob. Alice wants to send data securely to Bob. To do so, she creates an encryption key in the form of qubits whose polarization states represent the individual bit values of the key.

If it is, they ditch the suspect key and keep generating new ones until they are confident that they share a secure key. Alice can then use hers to encrypt data and send it in classical bits to Bob, who uses his key to decode the information.

Materials in cables can absorb photons, which means they can typically travel for no more than a few tens of kilometers. In a classical network, repeaters at various points along a cable are used to amplify the signal to compensate for this.

Currently, communications security relies on widely accepted (though never proven) beliefs in the difficulty of solving certain mathematical problems and requires authentication by trusted third parties. Quantum technologies have the potential to affect communication in both the securing and transmission of information, which could have far reaching affects.

Quantum communication applies the laws of quantum mechanics to protect and transmit data in a secure and effectively unhackable manner. We are exploring new technologies that will help secure communication networks against increasingly sophisticated attacks by utilizing quantum physics. We have made great strides in developing technologies such as quantum key distribution (QKD) to help realize this novel and advanced technology, and are exploring other ways in which quantum communication can enable the broader quantum ecosystem.

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CISA's Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Initiative will unify and drive efforts with interagency and industry partners to address threats posed by quantum computing and to support critical infrastructure and government network owners and operators during the transition to post-quantum cryptography.

Nation-states and private companies are actively pursuing the capabilities of quantum computers. Quantum computing opens up exciting new possibilities; however, the consequences of this new technology include threats to the current cryptographic standards that ensure data confidentiality and integrity and support key elements of network security. While quantum computing technology capable of breaking public key encryption algorithms in the current standards does not yet exist, government and critical infrastructure entities - including both public and private organizations - must work together to prepare for a new post-quantum cryptographic standard to defend against future threats.

In March 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas outlined his vision for cybersecurity resilience and identified the transition to post-quantum encryption as a priority. The following year, the U.S. government outlined its goals to maintain the nation's competitive advantage in quantum information science (QIS) while mitigating the risks of quantum computers to the nation's cyber, economic, and national security in National Security Memorandum 10.

Government and critical infrastructure organizations must take coordinated preparatory actions now to ensure a fluid migration to the new post-quantum cryptographic standard that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will publish in 2024.

On July 6, CISA announced the establishment of a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Initiative to unify and drive agency efforts to address threats posed by quantum computing. In coordination with interagency and industry partners, CISA's new initiative is building on existing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts as well as those underway at the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to support critical infrastructure and government network owners and operators during the transition to post-quantum cryptography.

Critical infrastructure systems rely on digital communications to transmit data. To secure the data in transit, data encryption built into the devices and systems protects the data from tampering and espionage. As quantum computing advances over the next decade, it presents increasing risk to certain widely used encryption methods.

Identification and inventory of vulnerable critical infrastructure systems across the 55 National Critical Functions (NCFs) is the first step of this preparation and is included in the Post-Quantum Cryptography Roadmap developed by DHS and NIST. To understand these risks to critical infrastructure systems, the RAND Corporation, in support of CISA, analyzed each of the 55 NCFs and assessed that there are risks from quantum computing to each.

CISA recommends that stakeholders responsible for these NCFs partner closely with NIST, DHS, and other government agencies to ensure their preparedness to not only migrate themselves, but also to support the migration of digital communications across other NCFs.

Although NIST does not expect to publish a standard for use by commercial products until 2024, organizations should start preparing for the transition now by following the DHS Post-Quantum Cryptography Roadmap, which includes:

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has announced that a new post-quantum cryptographic standard will replace current public-key cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum-based attacks.

New public-key cryptography standards will specify one or more additional unclassified, publicly disclosed digital signature, public-key encryption, and key-establishment algorithms, and are capable of protecting sensitive government information.

Find this paper interesting or want to discuss? Scite or leave a comment on SciRate.AbstractSecurity of a storage device against a tampering adversary has been a well-studied topic in classical cryptography. Such models give black-box access to an adversary, and the aim is to protect the stored message or abort the protocol if there is any tampering.

In this work, we extend the scope of the theory of tamper detection codes against an adversary with quantum capabilities. We consider encoding and decoding schemes that are used to encode a $k$-qubit quantum message $\vert m\rangle$ to obtain an $n$-qubit quantum codeword $\vert \psi_m \rangle$. A quantum codeword $\vert \psi_m \rangle$ can be adversarially tampered via a unitary $U$ from some known tampering unitary family $\mathcalU_\mathsfAdv$ (acting on $\mathbbC^2^n$).

Firstly, we initiate the general study of $\textitquantum tamper detection codes$, which detect if there is any tampering caused by the action of a unitary operator. In case there was no tampering, we would like to output the original message. We show that quantum tamper detection codes exist for any family of unitary operators $\mathcalU_\mathsfAdv$, such that $\vert\mathcalU_\mathsfAdv \vert \lt 2^2^\alpha n$ for some constant $\alpha \in (0,1/6)$; provided that unitary operators are not too close to the identity operator. Quantum tamper detection codes that we construct can be considered to be quantum variants of $\textitclassical tamper detection codes$ studied by Jafargholi and Wichs ['15], which are also known to exist under similar restrictions.

Additionally, we show that when the message set $\mathcalM$ is classical, such a construction can be realized as a $\textitnon-malleable code$ against any $\mathcalU_\mathsfAdv$ of size up to $2^2^\alpha n$.

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