[analytic] Re: Modified Realism
Rodrigo Vanegas
If you will allow me to pick up where you left-off more than a month
ago... The holidays distracted me more than I expected and I am returning
to these discussions only now. Jan, I hope to reply to your post next,
before you leave us next week.
> >What even equivocal advocates of texts-before-lumps philosophical
> >positions always fail to recognize is that irrespective of the objects
> >conceptualized, the only conceptualizations that matter to any
> >proposition, are the conceptualizations of the present,
>
> Indeed, Rodrigo,
>
> Yes, I'm equivocating. But not to deceive, mislead, nor to hedge. Why
> then?
>
> NOT because I'm sitting on the fence reviewing all the arguments for
> realism, anti-realism, and their various modifications. No, I see no
> point in that. Each argument (for or against) is, in my view, equally
> problematic.
>
> NOT because I think that there is some compromise in the works. Some
> modification of Realism or its varieties in way in which political
> stances are modified, as in "compassionate conservatives" or "pro-life
> feminists." The political compromises of liberalism and conservatism
> make sense since these generic political stances consist of separate
> arguments, arguments which have a point. In contrast, I see no point
> in claiming that we may, afterall, be only "brains-in-vat" or
> "everything is mental" (anti-realism), anymore then that we conceive
> of lumps before texts is evidence for the realism of objects outside
> of mind, language, whatever...
>
> No, I'm equivocating here because I find all of these arguments
> undecidable. But I find that no crime. In fact, I find that the most
> appropriate stance in this context. Any "relief", *here*, has serious
> side effects.
>
> By *here*, I mean within the Realist/Anti-Realist debate.
But this question is outside the debate. The question isn't whether there
are rocks independently of our conceptualization. It is whether the
conceptualization must coexist with the object conceptualized.
I think we can ask this question most effectively by considering a
counterfactual. Suppose the world had not been so welcoming the evolution
of intelligent life. Suppose that the most complex organisms ever to
evolve on earth were unicellular organisms, or better still suppose that no
life had evolved at all. Would the surface of the earth, had the world
missed our perceiving selves, find among its features, rocks. Would there
be rocks had we not evolved?
The answer, of course, is that there are. The difficulty is in how to
account for it. The metaphysical realist would without reservation claim
that there would be rocks just as there are rocks in actuality, and that we
as perceivers and conceptualizers have nothing to do with it. The
anti-realist would say .. err .. I'm not sure, though, there would be
denials of some kind. I am with neither of these two positions, being a
realist but not a metaphysical realist. My view is that conceptualizations
are relevant, but that the relevant conceptualizations are those we have in
actuality. There is no need to find them residing along with the desolate
rocks in the hypothetical lifeless world.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
bruce denner
>Bruce,
>
>If you will allow me to pick up where you left-off more than a month
>ago... The holidays distracted me more than I expected and I am returning
>to these discussions only now. Jan, I hope to reply to your post next,
>before you leave us next week.
No problem. With the birth of my first grandson, I've too have been
distracted. Also, sorry to hear that Jan will leave us. Hopefully, not
forever.
Bruce wrote (and still holds to)
> > No, I'm equivocating here because I find all of these arguments
> > undecidable. But I find that no crime. In fact, I find that the most
> > appropriate stance in this context. Any "relief", *here*, has serious
> > side effects.
> >
> > By *here*, I mean within the Realist/Anti-Realist debate.
>
Rodrigo poitned out...
>But this question is outside the debate. The question isn't whether there
>are rocks independently of our conceptualization. It is whether the
>conceptualization must coexist with the object conceptualized.
The last sentence puzzles me. Objects *exist* in space-time. If
conceptualizations exist, they don't in the same sense. But I read on...
>I think we can ask this question most effectively by considering a
>counterfactual. Suppose the world had not been so welcoming the evolution
>of intelligent life. Suppose that the most complex organisms ever to
>evolve on earth were unicellular organisms, or better still suppose that no
>life had evolved at all. Would the surface of the earth, had the world
>missed our perceiving selves, find among its features, rocks. Would there
>be rocks had we not evolved?
I'd say: "No", because what we take to be rocks is a function of our being
that type of organism we are. My one-month old grandson doesn't perceive
rocks, yet.
>The answer, of course, is that there are. The difficulty is in how to
>account for it.
Yes, if we insist that rocks are rocks, then you do have to account for it.
But object without a perception is what? Rays of deflected light? This way
of putting it is consistent with our scientific convention. The
philosophical question (for me) is "How to justify this convention of
self-identical things in the light of the fact that the self-identical
thing is not what we literally see ?"
>The anti-realist would say .. err .. I'm not sure, though, there would be
>denials of some kind.
Don't count me with the anti-realists. In fact, I can concur with your
statement...
>My view is that conceptualizations are relevant, but that the relevant
>conceptualizations are >those we have in actuality.
if by that you mean ..."holding to a realism makes sense in a context, in
one in which the criteria for what we take to be realistic can be a matter
for discussion.
bruce
bde...@sonic.net
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >But this question is outside the debate. The question isn't whether there
> >are rocks independently of our conceptualization. It is whether the
> >conceptualization must coexist with the object conceptualized.
>
>The last sentence puzzles me. Objects *exist* in space-time. If
>conceptualizations exist, they don't in the same sense.
Let's pause here. In what other sense do they exist? I think they do
exist in space-time. Moreover, while I do admit that some things do not
exist in space-time (e.g. numbers), there is no other "sense" of existence.
> >I think we can ask this question most effectively by considering a
> >counterfactual. Suppose the world had not been so welcoming the evolution
> >of intelligent life. Suppose that the most complex organisms ever to
> >evolve on earth were unicellular organisms, or better still suppose that no
> >life had evolved at all. Would the surface of the earth, had the world
> >missed our perceiving selves, find among its features, rocks. Would there
> >be rocks had we not evolved?
>
>I'd say: "No", because what we take to be rocks is a function of our being
>that type of organism we are. My one-month old grandson doesn't perceive
>rocks, yet.
Okay, let's wait a few years before we ask your grandson again. For now,
we can ask ourselves. Since we continue to be the type of organisms that
we are, as I ask this question, I don't understand why you'd say "no".
Again, the reason you give for answering "no" is that "what we take to be
rocks is a functions of our being that type of organisms we are". And yet,
we *are* "that type of organisms we are". So it would seem that you should
answer, "yes", just as your grandson surely will a few years from now.
> >The answer, of course, is that there are. The difficulty is in how to
> >account for it.
>
>Yes, if we insist that rocks are rocks, then you do have to account for it.
>But object without a perception is what? Rays of deflected light? This way
>of putting it is consistent with our scientific convention. The
>philosophical question (for me) is "How to justify this convention of
>self-identical things in the light of the fact that the self-identical
>thing is not what we literally see ?"
I don't know what conventions you're talking about. And I don't know what
non-self-identical things would be. To speak of "self-identical" things is
redundant.
> >My view is that conceptualizations are relevant, but that the relevant
> >conceptualizations are those we have in actuality.
>
>if by that you mean ..."holding to a realism makes sense in a context, in
>one in which the criteria for what we take to be realistic can be a matter
>for discussion.
I don't know if that's what I mean or not. In my own words, I think I was
clear enough.
Jan Dejnozka
How do you conceptualize conceptualization? For example, what happens
when you conceptualize a rock? Does anything happen to the rock?
If conceptualizations can exist unconceptualized, why cannot rocks exist
unconceptualized too?
If conceptualizations cannot exist unconceptualized, does this not lead
to a vicious regress of conceptualizations (level 1, level 2, etc.)?
Best wishes,
Jan
http://www.members.tripod.com/~Jan_Dejnozka/index.html includes vitae,
abstracts
of publications, philosophy book announcements, book corrections,
retrospects on
books, unpublished papers, brief lists of philosophical, musical,
literary, artistic,
and cinematic favorites, and a family photo and art gallery.
________________________________________________________________
GET INTERNET ACCESS FROM JUNO!
Juno offers FREE or PREMIUM Internet access for less!
Join Juno today! For your FREE software, visit:
http://dl.www.juno.com/get/tagj.
Jan Dejnozka
I think there are at least six ambiguous or unclear items needing
clarification.
First, before we can decide whether objects must exist in space-time, we
need to know what "object" means, or at least how both of you are using
the term, especially Bruce. What are the defining characteristics of an
object?
Second, also before we can decide whether anything must exist in
space-time, we need to know what "existence" means, or at least how both
of you are using the term. What are the defining characteristics of an
entity (existent)?
I'm extremely sensitive to these first two terms partly because they are
notoriously among the vaguest terms in the philosophical repertoire, and
partly because I've spent so much time studying Frege. Whether or not you
agree with him, Frege has at least a very clear and plausible position.
Namely, "exists" is an extremely general term which applies across all
metaphysical categories. In particular, it applies across Frege's big
divide between abstract (acausal) and concrete (capable of causing or of
being causally affected) objects. All concrete objects exist in space and
time, but only some abstract objects do. For Frege, the earth's axis is
an abstract object, yet it has a spatial location and exists only as long
as the earth rotates. The number 5, on the other hand, counts as an
abstract object for Frege, but has no space-time location for Frege. (I
might add that for Frege, while all objects equally exist, concrete
objects are more real than abstract objects because concrete objects have
the power to cause changes-- a position that both of you may disagree
with, but which has considerable intuitive plausibility.)
Third, this raises the question what "in space-time" means. This too must
be answered before we can decide what exists in space-time. For example,
if a group of concrete objects exists in space-time, do their properties
and relations also exist in space-time? For example, if a red ball exists
in space-time, does its red color exist in space-time? Some people
consider the number 5 to be a property of groups. If my right hand and
its five fingers exist in space-time, should we count (pardon the pun)
the number five as existing in space-time as a property of my right
hand's fingers? I hope Bruce will explain what he means by being "in
space-time."
> By *here*, I mean within the Realist/Anti-Realist debate.
But this question is outside the debate. The question isn't whether
there
are rocks independently of our conceptualization. It is whether the
conceptualization must coexist with the object conceptualized.
I think we can ask this question most effectively by considering a
counterfactual. Suppose the world had not been so welcoming the
evolution
of intelligent life. Suppose that the most complex organisms ever to
evolve on earth were unicellular organisms, or better still suppose that
no
life had evolved at all. Would the surface of the earth, had the world
missed our perceiving selves, find among its features, rocks. Would
there
be rocks had we not evolved?
The answer, of course, is that there are. The difficulty is in how to
account for it. The metaphysical realist would without reservation claim
that there would be rocks just as there are rocks in actuality, and that
we
as perceivers and conceptualizers have nothing to do with it. The
anti-realist would say .. err .. I'm not sure, though, there would be
denials of some kind. I am with neither of these two positions, being a
realist but not a metaphysical realist. My view is that
conceptualizations
are relevant, but that the relevant conceptualizations are those we have
in
actuality. There is no need to find them residing along with the
desolate
rocks in the hypothetical lifeless world.
Fourth, are we talking about mutual dependence or independence of rocks
and conceptualizations or one-sided dependence, and if one-sided, in
which direction? What is the difference between the two questions? If
Bruce's question is the mutual logical independence of rocks and
conceptualizations of rocks and Rodrigo's question is the mutual logical
dependence of rocks and conceptualizations of rocks, there is no
difference, though the
answers will be inverted by a negation. But if the dependence is
one-sided, perhaps Bruce's question is whether rocks can exist
independently of conceptualizations and Rodrigo's question is whether
conceptualizations can exist independently of rocks. These would be very
different questions, but of the two one-sided questions, Bruce and I were
discussing the first, and actually Rodrigo's counterfactual seems to
concern the first.
Fifth, compounding the difficulty is whether Rodrigo's expression "the
object conceptualized" means just the rock, or whether it means "the rock
conceptualized" as opposed to the rock itself.
Sixth, Rodrigo, we need to know what your distinction is between realism
is as opposed to metaphysical realism, and why your counterfactual
concerns realism as opposed to metaphysical realism. I would have thought
that realism is by definition a metaphysical position and that your
counterfactual concerns metaphysical realism. Perhaps you mean
pre-philosophical realism, that is, so-called naive realism (which many
find anything but naive). Within my own framework, I would take
pre-philosophical realism to be pretty well analyzed by Butchvarov's
working definition, and metaphysical substance realism to add to that
Aristotle's seven theses. But what I might mean is unimportant. We need
to know the speaker meaning of the speaker!
Rodrigo Vanegas
>Dear Bruce and Rodrigo,
>
>I think there are at least six ambiguous or unclear items needing
>clarification.
For the most part, I will give you my positions on these questions
without accounting for my answers, saying only that I believe myself to be
reporting standard Quinean naturalism. On a couple of points, I go further.
>First, before we can decide whether objects must exist in space-time, we
>need to know what "object" means, or at least how both of you are using
>the term, especially Bruce. What are the defining characteristics of an object?
>
>Second, also before we can decide whether anything must exist in
>space-time, we need to know what "existence" means, or at least how both
>of you are using the term. What are the defining characteristics of an
>entity (existent)?
I use "thing", "entity", and "object" interchangably and I identify
existence and being with logical quantification. "To be is to be the value
of a bound variable", goes the slogan. I would expand by writing: To be an
object, entity, or thing is to be the value of the bound variable of a true
theory expressed in first order logic. I believe that the expanded version
is what Quine had in mind.
>I'm extremely sensitive to these first two terms partly because they are
>notoriously among the vaguest terms in the philosophical repertoire, and
>partly because I've spent so much time studying Frege. Whether or not you
>agree with him, Frege has at least a very clear and plausible position.
>Namely, "exists" is an extremely general term which applies across all
>metaphysical categories. In particular, it applies across Frege's big
>divide between abstract (acausal) and concrete (capable of causing or of
>being causally affected) objects. All concrete objects exist in space and
>time, but only some abstract objects do. For Frege, the earth's axis is an
>abstract object, yet it has a spatial location and exists only as long as
>the earth rotates. The number 5, on the other hand, counts as an abstract
>object for Frege, but has no space-time location for Frege. (I might add
>that for Frege, while all objects equally exist, concrete objects are more
>real than abstract objects because concrete objects have the power to
>cause changes-- a position that both of you may disagree with, but which
>has considerable intuitive plausibility.)
Yes, I would disagree that anything is more real than anything else. (I am
not more real than Hamlet because there is no such thing as Hamlet.) And I
don't see why causality should play any role in an ontological
hierarchy. I also don't think much of the distinction between abstract and
concrete objects made in terms of causality. Rather, I consider
abstraction to be a matter of degree. I can only agree with the claim that
all objects capable of causing or being causally affected exist in
space-time. This follows directly from causality being a relation between
events.
>Third, this raises the question what "in space-time" means. This too must
>be answered before we can decide what exists in space-time. For example,
>if a group of concrete objects exists in space-time, do their properties
>and relations also exist in space-time? For example, if a red ball exists
>in space-time, does its red color exist in space-time? Some people
>consider the number 5 to be a property of groups. If my right hand and its
>five fingers exist in space-time, should we count (pardon the pun) the
>number five as existing in space-time as a property of my right hand's
>fingers? I hope Bruce will explain what he means by being "in space-time."
To exist in space-time, is just to exist and also to have a spatio-temporal
extension. Properties and relations, construed intensionally, do not
exist, and so do not have spatio-temporal extension. (Construed
extensionally, as sets, they do exist, but do so unremarkably.)
From here on, I am no longer parroting Quine. I do believe that what I
write is consistent with Quine, but I couldn't confidently say that I know
where he addressed these questions in these terms.
I am discussing ontological dependence. Since you spell it out above, I
know that you mean the same by "logical dependence", though I will continue
to use "ontological" instead. Just to be sure, one object is ontologically
dependent on another if the first cannot exist unless the second also exists.
My claim is that there is no dependence in either direction. Rocks can
exist even when there are no conceptualizations of rocks. However, I also
hold that the sentence `There are rocks' cannot be true unless there are
conceptualizations of rocks. The apparent contradiction is resolved by
paying careful attention to a certain use/mention distinction.
Let's consider the example I offered previously. We three are discussing
the counterfactual possibility that we might not have evolved and that the
earth might have been barren with only rocks and other lifeless
objects. Would these rocks be ontologically dependent on
conceptualizations of rocks? No, they would not because had the world been
lifeless, there would have been rocks and no minds, hence no
conceptualizers, hence no conceptulizations. Mindful of what might have
been, however, we did evolve. And not only did the human species evolve,
but the fact is that the three of us are here on this earth thinking about
rocks. Perhaps we are thinking about rocks that might have been rather
than about rocks that are, but nonetheless we are thinking about rocks. If
we had not evolved, and we three had not lived to think about rocks, hence
provide the conceptualizations of rocks, then there would not have been any
sentence `There are rocks' to be true. And yet, it would have been true
that there are rocks. Here is the use/mention distinction to which I want
to draw attention. When I say that the sentence `There are rocks' would
not have been true, I am *mentioning* a sentence that would not have been
(i.e., would not have existed), whereas when I say that it would have been
true that there are rocks, I am *using* a sentence that is (i.e., that does
exist). When I use a sentence that does exist, it does not much matter
that I might not have lived to use it, because I *do* live and I *do* use it.
I realize that this may be hopelessly confusing, but I would prefer to get
a reaction before trying to elaborate it further.
>Fifth, compounding the difficulty is whether Rodrigo's expression "the
>object conceptualized" means just the rock, or whether it means "the rock
>conceptualized" as opposed to the rock itself.
I don't go in for Kantian notions of things-in-themselves as opposed to
things-as-they-seem. There are just things. I used the qualifier
`conceptualized' rhetorically to emphasize that I was not neglecting the
fact that all objects are conceptualized. I consider it redundant.
>Sixth, Rodrigo, we need to know what your distinction is between realism
>is as opposed to metaphysical realism, and why your counterfactual
>concerns realism as opposed to metaphysical realism. I would have thought
>that realism is by definition a metaphysical position and that your
>counterfactual concerns metaphysical realism. Perhaps you mean
>pre-philosophical realism, that is, so-called naive realism (which many
>find anything but naive). Within my own framework, I would take
>pre-philosophical realism to be pretty well analyzed by Butchvarov's
>working definition, and metaphysical substance realism to add to that
>Aristotle's seven theses. But what I might mean is unimportant. We need to
>know the speaker meaning of the speaker!
It would be difficult to address this question without engaging you on the
discussion about Carnap and Quine that we started a month ago and which I
carelessly left hanging. I don't want to dodge the question, but I will
answer without justifying my claims as much as I think I should.
I subscribe neither to naive realism, nor to metaphysical realism. Rather,
I hold to a position which has been called natural realism. It is in my
view just Quinean naturalism, but I am afraid it is not Quine as you have
interpreted him. I'll give you just two details which may suffice to
distinguish my position from what you understand as metaphysical
realism. First, natural realism is an empirical claim, not an a priori
one. It follows from physics, not metaphysics. Second, it does not admit
of intensional objects, such as properties or relations.
bruce denner
Rodrigo asked...
>>>Would the surface of the earth, had the world
>> >missed our perceiving selves, find among its features, rocks. Would there
>> >be rocks had we not evolved?
and Bruce replied...
>>I'd say: "No", because what we take to be rocks is a function of our being
>>that type of organism we are.
>Again, the reason you give for answering "no" is that "what we take to be
>rocks is a functions of our being that type of organisms we are". And yet,
>we *are* "that type of organisms we are". So it would seem that you should
>answer, "yes"
>> >My view is that conceptualizations are relevant, but that the relevant
>> >conceptualizations are those we have in actuality.
I agree, in my everyday life, in the dominant Western Culture, the
"conceptualizations we actually have" are those which take rocks as being
there, just they way we find them, before we arrived on the scene and even
if we didn't. But in philosophy, need we cleave to the ordinary?
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981168221/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >> >My view is that conceptualizations are relevant, but that the relevant
> >> >conceptualizations are those we have in actuality.
>
>I agree, in my everyday life, in the dominant Western Culture, the
>"conceptualizations we actually have" are those which take rocks as being
>there, just they way we find them, before we arrived on the scene and even
>if we didn't. But in philosophy, need we cleave to the ordinary?
I know that when Bruce Denner speaks of "the ordinary", Stanley Cavell is
not far behind. Not being versed in Cavell myself, you'll have to say more.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981220802/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
Rodrigo, you wrote
>I know that when Bruce Denner speaks of "the ordinary", Stanley Cavell is
>not far behind. Not being versed in Cavell myself, you'll have to say more.
Forget Cavell for the moment. What is your impression of Kurt's summation
in a related Post?
"If somebody asks "Would there be stones even if there were no humans?"
she might be trying to make a metaphysical point, which would also be part
of our Western Culture. This would mean there is not one correct answer to
the question, but we have to ask what the speaker means by "would there be
stones?" If she wants to state that stones were not created by humans the
way automobiles were, then the answer clearly seems to be "yes". But if she
tries to be a metaphysical realist, I believe it would be correct to point
out that it makes no sense to talk of stones independently of our
conceptualizations".
I wouldn't say that it makes no sense to claim that the material world is
what it is, apart from our way of looking at things. Thre are any number of
contexts in which that phrase would work fine. A walk through the woods,
perhaps. But in our conceptual deliberations, at what point do I affirm
that objects are independent of my conceptualizations? A the beginning?
After considering what?
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981332524/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >I know that when Bruce Denner speaks of "the ordinary", Stanley Cavell is
> >not far behind. Not being versed in Cavell myself, you'll have to say more.
>
>Forget Cavell for the moment. What is your impression of Kurt's summation
>in a related Post?
>
>"If somebody asks "Would there be stones even if there were no humans?"
>she might be trying to make a metaphysical point, which would also be part
>of our Western Culture. This would mean there is not one correct answer to
>the question, but we have to ask what the speaker means by "would there be
>stones?" If she wants to state that stones were not created by humans the
>way automobiles were, then the answer clearly seems to be "yes". But if she
>tries to be a metaphysical realist, I believe it would be correct to point
>out that it makes no sense to talk of stones independently of our
>conceptualizations".
I affirm that I am *not*, in the sense that matters, a metaphysical
realist. And yet I find no difficulty in affirming that there would be
stones even if there were no humans, and that it can make sense to talk of
stones independently of our conceptualizations. The former is just the
ontological independence I have been arguing for elsewhere. I support it
by observing that the *relevant* conceptualizations need only be actual,
not also counterfactually co-existent with the stones. The latter, I
think, is trivially true in that it fails to capture the problem with
metaphysical realism. I can plainly talk about stones, such as those which
unexplainably make their way into my shoes from time to time, without
talking about .. er .. anything else in particular. I just did.
>I wouldn't say that it makes no sense to claim that the material world is
>what it is, apart from our way of looking at things. Thre are any number of
>contexts in which that phrase would work fine. A walk through the woods,
>perhaps. But in our conceptual deliberations, at what point do I affirm
>that objects are independent of my conceptualizations? At the beginning?
>After considering what?
Are you asking me? I don't really know what you want to affirm. I only
suggest that you be very clear about what sort of dependence you're talking
about. I have been talking about ontological dependence, meaning, objects
are ontologically independent of conceptualizations ("concepts"?) just in
case, were there no conceptualizations, objects would still exist.
What has any of this to do with Western Culture, the ordinary, or cleavage?
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981343720/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
>>I wouldn't say that it makes no sense to claim that the material world is
>>what it is, apart from our way of looking at things. Thre are any number of
>>contexts in which that phrase would work fine. A walk through the woods,
>>perhaps. But in our conceptual deliberations, at what point do I affirm
>>that objects are independent of my conceptualizations? At the beginning?
>>After considering what?
and on 2/7 Rodrigo answered...
>Are you asking me? I don't really know what you want to affirm. I only
>suggest that you be very clear about what sort of dependence you're talking
>about.
That's my problem in a nutshell. The sense of "dependence" puzzles me here.
And so you try to help by pointing pout "ontological" dependence.
>I have been talking about ontological dependence, meaning, objects
>are ontologically independent of conceptualizations ("concepts"?) just in
>case, were there no conceptualizations, objects would still exist.
I'm begining to see the light, but not yet. So again, is the last claim an
article of faith?,... as far as you can see an accurate description of how
the world is for us?...a feature of our language, i.e., that's the way we
speak?...a transcendental argument that things exist in space time and
while out bodies do, our mind doesn't?...
Rodrigo also wrote...
"The former is just the ontological independence I have been arguing for
elsewhere. I support it
by observing that the *relevant* conceptualizations need only be actual,
not also counterfactually co-existent with the stones."
A sort of transcendental argument. It's the way we actually think; It's all
the justificationw e need to make the claim?
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981568809/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >I have been talking about ontological dependence, meaning, objects
> >are ontologically independent of conceptualizations ("concepts"?) just in
> >case, were there no conceptualizations, objects would still exist.
>
>I'm begining to see the light, but not yet. So again, is the last claim an
>article of faith?,...
No, I'm just defining ontological independence. If you're asking whether I
hold to the ontological independence of objects and concepts as an article
of faith, then, again, no. I don't believe that I hold *any* view as an
article of faith.
>as far as you can see an accurate description of how
>the world is for us?...a feature of our language, i.e., that's the way we
>speak?...a transcendental argument that things exist in space time and
>while out bodies do, our mind doesn't?...
Slow down! I don't follow you at all. All I have said is that there would
be stones without minds, and that though there would be no concepts of
stones, there yet are. What now about "accurate descriptions" or "features
of our language" or "transcendental argumets" or "bodies but not minds
existing in space-time"? These all seem non sequiturs.
>Rodrigo also wrote...
>
>"The former is just the ontological independence I have been arguing for
>elsewhere. I support it by observing that the *relevant*
>conceptualizations need only be actual, not also counterfactually
>co-existent with the stones."
>
>A sort of transcendental argument. It's the way we actually think; It's
>all the justification we need to make the claim?
Again, it is as if I were participating in only half the discussion
here. "Transcendental argument"? Not only do I not transcend our
concepts, I *insist* upon them. "Justification"? What do you take me to
be justifying? And how?
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981609584/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
> I'm just defining ontological independence.
I beg your indulgence but I don't grasp your definition.
>All I have said is that there would be stones without minds
>What do you take me to be justifying? And how?
Well, I thought you were justifying your definition of ontological
independence.
I note that you write your's is not a transcendental argument. It wouldn't
be empirical, would it?
Rodrigo, I'm trying to take my bearings here from the last two chapters of
Lear's _Open Minded_. He draws a contrast between an *anthropological* and
a *transcendental inquiry* in which there is no hard/fast boundary between.
The anthropologist proceeeds empirically. How do folks talk? Now, Rodrigo,
when you wrote "what we actually say", I take this to be an empirical
point. But I've taken you out of context...I have Jan in mind who Rob
quotes ...
"And, more importantly, his modified realism is constituted by his holist
realism of language-games as physical patterns of behavior which contain
physical objects."
The mere fact that ones refers to behavior and things makes one a
"realist"? Again, does it jsut come down to how we talk?
Anyway, what we want to do here is not to collect statements of various
tribes but to think through the sense of the claim "the world is
independent (dependent) upon mind. Our project, at some point, turns
conceptual. It may be transcendental. In what sense?
In that we are trying to set down what it is to be "minded" to be a subject
in a world of objects. What must be the case for us, where "must" is not an
empirical finding, a logical deduction from a set of axioms, a definition,
but an argument why we should "talk this way" rather than another.
Returning to your definition. What is it? And how does it address the
debate between those we argue for "mind independent (dependent)" status of
objects.
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981765059/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
> > I'm just defining ontological independence.
>
>I beg your indulgence but I don't grasp your definition.
I really can't see how to make it any clearer. Its length is never more
than a sentence and I've written it in maybe four different forms by
now. Maybe if you could be more specific...
> >What do you take me to be justifying? And how?
>
>Well, I thought you were justifying your definition of ontological
>independence.
Since when do definitions call for justification? I haven't offered a
justification and don't plan to.
>I note that you write your's is not a transcendental argument. It wouldn't
>be empirical, would it?
Are those my only options? If pressed I would go with empirical, since I
consider *every* argument to have some empirical content. This one,
however, is more on the abstract end of things, relying more on conceptual
points. But, if I'm not mistaken, you're having trouble even finding my
argument. Isn't that so?
It really baffles me, since it could not be simpler and because I have been
explaining it what seems like twice per post. For good measure, I'll do it
once more in this post. If this one doesn't work for you either, you will
have to be specific about what is causing you trouble.
Suppose there are two kinds of things: Xs and Ys. Now, consider two sentences:
(1) Xs are ontologically dependent on Ys.
(2) If there were Xs, there would be Ys.
The second is an equivalent, by contextual definition, of the
first. Wherever you find the first sentence, you can substitute the second
one for it. For example,
(3) Stones are ontologically dependent on minds.
(4) If there were stones, there would be minds.
By definition, (4) substitutes for (3). Am I clear enough now? Thus far,
we have a definition for "ontological dependence". My position, expressed
in terms of ontological dependence, is that things are not generally
ontologically dependent on concepts. So (3), hence (4), to give a
particular example, is false.
My argument, if it can really be called that, has been nothing more than to
point out that if there is any kind of dependence (other than ontological)
of things and concepts, then there are not only the concepts that might
have existed to consider, but also the concepts that do exist.
Bruce continues with what may just possibly be a different subject:
>Rodrigo, I'm trying to take my bearings here from the last two chapters of
>Lear's _Open Minded_. He draws a contrast between an *anthropological* and
>a *transcendental inquiry* in which there is no hard/fast boundary between.
I am reading this book but haven't read these chapters. Let's hold until I do.
>The anthropologist proceeeds empirically. How do folks talk? Now, Rodrigo,
>when you wrote "what we actually say", I take this to be an empirical
>point.
Where did I write this?
>Returning to your definition. What is it? And how does it address the
>debate between those we argue for "mind independent (dependent)" status of
>objects.
Let's first be clear on the definition, and then we can discuss its relevance.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981775757/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Martin N Brampton
>Since when do definitions call for justification? I haven't offered a
>justification and don't plan to.
That in itself seems a tendentious claim. There are differing views as to the role
played by definitions in language. I don't for a moment wish to put words into the
mouths of others, but your dispute with Bruce seems to hinge around differing
philosophical assumptions and a consequent lack of communication.
>Suppose there are two kinds of things: Xs and Ys. Now, consider two sentences:
>
> (1) Xs are ontologically dependent on Ys.
> (2) If there were Xs, there would be Ys.
>
>The second is an equivalent, by contextual definition, of the
>first. Wherever you find the first sentence, you can substitute the second
>one for it. For example,
This move is not nearly so innocuous as you would have us believe. It is vulnerable
to attack by a Wittgensteinian on the grounds that isolated sentences cannot be
taken to have meaning outside of a particular language game. In particular, metaphysics
is the removal of words from all familiar language use, a move that corrupts rather than
refines words.
Derrida might express the objection in terms of iterability - the principle that a text has
a propensity for repetition, but at the same time is necessarily vulnerable to alteration.
Metaphysics is language that purports to hold itself aloof from iterability, but thereby
takes itself outside ordinary language and cuts its ties with the ordinary experiences
from which it claims to derive support.
Specifically, one can well argue that (2) does not, in all cases, follow from (1). What (1)
can be taken to say is that when considered in a certain way, Xs have a particular kind
of dependence on Ys. That is not enough to establish that regardless of context, if there
were Xs then there would be Ys.
Now you can disagree with those positions, and you can assert that a sentence has the
same meaning quite irrespective of context. But you can't without argument dismiss the
view that meaning (and therefore truth) will vary (possibly radically) with context. From
which, I think we are entitled to conclude that definitions are not the innocent parties that
you claim and that they do require justification.
> (3) Stones are ontologically dependent on minds.
> (4) If there were stones, there would be minds.
>
>By definition, (4) substitutes for (3). Am I clear enough now? Thus far,
>we have a definition for "ontological dependence". My position, expressed
>in terms of ontological dependence, is that things are not generally
>ontologically dependent on concepts. So (3), hence (4), to give a
>particular example, is false.
And this conclusion can be rejected, not because the argument is wrong in its own terms,
but because insufficient context has been provided.
We assert in (3) that stones are dependent on minds in a certain philosophical context,
namely the discussion of ontology, the precise role of which is itself a matter of debate.
From this, (4) cannot be taken to follow irrespective of context.
We might suppose that we want to take the context of (4) as being in some sense
empirical. (But could ontology be empirical? Have we changed the subject already?)
It is then essential to be clear what kind of context that is. Does empirical relate
somehow to human experience? Presumably it means something of that kind.
Then, do you wish to admit that we can consider matters from anything but an empirical
perspective? If you take that view, then there is no QUESTION about ontological
dependence, because you are not admitting that there is a distinction between what
is within human experience and what is beyond it. Given that assumption, you would
need to formulate a different question.
On the other hand, if we were to suppose that it is intelligible to talk of how things might
be if they were experienced by a non-human, or even to talk of how things might be
considered as themselves, then it is possible to ask the question. And then, the answers
may well be different between the two contexts.
For now, we have to settle the question of whether we can suppose that when we
talk of stones, we are referring to things considered in themselves, or referring to the
human experiences that we describe as being of stones. It might well be argued that
once the distinction has been allowed, then the former is incoherent. And so on.
Best regards, Martin
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981821898/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
>On Fri, 09 Feb 2001 21:43:33 -0500, Rodrigo Vanegas wrote:
>
> >Since when do definitions call for justification? I haven't offered a
> >justification and don't plan to.
>
>That in itself seems a tendentious claim. There are differing views as to
>the role
>played by definitions in language. I don't for a moment wish to put words
>into the
>mouths of others, but your dispute with Bruce seems to hinge around differing
>philosophical assumptions and a consequent lack of communication.
There may be distance between Bruce and I, but the distance between you and
I is so so much greater that I can't imagine what for you would count as
justification. I don't even really know what you think are definitions,
let alone contexts or language games.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981827260/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Martin N Brampton
>There may be distance between Bruce and I, but the distance between you and
>I is so so much greater that I can't imagine what for you would count as
>justification. I don't even really know what you think are definitions,
>let alone contexts or language games.
I think of definitions much as anyone else would - definitions function in different
ways in different contexts. Dictionaries are filled with definitions. Pure maths text
books also have definitions, but they are not quite like the definitions in dictionaries.
Likewise, I mean by contexts much the same as anyone else. It's hard to avoid
adding that what is meant by context will also vary according to context.
I mentioned language games only to paraphrase Wittgenstein, and there may well
be scope for various interpretations of his use of the phrase. I'd have thought that
my reading was reasonably plain from my comments.
And justification? Is there any one way to justify philosophical claims? Anything at
all would be more persuasive than bald assertion. You seem to make so many
assumptions that appear to be held above challenge.
Best regards, Martin
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981846234/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
which I failed to read elswewhere.
>Suppose there are two kinds of things: Xs and Ys. Now, consider two
>sentences:
>
> (1) Xs are ontologically dependent on Ys.
> (2) If there were Xs, there would be Ys.
>
>The second is an equivalent, by contextual definition, of the
>first. Wherever you find the first sentence, you can substitute the second
>one for it. For example,
>
> (3) Stones are ontologically dependent on minds.
> (4) If there were stones, there would be minds.
>
>By definition, (4) substitutes for (3). Am I clear enough now? Thus far,
>we have a definition for "ontological dependence". My position, expressed
>in terms of ontological dependence, is that things are not generally
>ontologically dependent on concepts. So (3), hence (4), to give a
>particular example, is false.
Hmm...given your definition, alone, I don't found (4) false. Stones, what
we take to be stones, is dependent upon the existence of minds to conceive
them as stones. But, of course, if you add that things aren't dependent on
concepts...then (4) is false. Of course, you haven't shown that things
aren't dependent upon concepts. Or, at this point, do you go empirical, and
remind me that stones are far, far older than humans?
PS: I purposely wrote this without looking at Martin's Post so as to think
the matter through on my own. I feel that he makes the same points but with
greater clarity and force, raising all sorts of related questions. I also
read your brief Reply Rodrigo. Hopefully, you'll say more.
In particular, I'm interested in how, philosophically, we integrate the
empirical, what we take as facts, with a conceptual commitment, as you
have, to divide concepts from things.
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981854709/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 05:03 PM 2/10/2001 -0800, Bruce wrote:
> >Suppose there are two kinds of things: Xs and Ys. Now, consider two
> >sentences:
> >
> > (1) Xs are ontologically dependent on Ys.
> > (2) If there were Xs, there would be Ys.
> >
> >The second is an equivalent, by contextual definition, of the
> >first. Wherever you find the first sentence, you can substitute the second
> >one for it. For example,
> >
> > (3) Stones are ontologically dependent on minds.
> > (4) If there were stones, there would be minds.
> >
> >By definition, (4) substitutes for (3). Am I clear enough now? Thus far,
> >we have a definition for "ontological dependence". My position, expressed
> >in terms of ontological dependence, is that things are not generally
> >ontologically dependent on concepts. So (3), hence (4), to give a
> >particular example, is false.
>
>Hmm...given your definition, alone, I don't found (4) false.
Good. Before we go on to disagree about (4), can we agree on this
definition of ontological dependence? I want to settle this point first
because there will be different kinds of dependence to consider immediately
after.
>PS: I purposely wrote this without looking at Martin's Post so as to think
>the matter through on my own. I feel that he makes the same points but with
>greater clarity and force, raising all sorts of related questions. I also
>read your brief Reply Rodrigo. Hopefully, you'll say more.
I'm sure I will.
>In particular, I'm interested in how, philosophically, we integrate the
>empirical, what we take as facts, with a conceptual commitment, as you
>have, to divide concepts from things.
Let's hold on to this question until a little later.
Incidentally, in case this question is also motivated by your reading of
Lear's chapter "Transcendental Anthropology", I have since read the chapter
and will comment on your previous questions.
>I note that you write your's is not a transcendental argument. It wouldn't
>be empirical, would it?
>
>Rodrigo, I'm trying to take my bearings here from the last two chapters of
>Lear's _Open Minded_. He draws a contrast between an *anthropological* and
>a *transcendental inquiry* in which there is no hard/fast boundary between.
I didn't find the distinction very illuminating. It is modelled after
Kant's distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, but is
then undercut by Lear's suggestion that we "loosen" the a priority of
transcendental inquiry. Well, if it isn't a priori, then what is it about
the transcendental inquiry that pulls us away from an empirical inquiry? I
simply fail to see the opposition thus conceived. Nothing in his essay
gave me any reason to believe that a transcendental anthropology (whatever
it's supposed to be without a priority) would offer anything more than a
straightforward empirical anthropology.
At 09:04 PM 2/10/2001 +0000, Martin wrote:
> >There may be distance between Bruce and I, but the distance between you and
> >I is so so much greater that I can't imagine what for you would count as
> >justification. I don't even really know what you think are definitions,
> >let alone contexts or language games.
>
>I think of definitions much as anyone else would - definitions function in
>different
>ways in different contexts. Dictionaries are filled with
>definitions. Pure maths text
>books also have definitions, but they are not quite like the definitions
>in dictionaries.
>Likewise, I mean by contexts much the same as anyone else. It's hard to avoid
>adding that what is meant by context will also vary according to context.
>
>I mentioned language games only to paraphrase Wittgenstein, and there may well
>be scope for various interpretations of his use of the phrase. I'd have
>thought that
>my reading was reasonably plain from my comments.
>
>And justification? Is there any one way to justify philosophical
>claims? Anything at
>all would be more persuasive than bald assertion. You seem to make so many
>assumptions that appear to be held above challenge.
Challenge away. I don't pretend to be above challenge. But it will take
more than disagreeing with me to solicit a philosophically engaging
reply. You say that you think "much as anyone else would" of definitions,
justification, context, and the rest. Well, I have my doubts, and look
back upon more than a year of discussions to support them. Surely you
think there is more to say about the nature of definitions, justification,
and context than you have said above. When you do, I too will say more.
Until then, I can only agree that definitions abound in dictionaries and
math textbooks, that justified claims stand in contrast to bald assertions,
and that much varies according to context. Hopefully, it is plain to see
that there remains ample room for differences within these platitudes
believed by "anyone else".
At 08:34 PM 2/10/2001 -0300, Speranza wrote:
>Perfectly true - but I think Rodrigo was pointing to "stipulative"
>definitions that require no justification?
Right.
>I'm not saying Rodrigo's definition of the ontological dependence of stones
>on minds (or is it of minds on stones, i.e. matter - I'm slightly confused
>there - but I'll revise his post!) is purely stipulative!
Nor am I, but to the extent that its non-stipulative content is
questionable in this case, I happen to be more committed to the definiens
than to the definiendum, and would gladly sacrifice the latter for another
so as to make a more purely stipulative definition. Remember that the goal
here is to find a suitable "dependence" relation to understand what we mean
by the "independence from mind" definition of "realism".
>PS. H.P.Grice is not cited in this post except in this ps. (:))
Whew! Until I saw it, I was tempted to judge your post a hoax! :-)
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981875512/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
statements...
>> >Suppose there are two kinds of things: Xs and Ys. Now, consider two
>> >sentences:
>> >
>> > (1) Xs are ontologically dependent on Ys.
>> > (2) If there were Xs, there would be Ys.
>> >
>> >The second is an equivalent, by contextual definition, of the
>> >first. Wherever you find the first sentence, you can substitute the second
>> >one for it. For example,
>> >
>> > (3) Stones are ontologically dependent on minds.
>> > (4) If there were stones, there would be minds.
>> >
>> >By definition, (4) substitutes for (3). Am I clear enough now? Thus far,
>> >we have a definition for "ontological dependence". My position, expressed
>> >in terms of ontological dependence, is that things are not generally
>> >ontologically dependent on concepts. So (3), hence (4), to give a
>> >particular example, is false.
and then asked me
>Good. Before we go on to disagree about (4), can we agree on this
>definition of ontological dependence?
Agree to what? Yes, I agree to work with your definition because I'm
interested in your ideas. So let me get a clearer picture. Is it true to
say: "The OD of X on Y, means if Y doesn't exist then X cannot? I think
that works well for objects in the world, e.g., no kids without parents.
But are concepts objects? I guess we can talk about "brains". No brain, no
stone! But what are "stones?" My perception or yours? Or perhaps the
physicist's stone, atoms in motion, or even vibrating strings. Odd, as we
get more real, in physical terms, objects become less real, in the sense
that no one can ever experienced them as that.
Much more important than the above quibbles, is this. I can only understand
a defintiion in context. The context, here, is philosophical, conceptual.
We both take for granted our everyday experience with objects. Neither of
us would confuse our dream house before it was build with the one we've
moved into. Anyway, Rodrigo, what possess you to point out that there is
"object constancy", i.e., things persist as they are even if no one is
thinking about them? Do you think that when one agrues that objects are
conceptualized, they are arguing that minds bring things into existence?
That we are Gods?
********************************************
In a related theme...Bruce wrote.
>>Rodrigo, I'm trying to take my bearings here from the last two chapters of
>>Lear's _Open Minded_. He draws a contrast between an *anthropological* and
>>a *transcendental inquiry* in which there is no hard/fast boundary between.
>
and Rodrigo responded..
>I didn't find the distinction very illuminating. It is modelled after
>Kant's distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, but is
>then undercut by Lear's suggestion that we "loosen" the a priority of
>transcendental inquiry. Well, if it isn't a priori, then what is it about
>the transcendental inquiry that pulls us away from an empirical inquiry?
Simply put, we can only do the empirical if we have some initial concept of
mindedness, what Lear terms a transcendental claim. Freud's unconscious
(and I put it this way intentionally) can serve as an example. Freud
reflecting on his dreams invents a way of making sense of mental life,
that, of course, is determined by his mental life. There is no way for
Freud, for any of us, to get outside of minds to detemine whether are
descriptions of our mental functioning are objective. Of course, one can
refuse to go down the Freudian road. There are other ways...
>Nothing in his essay gave me any reason to believe that a transcendental
>anthropology >(whatever it's supposed to be without a priority) would
>offer anything more than a
>straightforward empirical anthropology.
Well, it depends how you understand the straightforward. By my lights,
anthropology begins with transcendental claims. In any event, earlier you
claimed the empirical. In your work, do you expect to discover something
empirical, something about mind or world which no one has noticed? And then
I read ...(in response to Speranza)
"Remember that the goal here is to find a suitable "dependence" relation to
understand what we mean by the "independence from mind" definition of
"realism".
"To understand what we mean"...is an interesting phrase. What is it that
you don't understand about the use of the word "real." Why do you think
that talk about dependence/independence is going to get us any closer to
understanding someone when they point out that X isn't real.
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/981942245/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >> >Suppose there are two kinds of things: Xs and Ys. Now, consider two
> >> >sentences:
> >> >
> >> > (1) Xs are ontologically dependent on Ys.
> >> > (2) If there were Xs, there would be Ys.
> >> >
> >> >The second is an equivalent, by contextual definition, of the
> >> >first.
...
> >Good. Before we go on to disagree about (4), can we agree on this
> >definition of ontological dependence?
>
>Agree to what? Yes, I agree to work with your definition because I'm
>interested in your ideas. So let me get a clearer picture. Is it true to
>say: "The OD of X on Y, means if Y doesn't exist then X cannot? I think
>that works well for objects in the world, e.g., no kids without parents.
Yes, exactly. It's just a working definition. I only wanted to be sure
that you wouldn't object to the stipulation of a definition.
>But are concepts objects? I guess we can talk about "brains". No brain, no
>stone!
What do *you* think concepts are? I take them to be objects, yes. Maybe
in the brain, certainly part of the mind.
>Much more important than the above quibbles, is this. I can only understand
>a defintiion in context. The context, here, is philosophical, conceptual.
>We both take for granted our everyday experience with objects. Neither of
>us would confuse our dream house before it was build with the one we've
>moved into. Anyway, Rodrigo, what possess you to point out that there is
>"object constancy", i.e., things persist as they are even if no one is
>thinking about them? Do you think that when one agrues that objects are
>conceptualized, they are arguing that minds bring things into existence?
>That we are Gods?
I don't know what the anti-realist thinks. That is what I am trying to
figure out.
Earlier you wrote:
>Hmm...given your definition, alone, I don't found (4) false. Stones, what
>we take to be stones, is dependent upon the existence of minds to conceive
>them as stones. But, of course, if you add that things aren't dependent on
>concepts...then (4) is false. Of course, you haven't shown that things
>aren't dependent upon concepts. Or, at this point, do you go empirical, and
>remind me that stones are far, far older than humans?
Not at all. My tactic is to distill a second kind of dependence different
from ontological dependence. You wrote: "Stones, what we take to be
stones, is dependent upon the existence of minds to conceive them as
stones." What exactly are you saying here? Are stones themselves
dependent upon the existence of minds? Or is our conceiving them as stones
what depends upon the existence of minds? The grammar is ambiguous.
**************************************************************************************
>In a related theme...Bruce wrote.
> >>Rodrigo, I'm trying to take my bearings here from the last two chapters of
> >>Lear's _Open Minded_. He draws a contrast between an *anthropological* and
> >>a *transcendental inquiry* in which there is no hard/fast boundary between.
>
>and Rodrigo responded..
>
> >I didn't find the distinction very illuminating. It is modelled after
> >Kant's distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, but is
> >then undercut by Lear's suggestion that we "loosen" the a priority of
> >transcendental inquiry. Well, if it isn't a priori, then what is it about
> >the transcendental inquiry that pulls us away from an empirical inquiry?
>
>Simply put, we can only do the empirical if we have some initial concept of
>mindedness, what Lear terms a transcendental claim. Freud's unconscious
>(and I put it this way intentionally) can serve as an example. Freud
>reflecting on his dreams invents a way of making sense of mental life,
>that, of course, is determined by his mental life. There is no way for
>Freud, for any of us, to get outside of minds to detemine whether are
>descriptions of our mental functioning are objective. Of course, one can
>refuse to go down the Freudian road. There are other ways...
Yes, well, I thought among the other ways, according to Lear, were
empirical concepts of mindedness.
> >Nothing in his essay gave me any reason to believe that a transcendental
> >anthropology >(whatever it's supposed to be without a priority) would
> >offer anything more than a
> >straightforward empirical anthropology.
>
>Well, it depends how you understand the straightforward. By my lights,
>anthropology begins with transcendental claims. In any event, earlier you
>claimed the empirical. In your work, do you expect to discover something
>empirical, something about mind or world which no one has noticed?
You're begging the question. I doubted that there is anything to add to
empirical anthropology, and you counter that what empirical anthropology
lacks are transcendental claims? If anthropology *begins* with
transcendental claims that what is a purely empirical anthropology? Are
you still with Lear?
>And then
>I read ...(in response to Speranza)
>
>"Remember that the goal here is to find a suitable "dependence" relation to
>understand what we mean by the "independence from mind" definition of
>"realism".
>
>"To understand what we mean"...is an interesting phrase. What is it that
>you don't understand about the use of the word "real." Why do you think
>that talk about dependence/independence is going to get us any closer to
>understanding someone when they point out that X isn't real.
If to be "real" is to "exist independently of mind", then I think it will
get us closer to understanding realism if we understand what sort of
dependence this is. For me, it is ontological dependence. But I believe
that for others, other kinds of dependence are meant.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/982016425/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
>What do *you* think concepts are? I take them to be objects, yes. Maybe
>in the brain, certainly part of the mind.
We're far apart here. Can we set this aside?...let's go on.
>My tactic is to distill a second kind of dependence different
>from ontological dependence.
Oh...hopefully I can grasp what you are up to..not right now, though.
>You wrote: "Stones, what we take to be
>stones, is dependent upon the existence of minds to conceive them as
>stones." What exactly are you saying here? Are stones themselves
>dependent upon the existence of minds? Or is our conceiving them as stones
>what depends upon the existence of minds? The grammar is ambiguous.
Is it the grammar which is ambiguous, or is it that we can say either? I
take it that the second sentence "(our conceiving them as stones...") works
for both of us. It's how to read "stones themselves are dependent...")
which may divide us. I can read "stones are independent of mind" in the
following ways.
1. There are all kinds of descriptions of stones, but they all refer to the
same kind of thing.
2. Descriptions of stones don't vary much across time, between cultures....
3. The scientific analyses of stones has an objectivity, a universality,
not shared by the poets'.
4. No one description of stones is exhaustive. Folks always find new things
to say.
5. When you die, your stones remain pretty much the same.
BUT...I can't make any sense out of the claim that "stones themselves" are
dependent because I don't know what to do with the word "themselves." Also,
I can't make out whether this is a statement of fact, a matter of evidence,
or what.
>If to be "real" is to "exist independently of mind", then I think it will
>get us closer to understanding realism if we understand what sort of
>dependence this is.
Yes. I wish to understand what the Realist is teaching. How I might think
about the world differently if I embraced that position. But I have trouble
when folks tell me what my words "actually" mean. Or that some way of
speaking describes the world as it "actually" is.
>For me, it is ontological dependence.
But you began with... >My tactic is to distill a second kind of dependence
different
>from ontological dependence.
Hold on, do you mean that you'll distill the second kind leaving the
ontological? And the ontological you stipulate. I'm trying to grasp the
logic of this analysis. First you defind ontological in terms of existence,
but you don't define existence. You allow "existence" to mean what it means
ordinarily. And, of course, ordinarily things that exist are objects
separate from mind. So where is the philosophy here?
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/982434094/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
>What do *you* think concepts are? I take them to be objects, yes. Maybe
>in the brain, certainly part of the mind.
and I asked to set it aside, but upon reflection...I thought...
Electric activity in the brain (EBA) can be the substrate for concepts.
This activity exists in space/time and hence can be called an object. Rocks
exist in space/time, are objects. EBA and rocks enjoy an independent
existence.
All this holds from a bird's eye point of view. Looking down at you,
Rodrigo, your EBA exists independently from the rock. But I don't see your
concepts. They are not objects for me. Even if you take a 1st person point
of view, trying to relate your concepts to things, you can't see your own
concepts. Your concepts don't exist in the same sense as the rock. You
don't experience your rock concept separate from your rock percept.
Only when we take this visual metaphor for the relationship between
concepts and things, from a 3rd person perspective, does the autonomy of
EBA (as a correlate to concepts) from things make sense. I take this to be
the classical natural science perspective; a very powerful one indeed, but
quickly becoming dated. Contemproray physics, String Theory, as far as I
can grasp it, doesn't posit separate existences for things. In any event,
this visual metaphor, an aspect of the Empiricist imagination, is only an
option.
To continue, I'd agree, that in these matters we can't help but take a 3rd
person point of view. The notion that I can think totally on my own, as if
only I exist, is absurd to me, if, for nothing else, I think in our
collective language. But, the way I see it, the 3rd person natural science
metaphor of brains and things covers over the very questions I want to ask.
The 3rd person perspective I have in mind asks how *we* can make sense of
our peculiar practice of objectifying our subjectivity.
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/982453389/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
subject line.
At 02:29 PM 2/16/2001 -0800, you wrote:
> >You wrote: "Stones, what we take to be
> >stones, is dependent upon the existence of minds to conceive them as
> >stones." What exactly are you saying here? Are stones themselves
> >dependent upon the existence of minds? Or is our conceiving them as stones
> >what depends upon the existence of minds? The grammar is ambiguous.
>
>Is it the grammar which is ambiguous, or is it that we can say either?
I think it is the grammar because it is not clear what role the clause "to
conceive them as stones" is supposed to play in the dependence relation.
>I take it that the second sentence "(our conceiving them as stones...") works
>for both of us. It's how to read "stones themselves are dependent...")
>which may divide us.
That's right.
>I can read "stones are independent of mind" in the
>following ways.
>
>1. There are all kinds of descriptions of stones, but they all refer to
>the same kind of thing.
>2. Descriptions of stones don't vary much across time, between cultures....
>3. The scientific analyses of stones has an objectivity, a universality,
>not shared by the poets'.
>4. No one description of stones is exhaustive. Folks always find new
>things to say.
>5. When you die, your stones remain pretty much the same.
>
>BUT...I can't make any sense out of the claim that "stones themselves" are
>dependent because I don't know what to do with the word "themselves." Also,
>I can't make out whether this is a statement of fact, a matter of evidence,
>or what.
Ok, this is an interesting start. First of all, let me put to rest any
concern for my use of "themselves". As I wrote it, "stones themselves" was
meant to stand in contrast to "our conceiving of stones" not to
"stones". So I just meant "stones" and the "themselves" was just a marker
to prevent metonymic interpretation.
> >If to be "real" is to "exist independently of mind", then I think it will
> >get us closer to understanding realism if we understand what sort of
> >dependence this is.
>
>Yes. I wish to understand what the Realist is teaching. How I might think
>about the world differently if I embraced that position. But I have trouble
>when folks tell me what my words "actually" mean. Or that some way of
>speaking describes the world as it "actually" is.
And what do you suppose actuality has to do with realism?
> >For me, it is ontological dependence.
>
>But you began with...
>
> >My tactic is to distill a second kind of dependence different
> >from ontological dependence.
>
>Hold on, do you mean that you'll distill the second kind leaving the
>ontological? And the ontological you stipulate. I'm trying to grasp the
>logic of this analysis.
I'm saying this: Having discovered one kind of dependence of things on
minds, I want to discover a second kind. The question of definition,
whether it is justifiable or even needs justification is a distraction I
intend to avoid. I offer a stipulative definition for the convenience of
naming this first kind of dependence. But my having found it, does not
follow from or somehow rely upon the definition.
>First you defind ontological in terms of existence,
>but you don't define existence. You allow "existence" to mean what it means
>ordinarily.
It is not for me to allow or disallow meaning. Not having defined
"existence", I expect it to be interpreted where it occurs just as you
would have, had I not defined anything at all.
Now on to the five interpretations of dependence you offered.
>I can read "stones are independent of mind" in the
>following ways.
>
>1. There are all kinds of descriptions of stones, but they all refer to
>the same kind of thing.
Meaning that "kinds of things" are independent of "descriptions"? Or what?
>2. Descriptions of stones don't vary much across time, between cultures....
Of course, they do, right? What is the dependence relation here? Stones
to cultures?
>3. The scientific analyses of stones has an objectivity, a universality,
>not shared by the poets'.
Objectivity and universality are ideas as vague as mind independence and
realism, so I don't know that much help is offered here. What is the
dependence relation here? To the subjectivity of the poet?
>4. No one description of stones is exhaustive. Folks always find new
>things to say.
Is this interpretation different from (1)?
>5. When you die, your stones remain pretty much the same.
This interpretation is ontological independence, right?
All of these are not less but more vague than "mind independent existence",
so I don't know how much progress we're making here.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/982550285/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 03:15 PM 2/17/2001 -0800, you wrote:
>Rodrigo, you wrote...
>
> >What do *you* think concepts are? I take them to be objects, yes. Maybe
> >in the brain, certainly part of the mind.
>
>and I asked to set it aside, but upon reflection...I thought...
>
>Electric activity in the brain (EBA) can be the substrate for concepts.
>This activity exists in space/time and hence can be called an object. Rocks
>exist in space/time, are objects. EBA and rocks enjoy an independent
>existence.
Activity in the brain is not the only alternative. Activity of the entire
body is also a candidate. One or the other seem the best options, for sure.
>All this holds from a bird's eye point of view. Looking down at you,
>Rodrigo, your EBA exists independently from the rock. But I don't see your
>concepts. They are not objects for me. Even if you take a 1st person point
>of view, trying to relate your concepts to things, you can't see your own
>concepts. Your concepts don't exist in the same sense as the rock. You
>don't experience your rock concept separate from your rock percept.
If they really are brain activity then you don't perceive them because the
skull is not transparent, and even MRIs don't reveal enough of the inner
structure of the brain to reveal anything identifiable as an individual
concept. Not all that is real is ordinarily visible, however. We
shouldn't let that bother us.
>To continue, I'd agree, that in these matters we can't help but take a 3rd
>person point of view. The notion that I can think totally on my own, as if
>only I exist, is absurd to me, if, for nothing else, I think in our
>collective language. But, the way I see it, the 3rd person natural science
>metaphor of brains and things covers over the very questions I want to ask.
>The 3rd person perspective I have in mind asks how *we* can make sense of
>our peculiar practice of objectifying our subjectivity.
I'm not sure why you think this is a metaphor, nor why you think it is a
case of objectifying our subjectivity, nor what it would be to do this.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://click.egroups.com/1/11231/0/_/_/_/982550324/
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >I can read "stones are independent of mind" in the
> >following ways.
> >
> >1. There are all kinds of descriptions of stones, but they all refer to
> >the same kind of thing.
> >2. Descriptions of stones don't vary much across time, between cultures....
> >3. The scientific analyses of stones has an objectivity, a universality,
> >not shared by the poets'.
> >4. No one description of stones is exhaustive. Folks always find new
> >things to say.
> >5. When you die, your stones remain pretty much the same.
> >
> >BUT...I can't make any sense out of the claim that "stones themselves" are
> >dependent because I don't know what to do with the word "themselves." Also,
> >I can't make out whether this is a statement of fact, a matter of evidence,
> >or what.
>
>Ok, this is an interesting start.
I want to move this discussion ahead just far enough that I might write
down what I have been trying to lead up to dialectically. There is at
least one other kind of dependence relation that I believe plays a part in
discussions about realism. It is also ontological dependence, but not of
stones upon minds. Rather, it is the ontological dependence of truths
about stones upon minds.
By now I am sure you are familiar with my position that truths are simply
true sentences. And further, that true sentences are true according to an
interpretation. My primary influence is Davidson, but on a few points I
sometimes add ideas of my own. The ontological dependence of truths about
stones upon minds, then, comes to the ontological dependence of true
sentences about stones upon minds. We can drop stones and just say that it
is true sentences in general that depend ontologically upon minds. My
position, the way I see to steer a middle ground between metaphysical
realism and anti-realism, is to accept the ontological independence of
stones upon minds, but to affirm to ontological dependence of truths about
stones upon minds.
Let me explore this idea, again, with the example of stones on a lifeless
Earth as it might have been. Had there been no life on Earth, there would
have been stones. This is, in as many words, the ontological independence
of stones upon minds. On this barren Earth, however, there would have been
no truths about stones. There would have been no truths whatever, in fact,
since truths being true sentences, there would have been no sentences to be
true or false. And that is, by contrast, the ontological dependence of
truths about stones upon minds.
It is important to understand that although there would have been no
truths, it doesn't follow that nothing would have been true. For something
to have been true, about stones, say, it is only necessary that there be
sentences that would have been true. These sentences would not be
sentences in the world as it might have been but sentences in the world as
it is. The sentences are *about* the world as it might have been, not
sentences that *themselves* only might have been. Among these sentences
that would have been true are, "There are stones, but there are no
minds." This sentence would have been true, but it also would not have been.
It may not be obvious that there would not have been sentences on a
lifeless Earth. Of course, there would not have been sentence producers,
that is, minds, but could there not have been accidental
sentences? Accidental ink marks on accidental paper produced by
astronomically improbable events and spelling, "There are stones on this
miserably lifeless planet." Could there have been this accidental
sentence, and if so would it have been true? Though there would be no
sentence producers, there need not have been sentence interpreters since we
can interpret the sentences ourselves. Since there need not have been
interpreters, the question, then, is only whether there need have been
sentence producers. I think so, and the reason is that there cannot be
accidental sentences. The very nature of interpretation is such that where
there is no identifiable meaning producer, or at least the probable profile
of one, there cannot be any meaning produced to be interpreted. Accidental
ink and paper would no more be true, false, or meaningful than are the
shapes in clouds those things they remind us of.
I also wrote elsewhere:
>Activity in the brain is not the only alternative. Activity of the entire
>body is also a candidate. One or the other seem the best options, for sure.
I lean toward activity of the body since that is what we see when we learn
concepts from others. Also, to the extent that you want to adopt semantic
externalism, you may also want to include the activity of other bodies and
the natures of the things to which they are acting and reacting. Concepts
may prove less invisible than brains after all.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
eGroups is now Yahoo! Groups
Click here for more details
http://us.click.yahoo.com/kWP7PD/pYNCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Randall Helzerman
> Earth as it might have been. Had there been no life on Earth, there would
> have been stones. This is, in as many words, the ontological independence
> of stones upon minds. On this barren Earth, however, there would have been
> no truths about stones. There would have been no truths whatever, in fact,
> since truths being true sentences, there would have been no sentences to be
> true or false. And that is, by contrast, the ontological dependence of
> truths about stones upon minds.
Rodrigo, this is very well put, and I think, exactly right. Truth is a
property of sentences. As Bob Marly might sing:
"no woman, no cry:
no sentence, no truth"
As you probably already know, your views are very close to Rorty's (who also
arrived at them under the influence of Davidson).
What horrifies most hard-headed philosophers about the above viewpoint is
that it seems as if some claim is being made that the external world depends
upon our language. Not so, says Rorty (again, following Davidson).
Different languages might describe things differently (for example, there
may or may not be a word for "stone") but nevertheless we would quickly
notice that under any description there are many events which are causally
independent of our hopes, desires, and beliefs. This causal independence is
pretty much all there is to be said about the notion of an external world.
> Of course, there would not have been sentence producers,
> that is, minds, but could there not have been accidental
> sentences? Accidental ink marks on accidental paper produced by
> astronomically improbable events and spelling, "There are stones on this
> miserably lifeless planet."
Such an occurance is of course possible, but it wouldn't count as a genuine
sentence any more than a perfect counterfit $100 bill would be genuine money.
-Randy
Steven Ravett Brown
So for something to be a "sentence," then, entails not merely mind, but
particular attitudes?
Steven Ravett Brown
srb...@ravett.com
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 09:10 AM 2/21/2001 -0800, you wrote:
>>Let me explore this idea, again, with the example of stones on a lifeless
>>Earth as it might have been. Had there been no life on Earth, there
>>would have been stones. This is, in as many words, the ontological
>>independence of stones upon minds. On this barren Earth, however, there
>>would have been no truths about stones. There would have been no truths
>>whatever, in fact, since truths being true sentences, there would have
>>been no sentences to be true or false. And that is, by contrast, the
>>ontological dependence of truths about stones upon minds.
>
>Rodrigo, this is very well put, and I think, exactly right. Truth is a
>property of sentences. As Bob Marly might sing:
>
> "no woman, no cry:
> no sentence, no truth"
>
>As you probably already know, your views are very close to Rorty's (who also
>arrived at them under the influence of Davidson).
Actually, I didn't know. I have read maybe a book and a half by Rorty and
maybe a dozen articles by or about him, but, so far, I have left my copy of
_Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ untouched. I have known that he
rejects the posits of mental representatinos, which sounds a lot like
Quine/Davidson's rejection of intensions, but it's not obvious to me how
this would relate to sentential truth or whether it does.
>What horrifies most hard-headed philosophers about the above viewpoint is
>that it seems as if some claim is being made that the external world depends
>upon our language.
I don't see the objection. I wrote: stones are ontologically independent
of minds, and truths about stones are ontologically dependent upon
minds. To this I could add: stones are ontologically independent of truths
about stones. This follows directly from the first two, and with it, I
could not more directly agree that "the external world depends upon our
language" is false.
>Not so, says Rorty (again, following Davidson).
>Different languages might describe things differently (for example, there
>may or may not be a word for "stone") but nevertheless we would quickly
>notice that under any description there are many events which are causally
>independent of our hopes, desires, and beliefs. This causal independence is
>pretty much all there is to be said about the notion of an external world.
And yet he has at times said that he does not admit to the objectivity to
truth, preferring a story about the solidarity of like-minded believers. I
don't see that my views lead to such a relativistic conclusion.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Randall Helzerman
:-) Had to lurk for a spell, too much else to track. Good to be back.
> I have known that he [Rorty]
> rejects the posits of mental representatinos, which sounds a lot like
> Quine/Davidson's rejection of intensions,
Indeed, and Rorty always mentions his indebtedness to both Davidson & Quine
for those views.
> >What horrifies most hard-headed philosophers about the above viewpoint is
> >that it seems as if some claim is being made that the external world depends
> >upon our language.
>
> I don't see the objection.
You are right; there is no valid objection, just confused reading by
careless critics.
> And yet he has at times said that he does not admit to the objectivity to
> truth, preferring a story about the solidarity of like-minded believers. I
> don't see that my views lead to such a relativistic conclusion.
True, but his story is, I think, quite congenial to your viewpoint. As
Quine puts it in "Ontological Relativity", what objects there are is
relative to the language being used. ("to be is to be the value of a bound
variable") And who are the users of this language but a community of
like-minded believers?
Rorty's views have evolved quite a bit over the last few years; he seems to
be one of the few philosophers who are able to put ego aside and change
teir minds. A new book which just came out, "Rorty and his Critics" edited
by Robert Brandom, is a marvelous example of this. Davidson has a
superlative essay in there, as does Ramberg, and in Rorty's reply to
Ramberg, he admits to giving up many ideas he's held for a long time, moving
closer to Davidson's viewpoint.
The book is worth it for Davidson's essay alone, but its also fun to read
Rorty's replies to his other critics (including Habermas, Dennet, and
others) where he pretty much mops the floor with them. Say what you want
about Rorty; the dude can WRITE!
Also, Ramberg emerges as an important philosopher, able to serve as a
mediator between Davidson and Rorty. Reading Ramberg's essay in Davidson's Schlip
volumn and his essay in this book (and both philosopher's replies) shows
clearly that he has become a broker, forcing each philosopher into a new
understanding of the other's position, and effecting considerable rapprochment.
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
> So for something to be a "sentence," then, entails not merely mind, but
> particular attitudes?
>
The question is one of the identity criteria. To be more specific about it
requires a bit more detail. In particular, we have to talk not just about
sentences, but utterance of sentences.
Consider a sentence like "Its raining". Strictly speaking, it is not that
sentence itself which is true or false, but rather, it is an event, a
particular utterance, of that sentence which is true or false.
So the question boils down to what events should count as utterance of
sentences? I follow Davidson here too--events are individuated by what
their causes are, and what other events they cause.
So for an event to count as an utterance of a sentence its causal history
and (possible) causal consequences must satisfy certain criteria.
Specifying exactly what these criteria are is a good research program for
the 21st century :-) but would have to take into account all sorts of
mentalistic talk about (as you mention above) attitudes, intentions, belief,
hope, desire, etc.
Back to the counterfit bill analogy: An exact, atom-for-atom duplication of
a $100 bill would still not be money. Why not? Because its causal history
is sufficiently different from "real" $100 bills. However, a few patches of
magnitized disk in the mainframe computer of my bank might very well count
as money, even though it might be very different from a $100 bill.
Likewise, we might count an event of movement of hands as an utterance of a
sentence in sign language, even though it was not an acoustic event.
-Randy
Steven Ravett Brown
Yes, I like the type-token distinction plus relevant context, above. The
only problem I see with the above (and I can't really comment on this
because I haven't read Davidson on this) is, as you say, "specifying the
criteria." Now, if this is so difficult (almost impossible, I would say),
yet if it is, equally, essential, we have a problem, do we not? Perhaps that
problem could be solved through some type of (Bayesian, I would think)
likelihood analysis, or Rochean category analysis, where we could (assuming
we're not dealing with some non-centered category or event structure)
specify the context as some sort of relevancy vector.
Steven Ravett Brown
srb...@ravett.com
Rodrigo Vanegas
> > And yet he has at times said that he does not admit to the objectivity to
> > truth, preferring a story about the solidarity of like-minded
> believers. I
> > don't see that my views lead to such a relativistic conclusion.
>
>True, but his story is, I think, quite congenial to your viewpoint. As
>Quine puts it in "Ontological Relativity", what objects there are is
>relative to the language being used.
That's not quite how I interpret ontological relativity thesis. It's not
that what there is depends on the language we use, but that true theories
expressed in languages other than our own will make ontological claims that
are true relative to the manual of translation back into our home
language. But all truths, including ontological truths, are immanent, that
is, belong to their home language and hence make any manual of translation
irrelevant. It is ontological relativity to a manual of translation, not
ontological relativity to a language.
See pages 51-52 of _Pursuit of Truth_. You know, philosophers do us a
great great service by living long enough to clarify all of their positions!
>("to be is to be the value of a bound
>variable") And who are the users of this language but a community of
>like-minded believers?
Sure, but how like-minded must we be? In my view, we must share only
enough background common theory to be intelligible to one another. For
Rorty, it seems that the like-mindedness includes agreement on the belief
itself.
>Rorty's views have evolved quite a bit over the last few years; he seems to
>be one of the few philosophers who are able to put ego aside and change
>teir minds. A new book which just came out, "Rorty and his Critics" edited
>by Robert Brandom, is a marvelous example of this. Davidson has a
>superlative essay in there, as does Ramberg, and in Rorty's reply to
>Ramberg, he admits to giving up many ideas he's held for a long time, moving
>closer to Davidson's viewpoint.
>
>The book is worth it for Davidson's essay alone, but its also fun to read
>Rorty's replies to his other critics (including Habermas, Dennet, and
>others) where he pretty much mops the floor with them. Say what you want
>about Rorty; the dude can WRITE!
Some time ago you thanked me for motivating you to better understand
Quine. I now plan to better understand Rorty, so maybe I can soon return
the gratitude. (Tonight I bought _Rorty and His Critics_. It looks very
promising.)
>Also, Ramberg emerges as an important philosopher, able to serve as a
>mediator between Davidson and Rorty. Reading Ramberg's essay in
>Davidson's Schlip
>volumn and his essay in this book (and both philosopher's replies) shows
>clearly that he has become a broker, forcing each philosopher into a new
>understanding of the other's position, and effecting considerable
>rapprochment.
A great accomplishment. I look forward to reading these essays. Here's
his web page: <http://www.sfu.ca/~ramberg/>.
Tsiatsos
> Consider a sentence like "Its raining". Strictly speaking, it is not that
> sentence itself which is true or false, but rather, it is an event, a
> particular utterance, of that sentence which is true or false.
>
> So the question boils down to what events should count as utterance of
> sentences? I follow Davidson here too--events are individuated by what
> their causes are, and what other events they cause.
>
If I might jump in here, I wonder if there is any point in drawing a
distinction between:
1) an utterance as an event, and
2) an utterance as an aspect (property?) of an event?
I ask because it seems somewhat odd to me (which is of course no sign of any
wrongdoing) to say that an event is true or false. If we want to introduce
sentence tokens and use them as the things, as opposed to the sentences,
that are true or false, certainly written tokens seem fine (if not
paradigmatic truth bearers). I would also agree that an utterance is an
event, but I presume that for the purposes of a theory of truth we don't
refer to the event aspect of it but more to something like the memory of the
completed series of interpreted sounds or what have you. I guess 2)
couldn't be cause-effect relationship since the causes and effects of events
are also events (ignoring claims of substance causation that don't seem
relevant here). But then I'm not really sure anymore what the utterance is
in addition to the event or, if there even is anything in addition. One
reason why it strikes me that there is something in addition is the
possibility that the utterance as an event might have different truth values
under different descriptions. (maybe it makes no difference but given the
centrality of 'under a description' in Davidson's accounts of events, I
thought I'd bring it up.)
Anything salvageable here?
alex tsiatsos
Randall Helzerman
> >
> Yes, I like the type-token distinction plus relevant context, above. The
> only problem I see with the above (and I can't really comment on this
> because I haven't read Davidson on this) is, as you say, "specifying the
> criteria." Now, if this is so difficult (almost impossible, I would say),
> yet if it is, equally, essential, we have a problem, do we not?
Well, yes & no. For example, consider Darwin and the theory of evolution by
natural selection. When he proposed the theory, he had only very vague and
fuzzy ideas about how mutation and inheritence worked. But it was enough to
get the ball rolling. Similarly, Mendelev got us a bit further down the road by
proposing the concept of "gene", even though he hadn't a clue what genes
were or where they were located.
Same with philosophy of language--we can't hope to solve the problem all at
once, but that doesn't mean that progress can't be made.
Or that progress hasn't been made. For example, we might not be able to
_fully_ specify the conditions under which an event counts as an utterance,
but we know enough about them to exclude certain cases, (such as a snowflake
hitting the ground, or Rodrigo's imagined spontaniously-appearing paper with
a sentence written on it). Likewise, we can confidently classify other
events as utterances; for example, what we're doing now. Just because we can't
handle -every- case doesn't mean we can't handle -any- case.
> Perhaps that
> problem could be solved through some type of (Bayesian, I would think)
> likelihood analysis,
Back to Davidson's Schlip volume, one of his critics was working on fitting
Davidson's ideas into a Bayesian framework. Can't wait until I can read the
article in depth.
> or Rochean category analysis, where we could (assuming
> we're not dealing with some non-centered category or event structure)
> specify the context as some sort of relevancy vector.
All good ideas. Try them out & let us know how far you get! :-)
-Randy
Martin N Brampton
>the way I see to steer a middle ground between metaphysical
>realism and anti-realism, is to accept the ontological independence of
>stones upon minds, but to affirm to ontological dependence of truths about
>stones upon minds.
Are you sure that you can avoid incoherence? There's a possibility that you
are claiming that
1) "There are stones" is mind dependent
by virtue of truths about stones being dependent on minds. Yet it seems that
your claim that stones are ontologically independent of minds looks as if it
could be stated by
2) "There are stones" is mind independent.
It might be that you consider the use of quotation marks inappropriate. But I
would side with Wittgenstein in regarding them as irrelevant and perhaps
unnecessary.
>Had there been no life on Earth, there would
>have been stones.
This is a puzzlig statement. It certainly isn't overtly empirical, as it is clear that
no possible observation could (dis)confirm it. It's hard to think of any oblique
way in which it could be affected by any observation. It certainly doesn't look
like a tautology. Is it a transcendent truth? Or what?
Another way of looking at the issue is to wonder about the consequences of
the statement's truth or falsity. There don't seem to be any consequences. If
there are no consequences at all, can it be said to be meaningful?
It has the form of a counterfactual. These are the subject of controversy. How
do you interpret counterfactuals? Does your interpretation somehow give us a
route to understanding what kind of claim it is?
Best regards, Martin
Randall Helzerman
> I ask because it seems somewhat odd to me (which is of course no sign of any
> wrongdoing) to say that an event is true or false.
What entities can and what entities cannot serve as truth-bearers is an
interesting question, and one which is pretty much glossed over in most
discussions on truth. A notible exception to this is Kircher's book
"Theories of Truth" which has an extended discussion about truth bearers,
which is worth a read. Some things to think about:
1. A sentence like "its raining" is called an occasion sentence because its
true on some occasions and false on others. Sentences which have the
same truth value for all time are called "eternal sentences."
(Actually, if you live in the Pacific Northwest, as I do, its debatable
whether "its raining" is an occasion sentence or an eternal sentence :-))
2. Any occasion sentence can be turned into an eternal sentence by
including a time stamp and a location. For example, "it's raining here
in Portland, Oregon, Thursday, Feb. 22, 2001".
3. For eternal sentences, it realy doesn't matter whether we count the
(platonic?) "sentences themselves", their inscriptions, their utterances
etc. to be true or false, because they would all have the same truth
value everywhere.
4. For occasion sentences, however, its trickier. There are several
options:
a) we could take all occasion sentences to be abbriviations of
eternal sentences. If my girlfriend says to me before we
leave our house "its raining", I can consider what she really
said was "its raining, here in Portland, OR, Washington county,
on Thursday, Feb. 22, 2001, at 5:30 pm."
b) or we could just say that what is really true or false wasn't
the sentence "its raining", but rather that particular utterance of
it.
Personally, I think its much simpler just to regard the event as the truth
bearer. One reason for this is that the process of turning an occasion
sentence into an eternal sentence is not as easy as I've made it out to be.
For example, it might indeed be raining in the middle of the street, but its
not raining inside the house. It might not be raining a block down the
street. And "its raining" is a very simple sentence. For more complex
sentences, to really fully specify all possible conditions/times/locations
under in order to make it eternally true starts to be very very cumbersome.
> But then I'm not really sure anymore what the utterance is
> in addition to the event or, if there even is anything in addition.
Me either! :-)
> One reason why it strikes me that there is something in addition is the
> possibility that the utterance as an event might have different truth values
> under different descriptions.
But this is a general feature of changing descriptions. Consider the
following event: two skaters are on the ice, holding hands, and then they
push each other away. In the frame of reference of the ice, we say the ice
is stationary and both the skaters are moving. In the frame of reference of
a skater, we say that the skater is stationary, and the ice and the other
skater are moving. It is the same event, but the sentence "The first
skater is moving" is true under one description but false under the other.
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
> is, belong to their home language and hence make any manual of translation
> irrelevant. It is ontological relativity to a manual of translation, not
> ontological relativity to a language.
Yes, but even in the home language we have a choice as to what we consider
these entities to be. The Loewenheim-Skolem theorem shows that we can
consider our theories to be true not of rocks and trees, but of numbers.
Quine (grudgingly) admits that this "Pythagorian" ontology will work in
several places, and recall the discussion a while back on Putnam, who uses
techniques of the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem to prove that home language will
not be able to determine an ontology.
> See pages 51-52 of _Pursuit of Truth_. You know, philosophers do us a
> great great service by living long enough to clarify all of their
> positions!
:-) indeed.
> >("to be is to be the value of a bound
> >variable") And who are the users of this language but a community of
> >like-minded believers?
>
> Sure, but how like-minded must we be? In my view, we must share only
> enough background common theory to be intelligible to one another. For
> Rorty, it seems that the like-mindedness includes agreement on the belief
> itself.
But that wasn't Rorty's idea--he got that from Davidson. If you buy into
Davidson's viewpoint, in order to be intelligible to each other at all we
have to have pretty much durn identical outlooks. We must not only believe
that we share most of the same beliefs, but most of our beliefs are true and
most of their beliefs are true. We have to consider the people we talk with
to be "Believers of the true, lovers of the good" etc.
That's not to say that _every_ belief must be shared in order to
communicate--just that disagreement must take place in the context of
massive agreement, because communication itself must take place in the
context of massive agreement.
> Some time ago you thanked me for motivating you to better understand
> Quine.
Yeah, thanks again. Its pretty scary to think how hopless my prospects of
making any progress would have been had you not shown me the light.
BTW, I also owe you thanks for persuading me to try to understand Davidson as
well. He was a lot harder for me to swallow than Quine was, probably
because I was so steeped in Dummett.
> I now plan to better understand Rorty, so maybe I can soon return
> the gratitude. (Tonight I bought _Rorty and His Critics_. It looks very
> promising.)
Cool! perhaps we could do a slow read of Davidson's essay???
-Randy
Steven Ravett Brown
> Back to Davidson's Schlip volume, one of his critics was working on fitting
> Davidson's ideas into a Bayesian framework. Can't wait until I can read the
> article in depth.
Let me know...
>> or Rochean category analysis, where we could (assuming
>> we're not dealing with some non-centered category or event structure)
>> specify the context as some sort of relevancy vector.
>
> All good ideas. Try them out & let us know how far you get! :-)
>
Well I'm doing something somewhat similar with phenomenological analysis, or
will be in a few months... otherwise it's a bit down on my priorities list
right now...
Steven Ravett Brown
srb...@ravett.com
Tsiatsos
----- Original Message -----
From: "Randall Helzerman" <rahe...@ichips.intel.com>
I suppose I'm just more comfortable sticking with the eternal sentence
abbreviation account of occasion sentences. If it is cumbersome at times,
or even if so vague (prior to specification) as to leave us unsure as to
whether or not it is true, I would view those hassles as coming with the
territory. But as the thread progresses I might well change my mind. Maybe
the notion of events as truth bearers is so new (to me) that my bias against
it is just reflex.
> > One reason why it strikes me that there is something in addition is the
> > possibility that the utterance as an event might have different truth values
> > under different descriptions.
>
> But this is a general feature of changing descriptions. Consider the
> following event: two skaters are on the ice, holding hands, and then they
> push each other away. In the frame of reference of the ice, we say the ice
> is stationary and both the skaters are moving. In the frame of reference of
> a skater, we say that the skater is stationary, and the ice and the other
> skater are moving. It is the same event, but the sentence "The first
> skater is moving" is true under one description but false under the other.
>
I guess I agree, except, that it almost seems as if when you change
descriptions of utterances you change utterances (each one being true or
false), but when you change descriptions of events it is still the same
event--an event that is now true and false. Maybe I just don't understand
how re-description of sentence tokens is supposed to work. (Or even event
re-description for that matter.)
Alex tsiatsos
bruce denner
picked certain passages, which may distort your meaning.
Rodrigo wrote...
>There is at least one other kind of dependence relation that I believe
>plays a part in
>discussions about realism... it is the ontological dependence of truths
>about stones upon minds.
Not sure what work the word "ontological" does...but obviously no minds, no
sentences.
>By now I am sure you are familiar with my position that truths are simply
>true sentences.
Both Rob and Martin have taken serious issue with that claim. I'll pass,
though.
>My position, the way I see to steer a middle ground between metaphysical
>realism and anti-realism, is to accept the ontological independence of
>stones upon minds
Hey, I asked earlier and you claimed no understanding of anti-realism.
Perhaps, I'm mistaken. The steering metaphor suggests that one crashes on
the Scylla of Realism or the Charybdis of Anti-Realism. First that has to
be shown. Now you speak of acceptance, earlier you were positing. I don't
mean to be cranky but so much seems to hang on our words here.
******************************************************************
The Rorty theme
Rodrigo wrote...
>> Let me explore this idea, again, with the example of stones on a lifeless
>> Earth as it might have been. Had there been no life on Earth, there would
>> have been stones. This is, in as many words, the ontological independence
>> of stones upon minds. On this barren Earth, however, there would have been
>> no truths about stones. There would have been no truths whatever, in fact,
>> since truths being true sentences, there would have been no sentences to be
>> true or false. And that is, by contrast, the ontological dependence of
>> truths about stones upon minds.
Randy responded..
>As you probably already know, your views are very close to Rorty's
I don't think so. Rorty would have nothing to say about things outside of a
language. And elsewhere Rodrigo finds Rorty a relativist.
Rodrigo wrote, about Rorty...and I agree.
"And yet he has at times said that he does not admit to the objectivity to
truth, preferring a story about the solidarity of like-minded believers. I
don't see that my views lead to such a relativistic conclusion."
Rorty spells out in what sense he is, and is not a relativist. He is in the
sense that he writes in a particular, time and place. He is not in the
sense that he doesn't hold to some absolute truth which can only be viewed
thru a glass darkly.
Randy wrote...
>Different languages might describe things differently (for example, there
>may or may not be a word for "stone") but nevertheless we would quickly
>notice that under any description there are many events which are causally
>independent of our hopes, desires, and beliefs.
"Independent" means what here? Events? Are you saying that we all agree on
the description of birth, death...?
>This causal independence is pretty much all there is to be said about the
>notion of an external >world.
Well, that's a pretty minimalist world. It seems as if the consequence of
mind independence is to have nothing to interesting to say about it.
Randy wrote..
>A new book which just came out, "Rorty and his Critics" edited
>by Robert Brandom, is a marvelous example of this. Davidson has a
>superlative essay in there,
Yes, indeed. Truth Rehabilitated. He argues that under Rorty truth wastes
away. Do you think you are doing the same here for Realism? Have I lost my
grip on Reality if I point out that all our claims are a function of who
and what we are?
To say, as I believe Rodrigo has, that the external world is a posit, is,
the way I see it, to make Reality totally mind dependent, a function of a
convenient mental act. I, in contrast, do not find any need to convince
myself that water is wet and rocks are hard.
Rorty distinguishes between a subject-centered and a communicative
discourse. From your point of view, as a subject, I can see you affirming
that the world existed before your arrival and will continue after your
passing. But in our communication, given that you, I assume, consider me
not you, why tell me that our world is not in your mind.
More importantly, Rorty, and other Pragmatists differ in that they do not
view philosophy as a set of propositions about how the world is. That
alone, excludes him from the Relativist Camp. He admits that he finds no
sense in a "theory about a word", whether the word be truth or reality.
*************************************************
Roidrigo, let's not get lost in Rorty. I want to return to your effort to
write a sense of Reality which is objective (Is that what mind independent
means to you?). I'll wait for your response to Martin because I feel that
he moves us ahead.
bruce
Daniel Language
role of logical constants and particularly their role
in logical truth. I agree that only sentences can be
true but is it possible to discuss the conditions
whereby a sentence is a logical truth and particularly
the role that functions such as "there is a..." and
"and" and "not" etc. play in facilitating if not,
tentatively, determining what counts as logical truth.
What I am driving at is if there is validity in asking
of the logical structure that logical constants
provide and therby if this determines what counts as a
true sentence in respect to the values posited in that
structure. Basically, if there is any salvaging of
"logical truth by necessity"? Here the necessity is
systematically what is necessitated by the logical
structure provided by logical constants.
I just read an interesting article by Boghossian and
although i don't agree with his conclusions it got me
thinking about the old "analytic/synthetic"
distinction and why this had to necessarily invalidate
any "theory of necessity" in respect to logical truth.
I suppose I am quite against "implicit definition" and
"conventionalism" on some accounts because I don't see
why there need be an "indeterminancy" of meaning as a
result of the obviation of the "analytic/synthetic"
distinction.
I hope someone will clear me up.
best,
d
M Murphy
Randall Helzerman wrote:
>
> But that wasn't Rorty's idea--he got that from Davidson. If you buy into
> Davidson's viewpoint, in order to be intelligible to each other at all we
> have to have pretty much durn identical outlooks. We must not only believe
> that we share most of the same beliefs, but most of our beliefs are true and
> most of their beliefs are true. We have to consider the people we talk with
> to be "Believers of the true, lovers of the good" etc.
>
> That's not to say that _every_ belief must be shared in order to
> communicate--just that disagreement must take place in the context of
> massive agreement, because communication itself must take place in the
> context of massive agreement.
As a bit of an aside, its good to ask of Davidson (in "On the very Notion of a
Conceptual Scheme" especially): how massive is massive? how much makes "durn near
identical" and so forth? such that we have to reject the idea of alternative
conceptual schemes, which Davidson seems to want to do. We may, for example,
agree in the vast majority or beliefs, but disagree on the vast majority of our
beliefs concerning politics, or physics, or bird evolution. Do we share a
conceptual scheme, or not, in such cases? I would want to say that it is useful
to say that we do not. That is, I think the idea of alternative and incompatible
conceptual schemes is useful to have; Davidson's rejection only works because he
leaves the "most" in the statement that we must share "most" of our beliefs, and
that "most" of our shared beliefs must be true, carefully undefined.
Cheers
M.J. Murphy
`The shapes of things are dumb.'
-L. Wittgenstein
Randall Helzerman
> abbreviation account of occasion sentences.
That's OK...to me its kind of like being more used to buying a 12-hoz soda
instead of a 355 millilitre one. As long as you are able to formulate true
(or at least useful) theories, it doesn't really matter what you take truth
bearers to be.
> I guess I agree, except, that it almost seems as if when you change
> descriptions of utterances you change utterances (each one being true or
> false), but when you change descriptions of events it is still the same
> event--an event that is now true and false. Maybe I just don't understand
> how re-description of sentence tokens is supposed to work. (Or even event
> re-description for that matter.)
* Well back to my skater example (which is lifted pretty much blatantly from
one of those popular books about relativity theory which we all read as
hopeful adolescents).
** We can take the frame of reference to be the ice, or we can take it to
be one of the skaters.
** In one frame of reference, the sentence "the first skater is moving"
is true, and in the other, the sentence is false.
So how do we know that the same event is being talked about? Because we can
find invariences which link the descriptions. These invariences are
sentences which are true in both. For example, we might find that the
sentence "the distance between the skaters is increasing at 7 miles per
hour" is true in both. As Davidson says, these invariences are the "facts
of the matter."
-Randy
Rodrigo Vanegas
Randy,
At 08:41 AM 2/22/2001 -0800, you wrote:
> > But all truths, including ontological truths, are immanent, that
> > is, belong to their home language and hence make any manual of translat=
ion
> > irrelevant. It is ontological relativity to a manual of translation, n=
ot
> > ontological relativity to a language.
>
>Yes, but even in the home language we have a choice as to what we consider
>these entities to be. The Loewenheim-Skolem theorem shows that we can
>consider our theories to be true not of rocks and trees, but of numbers.
>Quine (grudgingly) admits that this "Pythagorian" ontology will work in
>several places, and recall the discussion a while back on Putnam, who uses
>techniques of the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem to prove that home language wi=
ll
>not be able to determine an ontology.
The reason the admission is grudging is that although we can adopt a
translation manual from the home language back into the home language, it
is also admissible to just use the identity translation or not to translate=
at all. After all, we are already home. In the home language, ontological=
relativity is optional. We can discuss Putnam's reservations if you are
not yet convinced of the irrelevance of ontological relativity to the
comparability of Quine and Rorty.
> > >("to be is to be the value of a bound
> > >variable") And who are the users of this language but a community of
> > >like-minded believers?
> >
> > Sure, but how like-minded must we be? In my view, we must share only
> > enough background common theory to be intelligible to one another. For
> > Rorty, it seems that the like-mindedness includes agreement on the beli=
ef
> > itself.
>
>But that wasn't Rorty's idea--he got that from Davidson. If you buy into
>Davidson's viewpoint, in order to be intelligible to each other at all we
>have to have pretty much durn identical outlooks. We must not only believ=
e
>that we share most of the same beliefs, but most of our beliefs are true a=
nd
>most of their beliefs are true. We have to consider the people we talk wit=
h
>to be "Believers of the true, lovers of the good" etc.
>
>That's not to say that _every_ belief must be shared in order to
>communicate--just that disagreement must take place in the context of
>massive agreement, because communication itself must take place in the
>context of massive agreement.
Right, but Rorty goes further. Davidson's massive agreement becomes
Rorty's agreement über alles. My point is that Rorty replaces truth with=
agreement, whereas Davidson only requires agreement for disagreement to be=
possible. In Davidson's philosophy there is ample room for truth to be
more than mere agreement.
But I will read Rorty and say more later.
> > Some time ago you thanked me for motivating you to better understand
> > Quine.
>
>Yeah, thanks again. Its pretty scary to think how hopless my prospects of
>making any progress would have been had you not shown me the light.
>
>BTW, I also owe you thanks for persuading me to try to understand Davidson=
as
>well. He was a lot harder for me to swallow than Quine was, probably
>because I was so steeped in Dummett.
I recently learned that Dummett is a converted Roman Catholic. What does
this tell you? I rather like the atheist heritage bestowed by Russell's
humanism. What were Frege's views of religion? Does anyone know?
> > I now plan to better understand Rorty, so maybe I can soon return
> > the gratitude. (Tonight I bought _Rorty and His Critics_. It looks ve=
ry
> > promising.)
>
>Cool! perhaps we could do a slow read of Davidson's essay???
Sounds good to me!
***************************************************************************=
***************
Martin,
It's a pleasure to see your reply to my realism idea since it is in part
thanks to the year-long discussion I had with you on Analytic-borders that=
I have reached the conclusions I have.
At 08:37 PM 2/22/2001 +0000, you wrote:
> >the way I see to steer a middle ground between metaphysical
> >realism and anti-realism, is to accept the ontological independence of
> >stones upon minds, but to affirm to ontological dependence of truths abo=
ut
> >stones upon minds.
>
>Are you sure that you can avoid incoherence? There's a possibility that y=
ou
>are claiming that
>
>1) "There are stones" is mind dependent
>
>by virtue of truths about stones being dependent on minds. Yet it seems t=
hat
>your claim that stones are ontologically independent of minds looks as if =
it
>could be stated by
>
>2) "There are stones" is mind independent.
>
>It might be that you consider the use of quotation marks inappropriate. B=
ut I
>would side with Wittgenstein in regarding them as irrelevant and perhaps
>unnecessary.
I consider the use of quotation marks appropriate, so I guess it's me
against you and Wittgenstein! Having said that, interpretations of
Wittgenstein are fluid enough that I bet I could bring him over to my side=
as well. It'll be me and W against you and W. Or, shall we say, my Ludwig=
against your Ludwig?
Joking aside, can you show me where you think Wittgenstein argues that
quotation marks are "irrelevant and perhaps unnecessary"?
> >Had there been no life on Earth, there would
> >have been stones.
>
>This is a puzzlig statement. It certainly isn't overtly empirical, as it=
>is clear that
>no possible observation could (dis)confirm it. It's hard to think of any=
>oblique
>way in which it could be affected by any observation. It certainly
>doesn't look
>like a tautology. Is it a transcendent truth? Or what?
There is more to empiricism than verificationism. It is an empirical
claim, like any other claim.
>Another way of looking at the issue is to wonder about the consequences of
>the statement's truth or falsity. There don't seem to be any
>consequences. If
>there are no consequences at all, can it be said to be meaningful?
I don't see why not.
>It has the form of a counterfactual. These are the subject of
>controversy. How
>do you interpret counterfactuals? Does your interpretation somehow give us=
a
>route to understanding what kind of claim it is?
I don't have a fully developed theory of counterfactuals, but I do have
certain sympathies. Counterfactuals, in my view, are based on something
like de dicto necessary truth, itself based on a weak sense of analyticity=
interpreted as relative linguistic content as against empirical
content. It is a whole different subject, and I'm not prepared to discuss=
it now.
If your criticism, in the end, comes to nothing more than that my account
depends on a satisfactory treatment of counterfactuals, then I will
consider my position successful at least so far as such conditional success=
goes.
***************************************************************************=
***************
Bruce,
At 02:54 PM 2/23/2001 -0800, you wrote:
> >There is at least one other kind of dependence relation that I believe
> >plays a part in
> >discussions about realism... it is the ontological dependence of truths
> >about stones upon minds.
>
>Not sure what work the word "ontological" does...but obviously no minds, n=
o
>sentences.
I thought we had settled what I mean by "ontological dependence". See
message numbers: 96, 91, and 84.
> >My position, the way I see to steer a middle ground between metaphysical
> >realism and anti-realism, is to accept the ontological independence of
> >stones upon minds
>
>Hey, I asked earlier and you claimed no understanding of anti-realism.
It is message 96, you're referring to. I said that I don't understand the=
anti-realist, which is not the same thing.
>Perhaps, I'm mistaken. The steering metaphor suggests that one crashes on
>the Scylla of Realism or the Charybdis of Anti-Realism. First that has to
>be shown.
"Metaphysical realism", not just "realism". After all, I am defending a
form of realism. What exactly is it that needs to be shown? That with
metaphysical realism or anti-realism one is on a doomed course? If so,
then I trust it has been shown by others well enough. My intended
audience, anyway, includes only those who are already looking for a third w=
ay.
>Now you speak of acceptance, earlier you were positing. I don't
>mean to be cranky but so much seems to hang on our words here.
Accepting what? "Positing"? Did I ever speak of "positing"?
>******************************************************************
>
>The Rorty theme
...
>To say, as I believe Rodrigo has, that the external world is a posit, is,
>the way I see it, to make Reality totally mind dependent, a function of a
>convenient mental act.
Did I say "the external world is a posit"? Where do I write about "the
external world" or "posits"?
>I, in contrast, do not find any need to convince
>myself that water is wet and rocks are hard.
I also don't need convincing. To whose views are you contrasting your own?
>Rodrigo, let's not get lost in Rorty. I want to return to your effort to
>write a sense of Reality which is objective (Is that what mind independent
>means to you?).
No, I'd rather not use the term "objectivity", or at least not just yet. I=
have already explained what I mean by "mind independent existence" in the
messages I mentioned above. Let's review what I wrote there.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Randall Helzerman
> role of logical constants and particularly their role
> in logical truth.
Have you read Quine's little book "Philosophy of Logic?" That book is one
of those gems that I tried reading several times, but never really quite
"got" until I have several long discussions with Rodrigo. But after I read
it---enlightenment! And thanks again to Rodrigo for his advocacy of Quine.
> What I am driving at is if there is validity in asking
> of the logical structure that logical constants
> provide and therby if this determines what counts as a
> true sentence in respect to the values posited in that
> structure.
Some things to think about:
1. What _is_ a logical constant? Why do we consider "and", "or", etc. to
be, but not, say "red" or "sweet"?
2. How do we know what _are_ the laws which govern the use of the logical
constants? For example, Rodrigo and I still disagree about whether
(p or not p) is true for every sentence p. (I think its true for
sentences about Rocks and Trees, but not for, say, sentenes about
transfinite ordinals, the continuum hypothesis, or Santa Claus).
> Basically, if there is any salvaging of
> "logical truth by necessity"?
I think Dewey said it best here--something to the effect that "we know that
the science of logic is just as revisable as the science of anything else.
We know it can change, because it _has_ changed."
> Here the necessity is
> systematically what is necessitated by the logical
> structure provided by logical constants.
...and I think Quine said it best here: (roughly) "Any sentence implies a true
sentence. Therefore, the logical truths are true by anything you care to
specify--logic, the world, anything."
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
> Have I lost my grip on Reality if I point out that all our claims are a
> function of who and what we are?
Of course not. If you have a grip on reality, you have to be gripping with
something. There is no "grip with nothing" anymore than there is a "view
from nowhere".
> >Different languages might describe things differently (for example, there
> >may or may not be a word for "stone") but nevertheless we would quickly
> >notice that under any description there are many events which are causally
> >independent of our hopes, desires, and beliefs.
>
> "Independent" means what here?
Causal indepencence. Consider the event of me sticking my hand in a pot of
boiling water. This causes another event, my hand getting burned.
That causation is independent of whether I describe the pot as being 100C or
212F. It is independent of whether I say my hand moved into a stationary
pot, or my stationary hand was engulfed by a moving pot.
> >This causal independence is pretty much all there is to be said about the
> >notion of an external world.
> Well, that's a pretty minimalist world.
Yep. But is there anything more to be about an external world than that,
given a description of the world, the described events divide into two classes,
those which are causally dependent on me and those which are not?
-Randy
Rodrigo Vanegas
I think I misread you.
At 07:15 PM 2/24/2001 -0500, I wrote:
> >Are you sure that you can avoid incoherence? There's a possibility that you
> >are claiming that
> >
> >1) "There are stones" is mind dependent
> >
> >by virtue of truths about stones being dependent on minds. Yet it seems
> that
> >your claim that stones are ontologically independent of minds looks as if it
> >could be stated by
> >
> >2) "There are stones" is mind independent.
> >
> >It might be that you consider the use of quotation marks
> inappropriate. But I
> >would side with Wittgenstein in regarding them as irrelevant and perhaps
> >unnecessary.
>
>I consider the use of quotation marks appropriate, so I guess it's me
>against you and Wittgenstein! Having said that, interpretations of
>Wittgenstein are fluid enough that I bet I could bring him over to my side
>as well. It'll be me and W against you and W. Or, shall we say, my Ludwig
>against your Ludwig?
>
>Joking aside, can you show me where you think Wittgenstein argues that
>quotation marks are "irrelevant and perhaps unnecessary"?
I consider the use of quotation marks appropriate, generally speaking, such
as the use you put them to in (1), but I don't consider your use of
quotation marks appropriate in (2). This second use is not a way of
stating that stones are ontologically independent of minds since it does
not refer to stones. The first three words, enclosed as they are in
quotation marks, refer to a sentence about stones, not to stones.
Sorry about the confusion.
Randall Helzerman
> After all, we are already home. In the home language, ontological
> relativity is optional.
It is not optional--it is inescapable. The Loewenheim-Skolem theorem is just
that--a theorem. And it says that a language, any language, is so
inherently vague that it cannot precisely specify an ontology.
No matter how many axioms you adopt, no matter what investigations you carry out,
there will -always- be infinitely many ontologies which are models of your
language. What's more, even -you- can't be sure which one you are thinking
about. In your home language, are there stones and trees, or are there just
numbers? Prove it! The Loewenheim-Skolem theorem says you can't.
The bottom line is, of course, that there is no difference which makes a
difference between whethere there are stones and trees, or there are just
numbers. This surely must reduce our interest in ontology. Our interest
lies primarily in which sentences are true, not in what things there are.
> My point is that Rorty replaces truth with agreement
That is a misreading of him.
Rorty thinks that the word "true" has three principle uses:
1. A disquotational use. "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.
This allows us to perform semantic ascent, a la Quine.
2. An approving use. We might say that a statement is true, indicating
that we think it is good to use in our reasoning. This is the use
that, say Euclid used when specifying a list of axioms for geometry.
3. A cautionary use. We might say something like "Although you are
justified in believing in Quantum mechanics, it might not be true."
This use distinguishes "true" from "justified".
Rorty believes that the above three uses say pretty much all there is to be
said about the subject of truth. Notice that none of those has anything to
do with agreement being the same thing as truth.
Can you think of anything else there might be to the concept of truth? Or
is Rorty right about this?
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
> What were Frege's views of religion? Does anyone know?
I don't know what Frege's views of religion were, but Dummett writes in his
book "The Philosophy of Frege" that he ran across some papers written by
Frege which shook him up badly. Turns out that Frege was viciously racist
and anti-semitic.
Consider how disturbing that must have been to someone like Dummett, who
idolized Frege, but who also gave up philosophy and spent the most of the
60's fighting againt racism, segregation and discrimination in England,
because he thought that fight was more important than philosophy.
Dummett writes that although it was deeply dissapointing to him, he's glad he
found out about it, because it told him something about human nature that he
would otherwise not have known.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is true, even though Heisenberg was a
Nazi. Relativity theory is true, even though Einstein was a Jew. Same goes
for philosophy--it is an empirical fact that someone's race, religion, or
political views are completely irrelevant to their ability as a philosopher.
Therefore, it is best to ignore such things when evaluating their
philosophical positions.
-Randy
bruce denner
Thanks for your comments. Because of time constraints, I can't do justice
to your Post. Also I took the liberty of chaning the subject to our
specific interchange
Randall originally wrote..
>> >Different languages might describe things differently (for example, there
>> >may or may not be a word for "stone") but nevertheless we would quickly
>> >notice that under any description there are many events which are causally
>> >independent of our hopes, desires, and beliefs.
And Bruce asked: "Independent" means what here?
>Causal indepencence. Consider the event of me sticking my hand in a pot of
>boiling water. This causes another event, my hand getting burned.
>That causation is independent of whether I describe the pot...
in any number of ways. Yes, this is the Roritarian take. But I cannot read
"causal" here literally, in the scientific sense, only metaphorically.
While I grant that there is lots we can say about the above unfortunate
event that does not alter the consequences of getting burned, would you
grant that the conceptualization of getting burned is a human invention,
one of our beliefs? If not, then we know something through a means which
bypasses our way of knowing.
Rorty cannot be making a scientific point, there is no of demonstrating
that the world causes this or that without first assuming a world. His
causal stance is a rhetorical device to distance himself from the
representational one. Rather then say, "Our worlds mirror a reality out
there", he'd have us say, "Events happen and we talk a certain way."
What do you think?
thanks again,
bruce
bde...@sonic.net
Rodrigo Vanegas
> Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is true, even though Heisenberg
> was a
> Nazi. Relativity theory is true, even though Einstein was a Jew.
> Same goes
> for philosophy--it is an empirical fact that someone's race,
> religion, or
> political views are completely irrelevant to their ability as a
> philosopher.
>
> Therefore, it is best to ignore such things when evaluating their
> philosophical positions.
My view of these matters is perhaps less attuned with the times. At
the risk of raising eyebrows, I will say that I think one's political
and religious views *are* relevant. (I'm not sure how race came up.)
And I should be specific in saying that it is not to one's *ability*
as a philosopher that one's views are relevant but to the
interpretation that others may develop of one's philosophical views
and general philosophical outlook.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle may be no less justified and true
for being a Nazi, but the individual decisions he made in his
research program may not be so independent of his politics, as is
explored in the recent play _Copenhagen_ by Michael Frayn. And
Einstein's general relativity may be no less justified and true for
being Jewish, but his possibly excessive loyalty to determinism and
the definiteness of physical values as against the overwhelmingly
well-comfirmed theory of quantum mechanics may not be so independent
of his religion, as is explored in many biographical accounts.
As for Dummett, I have nothing comparably specific to be dubious
about. But I would not be surprised if his religious views give him
motivation to adhere to an epistemology and metaphysics that leaves
room for God. Since not all currently popular epistemological
outlooks are similarly positioned with respect to religion, this is
not a consideration to be overlooked.
That isn't to say that arguments should not be taken on their own
merits. Of course they should, and, moreover, too great attention to
an author's biography can distract, and, at worst, descend into ad
hominem attacks. But in a post-Freudian age in which self-deception
comes as no surprise and motivated belief is par for the course, it
pays to know what to expect from our supposedly disinterested
philosophers.
Rorty, to make an example of our recent interest, has a background in the
literary radical-left circles of pre-McCarthy America. My guess was
that this motivates his attention and interest in solidarity. The
hunch was confirmed to my satisfaction by his book _Philosophy and
Social Hope_.
=====
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.
http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Daniel Language
No I don't believe that I have ever read Quine's
philosophy of logic, but for the most part I disagree
with Quine's views. But it may be worthwhile to check
it out.
>
> Some things to think about:
>
> 1. What _is_ a logical constant? Why do we
> consider "and", "or", etc. to
> be, but not, say "red" or "sweet"?
Well, i would say that logical constants are logical
utilities. They are used in fixing logical relations.
To answer your question, they differ from "red" and
"sweet" in that the logical constants have no value.
Their meanings are logical structures of sentences not
"things" in the world. There are things that are "red"
or "sweet" but there are no things that are "and" and
"is".
> 2. How do we know what _are_ the laws which govern
> the use of the logical
> constants? For example, Rodrigo and I still
> disagree about whether
> (p or not p) is true for every sentence p>
I think that each logical constant has its own
peculiar systematic map, which we can apply
successfully to all sentences that contain these
constants. I have a different take on "p or not p"
types of sentences. I hold that "not p" is not a
negation of "p" and I would also say that "not p" can
say nothing about the world at all.
> I think Dewey said it best here--something to the
> effect that "we know that
> the science of logic is just as revisable as the
> science of anything else.
> We know it can change, because it _has_ changed."
I never understood this. How has logic changed? Is it
possible to arbitrarly change logical truths? If he
means the method of doing logic, that is another
matter but it seems impossible to me that logical
truths could change.
> ...and I think Quine said it best here: (roughly)
> "Any sentence implies a true
> sentence. Therefore, the logical truths are true by
> anything you care to
> specify--logic, the world, anything."
Again, would you mind explaining this to me because it
just seems bizzare that logical truths can be true by
anything you please. It is not convention that makes
sentences logical truths, is it? I think there is a
definite logical order for what determines the logical
truth of a sentence and this can not be changed. Truth
is always about the world in any case.
best,
d
Randall Helzerman
> utilities. They are used in fixing logical relations.
I'm sure you realize that the above aren't definitions,
because they are circular.
> There are things that are "red" or "sweet" but there are no things that
> are "and" and "is".
Ok, this is a good point--my examples of "red" and "sweet" were already bad
examples, because grammatically, "red" and "sweet" are adjectives and the
logical constants are adverbs.
But what about other adverbs? You can use the adverb "definitely" anywhere you
can use the logical constant not:
Cindy Crawford is <not> beautiful.
Cindy Crawford is <definitely> beautiful.
(I'm dating myself here, but I just couldn't bring myself to use Britney
Spears as the subject of the sentence).
Is "definitely" a logical constant? What about "although" or "apparently",
or "very?"
> I have a different take on "p or not p"
> types of sentences. I hold that "not p" is not a
> negation of "p" and I would also say that "not p" can
> say nothing about the world at all.
In that case, you yourself disagree with most logicians about what the
logical constants are and what they mean. How can we be sure that the
logical laws are eternally true if there is so much disagreement about them?
How do you know you are right and they are wrong? (They sure don't know
that they are right and -you- are wrong.)
> I never understood this. How has logic changed? Is it
> possible to arbitrarly change logical truths? If he
> means the method of doing logic, that is another
> matter but it seems impossible to me that logical
> truths could change.
For example, the following syllogism is valid in Aristotelian logic:
All humans are mortal
---------------------
therefore, some humans are mortal
This was accepted as an eternally valid truth of logic, as firmly as today
as some believe (p or not p) is eternally true.
It wasn't for thousands of years before somebody noticed that the sylogism
is only true if there happens to be at least one human being!! That so-called
content-free "logical law" turned out to be dependent upon an empirical fact
(the existance of human beings) after all.
In short, logic changed. It has changed, and no doubt it will change in the future.
> Again, would you mind explaining this to me
Not at all.
> because it just seems bizzare that logical truths can be true by
> anything you please.
Ok, consider two sentences. The first sentence, is true:
P = "Randy lives in Oregon"
The second sentence may or may not be true. It is:
Q = "Rodrigo has 3 cousins"
Lets look at the truth table for the logical constant => (material implication)
P | Q | Q => P
--|----|---------
F | F | T
F | T | F
T | F | T
T | T | T
We know that P is true. Therefore, just consider the the last two lines of the
truth table:
P | Q | Q => P
--|----|---------
T | F | T
T | T | T
It says that if P is true, then Q => P is true -- no matter whether Q is
true or false!! In other words, the sentence:
"Rodrigo has three cousins, therefore Randy lives in Oregon"
is true!!
Now apply the same thing to the a logical law. Take the logical law
(A and B => A). We can do the same trick for this as the above.
"Randy lives in Oregon, therefore (A and B => A)"
"Rodrigo has three cousins, therefore (A and B => A)"
"Frege was the prophet of God, therefore (A and B => A)"
"Daniel Language _is_ God, therefore (A and B => A)"
Those sentences are all true.
> It is not convention that makes sentences logical truths, is it?
What do you mean by "makes true"? If by "makes true" you mean
"logically implies", then, as the above proof shows, _anything_ at all
makes the logical truths true. The sentence:
"Convention makes the logical truths true, therfore (A and B) => A"
is true, but it is just as silly as the sentence:
"My nose is bigger than yours, therefore (A and B => A)"
> No I don't believe that I have ever read Quine's
> philosophy of logic, but for the most part I disagree
> with Quine's views.
I disagreed violently with him as well, before I read him ;-)
Please do read his little book on Philosophical logic. Its a very short
book (only 109 pages) and at $17 is very cheap. For someone who is obiously
as smart and inquisitive as you are, it shouldn't take you very long, and it
will repay the effort many times over.
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
Sorry, I should have chosen a better example.
If you are saying that the following arguments _is_ sound:
Dummet is catholic
-------------------
therefore, he is more likely to advocate
ideas consistent with catholocism
and that the following argument _is_not_ sound:
Dummet is catholic
-------------------
therefore, his views on Bivalence are wrong
then I agree.
If you are saying something like:
Einstein believed in a God that didn't throw dice
---------------------------------------------------------------
Einstein didn't achieve as much scientifically as he could have
then I'm not so sure. First of all, arguments of that form involve
counter-factual conditionals, and I still haven't fully digested them yet.
Second, the biases inputed by religion can serve as useful
heuristics as well; for exmaple, biggest motivation for Kepler's rejection
of Ptolemy was what could best be described as sun worship.
-Randy
Martin N Brampton
>Joking aside, can you show me where you think Wittgenstein argues that
>quotation marks are "irrelevant and perhaps unnecessary"?
Certainly, notwithstanding the apparent imputation of "you think". Perhaps
you'd like to cite the reference that is to be interpreted in the opposite vein?
So is it correct to write ' "p" is true', ' "p" is false'; mustn't it be 'p is true'
(or false)? The ink mark is after all not *true*; in the way in which it's black
and curved.
Does ' "p" is true' state anything about the sign 'p' then? 'Yes, it says that
"p" agrees with reality.' Instead of a sentence of our word language consider
a drawing that can be compared with reality according to exact projection-rules.
This surely must show as clearly as possible what ' "p" is true' states about
the picture 'p'. The proposition ' "p" is true' can thus be compared with the
proposition 'this object is as long as this metre rule' and 'p' to the proposition
'this object is one metre long'. But the comparison is incorrect, because 'this
metre rule' is a description, whereas 'metre rule' is the determination of a
concept. On the other hand in ' "p" is true' the ruler enters immediately into
the proposition. 'p' represents here simply the length and not the metre rule.
For the representing drawing is also not 'true' except in accordance with a
particular method of projection which makes the ruler a purely geometrical
appendage of the measured line.
It can also be put thus: The proposition ' "p" is true' can only be understood
if one understands the grammar of the sign 'p' as a propositional sign; not if 'p'
is simply the name of the shape of a particular ink mark. In the end one can
say that the quotation marks in the sentence ' "p" is true' are simply superfluous.
(Wittgenstein: "Philosophical Grammar", pp 123 f.)
Rodrigo Vanegas
> > After all, we are already home. In the home language, ontological
> > relativity is optional.
>
>It is not optional--it is inescapable. The Loewenheim-Skolem theorem is just
>that--a theorem. And it says that a language, any language, is so
>inherently vague that it cannot precisely specify an ontology.
I'm not so sure that's what the theorem says. You know, the validity of
the theorem is never what's in question. That's why my interest in
mathematics and pure logic has always been secondary to the philosophy of
each. It is always the *interpretation* of the theorem that provokes
discussion. Does the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem say that a language is so
inherently vague that it cannot precisely specify an ontology? Or, rather,
does it say that there is no privileged translation that can fix a model in
a model-theoretic interpretation?
What does it mean to specify an ontology, exactly? There is, of course,
something that is inescapable about the ontological relativity thesis, and
that is that there is always another adequate translation in which the
ontology is different. But there is also something that is not
inescapable, and that is the need for translation. There is no need, even
if it is possible, to translate the home language back into the home
language, for we are already home. Just the same, there is no need to
satisfy some "metaphysical urge" (to quote Rorty's reply to Putnam in
_Rorty and His Critics_) by finding a way to settle on the "correct"
model. The ontology of the *untranslated* home language is given trivially
by the satisfaction relation. "London" refers to London, and "rabbits"
refers to rabbits. Absent the *exercised* option to translate back into
the home language, there is nothing more to be said about it.
> > My point is that Rorty replaces truth with agreement
>
>That is a misreading of him.
Maybe you misread me. I meant to abbreviate what I would in more words
write: Rorty replaces objective truth with solidarity among qualified
audiences.
>Rorty thinks that the word "true" has three principle uses:
>
>1. A disquotational use. "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.
> This allows us to perform semantic ascent, a la Quine.
>
>2. An approving use. We might say that a statement is true, indicating
> that we think it is good to use in our reasoning. This is the use
> that, say Euclid used when specifying a list of axioms for geometry.
>
>3. A cautionary use. We might say something like "Although you are
> justified in believing in Quantum mechanics, it might not be true."
> This use distinguishes "true" from "justified".
>
>Rorty believes that the above three uses say pretty much all there is to be
>said about the subject of truth. Notice that none of those has anything to
>do with agreement being the same thing as truth.
The cautionary use does. See point 6, on page 115 of _Rorty and His
Critics_. I want to spend some more time reading Rorty and others before I
tackle your question. Better still, I would prefer to just do the slow
read you suggested earlier.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Sandra Ann Shaw
> Randall,
>
> No I don't believe that I have ever read Quine's
> philosophy of logic, but for the most part I disagree
> with Quine's views. But it may be worthwhile to check
> it out.
>
> >
> > Some things to think about:
> >
> > 1. What _is_ a logical constant? Why do we
> > consider "and", "or", etc. to
> > be, but not, say "red" or "sweet"?
>
> Well, i would say that logical constants are logical
> utilities. They are used in fixing logical relations.
> To answer your question, they differ from "red" and
> "sweet" in that the logical constants have no value.
> Their meanings are logical structures of sentences not
> "things" in the world. There are things that are "red"
> or "sweet" but there are no things that are "and" and
> "is".
I would still say "There are things that seem 'red' or 'sweet'".
But 'red' and 'sweet' are different than 'apple' and 'orange'.
The logical utilities are used in statements from our language.
>
> > 2. How do we know what _are_ the laws which govern
> > the use of the logical
> > constants? For example, Rodrigo and I still
> > disagree about whether
> > (p or not p) is true for every sentence p>
>
> I think that each logical constant has its own
> peculiar systematic map, which we can apply
> successfully to all sentences that contain these
> constants. I have a different take on "p or not p"
> types of sentences. I hold that "not p" is not a
> negation of "p" and I would also say that "not p" can
> say nothing about the world at all.
>
> > I think Dewey said it best here--something to the
> > effect that "we know that
> > the science of logic is just as revisable as the
> > science of anything else.
> > We know it can change, because it _has_ changed."
>
> I never understood this. How has logic changed? Is it
> possible to arbitrarly change logical truths? If he
> means the method of doing logic, that is another
> matter but it seems impossible to me that logical
> truths could change.
>
Maybe valid and invalid are better terms than true or false.
True or false words belong to the level of descition and factual statements
AFTER determinination made by observation. Valid and Invalid refer
to the inferential level and apply to sets of relationships
and are a measure of the consistency of a symbolic system.
> > ...and I think Quine said it best here: (roughly)
> > "Any sentence implies a true
> > sentence. Therefore, the logical truths are true by
> > anything you care to
> > specify--logic, the world, anything."
>
> Again, would you mind explaining this to me because it
> just seems bizzare that logical truths can be true by
> anything you please. It is not convention that makes
> sentences logical truths, is it? I think there is a
> definite logical order for what determines the logical
> truth of a sentence and this can not be changed. Truth
> is always about the world in any case.
When one thinks about Well-Formed Formulas from which the
predicate calculus is formed it seems quite natural. Given
that 'we' use 'not', 'and', 'or', then if, . .. then, think
first about our observations. A baby (younger child) senses her
mommy is here or not here [negation]. Mommy and Daddy [conjunction]. If I reach for
the iron then mommy will get mad [conditional]. Go outside or stay inside [disjunction].
To me, these are natural logical laws, i.e., you don't need
to be a logician, or Quine, to figure the validity or invalidity
of such statements.
Sandra
Tsiatsos
up with anything brilliant in the meantime. I'm kind of running out of
steam on this thread. Not really sure why I felt such a need to get
involved in the first place.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Randall Helzerman" rahe...@ichips.intel.com
>> I guess I agree, except, that it almost seems as if when you change
> > descriptions of utterances you change utterances (each one being true or
> > false), but when you change descriptions of events it is still the same
> > event--an event that is now true and false. Maybe I just don't understand
> > how re-description of sentence tokens is supposed to work. (Or even event
> > re-description for that matter.)
>
> * Well back to my skater example (which is lifted pretty much blatantly from
> one of those popular books about relativity theory which we all read as
> hopeful adolescents).
>
> ** We can take the frame of reference to be the ice, or we can take it to
> be one of the skaters.
>
> ** In one frame of reference, the sentence "the first skater is moving"
> is true, and in the other, the sentence is false.
>
> So how do we know that the same event is being talked about? Because we can
> find invariences which link the descriptions. These invariences are
> sentences which are true in both. For example, we might find that the
> sentence "the distance between the skaters is increasing at 7 miles per
> hour" is true in both. As Davidson says, these invariences are the "facts
> of the matter."
>
It seems that if it comes down to invariences in the descriptions, we are
talking about facts or something like that because an actual utterance would
presumably vary given the criterion for event identity listed earlier in
this thread. (This without knowing how literally 'facts' in Davidson's
"Facts of the matter" is to be taken). Also, at this point, I'd like to
know what the relation is between the sentence, the description and the
utterance. I guess I could spare everyone the trouble if I could make a
positive case for there being some non-event truth bearing aspect to an
utterance (speech event).
alex tsiatsos
Jud Evans
Hi Folks my name is Jud (NW England, ) and I have just joined the list. In
fact my partner and I have just started our own list and it was only when I
was setting it up that I came across this superb group. I am probably going
to regret jumping in quickly like this and not lurking longer, particularly
amongst such obviously talented and intellectual company, but the content of
JL's posting so engages my interest that I can't help it.
I was very interested in Daniel's recognition-based theory of meaning and
JL's thoughtful and pertinent response to the questions raised by
'Compositionality, Meaning, and Recognition, ' about which I am greedy to
know more. Although I am 'getting on a bit now, ' all my life I have
pondered the meaning and function of the 'to be' device. I have come to the
conclusion that it is a pseudo-verb that has been wrongly classified as a
'verb of existence' and that it only has to do with the existence of the
subject of a sentence in the sense that it 'introduces' or 'indicates' the
predicational modality of existence in the cosmos of the subject. Our
conclusions are based (originally developed as a critical response to the
Heideggerian 'Daseinic device, ) on the observation that existential
extantness is instantaneously imbued in a subject by its very utterance and
therefore the unfortunately named 'copula. ' must have some other role. We
have therefore identified that role as a temporal marker and indicator of
the 'manner' of existence of the subject of statement rather than as an
assertion of that existence.
Analytical Indicant Theory, (AIT) analyses statements thus:
(1) Take the sentence: "Mary is sitting on the riverbank. "
Maps as: "Mary, imbued with existence, is in a present mode of existence
which consists of sitting on the riverbank. " Thus:
Maps as: "Mary" extantal imbuant "is" modal indicant "sitting on the
riverbank. " modal informant
Indicant Theory is not at all concerned with the truth or falsity of this
statement. We are only interested in the syntactical logicality and semantic
veracity of the sentential structure.
(2) Take the statement: . "Daniel Jones is the King of France. " Analytical
Indicant Theory, knowing that there is no such thing as the King of France,
is not concerned with the falsity of reportage inherent in this statement,
but is concerned simply with the acceptability of the statement as a true
sentence syntactically. Thus:
"Daniel Jones" extantal imbuant "is" modal indicant "the King of France. . "
modal informant.
Nomenclature: 'Extantal Imbuant. ' The term illustrates the fact of
'existential incorporation' that the 'subject' has as an 'a priori
existence, ' [for extantal imbuant is just our way of saying - "the subject
that already exists, "]
'Modal Indicant. ' Our new description of the 'copula. ' The 'is' word is a
pseudo-verb, which does not impart existence to the Extantal Imbuant,
[subject, ] but is an 'enabler, ' which indicates or allows the modalities
of existence of the Modal Informant to be attributed to the Extantal
Imbuant.
'Modal Informant. ' The 'particular' modality of existence contained in the
extantal imbuant which gives a character, essence, manner etc.
For the Analytical Indicant Theory to be finally accepted it has got to be
shown that the human mind works this way, (with certain understood
variances, ) universally even in remote languages far from civilisation.
Coincidently we also use rather crude symbols in our discussions: was = <
is = ^ will be = being = < is not = v
I would be extremely grateful for any comments from any of the contributors
to this list on the above. I know that 'humble' is an old fashioned word,
but without sounding hypocritical that is the way I feel in such company
here, so please be gentle with me.
Jud.
Randall Helzerman
> would you grant that the conceptualization of getting burned is a human
> invention, one of our beliefs?
Sure. Moreover, it is one which is highly relative/depended/whatever on our
form of life. For example, a race of intelligent Octopi might not have any
conceptualization of getting burned.
Even, say, the conceptualizaion of stones is so relative. A race of
intelligent microbes might not find any use for the term at all.
> Rorty['s] ... causal stance is a rhetorical device to distance himself from the
> representational one.
Rorty's rhetorical device (no denegration is implied here--modus ponens, for
example, is also a rhetorical device) has in my opinion at least two purposes.
The first (and perhaps most important) one is just what you said above;
namely to wean us from a corresponance theory of truth.
The second is to reassure "hard-headed" philosophers and scientists.
Saying things like "there is no view from nowhere" concerns them because
they think that it makes us more susceptible to being mislead, to falling
for a bogus argument like :
1. there is no view from nowhere,
2. therefore, truth is agreement (1) <- bad inference
so lets just get enough of us white boys together and agree that:
3. there is a black race and (2)
4. that it should be enslaved (2,3)
or something like that. Rorty's causal stance is a device to show that
something like that would not be a sound arguement, no matter how we phrase
it :-)
> What do you think?
Actually, I think we're pretty much in agreement about Rorty.....
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
A theory specifies an ontology iff that onology is the *only* model of that
theory. For example, a favorite passtime of logicians around the turn of
the century was to try to create a number theory, or a set of axioms whose
_only_ model was the natural numbers.
But they soon noticed that this wasn't possible--no matter what set of
axioms they proposed, there were many things which obeyed those axioms. For
example, you can take your numbers to be the sets:
{}, {[}}, {{{}}}, {{{{}}}}, . . .
or you can take them to be the sets
{}, {{}}, {{}, {{}}}, {{}, {{}}, {{},{{}}}}, . . .
both satisfy the axioms of number theory.
The Loewenheim-Skolem theorem is just a generalization of this obervation.
Number theory isn't the only one with multiple models--_any_ consistent
theory has multiple models.
> The ontology of the *untranslated* home language is given trivially
> by the satisfaction relation. "London" refers to London, and "rabbits"
> refers to rabbits.
yes, and "5" refers to 5.
But what's five? {{{{{}}}}} or {{}, {{}}, {{}, {{}}}, {{}, {{}}, {{}, {{}}}}}??
Right now, I think I know (kinda) what you're thinking. You're thinking
something like "I'm not trying to translate number theory into set theory.
_Of_course_ there are many posible translations from number theory into set
theory!! Duh! I'm just staying at home--in number theory. As long as I
don't try to go beyond number theory--as long as i just frame sentences
which contain numbers but no sets, then there's just one number 5!! And
**that's** the one I mean when I say 5, durn it!"
Well, that's right. In fact, this is exactly the outlook that Putnam
recommends in his article. But lets be clear what you are doing when you
are "staying at home":
0. By adding a truth predicate to a language you don't get any better
"grip on the world" than you already had with the language. (e.g.,
realizing that "'London' refers to London" tells you nothing more about
London than you already knew. Same goes for "'5' refers to 5")
1. Therefore, by including a truth predicate in the home language, you
are not thereby providing any semantics for your home language. What I
mean by this is that you are not proposing any model for your language.
2. If you are not providing a model for your language (in this example,
number theory) then your talk of numbers is _entirely_ dependent upon
the home language. What numbers are and how they behave is specified by
the home language, only the home language, and nothing but the home
language. In other words, (Bob Marly again), no number theoretic
axioms, no numbers.
3. Therefore, without providing a model for numbers, you can't say that a
sentence like "There would be numbers even if there were no humans
to frame number-theoretic axiom" is true.
Now lets do the same thing for "stone theory" now. As long as I only frame
sentences about stones ("they hurt when I kick them", "some stones are
heavier than others", "The rock of Gibraltar" refers to the rock of
Gibralter", or "I'll die if a stone crushes my skull") we have no problems.
Its when I try to provde a _model_ for stones, to transltate stone-talk into
some sort of "God's own language of nature" talk that I run into trouble.
I do this when I try to frame sentences like "stones would be here even if
there were no humans to speak English". Unless you provide a model for
stone-talk, you can't say that sentence is true!
But of course, when you _do_ try to provide a model for stone talk, the
Loewenheim-Skolem theorem says that you go vague, just as you go vague for
number theory. What are these numbers? What are these stones? I'm with
you--who gives a rip? Lets just stay at home.
-Randy
Daniel Language
> first about our observations. A baby (younger child)
> senses her
> mommy is here or not here [negation]. Mommy and
> Daddy [conjunction]. If I reach for
> the iron then mommy will get mad [conditional]. Go
> outside or stay inside [disjunction].
> To me, these are natural logical laws, i.e., you
> don't need
> to be a logician, or Quine, to figure the validity
> or invalidity
> of such statements.
>
I think it may be important to distinguish between the
concept of mind and the concept of a logical language.
Mixing the two together simply creates confusion.
best,
d
>
>
>
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.
http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Daniel Language
> I'm sure you realize that the above aren't
> definitions,
> because they are circular.
Not necessarily
-the
> logical constants are adverbs.
Again, how can logical constants be adverbs? For
example "is" or "or" indicate a certain logical
structure and as such they do not serve as referrents
to any other word.
>
> But what about other adverbs? You can use the
> adverb "definitely" anywhere you
> can use the logical constant not:
>
> Cindy Crawford is <not> beautiful.
> Cindy Crawford is <definitely>
> beautiful.
It seems that you are confusing the roles that logical
constants play. Adverbs and logical constants do not
perform the same function, in fact, they are entirely
different in function.
>
> Is "definitely" a logical constant? What about
> "although" or "apparently",
> or "very?"
>
I would say that logical constants are "is", "or",
"of", "and", "for", "not", etc. They are not adverbs,
those serve a different function.
How can
> we be sure that the
> logical laws are eternally true if there is so much
> disagreement about them?
Well I would say that the logical constants are
neither true nor false. There is a difference between
logical truth and conceptual truth. One is purely
analytic and the other is synthetic and the subject of
science. It is obvious that the logical structure of
language is what against we define logical truth. And
what disagreement are you referring to?
> For example, the following syllogism is valid in
> Aristotelian logic:
>
> All humans are mortal
> ---------------------
> therefore, some humans are mortal
>
---That so-called
> content-free "logical law" turned out to be
> dependent upon an empirical fact
> (the existance of human beings) after all.
It is equally obvious that the logical truth of that
statement has not changed, and obviously there must be
a human being to state its logical truth. Logical
truth can not be independent of human language, that
is where it exists. And it is also interesting that
"empirical fact" is as much a feature of the logical
language as anything else.
>
> Ok, consider two sentences. The first sentence, is
> true:
>
> P = "Randy lives in Oregon"
>
> The second sentence may or may not be true. It is:
>
> Q = "Rodrigo has 3 cousins"
>
Again i think we are here confusing logical truth with
conceptual truth. Both are logically and analytically
true but both may or may not be conceptually true
depending upon the structure of certain events in the
world.
>
> Now apply the same thing to the a logical law. Take
> the logical law
> (A and B => A). We can do the same trick for this
> as the above.
>
> "Randy lives in Oregon, therefore (A and B
> => A)"
> "Rodrigo has three cousins, therefore (A and B
> => A)"
> "Frege was the prophet of God, therefore (A and B
> => A)"
> "Daniel Language _is_ God, therefore (A and B
> => A)"
>
> Those sentences are all true.
We don't need analysis to tell us that these are all
logical truths. They may or may not be true synthetic
facts.
>
> > It is not convention that makes sentences logical
> truths, is it?
>
> What do you mean by "makes true"? If by "makes
> true" you mean
> "logically implies", then, as the above proof shows,
> _anything_ at all
> makes the logical truths true.
"anything at all"? i disagree, it does appear that it
these are logical truths because of the logical
structure of language.
>
best,
d
>
>
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.
http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Daniel Language
Thank you for your interesting post. I think that we
are working near along the same lines. I would have a
different systematic map of "is" although I very much
agree that we can separate logical truth from
conceptual truth. One belongs to the philosophy of
mind, the other to the philosophy of
(logical)language.
I would like to hear more.
best,
d
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.
http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Rodrigo Vanegas
>If you are saying that the following arguments _is_ sound:
>
> Dummet is catholic
> -------------------
> therefore, he is more likely to advocate
> ideas consistent with catholocism
>
>and that the following argument _is_not_ sound:
>
> Dummet is catholic
> -------------------
> therefore, his views on Bivalence are wrong
>
>then I agree.
I agree that the first is sound and the second unsound.
>If you are saying something like:
>
> Einstein believed in a God that didn't throw dice
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Einstein didn't achieve as much scientifically as he could have
>
>then I'm not so sure.
Is this a fair question? I mean, who am I to suggest that Einstein could
have achieved more? And yet, it is a recurring theme in his biographical
accounts, that the last years of his life were wasted in his possibly
misguided opposition to quantum mechanics. I can only guess that if he had
been engaged more with the physics than with the metaphysics, he might have
been an even greater giant than he already is.
>First of all, arguments of that form involve
>counter-factual conditionals, and I still haven't fully digested them yet.
That's a rather timid objection, isn't it? It doesn't take a philosopher
of language to digest the counterfactual consequences of having won the
lottery.
>Second, the biases inputed by religion can serve as useful
>heuristics as well; for exmaple, biggest motivation for Kepler's rejection
>of Ptolemy was what could best be described as sun worship.
I didn't say religion was good or bad. I said it was relevant, where you
said it should be ignored.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Rodrigo Vanegas
> > What does it mean to specify an ontology, exactly?
>
>A theory specifies an ontology iff that onology is the *only* model of that
>theory.
Oh, well, that's not what I had in mind. I have two parents. Is it the
case that I specify a parent iff that parent is the only parent I have?
>Right now, I think I know (kinda) what you're thinking. You're thinking
>something like "I'm not trying to translate number theory into set theory.
>_Of_course_ there are many posible translations from number theory into set
>theory!! Duh! I'm just staying at home--in number theory. As long as I
>don't try to go beyond number theory--as long as i just frame sentences
>which contain numbers but no sets, then there's just one number 5!! And
>**that's** the one I mean when I say 5, durn it!"
Yes, that's along the lines I'm thinking.
>Well, that's right. In fact, this is exactly the outlook that Putnam
>recommends in his article.
Who is he recommending this to? Does he think his recommendation
contradicts the ontological relativity thesis?
>But lets be clear what you are doing when you
>are "staying at home":
>
>0. By adding a truth predicate to a language you don't get any better
> "grip on the world" than you already had with the language. (e.g.,
> realizing that "'London' refers to London" tells you nothing more about
> London than you already knew. Same goes for "'5' refers to 5")
Fine by me. I don't think my "grip on the world", whatever that is, would
be improved with a model-theoretic interpretation.
>1. Therefore, by including a truth predicate in the home language, you
> are not thereby providing any semantics for your home language. What I
> mean by this is that you are not proposing any model for your language.
Not so. There is room for an extensional truth-conditional semantics
derived from the identity translation/interpretation truth theory. You
don't need model theory.
>2. If you are not providing a model for your language (in this example,
> number theory) then your talk of numbers is _entirely_ dependent upon
> the home language. What numbers are and how they behave is specified by
> the home language, only the home language, and nothing but the home
> language. In other words, (Bob Marly again), no number theoretic
> axioms, no numbers.
I don't think so. It is only my "talk of numbers" that depends on the home
language. The numbers are on their own.
>3. Therefore, without providing a model for numbers, you can't say that a
> sentence like "There would be numbers even if there were no humans
> to frame number-theoretic axiom" is true.
Not true, because though the home language would not exist, the home
language does exist. See message #114.
>Now let's do the same thing for "stone theory" now. As long as I only frame
>sentences about stones ("they hurt when I kick them", "some stones are
>heavier than others", "The rock of Gibraltar" refers to the rock of
>Gibralter", or "I'll die if a stone crushes my skull") we have no problems.
>
>Its when I try to provde a _model_ for stones, to transltate stone-talk into
>some sort of "God's own language of nature" talk that I run into trouble.
>I do this when I try to frame sentences like "stones would be here even if
>there were no humans to speak English". Unless you provide a model for
>stone-talk, you can't say that sentence is true!
Not so, see message #114. You don't need any gods, with or without their
languages, to talk about what might have been, no matter what might have been.
>But of course, when you _do_ try to provide a model for stone talk, the
>Loewenheim-Skolem theorem says that you go vague, just as you go vague for
>number theory. What are these numbers? What are these stones? I'm with
>you--who gives a rip? Lets just stay at home.
Like me, you are content to stay home, but unlike me, you think important
truths are still found only out of doors. If you can agree that our
pursuit of truth should be just our pursuit of true sentences in our home
language, then why shouldn't our pursuit of ontological truth be just the
pursuit of true sentences in our home language about ontology? Yes, in the
home language! Ontological truth just answers the question, what is there?
It isn't also required to answer, what is the unique description of what
there is?
Randall Helzerman
>
> Again, how can logical constants be adverbs?
Do you think that "not" is a logical constant? Well, "not" is an adverb.
I was talking about adverbs because I was talking about putative 1-place
logical constants, which would be adverbs.
Two-place logical constants, like conjunction ("and") are, of course,
conjunctions, not adverbs.
The _first_ point is that just because something is an adverb or a conjunction
does not mean that it is a logical constant. "although" is a conjunction,
abut nobody thinks its a logical constant. "Possibly" is an adverb, and can
be used in plase of "not" in any sentence, but nobody thinks its a logical
constant.
The _second_ point is that it is not at all easy to specify exactly what
_is_ a logical constant. And those people who know _most_ about logic today
are the ones which are _least_ certain what exactly logical constants are.
That's the difference between inquiry and dogma.
> For example "is" or "or" indicate a certain logical structure and as such
> they do not serve as referrents to any other word.
"Because" also serves to structure sentences. So does "quicker than".
Are they logical constants?
> It is obvious that the logical structure of language is what against we
> define logical truth.
Saying that something is "obvoius" is not a valid method of proving that it
is true; e.g. nothing could possibly be more "obvious" than that the sun goes
around the earth.
> There is a difference between logical truth and conceptual truth. One is
> purely analytic and the other is synthetic and the subject of science.
*sigh* You believe this because you read it in some book. This outlook has
been totally discredited for over half a century now.
Its as outdated today as the idea that the sun goes around the earth was
half a century after Johannes Kepler. No doubt for centuries people will
still believe this, just as centuries after Copernicus (or millenia after
Aristarchus, for that matter) people believed the earth was the center of
the universe.
It may give you comfort to think that you possess some special knowledge --
that you've grabbed onto something really firm: eternal, analytic TRUTH! As
long as you are only seeking comfort and self-reassurance, fine. But this
is not inquiry.
Nor is it a safe refuge. Kant thought that Euclidean geometry was an
eternal, analytic TRUTH. Now nobody thinks that. But that was just the
first analytic TRUTH to die. Frege, Russell, and Carnap all thought that
set theory was analytically true "purely by the laws of logic." Today
nobody believes that. One by one, the analytic TRUTHs will fall, just as
one by one people stopped believing in Marduk, Baal, and Zeus. We may
construct an idol of the most solid stone, but given enough time it will
crumble.
You've got to rid yourself of this dogma, Daniel, or you will be,
metaphorically speaking, doomed to be praying to a dead god, doomed to be
continually adding epicycle after epicycle to a bankrupt cosmology. I and
others on this list will be perfectly happy to help you in your inquiry, but
just parroting phrases you've read in a book ("one kind of truth is purely
analytic and the other is synthetic and the subject of science") is not
inquiry. Its a prayer, just like saying a Hail Mary isn't inquiry, but a
prayer.
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
> case that I specify a parent iff that parent is the only parent I have?
Didn't quite understand the question; could you rephrase?
> Yes, that's along the lines I'm thinking.
Cool! We've talked about similar things in other mail, but agreement
between us was blocked by a confusion on my part as to what you were saying.
> >Well, that's right. In fact, this is exactly the outlook that Putnam
> >recommends in his article.
>
> Who is he recommending this to?
Hmm...to those who are bothered by the indeterminacy of reference, I suppose.
> Does he think his recommendation
> contradicts the ontological relativity thesis?
No. Our ontology is unambiguous if we "stay at home", but it is nevetheless
still relative to the home language.
Now lets see if I understand the _rest_ of your position.....here goes.
> >1. Therefore, by including a truth predicate in the home language, you
> > are not thereby providing any semantics for your home language. What I
> > mean by this is that you are not proposing any model for your language.
>
> Not so. There is room for an extensional truth-conditional semantics
> derived from the identity translation/interpretation truth theory. You
> don't need model theory.
Ok, what I _think_ you mean here is something like the following. Suppose I
have some basic theory. Lets choose a subset of number theory to make it
easier. Say it has two axioms:
number(0). % zero is a number.
number(s(X)) :- number(X). % the sucessor to a number is
% also a number.
(let me appologize to you, a lisp hacker, for the notation. I'm an old
prolog hacker, so I like to use prolog notaion. Capitolized identifiers are
universally quantified variables, and ":-" is material implication "<=".)
Now, when you propose to "stay at home" what you are saying is that we don't
need to translate to set theory in order to provide a model for this
language. Just using Tarski's truth theory should do the trick. This
theory of truth would have the following sentences as theorems:
"0" refers to 0 i.e. "zero" refers to zero
"s(0)" refers to s(0) i.e. "one" refers to one
"s(s(0))" refers to s(s(0)) i.e. "two" referes to two
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
etc. And these guys on the right-hand side of the "refers to" relation can
serve perfectly well as our numbers. These are our ontology. These are the
model for our axioms.
Are we still in sync?
If so good...but notice this very important point. We have indeed provided
objects to refer to, but these objects are _entirely_dependent_ on the home
language for their existence. We can demonstrate this by changing the home
language. If we remove the axiom:
number(0). % zero is a number.
from our home language, then the sentence:
"0" refers to 0
which provides the object for "0" to refer to, would not be a theorem of the
truth theory for our home language. In other words, by deleting an axiom
about zero, we've deleted zero itself from the universe!
You might say, "I can't cause 0 to disappear just by not talking about
it!" Well, by the same token, merely saying "zero is a number" and "'zero'
refers to zero" no more imbues zero with eternal, human-independent reality
than giving a truth theory to the axiom "Phil is a unicorn" imbues Phil with
eternal, human-independent reality.
In short, "staying at home" means just that--staying at home. It means that
the ontology derived from the truth theory for the home language is
dependent upon--what else?--the home language.
If you want a vantage-point from which to say that the number zero exists
independently of the home language, what Quine tells us is that the only
candidate is that of a foreign language. If you want to stand back and view
the subject from a distance, a foreign language is as far away from the home
language as you can get.
Hence the hopes of early number theorists to provide a model for number
theory by translating it into set theory. Of course, the truths of set
theory are no less immanent than the truths of number theory, so the further
hope was to translate set theory into the "eternal analytic truths" of
logic. But of course, that failed, leaving us right back where we
started--at home.
-Randy
Daniel Language
Please refer to the last post I wrote, in there I
agree that "not" is an adverb and only "is" is a
logical constant. However, i resent your patronizing
attitude and i did not "just read it in a book". I am
fully aware of Quine's ad-hoc attack at the
analytic/synthetic distinction although Quine never
proved anything and there are in fact a great deal of
philosophers who still think otherwise. I have been
spending a great deal of time on the
analytic/synthetic distinction and I do believe that
it can be salvaged. I would say that Kant's definition
was not invalid but merely inconclusive and too broad.
The problem with the distinction is really finding the
crux of analyticity, systematically defining it, as it
were. Therefore, it rather seems that "You believe
this because you read it in some book." There is a
very clear distinction between science and
analyticity. One is concerned with constructing facts
and the other with the logical structure of facts. One
is conceptual truth, the other logical truth. And i
did not join this board to provide a proof of it, for
that you will have to wait till i complete my work.
best,
d
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.
http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Rodrigo Vanegas
> > Oh, well, that's not what I had in mind. I have two parents. Is it the
> > case that I specify a parent iff that parent is the only parent I have?
>
>Didn't quite understand the question; could you rephrase?
You seemed to be saying that to specify something (a parent, an ontology),
it has to be unique. I was just explaining why uniqueness is not
something I see as relevant to specification.
> > Yes, that's along the lines I'm thinking.
>
>Cool! We've talked about similar things in other mail, but agreement
>between us was blocked by a confusion on my part as to what you were saying.
Confusion is usually the fault of the speaker, so I appreciate your help. :-)
> > Does he think his recommendation
> > contradicts the ontological relativity thesis?
>
>No. Our ontology is unambiguous if we "stay at home", but it is nevetheless
>still relative to the home language.
Relative to the manual of translation, not to the home language. And,
absent a translation, there is no manual, hence no relativity. See #126.
>Now lets see if I understand the _rest_ of your position.....here goes.
>
> > >1. Therefore, by including a truth predicate in the home language, you
> > > are not thereby providing any semantics for your home
> language. What I
> > > mean by this is that you are not proposing any model for your
> language.
> >
> > Not so. There is room for an extensional truth-conditional semantics
> > derived from the identity translation/interpretation truth theory. You
> > don't need model theory.
>
>Ok, what I _think_ you mean here is something like the following. Suppose I
>have some basic theory. Lets choose a subset of number theory to make it
>easier. Say it has two axioms:
>
> number(0). % zero is a number.
>
> number(s(X)) :- number(X). % the sucessor to a number is
> % also a number.
>
>(let me appologize to you, a lisp hacker, for the notation. I'm an old
>prolog hacker, so I like to use prolog notaion. Capitolized identifiers are
>universally quantified variables, and ":-" is material implication "<=".)
>
>Now, when you propose to "stay at home" what you are saying is that we don't
>need to translate to set theory in order to provide a model for this
>language. Just using Tarski's truth theory should do the trick. This
>theory of truth would have the following sentences as theorems:
>
> "0" refers to 0 i.e. "zero" refers to zero
> "s(0)" refers to s(0) i.e. "one" refers to one
> "s(s(0))" refers to s(s(0)) i.e. "two" referes to two
> . . . .
> . . . .
> . . . .
>
>
>etc. And these guys on the right-hand side of the "refers to" relation can
>serve perfectly well as our numbers. These are our ontology. These are the
>model for our axioms.
>
>Are we still in sync?
Almost. First, it isn't the guys on the right-hand side that are our
numbers. It is what the guys on the right-hand side refer to that are our
numbers. Remember that, in your post, the left-hand side is doubly quoted
and the right-hand side is singly quoted. There are no numbers on the
page. Second, the numbers aren't our ontology. Ontology is inquiry into
ontological truth, and truths are true sentences. So our ontology wouldn't
be one, two, three, and so on. It would be "number(0)", "number(s(0))",
"number(s(s(0))", and so on. These would be our true ontological
claims. Third, model-theory doesn't enter into it, so I don't think they
are our model.
>If so good...but notice this very important point. We have indeed provided
>objects to refer to, but these objects are _entirely_dependent_ on the home
>language for their existence. We can demonstrate this by changing the home
>language. If we remove the axiom:
>
> number(0). % zero is a number.
>
>from our home language, then the sentence:
>
> "0" refers to 0
>
>which provides the object for "0" to refer to, would not be a theorem of the
>truth theory for our home language. In other words, by deleting an axiom
>about zero, we've deleted zero itself from the universe!
We've only deleted our ability to talk about zero. Not the same thing.
>You might say, "I can't cause 0 to disappear just by not talking about
>it!" Well, by the same token, merely saying "zero is a number" and "'zero'
>refers to zero" no more imbues zero with eternal, human-independent reality
>than giving a truth theory to the axiom "Phil is a unicorn" imbues Phil with
>eternal, human-independent reality.
You're right. The eternal, human-independent reality has nothing to do
with us anyway. Having nothing to do with us, is what "human-independent"
means. Zero needs no imbution. And Phil? Well, Phil does not exist.
>In short, "staying at home" means just that--staying at home. It means that
>the ontology derived from the truth theory for the home language is
>dependent upon--what else?--the home language.
The ontology is dependent on the home language, yes. But ontological truth
is just true sentences, so this comes as no surprise.
>If you want a vantage-point from which to say that the number zero exists
>independently of the home language, what Quine tells us is that the only
>candidate is that of a foreign language. If you want to stand back and view
>the subject from a distance, a foreign language is as far away from the home
>language as you can get.
You're confusing zero with "zero". Zero is not part of the home language,
so speaking a foreign language won't distance you from it. On the other
hand, "zero" *is* part of the home language, at least in Boston. Start
saying "zed" and you may be rid of "zero", but zero will answer still.
>Hence the hopes of early number theorists to provide a model for number
>theory by translating it into set theory. Of course, the truths of set
>theory are no less immanent than the truths of number theory, so the further
>hope was to translate set theory into the "eternal analytic truths" of
>logic. But of course, that failed, leaving us right back where we
>started--at home.
That's why I am fond of, but not a fan of, set theory.
rahe...@ichips.intel.com
rest of the way before continuing w/Rorty, et. al. That will save us
a lot of time later.
> Remember that, in your post, the left-hand side is doubly
> quoted and the right-hand side is singly quoted.
No, in a sentence like
"0" refers to 0
the left hand side is quoted, and the right and side is unquoted.
> There are no numbers on the page.
Of course not--there is only mention on the left side and use on the
right. But I don't have to put numbers on the page any more than I
have to put apples on the page if we were talking about apples.
That is how a Tarskian theory of truth specifies the extension of
the "refers to" relation, i.e. that's how it specifies what terms
refer to what objects. On the left hand side we have a (sign which
represents a) term, and on the right hand side we have a (sign which
represent an) object. Given that I have to write out the theory
by using signs, how else could it work?
Therefore, the sentences of the form:
Term refers to Object
(where "Term" and "Object" are schematic placeholders here) which are
theorems of the truth theory enumerate the objects which can be
refered to--which is another way of saying that they enumerate the
ontology of the home language.
> Ontology is inquiry into ontological truth, and truths are true
> sentences. So our ontology wouldn't be one, two, three, and so
> on. It would be "number(0)", "number(s(0))", "number(s(s(0))",
> and so on. These would be our true ontological
> claims.
Not sure why you prefer the true sentences
number(0).
number(s(0)).
etc. to the true sentences
"0" refers to 0.
"s(0)" refers to s(0)
etc. as the our "true ontological claims", but even so, the previous
point still stands. If you delete the axiom:
number(0).
from your home language, then the "true ontological claim"
number(0).
is also (trivially, in this case) deleted from your home language.
Since this is your home language, you are no longer claiming 0 to
exist.
Have you wiped out the number zero itself? Well, if you "stay at
home" what else could you be doing? You have "eliminated the
ontological claim for zero" which is just a high-falutin' way of
saying that zero no longer exists. By changing the home language,
you're changing the "furniture of the universe" -- as the above
considerations of a Tarski truth theory for the home language show.
> We've only deleted our ability to talk about zero. Not the same
> thing.
If you "stay at home" it _is_ the same thing. To explain why I will,
with your forbearance, venture a bit aways from home now-but only to
make a point about the home language. Say there are two
possible languages which can explain a body of observation
sentences.
In fact, with respect to the physical world, we apparently are so
blessed. Democritus was the first to sing this jingle when he said
that "in reality" there are no rocks, or trees, or snow, but rather
there is "nothing but atoms and the void."
Lets call our normal talk of rocks & snow "folk physics" to
distinguish it from the more austere "real physics" of atoms and the
void. Notice there's no talk of translation here--you can't
possibly translate a sentence about a stone into a sentence about
a fuzzy probabilistic cloud of real and virtual particles without
totally changing the subject.
We have to take Democritus at face value when he tells us that in
real physics there is no snow, just atoms and void. Why? Because he
only quantifies over atoms and numbers (which represent positions in
the void).
I _think_ your point is that if you "stay at home" in folk physics,
you can say that the sentence
"There would be snow even if there were no humans to talk
about it"
is true in the home language. Well, it _is_ true in the home
language. But that truth is no less immanent--no less dependent
upon--the home language than any other truth about snow which is
phrased in the home language. In "real physics" that
sentence is _not_true_ because in real physics, thats not a
sentence! In real physics, Democritus teaches us, there's neither
humans nor snow. Just atoms and void.
This all is of course unproblematic to the point of being
obvious--but it is really all that Rorty is saying when
he says things like "language penetrates so deeply into the world
that it is impossible to seperate language from the world."
When he says things like "We create stones by talking about them"
all he is saying is that it is more convenient to use folk physics
than real physics in day-to-day life.
He sounds more radical than he is because he is trying to form
bridges between the vocabularies of analytic philosophy, American
pragmatism, and European idealism. So whatever he says scandelizes
everybody :-)
-Randy
Rodrigo Vanegas
>Rodrigo writes that we're almost in sync. Well, lets sync up the
>rest of the way before continuing w/Rorty, et. al. That will save us
>a lot of time later.
Sounds good to me. In fact, it might be better to do a slow reading of
Rorty's _Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth_ first.
> > Remember that, in your post, the left-hand side is doubly
> > quoted and the right-hand side is singly quoted.
>
>No, in a sentence like
>
> "0" refers to 0
>
>the left hand side is quoted, and the right and side is unquoted.
Yes, "in a sentence", the left hand side is quoted singly, but I wrote that
it is "in your post" that the left hand side is quoted doubly. Don't
forget the blockquote.
> > There are no numbers on the page.
>
>Of course not--there is only mention on the left side and use on the
>right. But I don't have to put numbers on the page any more than I
>have to put apples on the page if we were talking about apples.
Naturally, but consider the context of what I wrote.
You asked:
>>And these guys on the right-hand side of the "refers to" relation can
>>serve perfectly well as our numbers. These are our ontology. These are
>>the model for our axioms.
>>
>>Are we still in sync?
And I replied:
>Almost. First, it isn't the guys on the right-hand side that are our
>numbers. It is what the guys on the right-hand side refer to that are our
>numbers. Remember that, in your post, the left-hand side is doubly quoted
>and the right-hand side is singly quoted. There are no numbers on the
>page. Second, the numbers aren't our ontology. Ontology is inquiry into
>ontological truth, and truths are true sentences. So our ontology wouldn't
>be one, two, three, and so on. It would be "number(0)", "number(s(0))",
>"number(s(s(0))", and so on. These would be our true ontological claims.
>Third, model-theory doesn't enter into it, so I don't think they are our
>model.
You wrote that the right hand sides are the numbers. Maybe I'm being too
picky, but since I think it is a use-mention confusion that is at the heart
of the problem, I'm hoping to find the catch by being anal for a
while. But please do not think I am just looking for faults. If we really
do agree, you will see that I gave you a way to say what you wanted. Don't
speak of the numbers on the right hand side of the reference
relations. Instead, speak of the numbers referred to by the right hand
side of the reference relations.
> > Ontology is inquiry into ontological truth, and truths are true
> > sentences. So our ontology wouldn't be one, two, three, and so
> > on. It would be "number(0)", "number(s(0))", "number(s(s(0))",
> > and so on. These would be our true ontological
> > claims.
>
>Not sure why you prefer the true sentences
>
> number(0).
> number(s(0)).
>
>etc. to the true sentences
>
> "0" refers to 0.
> "s(0)" refers to s(0)
>
>etc. as the our "true ontological claims",
What is an ontological claim? It is a claim about what there
is. "number(0)" says "there is the number zero". Actually, it says "zero
is a number", so all we really need is "(Ex)(x=0)" which follows from
"number(0)". So, amending my earlier claim. The ontology would be
"(Ex)(x=0)", "(Ex)(x=s(0))", "(Ex)(x=s(s(0)))", and so on. Or maybe it
would be better to say "(Ex)(x=s(0)) and (Ex)(x=s(0)) and (Ex)(x=s(s(0)))
and ...". Since I feel more comfortable with infinite sets of sentences
than I do with infinite conjunctions, it would be better to say "(Ex)(x=0
and number(x)) and (x)(Ey)(if number(x) then y=s(x) and number(y))". Feels
like we've gone full circle, doesn't it? Well, it's no accident. An
ontological theory, a theory about what there is, is just another theory,
and the original axioms are our most basic theory about numbers.
>but even so, the previous
>point still stands. If you delete the axiom:
>
> number(0).
>
>from your home language, then the "true ontological claim"
>
> number(0).
>
>is also (trivially, in this case) deleted from your home language.
>Since this is your home language, you are no longer claiming 0 to
>exist.
Right.
>Have you wiped out the number zero itself? Well, if you "stay at
>home" what else could you be doing? You have "eliminated the
>ontological claim for zero" which is just a high-falutin' way of
>saying that zero no longer exists.
It is?
>By changing the home language,
>you're changing the "furniture of the universe" -- as the above
>considerations of a Tarski truth theory for the home language show.
Do they? The only corner of the universe you'd be changing, as I see it,
is your home.
>We have to take Democritus at face value when he tells us that in
>real physics there is no snow, just atoms and void. Why? Because he
>only quantifies over atoms and numbers (which represent positions in
>the void).
>
>I _think_ your point is that if you "stay at home" in folk physics,
>you can say that the sentence
>
> "There would be snow even if there were no humans to talk
> about it"
>
>is true in the home language. Well, it _is_ true in the home
>language. But that truth is no less immanent--no less dependent
>upon--the home language than any other truth about snow which is
>phrased in the home language. In "real physics" that
>sentence is _not_true_ because in real physics, thats not a
>sentence!
If it's not a sentence "in real physics", then in what sense is it not true
"in real physics"? I mean, it's not even there to be true, false. Not
even a sentence. You may as well be saying that "snow is white" is not
true in French.
>In real physics, Democritus teaches us, there's neither
>humans nor snow. Just atoms and void.
Maybe Democritus was wrong? Humans and snow are collections of atoms,
after all. And what about Pythogoras? Doesn't he get a say? There are
not only atoms and void. There are also numbers. How could you do
physics, ancient or modern, without numbers?
>This all is of course unproblematic to the point of being
>obvious--but it is really all that Rorty is saying when
>he says things like "language penetrates so deeply into the world
>that it is impossible to seperate language from the world."
I don't think language permeates the world. I don't think it gets very far
from human environs, for that matter, telecommunications notwithstanding.
>When he says things like "We create stones by talking about them"
>all he is saying is that it is more convenient to use folk physics
>than real physics in day-to-day life.
An odd way of putting it. Anyway, in case there is any affection for the
literal meaning of that sentence, I disagree with it too. I have never
created a stone, much less created one by talking about it. If his only
point is that folk physics is more convenient, then why encrypt it into an
obscure metaphor? We both know that his claims are genuinely more
substantial than some silly truism.
>He sounds more radical than he is because he is trying to form
>bridges between the vocabularies of analytic philosophy, American
>pragmatism, and European idealism. So whatever he says scandelizes
>everybody :-)
If it were up to me, it would be Rorty instead of Clinton at those Senate
hearings. :-)
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Randall Helzerman
> Rorty's _Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth_ first.
Hmmmnnn...that's probably a good idea. Do you want to lead it, or do you
want me to lead it?
> You wrote that the right hand sides are the numbers.
You're right; that was careless. Instead I should have:
> Don't speak of the numbers on the right hand side of the reference
> relations. Instead, speak of the numbers referred to by the right hand
> side of the reference relations.
Back in sync? At least about Tarski's truth theory?
> I'm hoping to find the catch by being anal for a while.
Thanks for putting the "anal" back in "analytic". Details matter.
> Since I feel more comfortable with infinite sets of sentences
> than I do with infinite conjunctions,
We certainly are in sync here...
> An ontological theory, a theory about what there is, is just another
> theory, and the original axioms are our most basic theory about numbers.
Agreed. But arn't you just saying that the axioms of our home language
determine what there is?
If so, why would it be controversial at all to say:
1. What there is depends upon the home language
and therefore
2. If we change the home language, we change what there is?
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
> However, i resent your patronizing attitude
Daniel, I appologize if I hurt your feelings. I hope there's room for
disagreement between us without resentment.
> and i did not "just read it in a book".
Well, try and understand how I came to be of that opinion. Let me
"deconstruct" your following paragraph:
> I am fully aware of Quine's ad-hoc attack at the
> analytic/synthetic distinction
This sounds more like name-calling than arguement. There's two problems
with it:
1. Before you are entitled to call his arguments ad hoc, you must give us
some reasons why you think they are ad hoc.
2. Even if they are ad hoc, so what? It is "logically possible" that
his reaons are ad hoc, but that nevertheless he's still right!
> there are in fact a great deal of
> philosophers who still think otherwise.
The argument form:
Lots of people still believe in X
--------------------------------
therefore, X is true
is not sound! Why do they believe that? What are their reasons? Are they
good ones? What about all the people who _don't_ believe in X? What are
their reasons? Why are they wrong and the believers right?
> Quine never proved anything
Before you are entitled to say that, you need to show that Quine's arguments
arn't sound. You need to create a long list, each entry in the list being an
argument by Quine against the analytic/synthetic distinction. And for each
entry in that list, you need to provide a counter-argument to show that's
not true. I'll illustrate, using one of my own arguments against the
analytic/synthetic distinction, just to give you an example:
Argument #1:
Randy says that there's no such thing as analytic truth because
most of the so-called "analytic truths" have turned out to be
"synthetic" after all. Eucliean geometry, set theory, etc.
Daniel's (putative) response: This is an argument from induction.
It is of the following form:
Euclidean geometry was thought to be analytic, but wasn't.
Set theory was thought to be analytic, but wasn't.
---------------------------------------------------------
therefore, anything which is now believed to be analytic, isn't.
Just because in the past we've been able to show some truths
not to be analytic doesn't necessarily mean that we will eventually be
able to show that _all_ truths are not analytic. Randy, can you tell us
more about why you think this is a sound argument from induction?
Arguments from induction usually take more than just two instances to be
confirmed--you've given us only two instances: Euclidean geometry and
set theory. If you can give us, say, 100 instances of discredited
analytic truths, I might start to believe you, but as of now, your
argument is a little weak.
etc. etc. You need to go through all of Quine's reasons for rejecting the
analytic/synthetic divide, and make sure you fully understand them. What
argument form is Quine using? Is it an argument by induction, as I was
using above? An arguement from analogy? A logical deduction? And then you
must construct counter-arguments for them. How do you disprove an argument
by induction? How do you discredit an arguement from analogy? If it is a
logical deduction, what are his axioms? What are the steps of the
arguement? Does the conclusion follow from the axioms? If so, do the
axioms make sense?
Of course, perhaps I'm being patronizing here--if you've already done all
this, please post your counter-arguments, and we'll be happy to double-check
them for you. Perhaps we'll even be convinced and enlightened by the power
of your reasoning. But if you _havent_ done this, please don't say things
like "Quine never proved a thing." You're not entitled to say that yet.
Another good example for you to follow is Speranza: Right now, you're
grappling with what the logical constants are. Well, before you start
proposing theories, you should check to see what others have already said
about this.
Fortunately, our Obscure Historicist (Speranza) has already done much of the
heavy-lifting for you in his post. A good place for you to start would be to
go through Speranza's list, read all of the sources which he refers to, and
do the same sort of enumeration of argument and counter-argument. What did
Lord Russell say the logical constants were? What were his arguments for
including "e" (set membership)? Why don't we consider "e" to be a logical
constant today? Were his reasons good reasons or were they bad reasons?
What about Quine? Why does Quine consider "=" (identity) to be a logical
constant? Is it a good reason? If you disagree, _why_ do you disagree--why
is your reason better than Russell's or Quine's?
You might say that this is a lot of reading to do and a lot of work. Well,
nobody said philosophy was easy! Consider the example of our most honerable
moderator, Rodrigo. He and I have a disagreement about the relationship
between the world and language. But, before we started to discuss this on
analytic, he asked me for a reading list--and he sat down and read every
article which Davidson and Rorty wrote about the subject for the last ten
years!! Was that a lot of work--yes, but the result speak for
themselves--we're having an excellent discussion on the topic.
-Randy
Daniel Language
. I
> hope there's room for
> disagreement between us without resentment.
ofcourse, this is after all a discussion. But never
mind that, let's move on.
> 1. Before you are entitled to call his arguments ad
> hoc, you must give us
> some reasons why you think they are ad hoc.
agreed. but like i said i wasn't out to prove the
distinction here on the board, that isn't why i joined
but i would like to make some general comments about
why his argument was only ad-hoc.
let's start with your examples.
Eucliean geometry, set
> theory, etc.
I agree that these are not analytic and i suppose that
it is my slightly different take on the analytic that
has caused the confusion here.
Now to briefly review Quine's "two dogmas" let's look
at the crux of his arguments. Firstly he was attacking
the notion of analyticity that Kant proposed and as it
was only a notion at the time and not a clear cut
systematic distinction then all he needed to do was
show the unclarity of the notion in order to succeed
in his attack. That is why i think his argument was
ad-hoc. In any case, his attack rested on what i take
to be a weak definition of the distinction, as
follows:
1. Analytic truths are true by virtue of meaning and
independently of matters of fact.
2. Synthetic truths are true by virtue of fact.
Now seeing how ambiguous these definitions are, it is
no suprise that someone like Quine who had radical
views on the indeterminancy of meaning could simply
show these ambiguous definitions to be mere cloudy
notions. His main lines of attack took two main forms.
First he attacked the notion of meaning (which was
also just as unclear), then the notion of synonomy
(which was also unclear) and thereby seemed to debase
any recourse to the already ambiguous distinction.
I would say much of the ambiguity of the distinction
is that it has been defined too broadly and I would
say that Kant's account of analyticity was not
entirely off-base but merely inconclusive. He didn't
seem to appreciate the crux of it, possibily because
he didn't have the logical tools to take it to the
strict systematic intelligibility that it deserves.
In any case, I believe that Wittgenstein, in the
tractatus, was near to discovering the crux of the
matter of analyticity and it is truly bizzare how he
didn't connect his work with analyticity and then
resorted to his later "language is a game" and
"meaning is in the use" type of dogma. It still
perplexes me. Now I know that I have not satisfied
your call for a clear-cut argument, however it wasn't
my intention to review Quine's arguments here nor to
prove the distinction. I propose we just agree to
disagree on the matter.
All I would like to say is that it is clear that in
attacking an ambiguous notion, all one need do is
debase the premises by showing forth the ambiguity of
the notion in order to be successful.
For example, I do not think the following are analytic
truths:
1.No bachelor is married.
2.Gold is a yellow metal.
3. 2 + 2 = 4
These are synthetic truths and what is analytic about
them is not their values. At least, I think, we can
agree that these are not analytic.
best,
d
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.
http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Rodrigo Vanegas
> > Sounds good to me. In fact, it might be better to do a slow reading of
> > Rorty's _Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth_ first.
>
>Hmmmnnn...that's probably a good idea. Do you want to lead it, or do you
>want me to lead it?
Experience shows that these discussions need initiative more than they need
leadership. None need be followers. Anyway, since you've already read the
book, I'll just write the first message, when I've finished reading the
first essay.
>Back in sync? At least about Tarski's truth theory?
Yes, I think so. The main point is that an ontology is a theory about what
there is. An ontology is not the things that are.
> > An ontological theory, a theory about what there is, is just another
> > theory, and the original axioms are our most basic theory about numbers.
>
>Agreed. But arn't you just saying that the axioms of our home language
>determine what there is?
I have trouble with the term "determine". Your use is likely rooted in
Dummett, and I agree with Dummett on so little, that I cannot really be
sure of what is being meant with the term. As I use it, it is just another
means to talk about logical truth. P determines Q iff "if P then Q" is
logically true. In this sense, number theory axioms determine number
theory ontology, yes. But my point is primarily that an ontology is a
theory, not the things the theory is about.
>If so, why would it be controversial at all to say:
>
>1. What there is depends upon the home language
>
>and therefore
>
>2. If we change the home language, we change what there is?
I can't imagine why these would be controversial at all! They're plainly
false, aren't they? :-)
How can what there is depend upon the home language? If it is ontological
dependence, then I think messages #96 and #114 set out why I think (1) is
false. And (2) seems true only if (1) is.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Martin N Brampton
>There is more to empiricism than verificationism. It is an empirical
>claim, like any other claim.
How can this be? Empiricism means pertaining to experience. While
it does not need to imply verificationism, or even any direct experiential
requirement, for a claim to be empirical surely it has to touch experience
in some way?
Prefixing statements with "in the absence of minds" appears to give us
licence to change the statements in any way we please that does not
introduce inconsistency. We are perfectly to change related statements
as we please on the same basis. Unless you believe that there is only a
single set of consistent statements about the world, this leaves us with
many choices as to how we might claim the world to be in the absence
of minds.
None of them seem to be amenable to any relevant observations, as
ex hypothesi there are no minds to make observations. How, then, can
claims of what may be the case in the absence of minds be counted
empirical?
On Sun, 25 Feb 2001 00:39:43 -0500, Rodrigo Vanegas wrote:
>> >1) "There are stones" is mind dependent
>> >2) "There are stones" is mind independent.
>I consider the use of quotation marks appropriate, generally speaking, such
>as the use you put them to in (1), but I don't consider your use of
>quotation marks appropriate in (2). This second use is not a way of
>stating that stones are ontologically independent of minds since it does
>not refer to stones. The first three words, enclosed as they are in
>quotation marks, refer to a sentence about stones, not to stones.
What exactly do you think that (2) means? It would appear to have as
much right to be meaningful as (1).
Is your view of stones captured by the sentence "That there are stones
is mind independent"?
Isn't there something rather odd about the claim
3) "Stones are ontologically independent of minds" is mind dependent
although it appears to follow from truths about stones being mind
dependent.
Best regards, Martin
Sandra Ann Shaw
> I would say much of the ambiguity of the distinction
> is that it has been defined too broadly and I would
> say that Kant's account of analyticity was not
> entirely off-base but merely inconclusive. He didn't
> seem to appreciate the crux of it, possibily because
> he didn't have the logical tools to take it to the
> strict systematic intelligibility that it deserves.
> In any case, I believe that Wittgenstein, in the
> tractatus, was near to discovering the crux of the
> matter of analyticity and it is truly bizzare how he
> didn't connect his work with analyticity and then
> resorted to his later "language is a game" and
> "meaning is in the use" type of dogma. It still
> perplexes me. Now I know that I have not satisfied
> your call for a clear-cut argument, however it wasn't
> my intention to review Quine's arguments here nor to
> prove the distinction. I propose we just agree to
> disagree on the matter.
I am taking this out of context of what is being discussed
here, but if I may, I would like to ask you why you believe
Wittgenstein resorted to 'language is a game" and
"meaning is in the use" type dogma? I am curious because
this is exactly what attracts me to Wittgenstein. I just
started studying Wittgenstein and I am by no means an
expert; however, my lack of expertise is exactly what
makes me want to ask you this question. I can tell you
what I believe to know. First he asks us to define a game -
not arm-chair style - but to literally go around and
ask people what a game is. The conclusion seems to be
that what we call game is not a disjunction of all games,
or a commonality of all games. I would argue that well yes,
but isn't having rules to a game a commonality. Nevertheless,
he comes up with rules of grammar - in this manner. So
the predicate/subject stuff of say Frege and some of Russell
is one such game. This appeals to me because, first I like
rules and game-playing and it seems to make rules of grammar
more applicable to certain settings. That is, within
modal logic one can do this or that according to the rules.
Since I have a basic math groundground - this also appeals
to my sense rules 'within' math constructs. For instance
in 'ring theory' you can do this or that within the rules,
in 'group theory' you can do this or that - and so on.
The rule is just the beginning and all sort of creative and/or
anayltical stuff can
follow. I guess a good comparision would be playing chess.
The rules are in place - but the way it is played is anyone's
guess. Why wouldn't this be a good way to proceed with language?
Again, just curious?
Sandra
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 10:50 PM 3/5/2001 +0000, you wrote:
>>There is more to empiricism than verificationism. It is an empirical
>>claim, like any other claim.
>
>How can this be? Empiricism means pertaining to experience. While it
>does not need to imply verificationism, or even any direct experiential
>requirement, for a claim to be empirical surely it has to touch experience
>in some way?
Its relation to experience is that it is subject to revision in the face of
"recalcitrant experience". The basic Quinean idea is that one holds out
for the possibility that one will have an experience that will not cohere
with the rest of one's beliefs unless the claim in question is abandoned.
>Prefixing statements with "in the absence of minds" appears to give us
>licence to change the statements in any way we please that does not
>introduce inconsistency. We are perfectly to change related statements as
>we please on the same basis. Unless you believe that there is only a
>single set of consistent statements about the world, this leaves us with
>many choices as to how we might claim the world to be in the absence of minds.
I don't understand this at all. I don't see how the prefix gives any such
license, I don't see why license is needed under any circumstances to
change the statements, and I don't see what it is "to change the statements".
>None of them seem to be amenable to any relevant observations, as ex
>hypothesi there are no minds to make observations. How, then, can claims
>of what may be the case in the absence of minds be counted empirical?
That's just where we disagree. It isn't the case that ex hypothesi there
are no minds. Instead, ex hypothesi there *would* *be* no minds, and yet
there *are*. See #114.
>On Sun, 25 Feb 2001 00:39:43 -0500, Rodrigo Vanegas wrote:
>
> >> >1) "There are stones" is mind dependent
>
> >> >2) "There are stones" is mind independent.
>
>>I consider the use of quotation marks appropriate, generally speaking,
>>such as the use you put them to in (1), but I don't consider your use of
>>quotation marks appropriate in (2). This second use is not a way of
>>stating that stones are ontologically independent of minds since it does
>>not refer to stones. The first three words, enclosed as they are in
>>quotation marks, refer to a sentence about stones, not to stones.
>
>What exactly do you think that (2) means? It would appear to have as
>much right to be meaningful as (1).
Yes, as the negation of (1), of course it's meaningful, but you're quoting
yourself out of context. As you've noted, context is terribly important,
so I've copied here what you originally wrote. You quoted me as writing:
>the way I see to steer a middle ground between metaphysical realism and
>anti-realism, is to accept the ontological independence of stones upon
>minds, but to affirm to ontological dependence of truths about stones upon
>minds.
And then replied:
>Are you sure that you can avoid incoherence? There's a possibility that
>you are claiming that
>
> 1) "There are stones" is mind dependent
>
>by virtue of truths about stones being dependent on minds. Yet it seems
>that your claim that stones are ontologically independent of minds looks
>as if it could be stated by
>
> 2) "There are stones" is mind independent.
>
>It might be that you consider the use of quotation marks
>inappropriate. But I would side with Wittgenstein in regarding them as
>irrelevant and perhaps unnecessary.
Out of context, there is nothing inappropriate about the use of quotation
marks in (2). But in this context, where it is clear that the goal is to
paraphrase the claim "that stones are ontologically independent of minds",
the entire sentence (2) is inappropriate. Instead, it would be appropriate
to write "stones are mind independent" which does not contradict (1).
>Is your view of stones captured by the sentence "That there are stones is
>mind independent"?
No. It is captured by the sentence "stones are mind independent".
>Isn't there something rather odd about the claim
>
> 3) "Stones are ontologically independent of minds" is mind dependent
>
>although it appears to follow from truths about stones being mind dependent.
No, there is nothing odd about it, and furthermore, it does not follow from
any truths about stones.
At 09:29 PM 3/5/2001 +0000, you wrote:
>>>So is it correct to write ' "p" is true', ' "p" is false'; mustn't it be
>>>'p is true' (or false)? The ink mark is after all not *true*; in the
>>>way in which it's black and curved.
>>
>>Actually, that is exactly what I think. It is the ink marks that are
>>black, curved, and either true or false.
>
>Don't we need to read W rather carefully here? The phrase "in the way in
>which" seems important to the sense of what he says.
Since following this he wrote that it is not the ink marks but propositions
that are true or false, I think he just meant that there is an indirection
in the attribution of truth that isn't found in the attribution of the
attributes "black" and "curved". Anyway, I disagree. It is the ink marks,
not a proposition, that is true or false. What did you think of the rest
of my interpretation?
>Isn't there a difference between looking at marks on paper as a physical
>manifestation and looking at them as signs?
Physical manifestations of what?
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
Daniel Language
Sandra:
It's interesting that you brought this up, because it
was Wittgenstein's style of philosophy (which is
wholly unique) that attracted me to his works. In
fact, i remember reading the tractatus and thinking
"this is probably some of the most coherent and truly
grounded philosophy i have ever read"...in fact I
think Wittgenstein, at least in the tractatus, had the
first real grip on what was truly important and
fruitful to do in philosophy. However, i feel that he
quit that line of philosophy much too early and for
some bizzare reason did not connect his work with that
of Kant's, well, at least with Kant's account of
analyticity. But I suppose that there are a lot of
contradictions present in how Wittgenstein wrote
philosophy. the contradictions are not present in the
content of his individual works per say, but one is
able to see that he writes with such clarity
(sometimes blinding clarity) but then refuses to
elaborate which often defeats the purpose. For example
he says stuff in the tractatus like "logic is
transcendent", which in itself could be the thesis of
an entire book and connects most wonderfully with
analyticity, but then he refuses to apply it to
language as it is. Sometimes it seems like he's laying
the groundwork but then neglects in proceeding to
build on it with application. I have a theory about
why Wittgenstein abandoned his earlier work and went
on to approach "language as a game". I feel that,
incredibly as it may seem, he missed that what would
have grounded his work and thus analytical philosophy
in a beautiful way. He hints at it throughout the
tractatus in talking about logic and tautologies but
for someone who had a background in science it is
truly perplexing how he was blinded to what was just
under his nose. Here I am talking about the proper
reason behind the analytic/synthetic distinction and
if he would have been able to connect that with his
desire to find, "the general form of all propositions"
then I am almost certain that he would not have
resorted to approaching "language as a game". The
reason that I think viewing "language as a game with
rules" is a dogma is because it completely ignores the
logical aspects of language which are truly
fundamental. At best, this type of approach is not
even pragmatism. In such an approach language becomes
a field of riddles without any foundation or
conclusiveness (it may be interesting but suffers from
a lack of center and ground). It is my opinion that
"rules" are not the same thing as "logical structures"
and even pragmatism recognizes this. And for this
reason, the behaviour connected with language, that
what pragmatism studies does not always contain clear
cut "rules" and if it does (and here you may check out
Grice's "conversational implicature") these "rules"
have nothing essentially to do with the logical
structure of language. They are two different fields.
best,
d
>
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.
http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
ggos...@aol.com
In a message dated 3/7/01 9:26:14 PM, s...@math.uh.edu writes:
>I am curious because
>this is exactly what attracts me to Wittgenstein.
You might not know that a discussion of PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS is taking place on Analytic-Borders,
the other part of Rodrigo's beneficent kingdom. Please
join in if you wish.
Gary Goss
"All that philosophy can do is destroy idols. And
that means not making any new ones -- say out of
the 'absence of idols.'" LW (MS 213)
Rodrigo Vanegas
>You might not know that a discussion of PHILOSOPHICAL
>INVESTIGATIONS is taking place on Analytic-Borders,
>the other part of Rodrigo's beneficent kingdom. Please
>join in if you wish.
To join, send mail to <analytic-bord...@yahoogroups.com>.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
Martin N Brampton
>Its relation to experience is that it is subject to revision in the face of
>"recalcitrant experience". The basic Quinean idea is that one holds out
>for the possibility that one will have an experience that will not cohere
>with the rest of one's beliefs unless the claim in question is abandoned.
My concern is that I cannot see how any recalcitrant experience would have a
bearing on the claim that "Had there been no life on Earth, there would have
been stones".
>I don't understand this at all. I don't see how the prefix gives any such
>license, I don't see why license is needed under any circumstances to
>change the statements, and I don't see what it is "to change the statements".
One could assert that "had there been no life on Earth, the moon would have
been made of green cheese". Again, I'm not clear how any recalcitrant
experience would have any bearing on this. Alternatively, we could assert
that "had there been no life on Earth, the moon would have been made of
chocolate pudding". Now I accept that we would have to be consistent, so
for the latter, we would have to also assert that "had there been no life on
Earth, the moon would have been sweet and sticky" and so on. There is a
constraint of coherence. But is there any other constraint? Why?
>No. It is captured by the sentence "stones are mind independent".
Is that a truth about stones? If not, why not?
>>Isn't there something rather odd about the claim
>>
>> 3) "Stones are ontologically independent of minds" is mind dependent
>>
>>although it appears to follow from truths about stones being mind dependent.
>
>No, there is nothing odd about it, and furthermore, it does not follow from
>any truths about stones.
Why is "Stones ontologically independent of minds" not a truth about stones?
>Since following this he wrote that it is not the ink marks but propositions
>that are true or false, I think he just meant that there is an indirection
>in the attribution of truth that isn't found in the attribution of the
>attributes "black" and "curved".
Wittgenstein's notion of proposition wouldn't necessarily involve any kind of
indirection. See for example Philosophical Investigations 136, 137.
>Anyway, I disagree. It is the ink marks,
>not a proposition, that is true or false.
Not all ink marks can be true or false. Whereas they can be black and of
particular shapes. My suggestion is that Wittgenstein is pointing out this
difference.
>What did you think of the rest of my interpretation?
I haven't time to go that quickly. One small step at a time, please.
Best regards, Martin
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/l3joGB/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
>On Wed, 07 Mar 2001 02:30:03 -0500, Rodrigo Vanegas wrote:
>
> >"recalcitrant experience". The basic Quinean idea is that one holds out
> >for the possibility that one will have an experience that will not cohere
> >with the rest of one's beliefs unless the claim in question is abandoned.
>
>bearing on the claim that "Had there been no life on Earth, there would have
>been stones".
It's a legitimate concern, but I don't share it.
> >>Isn't there something rather odd about the claim
> >>
> >> 3) "Stones are ontologically independent of minds" is mind dependent
> >>
> >>although it appears to follow from truths about stones being mind
> dependent.
> >
> >No, there is nothing odd about it, and furthermore, it does not follow from
> >any truths about stones.
>
>Why is "Stones are ontologically independent of minds" not a truth about
>stones?
Oh, it is. But (3) is not. Sentence (3) and the sentence quoted by (3)
are not one and the same sentence. The first one is not about stones, and
the second one is. But all this relies on conventional logical usage of
quotation marks, which you have expressed disapproval of.
> >Since following this he wrote that it is not the ink marks but propositions
> >that are true or false, I think he just meant that there is an indirection
> >in the attribution of truth that isn't found in the attribution of the
> >attributes "black" and "curved".
>
>Wittgenstein's notion of proposition wouldn't necessarily involve any kind of
>indirection. See for example Philosophical Investigations 136, 137.
I may look. Until then, it will be hard to imagine what he could have
meant by the last paragraph in message #157, if not that sentences
constituted of ink and paper are not directly true or else.
> >Anyway, I disagree. It is the ink marks,
> >not a proposition, that is true or false.
>
>Not all ink marks can be true or false. Whereas they can be black and of
>particular shapes. My suggestion is that Wittgenstein is pointing out this
>difference.
That could be, but since he didn't say so explicitly, I suppose it is a
matter of interpretation what he was pointing out. It's worth nothing,
however, that he wasn't discussing just any ink marks. He was discussing
the ink marks that constitute a sentence. And these, typically, if not
always, are true or false.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/l3joGB/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >Not all ink marks can be true or false. Whereas they can be black and of
> >particular shapes. My suggestion is that Wittgenstein is pointing out this
> >difference.
>
>That could be, but since he didn't say so explicitly, I suppose it is a
>matter of interpretation what he was pointing out. It's worth nothing,
I meant: "It's worth noting, ...".
>however, that he wasn't discussing just any ink marks. He was discussing
>the ink marks that constitute a sentence. And these, typically, if not
>always, are true or false.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/l3joGB/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
bruce denner
If my recalcitrant experiences differ from yours, then we return to hard
core relativism. No?
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/l3joGB/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Rodrigo Vanegas
>If my recalcitrant experiences differ from yours, then we return to hard
>core relativism. No?
No. The experiences may be different, but they can be about the same
things and they can have common causes.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
We give away $70,000 a month! Come to iWin.com for
your chance to win!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/r_1oCB/BJVCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
bruce denner
>>If my recalcitrant experiences differ from yours, then we return to hard
>>core relativism. No?
>
>No. The experiences may be different, but they can be about the same
>things and they can have common causes.
How can you determine that they are about the same *thing* if the
experience is different? Anyway, what's a *thing*? Not Philip's slice of
life? Anway, would you say that two drunks at the bar complaining "my wife
doesn't understand me?" have a common cause?
bruce
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/l3joGB/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Rodrigo Vanegas
> >>If my recalcitrant experiences differ from yours, then we return to hard
> >>core relativism. No?
> >
> >No. The experiences may be different, but they can be about the same
> >things and they can have common causes.
>
>How can you determine that they are about the same *thing* if the
>experience is different? Anyway, what's a *thing*? Not Philip's slice of life?
No, not the slices. I mean the things referred to by the singular terms in
the observation sentence, not anything referred to by the sentence as a
whole. So if I observe, "This book is heavy", the relevant thing is the book.
As for determining whether they are the same thing, the short answer is
that one can't. Just like translation and meaning, reference is
indeterminate. However, with liberal application of the principle of
charity, we arrive at a choice. This is the process of triangulation, one
subject at one corner, a second subject at the second corner, and an object
at the third corner. What we believe about any two corners will support
the choices made about the third, but none is prior to the other two.
>Anyway, would you say that two drunks at the bar complaining "my wife
>doesn't understand me?" have a common cause?
Not unless they're married to the same woman!
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/l3joGB/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Martin N Brampton
>>My concern is that I cannot see how any recalcitrant experience would have a
>>bearing on the claim that "Had there been no life on Earth, there would have
>>been stones".
>
>It's a legitimate concern, but I don't share it.
Do you have in mind an example of a recalcitrant experience that would have a
bearing on the claim?
>> >>Isn't there something rather odd about the claim
>> >>
>> >> 3) "Stones are ontologically independent of minds" is mind dependent
>> >>
>> >>although it appears to follow from truths about stones being mind
>> dependent.
>> >
>> >No, there is nothing odd about it, and furthermore, it does not follow from
>> >any truths about stones.
>>
>>Why is "Stones are ontologically independent of minds" not a truth about
>>stones?
>
>Oh, it is. But (3) is not. Sentence (3) and the sentence quoted by (3)
>are not one and the same sentence. The first one is not about stones, and
>the second one is. But all this relies on conventional logical usage of
>quotation marks, which you have expressed disapproval of.
I am trying to work with your notion of quotation marks here. You agree that
the sentence quoted in (3) is claimed to be a truth about stones. You also
stated earlier that truths about stones were mind dependent. From these two
statements, doesn't (3) follow directly?
>> >Since following this he wrote that it is not the ink marks but propositions
>> >that are true or false, I think he just meant that there is an indirection
>> >in the attribution of truth that isn't found in the attribution of the
>> >attributes "black" and "curved".
>>
>>Wittgenstein's notion of proposition wouldn't necessarily involve any kind of
>>indirection. See for example Philosophical Investigations 136, 137.
>
>I may look. Until then, it will be hard to imagine what he could have
>meant by the last paragraph in message #157, if not that sentences
>constituted of ink and paper are not directly true or else.
Wittgenstein says that ink marks are not true or false in the same way as they
are black or curved. Isn't that a reasonable claim? Not all ink marks are true
or false. Whereas all are black (or not) and curved (or not). What are you
saying distinguishes those that are capable of being true?
>> >Anyway, I disagree. It is the ink marks,
>> >not a proposition, that is true or false.
>>Not all ink marks can be true or false. Whereas they can be black and of
>>particular shapes. My suggestion is that Wittgenstein is pointing out this
>>difference.
>
>That could be, but since he didn't say so explicitly, I suppose it is a
>matter of interpretation what he was pointing out. It's worth noting,
>however, that he wasn't discussing just any ink marks. He was discussing
>the ink marks that constitute a sentence. And these, typically, if not
>always, are true or false.
It isn't at all clear that ink marks are (not) a sentence in the same way as
they are (not) black or curved. What is it that makes ink marks a sentence?
Best regards, Martin
rahe...@ichips.intel.com
> here in US/Canada.
Thanks, it had been entirely too long since I'd seen live theater.
Shakespear is _not_ the same in movies.
> (Did you know that I play a minor part in "Othello"?)
Wow, no I didn't. You are one of these people whose lifegoal seems
to be to see how many Gaussian curves the can be at the right-hand
side of.
Quick note on Great facts and artifacts (you gave me too much
homework to do on the topics of truth and anomolous monism; it
will be a while before I can reply)
I asked:
> > do you now agree that, e.g. there's no real "fact" to
> > correspond with "there would be stones even if there
> > were no humans?" In other words, there is the "Great
> > Fact", but everything else is artifact.
You said:
> This was always my position.
So our disagreements before were terminological? In particular,
given our little number theory:
number(0). % zero is a number.
number(s(X)) :- number(X). % the sucessor to a number
% is also a number
You would now agree that:
0. As Quine shows in his book "ontological relativity",
the ontology is relative to the home language.
1. Therefore, if we change the home language, we change
ontology.
2. In particular, by changing the axioms above, we can change
whether the number zero exists or not.
2. Therefore it makes no sense to say that the number zero
would exist even if there were no speakers of Bostonian English
3. And by the same token, it makes no sense to say that stones
would exist even if there were no speakers of English?
-Randy
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/03IJGA/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------_->
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 09:49 PM 3/21/2001 +0000, you wrote:
> > (Did you know that I play a minor part in "Othello"?)
>
>Wow, no I didn't. You are one of these people whose lifegoal seems to be
>to see how many Gaussian curves they can be at the right-hand side of.
Dear God, I hope not! That would be a recipe for unhappiness and little
more. Anyway, the "Othello" bit was a joke. Read the play's first lines
and you'll see what I mean. I've done nothing...
>You would now agree that:
>
>0. As Quine shows in his book "ontological relativity",
> the ontology is relative to the home language.
>
>1. Therefore, if we change the home language, we change
> ontology.
>
>2. In particular, by changing the axioms above, we can change
> whether the number zero exists or not.
>
>3. Therefore it makes no sense to say that the number zero
> would exist even if there were no speakers of Bostonian English
>
>4. And by the same token, it makes no sense to say that stones
> would exist even if there were no speakers of English?
I agree with none of these! (0) No, because ontology is relative the
manual of translation into the home language, not to the home language
itself. See #126. (1) If by "ontology" we mean "theory about what there
is", then yes, but if we mean "what there is", then no. (2) No, because
the number zero is not *part* of our ontology; it is *said* to exist by our
ontology. And what we say, is neither here nor there. (3,4) No, because,
well, because of what I wrote in #114.
This feels like old ground. I covered it already in #181 and #192. What
is most puzzling to me, and seems to be Rorty's error as well, is the line
of argument from
>do you now agree that, e.g. there's no real "fact" to correspond with
>"there would be stones even if there were no humans?" In other words,
>there is the "Great Fact", but everything else is artifact.
to the five points above. Could the trouble be in the last sentence? I'm
not sure what you meant by it. Are stones artifacts? No, of course not,
so not "everything else is artifact". I thought you meant that all
*truths* are artifacts, and that there isn't need to extend the ontology to
include "facts" in addition to truths. But this wouldn't be enough to draw
the conclusions above. As I wrote in #215, there seems to be false step in
moving from the disavowal of a correspondence theory of truth to some sort
of anti-realism.
Our difference could still be terminological, but I have my
doubts. Instead, I feel that you are still holding on to the
internal/external dichotomy, as in, internally, there is what we say there
is, and externally, there is what there really is. But what we say, is
what we say there really is! We say there is zero, and there is no
external point of view from which we can see zero not to exist. You seem
not to deny the dichotomy, but to declare everything internal. Rorty does
the same where he offers intersubjectivity as a stand-in for a wasted
objectivity. (This last paragraph is very abstract and may impart
nothing. That's okay, I just want to give you a feeling for why I don't
expect that we are facing only a terminological difference.)
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Get great low international calling rates
from Net2Phone! Click Here!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/fBRVBB/kJXCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
Randall Helzerman
>(0) No, because ontology is relative the
> manual of translation into the home language, not to the home language
> itself.
You may be right, but according to the "standard cannons" of radical
interpretation, this is not so. I'll cite chapter & verse: In Quine's book
"Ontological Relativity", the title essay contains the phrase (on p. 51):
In specifying a theory we must indeed fully specify, in our own words,
what sentences are to comprise the theory, and what things are to be
taken as values of the variables, and what things are to be taken as
satisfying the predicate letters; insofar, we do fully interpret the
theory, _relative_ to our own words and
>>> relative to our overall home theory <<<
which lies behind them. But this fixes the objects of the
described theory only
>>>>> relative to those of the home theory <<<<<;
and these can, at will, be questioned in turn.
Emphasis mine:-) Here Quine is unambiguously saying that the ontology is
relative to the home language.
Rereading the essay, it actually retraces much of the ground we've
together been walking. Quine makes many remarks which sound a lot
like what you've been saying, e.g.:
p. 35:
For the indeterminacy between "rabbit," "rabbit stage," and the rest
depended only on a correlative indeterminacy of translation of the
English apparatus of individuation--the apparatus of pronouns,
pluralization, identity, numerals and so on. No such indeterminacy
obtrudes so long as we think of this apparatus as given and fixed.
Next, he says something which sounds very much like what you were
saying about "staying at home":
Given this apparatus, there is no mystery about extension; terms
have the same extension when true of the same things. At the
level of radical translation, on the other hand, extension
itself goes inscrutable.
It sounds like what Quine is saying is that inscrutability only appears
when we translate--or in your verbiage, ontology is relative to the
manual of translation not to the home language itself. But Quine is
not done yet. He develops the argument further,
p. 41
The inscrutability of reference runs deep, and it persists in a subtle
form even if we accept identity and the rest of the apparatus of
individuation as fixed and settled; even indeed, if we forsake radical
translation and think only in English.
Radical translation is just a didactic device to make a point about the home
language. We get from foreign language to home language in two steps:
First in terms of talking with a neighbor in (Bostonian?) English:
p. 46
...radical translation begins at home.
p. 47
. . . in short, we can reproduce the inscrutability of reference at
home. It is of no avail to check on this fanciful version of our
neighbor's meanings by asking him, say, whether he really means at a
certain point to refer to the formulas or to their Goedel numbers; for
our question and his answer "By all means, the numbers" have lost their
title to homophonic translation.
But then, we leave the neighbor and just talk to ourselves:
But if there is really no fact of the matter, then the inscrutability of
reference can be brought even closer to home than the neighbor's case;
we can apply it to ourselves. If it is to make sense to say even of
oneself that one is referring to rabbits and formulas and not to rabbit
stages and Goedel numbers, then it should make sense equally to say it
of someone else. After all, as Dewey stressed, there is no private
language.
The punch-line also sounds quite a bit like what you are saying, but is
**subtly** different:
p. 50
It makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond
saying how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another.
but it is exactly opposite. What you are saying is something like:
It makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are when we
interpret or reinterpret that theory in another.
see the difference? If so, that is the difference between your position and
mine.
The difference is subtle, but makes all the difference:
What you are saying:
If you stay at home, it makes perfect sense to talk about
objects
What Quine is saying,
If you stay at home "it makes no sense to say what the objects of a
theory are"
Quine says talk of objects only makes sense in the context of
translation. Objects (like stones) are just, as it were, ladders to be
thrown away when we climb up them to the foreign language (or into the
metalanguage, if we're constructing a Tarskian truth theory.)
-Randy
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/03IJGA/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 12:33 PM 3/23/2001 -0800, you wrote:
>Quine says talk of objects only makes sense in the context of translation.
What does Quine really say? In #126, I referred to a certain passage in
_Pursuit of Truth_, but I did not quote it. Now, I think I will have to
type it in.
>Kindly, readers have sought a technical distinction between my phrases
>"inscrutability of reference" and "ontological relativity" that was never
>clear in my own mind. But I can now say what ontological relativity is
>relative to, more succinctly than I did in the lectures, paper, and book
>of that title. It is relative to a manual of translation. To say that
>"gavagai" denotes "rabbit" is to opt for a manual of translation in which
>"gavagai" is translated as "rabbit", instead of opting for any of the
>alternative manuals.
>
>And does the indeterminacy or relativity extend also somehow to the home
>language? In "Ontological Relativity" I said it did, for the home
>language can be translated into itself by permutations that part
>materially from the mere identity transformation, as proxy functions bear
>out. But if we choose as our manual of translation the identity
>transformation, thus taking the whole language at face value, the
>relativity is resolved. Reference is then explicated in disquotational
>paradigms analogous to Tarski's truth paradigm; "rabbit" denotes rabbits
>whatever *they* are, and "Boston" designates Boston.
> --Quine, _Pursuit of Truth_, pp. 51-52.
In his own words, "ontological relativity ... is [relativity] to a manual
of translation." Of course, ontological relativity applies to the home
language. But only where it is translated into itself. The question,
then, is whether when the home language plays the part of both object- and
meta-language, and on what basis do we assume the identity translation?
I think the answer can be best explored by stepping up to the second rung
on the ladder of semantic ascent. Suppose my neighbor (from step 1, above)
overhears me philosophizing to myself in a muttering voice. He hears,
"Plainly, "rabbits" refers to rabbits." As a neighbor who has tolerated
dizzying lectures about radical translation and the inscrutability of
reference, he knows better than to take such statements at face value. He
considers various translations into his home language, including most notably:
(1) "Plainly, "rabbits" refers to rabbits"
(2) "Plainly, "rabbit stages" refers to rabbit stages"
(3) "Plainly, "rabbit stages" refers to rabbits"
(4) "Plainly, "rabbits" refers to rabbit stages"
Inscrutability says that all four choices are adequate translations. But
isn't there something special about (3) and (4)? It is, plainly, that they
assume the meta-language to be distinct from the object language, requiring
independent translation. The question I pose to you, Randy, is whether you
can see any reason why the radical translator should not make this assumption?
As my neighbor gives these thoughts a whirl, he overhears me once more
muttering to myself, this time unphilosophically, saying, "What are those
rabbits doing here? Those aren't my rabbits!" My neighbor now has his
insight. How should he translate? There are, it seems, at least these
four options:
(5) "What are those rabbits doing here? Those aren't my rabbits!"
(6) "What are those rabbit stages doing here? Those aren't my rabbit
stages!"
(7) "What are those rabbit stages doing here? Those aren't my rabbits!"
(8) "What are those rabbits doing here? Those aren't my rabbit stages!"
Is the situation any more determinate now than it was for (1)-(4)? Can my
neighbor rule out (7) and (8)? Isn't one of the bases upon which radical
translation depends the continuity in stimulus meaning in the native's
speech across time?
Now turning back to the argument you found in "Ontological Relativity", you
wrote:
>The punchline also sounds quite a bit like what you are saying, but is
>**subtly** different:
>
> p. 50
> It makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond
> saying how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another.
>
>but it is exactly opposite. What you are saying is something like:
>
> It makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are when we
> interpret or reinterpret that theory in another.
>
>see the difference? If so, that is the difference between your position and
>mine.
>
>The difference is subtle, but makes all the difference:
>
>What you are saying:
>
> If you stay at home, it makes perfect sense to talk about
> objects
>
>What Quine is saying,
>
> If you stay at home "it makes no sense to say what the objects of a
> theory are"
>
>Quine says talk of objects only makes sense in the context of
>translation.
Actually, I agree with Quine's very specific point that "it makes no sense
to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or
reinterpret that theory in another." But this is a question separate from
what objects there are. There are two distinct questions we may be asking
in this context.
(1) What objects are there?
(2) What are the objects of a theory?
Only (2) is subject to ontological relativity because there is an implicit
semantic ascent in talking about "a theory". If we are asked what objects
there are, we are not being asked anything about a theory, not even our
home theory. We aren't being asked about any particular thing at
all. Just, what is there? But if we ask about a theory, we must begin by
translating the theory into our home language. Even if the theory is ours,
there is the question of reflexive semantic ascent that I explore
above. Quine does not say that "talk of objects only makes sense in the
context of translation." On the face of it, this remark is absurd, for
translation is not so commonplace as is talk of objects. On closer
inspection, however, his entire argument, as you've quoted it, does make
sense because what is being discussed is not what objects there are but
what are the objects of theories! The topic is not objects but ontologies,
and ontologies are theories! Consider the very beginning of his argument
as you quoted it. He writes:
>In specifying a theory we must indeed fully specify, in our own words,
>what sentences are to comprise the theory, and what things are to be taken
>as values of the variables, and what things are to be taken as satisfying
>the predicate letters
He is not talking about what objects there are; instead, he is talking
about "specifying a theory" about what objects there are. It isn't "talk
of objects" that "only makes sense in the context of translation", it is
talk of talk of objects. And the latter is not implicit in the former any
more than mention is generally implicit in use.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
Randall Helzerman
> What does Quine really say? In #126, I referred to a certain passage in
> _Pursuit of Truth_, but I did not quote it. Now, I think I will have to
> type it in.
>
> >But I can now say what ontological relativity is
> >relative to, more succinctly than I did in the lectures, paper, and book
> >of that title. It is relative to a manual of translation.
Those who live by the proof-text die by the proof-text, I suppose.
At the risk of making us sound even more like septuagenarian rabbis
doing Talmudic exegesis, I'll quote Davidson agreeing with me (and the
earlier Quine) against the later Quine. In his Schlip volume,
reply to Rorty, p.597 (top of page) he first explicitly says its
relative to a language:
... for theoretical purposes, it is good to know what our assignments
are relative to; they are relative to a language ...
(interesting sentence elided here which I'll come back to directly)
and then he explicily says Quine was wrong to advert to a manual of
translation:
Quine calls this changing the translation manual, but this makes it
seem that there is something in addition to the usual relativity of a
theory of meaning to a language, while in fact only one relativization
is required....
What I take Davidson to be saying here is that the translation manual mearly
maps expressions in the foreign language to the objects I already knew about
in my home language.
Now, back to the interesting sentence I elided in the above quote. Davidson
says:
... for theoretical purposes, it is good to know what our assignments
are relative to; they are relative to a language ...
but, _which_ language are they relative to? _I_ would have said the home
language. BZZZZT!!! Wrong answer. Davidson continues:
they are relative to a language. Not our own language, of
course,
gulp! er, of course not!
but the language of the speaker or agent [that we're interpreting].
So, summarizing what I've learned: "Inscrutability of reference for
Dummies" chapter #1 would be:
The indeterminacy (nee' inscrutibility) of reference is mearly the fact
that it is indeterminate which foreign expressions refer to which of my
objects. As a concrete example, suppose I speak set theory, and the natives
speak number theory. I could choose to translate their odd expressions:
0 1 2 3 . . .
as
{} {{}} {{{}}} {{{{}}}} . . ;.
or as
{} {{}} {{},{{}}}, {{}, {{},{{}}}} . . .
and either one is a perfectly good translation, in the sense that no amount
of evidence could prove me to be using the wrong translation manual.
In either case, I have no doubt that
"{{{}}}" refers to {{{}}}
is true. What is indeterminate, indeed what I am fully able to control, is whether
"2" refers to {{{}}}
is true or not.
Are we in sync?
More proof-texts:
> >And does the indeterminacy or relativity extend also somehow to the home
> >language? In "Ontological Relativity" I said it did, for the home
> >language can be translated into itself by permutations that part
> >materially from the mere identity transformation, as proxy functions bear
> >out. But if we choose as our manual of translation the identity
> >transformation, thus taking the whole language at face value, the
> >relativity is resolved. Reference is then explicated in disquotational
> >paradigms analogous to Tarski's truth paradigm; "rabbit" denotes rabbits
> whatever *they* are, and "Boston" designates Boston.
> --Quine, _Pursuit of Truth_, pp. 51-52.
The argument seems to be:
1. Indeterminacy of reference is a problem only
when we can't decide on a manual of translation.
2. But there is a a singular identity translation
for the home language.
3. Which is so obviously the right one that
we'll use it and not the others.
----------------------------------------------
4. therefore, by all means, lets do this,
and indeterminacy of reference won't be
a problem for the home language.
Assuming that the choice of which translation manuel I have is
fully under my control (as I said above, I can control whether "2" refers
to {{{}}} or not by volitional choice of translation manuel), this
arguement is sound.
Nevetheless, its conclusion is false. False because premises #2 and #3 are
false. We are speaking here as if there were but one distinguishable
translation which is obviously the identity translation. Of course there
isn't--I'll show why below. Before I do, lets ask why Quine _thinks_ there
is an identity translation. I think it is because he normally has a very
specific formal language in mind--a formal language he designed for the sole
purpose of making it easy to construct a Tarskian truth theory for it. In
this language, Quine doesn't even allow terms like "Boston". He uses
contextual definition to paraphrase them away as '(Ex) x is Boston". Why?
just to make the Tarskian truth theory for it dirt-simple to construct--and
therefore to make it blatently obvious which "identity translation" he had
in mind from the start. But for languages which weren't so carefully
engineered, this is not the case. See below.
> The question, then, is whether when the home language plays the part of
> both object- and meta-language, and on what basis do we assume the
> identity translation?
If there _were_ a single distinguished identity translation, I would say:
the basis for choosing the identity translation is the same as the basis for
any other translation: if we can engage in sucessful convsersation by using
it, then we can use it.
> (1) "Plainly, "rabbits" refers to rabbits"
> (2) "Plainly, "rabbit stages" refers to rabbit stages"
> (3) "Plainly, "rabbit stages" refers to rabbits"
> (4) "Plainly, "rabbits" refers to rabbit stages"
All I can plead is that no amount of evidence can prove you wrong if you
choose any of the above. To emphasize this point, I'll give two examples,
one which gives a compelling example of the indeterminacy of reference even
within the home language, and then the promised one one which shows that
there is no such thing as "the one and only" identity transformation.
The first example: Suppose I'm interpreting a sentence from a cheap
Karate flick:
"Please give this sword to Fugi-mora, for the sake of our ancestors."
Do I take the sentence at face value, and say that he is reifying "sakes"?
Do I look for some object in my homie language ontology to correspond
with "sakes"? Or should I use contextual definition to paraphrase away
"sakes" and take him to mean something like:
"Please give this sword to Fugi-mora, to honor our ancestors."
Its not obvious which to do. When I say "For God's sake" I certainly am not
reifying God.
But of course, I can choose to go either way, and still understand the scene
just fine.
Ok, now for the long-promised example showing why there is no identity
translation in general. I claim the English language itself has no single
identity translation. Why? Well, as Quine says, "Logic chases truth up the
tree of grammar". But there are many _different_ possible grammars for
English. Each one of those grammars will induce a different Tarskian theory
of truth. So which one is so obviously the identity translation?
Inasmuch as our neural wirings are different, it is **extremely** plausible
that you and I have different grammars for English. You, for example, might
parse "little red book" as
NP
/ \
ADJ NP
/ / \
little ADJ NOUN
/ \
red book
and I might parse it as
NP
/ | \
ADJ ADJ NOUN
/ | \
little red book
In which case your Tarskian truth theory would only have to cope with
rules of the form
NP-> ADJ NP
whereas mine might have to cope both the above and also rules of the form:
NP-> ADJ ADJ NP
Our total theories might, however be as simple as each other, because the
complexity I add here might simplify my other rules elsewhere. As a
radical interpreter of you, there is no speaking of one or the other as
being "the" identity translation. It is just not obvious which one to pick.
> The question I pose to you, Randy, is whether you
> can see any reason why the radical translator should not make this
> assumption? [i.e. use the identity translation]
I hope by now I've demonstrated to your satisfaction that in general, it is
not at all as obvious as it is for made-up languages.
At least in the case when I'm radically translating you. the conclusion
seems inescapable. But what of myself? My own homie language? Is it
similarly indeterminate to me? The answer is yes, but I have yet to show
that it is....stay tuned...
Later you ask:
> Can my neighbor rule out (7) and (8)?
(7 and 8 being "non identity translations")
No, not because of:
> Isn't one of the bases upon which radical
> translation depends the continuity in stimulus meaning in the native's
> speech across time?
yes, but that's just one of the considerations. Davidson speaks (re
Mrs. Maloprop) of revising even the translation manuels themselves every
sentence. If we can revise them every sentence, I don't see why we can't
swap them every sentence. Ex hypothesi, we could swap translation manuals
and converse just as fluently. Therefore, we could swap translation manuels
-every sentence- and still converse just as fluently.
Now, you might at this point be a bit impatient with me. Perhaps you are
still saying "Randy, you've only proven Davidson's point--that ontological
relativity exists -only- when I'm interpreting somebody else's language.
What about you yourself? If you stay at home, is there indeterminacy still?"
I still say yes, and I'll give two reasons why. First reason:
Suppose these probabilistic grammar weenies are correct, and humans
really do use a probabilistic context-free grammar to parse and generate
English. This actually is not so very unplausible. You and I might very
well have a probabilistic algorithm for generating sentences. We might
very well on occasion generate the phrase "little red book"
as:
((little red) book)
and sometimes generate it as
(little (red (book)))
If I'm interpreting you, how could I know which way you generated it? But
more importantly, if I'm interpreting myself, how could I know which way I
generated it? In effect, I could be swapping between not just two, but
exponentially many translation manuels every sentence.
The second reason: Suppose the probabilistic grammar weenies arn't correct,
and we do have a more or less constant grammar we use to generate English.
Even then, how would I know which one I was using? Could I intuit it? In
point of fact, I _don't_ know which grammar I'm using to generate even this
sentence I'm typing now :-( My only hope of finding out--short of radical
brain surgury--is radical interpretation on myself. In which case of
course I find a lot of different ways to construct my grammar, and
therefore interpret myself.
So far we've been talking about indeterminacy driven by syntactic issues,
can we come up with a second confirming example which doesn't rely on
the variagated ways to construct a grammar?
Well.....come to think of it, I don't really know if there are sakes or not.
I can think of at least three ways of handling a sentence like "do it for my
sake":
1. We can take the surface grammar at face value. This yields a simple
translation of the point sentence, but it might yield an
unseemingly complex theory in context. Maybe we could construct a
simpler theory by:
2. using contextual definition to simplify the ontology, to get rid of
"sakes" by paraphrasing each occasion of "for my sake" as being just for
that particular purpose, "do it for my honor" or "do it to avenge me" or
"do it because I'll kill you if you don't".
There may be no point in creating a set of all of those disparate
reasons. It would really only work if we could abstract away some
properties that all things called "sakes" have in common to use as
an identity criterion for sake.
3. We could take "sake" an anaphoric expression.
This would involve changing the grammar to classify "sake" as
as kind of a pronounish thing, which could take on the values
of purposes and motives.
In any case, the way to answer the question is not to mount an expedition to
see if we can find some sakes in the wild. The question could only be
definiatively answered, it seems to me, by both observation (collecting a
corpus of sentences which included the word "sake") and "looking at the home
language" (trying to explain that corpus by some general theory, which may
or may not quantify over sakes).
Upshot: Since I haven't done this, I don't know whether when I say
do this for my sake
I'm referring to a sake or not. I honestly have no clue. Telling me
"sake" refers to sake
does me no good--in fact, it is just begging the question.
But the amazing thing is, even though I don't know whether "sake" refers,
nevertheless, I can use such sentences just fine. And people around me
understand me just fine. I suppose that Rorty's point, when he is in one of
his thereputic moods, is that we should adopt the relaxed attitude I have
towards "sakes" to everything--stones, trees, etc. As long as we know how
to properly use sentences which contain sakes, stones, and trees, we can
safely delegate the question of reference up to the probabilistic grammar
weenies--while we work on something which actually matters, like, say social
justice.
Anyways, since we have met the weenies and they are us, back to our story:
> Actually, I agree with Quine's very specific point that "it makes no sense
> to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or
> reinterpret that theory in another."
Good. We are in full agreement here then.
> But this is a question separate from
> what objects there are. There are two distinct questions we may be asking
> in this context.
>
> (1) What objects are there?
> (2) What are the objects of a theory?
Yes they are distinct questions. But they are not independent of each other
either. How could we possibly answer:
(1) What objects are there?
without asking:
(2') What are the objects of my home theory?
?? Is that not the correct method for answering (1) ??
> Only (2) is subject to ontological relativity because there is an implicit
> semantic ascent in talking about "a theory".
If I am right that we can't answer (1) without asking (2'), then (1) has the
same implicit semantical ascent that (2) does--if we ask what objects there
are, we are *not* just asking a question about the world--that would be to
ignore the other two sides of Davidson's triangle.
When we ask what objects there are we are *also* asking a question about our
home language--namely, what objects our home language quantifies over, and
what its terms refer to!
And in order to specify that, we need to construct a Tarskian truth theory
for it. When we do this, we find as per the arguements above that there are
many ways to do it, (are there sakes? When I say "By Jove!" do I postulate
Jove? What of fictional objects?)
> If we are asked what objects
> there are, we are not being asked anything about a theory, not even our
> home theory.
As per above, I disagree. Suppose I'm having a conversation with a
nominalist and bright adolescent who asks me "Does the number zero really
exist?"
The nominalist answers: "No. Zero is just a convient fiction we invented to
make addition and multiplication easier than it was when we only had
Roman numerals to work with."
Now how am I to answer them? A cavalier retort of "'0' refers to 0, duh!"
is just begging both questions. Do I not answer both the adolescent and the
nominalist by looking at my home language and seeing whether I hold as true
sentences which quantify over a range which includes what "0" refers to?
And even if the answer is yes, do I not go on to ask myself whether I could
use contextual definition to paraphrase such quantifications away?
What if somebody asks me if time exists? Do I not examine my home language
to see if I quantify over time instances or intervals?
-Randy
Rodrigo Vanegas
Thank you for this smart and careful post! We are raising Analytic to new
levels, I believe, or at least the threads to which I happen to contribute
are rising to new levels. Others may have surpassed us without my noticing.
I disagree with Davidson's interpretation of Quine, here. The reason it is
relativity to the manual of translation from the foreign language into the
home language is precisely that there is any number of ways to do this
translation, and for each translation, there are different answers to the
question, what are the objects of the (foreign) theory. There is, pace
Davidson, a relativity additional to the relativity of the theory of
meaning to a language. There is the relativity to the theory of
meaning. Ontological relativity is, to use Davidson's terms, not the
relativity of the theory of meaning to a language, but the relativity of
what there is to the theory of meaning and to the language that it is a
theory of.
>So, summarizing what I've learned: "Inscrutability of reference for
>Dummies" chapter #1 would be:
>
>The indeterminacy (nee' inscrutibility) of reference is mearly the fact
>that it is indeterminate which foreign expressions refer to which of my
>objects.
I would disagree in only two respects. First, I would write "it is
indeterminate which foreign expressions refer to which objects". The "of
my" is redundant, if it is meant as abbreviation for "according to me" or
"by my own lights". It is also misleading since it suggests that the
objects are in some way "yours", where it is only the theory to which you
are according that is yours. Second, notice that this formulation includes
two uses of "which", viz., "which foreign expressions refer" and "which
objects". Only the second "which" corresponds to the inscrutability of
reference. The first corresponds to the indeterminacy of
translation. This is important because your argument, which I agree with,
relies not on the inscrutability of reference but on the indeterminacy of
translation. It is my not knowing which of my expressions refer, that
casts doubt on the apparent truism, ""sakes" refers to sakes", not my not
knowing what objects they refer to.
>As a concrete example, suppose I speak set theory, and the natives
>speak number theory. I could choose to translate their odd expressions:
>
> 0 1 2 3 . . .
>
>as
>
>{} {{}} {{{}}} {{{{}}}} . . ;.
>
>or as
>
>{} {{}} {{},{{}}}, {{}, {{},{{}}}} . . .
>
>and either one is a perfectly good translation, in the sense that no amount
>of evidence could prove me to be using the wrong translation manual.
>In either case, I have no doubt that
>
> "{{{}}}" refers to {{{}}}
>
>is true. What is indeterminate, indeed what I am fully able to control,
>is whether
>
> "2" refers to {{{}}}
>
>is true or not.
>
>Are we in sync?
Yes, except for the minor points above, I think we've converged on
something major.
If inscrutability of reference were the only kind of linguistic
indeterminacy, there'd be no problem because we'd know that "sakes" isn't a
singular term. But in addition to the inscrutability of reference there is
also the indeterminacy of translation. And the indeterminacy of
translation says that so long as we are speaking English, it is
indeterminate which words and phrases of English translate into the
singular terms of predicate logic. For what is our Quinean theory of
being? To be is to be the value of a bound variable -- in predicate
logic. The objects of a theory in any other language, are the values of
the bound variables in a *translation* of the theory into predicate
logic! Translation, and hence the indeterminacy of translation, is for
this reason inevitable. Not because we are obliged to translate from our
home language into itself, but because we must translate from our home
language into predicate logic -- and back again, perhaps.
Imagine, for a moment, that rather than English we spoke predicate logic to
each other in everyday conversation. Under these circumstances, I believe
that the indeterminacy of translation would not similarly intrude. We
would not go wrong, when asked whether there really are sakes or numbers,
if we just answered blithely with
refers("{x: sake(x)}", {x: sake(x)})
and
refers("(the x)(zero(x))", (the x)(zero(x)))
because these expressions would not be the sort of constructions that could
be contextually defined away. If it looked like a singular term, it would
be a singular term, and hence would refer to the value of a bound variable.
Alas, we speak English, so where inscrutability of reference leaves off,
indeterminacy of translation sets in. I agree that radical translation
begins at home, but not for the same reasons you give. I don't think there
would be need for radical translation of the home language if we spoke
predicate logic -- which we don't.
>are false. ... [Quine] normally has a very specific formal language in
>mind--a formal language he designed for the sole purpose of making it easy
>to construct a Tarskian truth theory for it ... to make it blatently
>obvious which "identity translation" he had in mind from the start. But
>for languages which weren't so carefully engineered, this is not the case.
Do alternative grammars make for more than a single identity
translation? I think what matters is not the theory of meaning itself but
the resultant sentence-for-sentence translations. So, perhaps I could
speak of two translations as equivalent if they translated
sentence-for-sentence identically, even if their grammars were not
identical. There would not then be a unique identity translation manual
but any number of identity translation manuals, all equivalent to one
another, in the specified respect, if not wholly identical. So premise #2
is false, but if premise #3 becomes, "Obviously, it is right to use an
identity translation", can the remainder of the argument still hold?
> > The question, then, is whether when the home language plays the part of
> > both object- and meta-language, and on what basis do we assume the
> > identity translation?
>
>If there _were_ a single distinguished identity translation, I would say:
>the basis for choosing the identity translation is the same as the basis for
>any other translation: if we can engage in sucessful convsersation by using
>it, then we can use it.
No, we couldn't swap translation manuals after every sentence and converse
just as fluently. Quine explicitly says this somewhere, saying that any
adequate translation manual could be used in place of any other, but all
would break down if we swapped them every other sentence. I would give
anything to know where he says this! Davidson's manual swapping is not so
radical as the kind of swapping we're talking about here. In Davidson's
case, the alternative manuals would be largely alike, different only where
necessary in their local adjustments to take account of malapropisms,
metaphors, and similar figurative language. The multiple manuals of
radical translation (rabbits then rabbit stages) would clash if used in
alternation.
> > Actually, I agree with Quine's very specific point that "it makes no sense
> > to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or
> > reinterpret that theory in another."
>
>Good. We are in full agreement here then.
We're definitely closer. You give two reasons why ontological relativity
applies to the home language. First, we cannot know what translation
manual we are using when we interpret ourselves. Even as I grant this, I
claim its irrelevance because among the possible manuals, all would be
identity translations. Second, it is indeterminate whether "sakes" refers
to sakes because we don't know, in our manual of translation, whether
"sakes" is treated as a referring expression. Quite so, and here I
agree. Not because we cannot know the manual of translation by which we
interpret ourselves. Actually, although I agree that we cannot know which
identity translation it is, I think we can know that it is an identity
translation. It is because what is needed is not a translation of the home
language into itself but a translation of the home language into predicate
logic, and this implicates the usual indeterminacy most evidently displayed
by your three alternative treatments of "sakes".
> > But this is a question separate from
> > what objects there are. There are two distinct questions we may be asking
> > in this context.
> >
> > (1) What objects are there?
> > (2) What are the objects of a theory?
>
>Yes they are distinct questions. But they are not independent of each other
>either. How could we possibly answer:
>
> (1) What objects are there?
>
>without asking:
>
> (2') What are the objects of my home theory?
>
>?? Is that not the correct method for answering (1) ??
I don't think so. It is no more necessary to ask (2') in answering (1)
than it is necessary to ask
(3) According to my home theory, what are the objects of my home theory?
when answering (2'). There is an infinite regress that is avoided by
asking only (1). If your bright adolescent philosopher asks me whether
there are really numbers, I tell him that there are. I tell him that
because that is what I believe. If pressed, I might remind him that
numbers are indispensable to science as we know it and that they are
assumed to exist during our everyday practices of counting and
measuring. If he then challenges me to engage the position that argues
that numbers are "convenient fictions", I would tell him about the
naturalistic view of ontology which takes a theory's ontological
commitments in the familiar way. Only then would it occur to me to take my
own beliefs, now reflectively, step up a rung on the ladder of semantic
ascent, and ask "what are the objects of my home theory?". At this point I
would find myself obliged to translate my home theory into predicate logic,
and in doing so, elect, indeterminately, whether to find sakes among my
ontological commitments. But this is a step I would not turn to as a
matter of course. Only if pressed. Otherwise, I would already have
beliefs about what there is.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
Randall Helzerman
> Thank you for this smart and careful post! We are raising Analytic to new
> levels, I believe, or at least the threads to which I happen to contribute
> are rising to new levels. Others may have surpassed us without my
> noticing.
Thank-you for your kind evaluation! But lets give credit where due--this
discussion we're having just makes it all the more blatently obvious how
pathentic my philosophical progress would have been without Analytic,
and in particular, without you having convinced me to give Quine and
Davidson a second shot. Its pretty scary--I would have been spending as
much time in the coffeehouse, but it would have all been wasted because I
would have been just digging myself deeper in a pit. Fortunately, you put
me on the right path, and I have to agree that we're making real progress
here.
We're so close to convergence...lets converge. I'll structure this reply as
follows:
1. First, I'll cover the areas where I'm changing my position to get
closer to you.
2. Then, I'll cover the areas in which I need more clarification from you
in order to determine whether we've converged or not.
3. Finally, I'll cover where you need to change your opinions to get
closer to me :-) Provisionally of course! I reserve the right
to admit that I'm wrong at any time :-)
Part #1: My goofs:
> I disagree with Davidson's interpretation of Quine, here. The reason it is
> relativity to the manual of translation from the foreign language into the
> home language is precisely that there is any number of ways to do this
> translation, and for each translation, there are different answers to the
> question, what are the objects of the (foreign) theory.
Rodrigo, this is a very good point--now that you've pointed it out, its
obvious that you and the latter Quine get the last word about what
ontological relativity is relative to. To make the issue concrete,
consider again my favorite example: number theory and set theory. It is
not enough to say that if I speak set theory, then reference is relative to
number theory--indeed the *whole point* is that there are _many_ translation
manuels from number theory to set theory. Relatvity is, as Quine says,
relativity to a translation manuel, end of story. It feels good not to be
doing textual criticism any more :-)
Now, for switching translation manuals:
> No, we couldn't swap translation manuals after every sentence and converse
> just as fluently. Quine explicitly says this somewhere, saying that any
> adequate translation manual could be used in place of any other, but all
> would break down if we swapped them every other sentence.
Here, I made a boo boo and used a single word "swap" ambiguously. We must
distinguish between two senses of swap, which I'll call "garden variety
swapping", and "on-the-fly swapping". Some manuels you can swap on-the-fly,
and some you can't. Here's the difference:
Garden variety swapping is what I was talking about in my earlier post when
I claimed that you could always swap translation manuels every sentence
and still converse. As you point out above, this is not possible---unless
you reinterpret the entire conversation up until that point with the new
translation manuel. So garden-variety swapping carries a lot of overhead
with it. It is nevertheless possible.
But some translation manuels you don't have to reinterpret the entire
conversation. These are the on-the-fly-swappable translation manuels.
I was talking about these when I was talking about the probabilistic
grammars. I _think_ you were also talking about these kinds here:
> So, perhaps I could speak of two translations as equivalent if they
> translated sentence-for-sentence identically, even if their grammars were
> not identical.
Right?
Ok, on to part #2: Clarifications:
> I would disagree in only two respects. First, I would write "it is
> indeterminate which foreign expressions refer to which objects".
Let me see if I understand this point. A translation manual between two
languages reveals the referring expressions which talk about the same object
in both languages. For example, suppose I'm radically interpreting German.
The axiom:
"schnee" refers to snow
reveals that "snow" is a refering term, just as much as it reveals that
"schnee" is, right? Before I constructed this translation manuel, I might
not have been aware that "snow" refers... For example, right now I'm
ignorant of whether "sake" refers, but suppose that I come up with an axiom
of the form:
"zuliebe" refers to sake
would I not also have determined that there are sakes--indeed that
zuliebe and sake both refer to the same object?
In this sense, it is (as you said above) *not* appropriate to say "my
objects" and "your objects". The following axiom:
"schnee" refers to snow
does not indicate the existance of two objects--just one object with two
names. Objects are, well "objective"--which means we both can talk about
the same one. So if they are not my object or your objects, whose are they?
Well, as we determined above (after much arduous labor), ontological
relativity is relative to _THE_TRANSLATION_MANUAL_. To link this back to
Quine's point:
"It makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying
how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another."
What this means is that object emerge as important at all *only* when we are
engaged in building a translation manuel--either a translation manuel from
foreign to home language, or from home language to home language. What
objects there are is determined by THE TRANSLATION MANUEL in the following
sense: if there are two equally "good" translations manuals, one which
e.g. reifies sakes and one which doesn't, then I can, by volitional choice,
cause "sakes" to exist or not, by choosing which translation manuel to use.
> This is important because your argument, which I agree with,
> relies not on the inscrutability of reference but on the indeterminacy of
> translation. It is my not knowing which of my expressions refer, that
> casts doubt on the apparent truism, ""sakes" refers to sakes", not my not
> knowing what objects they refer to.
Let me see if I understand the distinction you're trying to draw here: you
are saying that inscrutability of reference is a child of indeterminacy of
translation. If so, I agree too.
BTW, it might be good to follow the latter Quine of "Pursuit"; instead of
saying "incrutability of reference" say "indeterminacy of reference. Near
that "Pursuit of Truth" quote you typed in he says that he doesn't called it
"inscrutability" anymore. Rephraseing the above, we would say:
"The Indeterminacy of reference is a consequence of
the indeterminacy of translation."
> >Are we in sync?
>
> Yes, except for the minor points above, I think we've converged on
> something major.
yay!
> To be is to be the value of a bound variable -- in predicate
> logic. The objects of a theory in any other language, are the values of
> the bound variables in a *translation* of the theory into predicate
> logic!
Yes--in many places Quine says that we can only identify a particular
language feature as refering if we can match it up with predicate logic. He
points out that there are several sorts of language (e.g. predicate functor
logic, or Hintikka's game-theoretic logic with branching quantifiers) which
don't really use the concepts of existence and reference in the same way as
we predicate logic does. These languages don't really make ontological
commitments per se--they do what he calls a "family resemblance" to
reference. Nevertheless, we can translate to predicate logic--but sometimes
only sentence by sentence, not term-by-term, so we might say something like
"I know there's reference going on in there somethere--I just don't know
exactly where!"
Nevertheless I would not consider FOPC as some sort of God's own language of
reality or superiour in all respects to natural languages. Each language
has its own uses. I'll give 10 pistoles to the first guy who can sucessfully
reproduce speaking only FOPC. Heck, I only speak FOPC 2% of the time and
that's caused me no end of troubles with reproduction....
Part #3: Our remaining disagreements:
> Imagine, for a moment, that rather than English we spoke predicate logic to
> each other in everyday conversation. Under these circumstances, I believe
> that the indeterminacy of translation would not similarly intrude.
OK, here's a divergence betwixt us; lets see if we can patch it up.
I believe that indeterminacy of reference happens whenever there is
translation: translation is inescapably indeterminate, and therefore
reference is inescapably indeterminate. To demonstrate, I'll advert again
to my favorite vest pocket specimen of indeterminacy of reference:
number theory vs. set theory.
Suppose there were two tribes whose language was predicate calculus. The
first tribe, call them the Seti, use predicate calculus plus the axioms of
set theory to describe the universe. The second tribe, call them the Numb,
use predicate calculus plus the axioms of number theory to describe the
universe.
Now when the Seti and the Numb meet for the first time, a Seti linguist has
the choice of how he wishes to interpret the Numb's odd expressions:
0 1 2 3 . . .
he can interpret them as:
{} {{}} {{{}}} {{{{}}}} . . ;.
or he can interpret them as:
{} {{}} {{},{{}}} {{}, {{},{{}}}} . . .
He can fluently converse with the Numb using either manuel--it is
indeterminate which to use. He can by volitional choice cause
"2" refers to {{{{}}}}
or
"2" refers to {{},{{}}}}
to be true.
Now, we're not done yet, because we're still talking about translation
between two different languages--the Seti's and the Numb's. So lets
bring the point home by talking about a third tribe--call them the Su.
The Su have both the axioms of number theory _and_ the axioms of set theory
in their home language. Their mathematicians use set theory for one part of
mathematics, and number theory for another part.
But one fine day, one of the Su (call him "Cantor") discovers that all of
mathematics can be cast in set theory. That very day, another of the Su
(call him "Goedel") discovers that likewise, all of mathematics can be cast
in number theory. The Su are very exited by these developments---set theory
and number theory must somehow be talking about "the same thing." But how
to coordinate their theories? One mathematician (call him "Von Neuman")
proposes
{} {{}} {{{}}} {{{{}}}} . . ;.
as the natural numbers. Another (call him "Bernas") proposes:
{} {{}} {{},{{}}} {{}, {{},{{}}}} . . .
Meanwhile, that wily Goedel shows that there's infinitely many ways you can
assign Goedel numbers to the symbols of predicate logic and the axioms of
set theory.
Finally, above the din and confusion, the master Su (call him "Quine")
has been pointing out for over 40 years now that it just doesn't matter what
we take the objects of our theory to be.
"2" refers to {{{{}}}} or "2" refers to {{},{{}}}}
Its your choice. So is:
"{{},{{}}}}" refers to 2
or
"{{},{{}}}}" doesn't refer to a number at all.
Its your-choice--so just relax and enjoy the freedom! This freedom is
actually useful, as I'll point out below.
The point of this parable is obvious:
We have met the Su and they are uS!
Even within the English language, it is indeterminate what 2 refers to.
"2" refers to 2, all right--the hope for an identity translation gets us
that far. And "{{{{}}}}}" refers to {{{{}}}}. But, we know (by
virtue of these sundry translation manuals) that both set theory and
number theory are somehow "about the same thing." There must be _some_ set
whose quotation refers to two--after all, we _are_ talking about the same
objects, we're just using two different vocabularies to do it.
But which? We could take either:
"{{{{}}}}" or "{{},{{}}}}"
to refer to 2. But it is indeterminate which one does. We could perform a
"garden-variety swap" of the mappings between set theory and number theory
at any time and never know the difference. And therefore it is forever
indeterminate--both what "2" refers to _and_ whether "{{{{}}}}" refers to a
number at all.
You're probably wondering whether we can get around this by using an
"obvious" identity translation? Well, suppose we just say for each number:
"0" refers to 0
.
.
.
etc.
and for each set:
"{}" refers to {}
.
.
.
etc.
would that solve the problem? Well, we've thrown out the baby with the bath
water. This "identity translation" is obviously wrong, because it doesn't
reflect our new found discovery that number theory and set theory are "about"
the same thing. If
"{{},{{}}}}" refers to {{},{{}}}}
and nothing else, then it cannot refer to 2, and so we've lost the
connection between the two vocabularies. We must include some axioms with
mentions of numbers on one side and uses of sets on the other (and vice
versa) in any putative "identity translation" or we've missed something.
Unfortunately, whatever it is that we've missed can be captured in
many ways, hence indeterminacy strikes again.
Indeterminacy is inescapable, Q.E.D.
But why are you so afraid of indeterminacy? It can be a very useful tool!
Its not a bad thing, its a good thing. A good example of this
phenomena is Turing's completeness theorem--where he proved that Turing
machines and lambda calculus were equivalent computing platforms. Lambda
calculus and Turing machines must somehow be "about the same thing". But
there are infinitely many universal turing machines, so there are infinitely
many possible mappings. A "theory of truth" which interprets one universal
language into another has a name--its called a compiler. Which set of
machine instructions "corresponds" to a for loop? It is indeterminate, but
the are both "about" the same computation in some sense. Programs which
exploit this indeterminacy are called "optimizing compilers".
Back in sync?
> If it looked like a singular term, it would be a singular term, and hence
> would refer to the value of a bound variable.
Yes, but as per above this doesn't mean that indeterminacy of translation or
indeterminacy of reference wouldn't be endemic.
> I don't think there
> would be need for radical translation of the home language if we spoke
> predicate logic -- which we don't.
We still do--we'd still need radical translation of the home language. If
we want to relate some parts of our vocabulary to others (say, we've just
discovered that atoms exist, and we want to be able to give some precise
truth conditions for when a set of atoms constitutes a stone or not). We
will in those cases have many ways of effecting the reduction, in general,
so indeterminacy arises again.
Quine uses radical translation of predicate calculus to predicate calculus
in several ways--one way is to define virtual sets w/o using set theoretic
axioms. Another is to prove that we can paraphrase away terms. There's
many ways of paraphrasing away terms--Quine's isn't the only one.
Compilers, optimizers---radical translation is a useful tool!! To ban it
just to ban indeterminacy of reference would be to throw out the baby with
the bath water.
And even at that, Rodrigo, Quine explicitly states in "Philosophy of Logic"
that even within predicate calculus, there are many ways we could draw the
boundary between syntax and lexicon. Predicate calculus is no language of
the Gods. In his latter years Quine grew very fond of non-standard
logics--see his "algebraic logic and predicate functors" in "ways of
paradox", for example, or his appendix to "Stimulus". The motto of Pearl
applies here--"there's more than one way to do it." I don't think that
there _is_ any priveledged languate you can call "THE ONE TRUE LOGIC". I
took a programming class to learn the language Haskell, which is based on
predicate functor logic. It is a _wonderful_ language. I was blown away by
how it handled some things so elegantly. But of course, I could choose to
still program in prolog, which is based on predicate logic. It doesn't
matter. Neither vocabulary is "obviously" God's own.
Alternative grammars:
> Do alternative grammars make for more than a single identity
> translation?
Sure. Recall my 3 ways of construing "sake". One was was to just reify
sakes, another was to treat sake as an anaphoric device, sort of a pronoun
like "his", but whereas "him" only picks out male objects, "sake" would pick
out objects that were, say, plans or motives. This rules out:
> So, perhaps I could
> speak of two translations as equivalent if they translated
> sentence-for-sentence identically, even if their grammars were not
> identical.
As pointed out above, this _is_ a useful way to classify translation
manuels, but it doesn't eliminate indeterminacy of reference or
translation, because...
> There would not then be a unique identity translation manual
> but any number of identity translation manuals, all equivalent to one
> another, in the specified respect, if not wholly identical. So premise #2
> is false, but if premise #3 becomes, "Obviously, it is right to use an
> identity translation", can the remainder of the argument still hold?
...in the vocabulary of the above, I can say: No, just because _some_
translation manuels are on-the-fly switchable, doesn't mean that they _all_
are. There could be a garden variety manual which is just as
simple/desirable whatever as any on-the-fly switchable one, and then it
wouldn't be obvious which to pick--and hence it wouldn't be obvious what
objects there are or even what objects exist.
OK, to sum up the story so far:
> We're definitely closer. You give two reasons why ontological relativity
> applies to the home language. First, we cannot know what translation
> manual we are using when we interpret ourselves. Even as I grant this,
good...
> I claim its irrelevance because among the possible manuals, all would be
> identity translations.
I hope that I've convinced you otherwise; one reason you immediatly state below:
> Second, it is indeterminate whether "sakes" refers
> to sakes because we don't know, in our manual of translation, whether
> "sakes" is treated as a referring expression. Quite so, and here I
> agree.
re: treating "my sake" as a singular term or using contextual definition to
paraphrase it away is a non-trivial change in grammar. It would require a
"garden-variety" swap. Its even more radical than indeterminacy of
reference--whether there even _is_ such a thing as a sake or not is
determined by---as we finally found out--(all together now:) "THE
TRANSLATION MANUAL."
> It is because what is needed is not a translation of the home
> language into itself but a translation of the home language into predicate
> logic,
Again, even if I translate the home language into itself in english (I'm
not really reifying God when I say "For God's sake) or in predicate calculus
(lets use virtual sets when we can) this isn't true.
Indeterminacy of reference happens _whenever_ there is translation, because
_whenever_ there is translation, there's more than one way to do it.
Ok, and finally: The Linguistic Turn:
> If your bright adolescent philosopher asks me whether
> there are really numbers, I tell him that there are.
Well Rodrigo, I happen to be living with a bright adolescent, and I've
learned through hard experience that this would not wash. I was surprised
at how remarkably good adolescents are--with no formal training--at spotting
falacies. And even argument forms which I would consider sound (arguments
from the authority of Randy Helzerman, for example) they look upon with some
dubiousness. So if you would:
> I tell him that because that is what I believe.
it would sound to him like you said "its true because I told you so!" This
form of argument doesn't wash with adolescents, nor should it--the technical
name for that is begging the question. He's asked you whether numbers
exists and you say:
> I tell him that there are.
??? This is blatent begging of the question.
> I tell him that because that is what I believe.
Still begging.
> If pressed, ...
Why wouldn't he press you? You haven't answered him yet.
> ...I might remind him that numbers are indispensable to science
> as we know it and that they are assumed to exist during our everyday
> practices of counting and measuring.
This is begging the nominalist's question--(that's actually why I invited
him to the party. Besides, the adolescent would have read up on this
eventually anyways.) The nominalist agrees that numbers (well, he calls
them "numerals") are indispensible for science and everyday life. But that
doesn't make them real, any more than God is real because the Pope finds God
useful and indeed indispendible to his everyday life. The nominalist is
wrong, of course, but what will answer him?
> If he then challenges me to engage the position that argues
> that numbers are "convenient fictions",
Which he no doubt will do!
> Only then would it occur to me to take my own beliefs, now reflectively,
> step up a rung on the ladder of semantic ascent, and ask "what are the
> objects of my home theory?".
*NOW* we are getting somewhere. We are no longer begging the question. By
doing this semantic ascent, we can offer some better reason for the
existance of numbers than "I believe in them." The evidence for numbers is
as strong as the evidence for stones--but we can only know this once we've
taken the Linguistic turn--or done the semantic ascent, in your verbiage, and
in the verbiage of Quine's chapter in "Word and Object" on the same topic.
> At this point I
> would find myself obliged to translate my home theory into predicate logic,
> and in doing so, elect, indeterminately, whether to find sakes among my
> ontological commitments.
Yes! Yes!
My point is that until we do this, we are begging the question. That was
what made the Linguistic Turn (as honed to perfection by Quine) such a great
advance--it finally let us attack problems such as the existance of numbers
or of time without beggging the question. Before this, we had no clue how
to even begin to answer such questions. In fact, I can think of no better
capsule summary of
"The Linguistic Turn in a Nutshell"
The only way to answer questions like:
(1) What objects are there?
is to ask questions like:
(2') What are the objects revealed by the translation of my home
theory into predicate calculus?
Because if you don't, you're just begging the question.
-Randy
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 02:55 AM 3/28/2001 -0800, you wrote:
>I have to agree that we're making real progress here.
It's exciting!
>It feels good not to be doing textual criticism any more :-)
Yeah, exegesis is fine, when it is to a point. But ultimately, one must
have the courage to disagree with the masters, and not worry too much about
what they *really* meant. When they write consistently and clearly, we
read carefully. When they do not write consistently and clearly, we
consider reading someone else. That's how I play the game, anyway.
>But some translation manuals you don't have to reinterpret the entire
>conversation. These are the on-the-fly-swappable translation manuels. I
>was talking about these when I was talking about the probabilistic grammars.
Okay, good.
>I _think_ you were also talking about these kinds here:
>
>>So, perhaps I could speak of two translations as equivalent if they
>>translated sentence-for-sentence identically, even if their grammars were
>>not identical.
>
>Right?
Yes.
>>I would disagree in only two respects. First, I would write "it is
>>indeterminate which foreign expressions refer to which objects".
>
>Let me see if I understand this point. A translation manual between two
>languages reveals the referring expressions which talk about the same
>object in both languages. For example, suppose I'm radically interpreting
>German. The axiom:
>
> "schnee" refers to snow
>
>reveals that "snow" is a refering term, just as much as it reveals that
>"schnee" is, right?
Right.
>Before I constructed this translation manuel, I might not have been aware
>that "snow" refers... For example, right now I'm ignorant of whether
>"sake" refers, but suppose that I come up with an axiom of the form:
>
> "zuliebe" refers to sake
>
>would I not also have determined that there are sakes--indeed that zuliebe
>and sake both refer to the same object?
Yes. (Is "zuliebe" nonsense? Or is it German for "sake"?)
>In this sense, it is (as you said above) *not* appropriate to say "my
>objects" and "your objects". The following axiom:
>
> "schnee" refers to snow
>
>does not indicate the existance of two objects--just one object with two
>names. Objects are, well "objective"--which means we both can talk about
>the same one. So if they are not my object or your objects, whose are
>they? Well, as we determined above (after much arduous labor),
>ontological relativity is relative to _THE_TRANSLATION_MANUAL_.
Meaning what? Whose objects are they? I would say that they are no one's
objects.
>To link this back to Quine's point:
>
> "It makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying
> how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another."
>
>What this means is that objects emerge as important at all *only* when we
>are engaged in building a translation manuel--either a translation manuel
>from foreign to home language, or from home language to home
>language. What objects there are is determined by THE TRANSLATION MANUAL
>in the following sense: if there are two equally "good" translation
>manuals, one which e.g. reifies sakes and one which doesn't, then I can,
>by volitional choice, cause "sakes" to exist or not, by choosing which
>translation manual to use.
Eeek! Do you really want to say that there is a causal relationship
between your choice of translation manual and the existence of the objects
you talk about?? I hope you are only speaking figuratively, but this is
dangerous ground in which to use any idiom but the literal.
Yes, if ""sakes" refers to sakes" is true according to the manual of
translation then there are sakes, and if it is false then there are no
sakes, but causation plays no role in this.
>>This is important because your argument, which I agree with, relies not
>>on the inscrutability of reference but on the indeterminacy of
>>translation. It is my not knowing which of my expressions refer, that
>>casts doubt on the apparent truism, ""sakes" refers to sakes", not my not
>>knowing what objects they refer to.
>
>Let me see if I understand the distinction you're trying to draw
>here: you are saying that inscrutability of reference is a child of
>indeterminacy of translation. If so, I agree too.
Yes.
>BTW, it might be good to follow the latter Quine of "Pursuit"; instead of
>saying "incrutability of reference" say "indeterminacy of reference. Near
>that "Pursuit of Truth" quote you typed in he says that he doesn't called
>it "inscrutability" anymore. Rephraseing the above, we would say:
>
> "The Indeterminacy of reference is a consequence of
> the indeterminacy of translation."
I bet he dropped "inscrutability" precisely to discourage the view that it
wasn't just another word for indeterminacy, in the way that
"underdetermination" is not just another word for indeterminacy.
>>To be is to be the value of a bound variable -- in predicate logic. The
>>objects of a theory in any other language, are the values of the bound
>>variables in a *translation* of the theory into predicate logic!
>
>Yes--in many places Quine says that we can only identify a particular
>language feature as refering if we can match it up with predicate
>logic. He points out that there are several sorts of language (e.g.
>predicate functor logic, or Hintikka's game-theoretic logic with branching
>quantifiers) which don't really use the concepts of existence and
>reference in the same way as we predicate logic does. These languages
>don't really make ontological commitments per se--they do what he calls a
>"family resemblance" to reference. Nevertheless, we can translate to
>predicate logic--but sometimes only sentence by sentence, not
>term-by-term, so we might say something like "I know there's reference
>going on in there somethere--I just don't know exactly where!"
Right.
>Nevertheless I would not consider FOPC as some sort of God's own language
>of reality or superiour in all respects to natural languages. Each
>language has its own uses.
It isn't "superior in all respects", but it is special in one important
respect which is that it is the measure by which we judge our ontological
commitments. Ontology, hence our conceptions of objects and of
objectivity, are, as it were, entangled with the very special language that
is predicate logic.
>The point of this parable is obvious:
>
> We have met the Su and they are uS!
>
>Even within the English language, it is indeterminate what 2 refers to.
>"2" refers to 2, all right--the hope for an identity translation gets us
>that far. And "{{{{}}}}}" refers to {{{{}}}}. But, we know (by virtue of
>these sundry translation manuals) that both set theory and number theory
>are somehow "about the s ame thing." There must be _some_ set whose
>quotation refers to two--after all, we _are_ talking about the same
>objects, we're just using two different vocabularies to do it.
Your point is very suggestive, but ultimately I find myself doubting your
premise. Must there be "_some_ set whose quotation refers to two"? Are we
definitely "talking about the same objects" "using different
vocabularies"? I still think not. The fact that we can "reduce" the
truths of one subject to another doesn't establish a mandatory reduction in
our ontology. Quine likes to say that math is just set theory, by which he
means that he takes this reduction more seriously than I do. But he also
has a taste for "desert landscapes", whereas I am from the tropics. It's
a matter of taste.
>You're probably wondering whether we can get around this by using an
>"obvious" identity translation?
Tes.
>Well, we've thrown out the baby with the bath water. This "identity
>translation" is obviously wrong, because it doesn't reflect our new found
>discovery that number theory and set theory are "about" the same thing. If
>
> "{{},{{}}}}" refers to {{},{{}}}}
>
>and nothing else, then it cannot refer to 2, and so we've lost the
>connection between the two vocabularies. We must include some axioms with
>mentions of numbers on one side and uses of sets on the other (and vice
>versa) in any putative "identity translation" or we've missed something.
This is not convincing me just yet, though I feel the potential. I don't
yet see that it is a discovery that the two vocabularies are about the same
thing. And if "{{},{{}}}" refers to {{},{{}}} it might still refer to 2 if
{{},{{}}} = 2. I suppose it depends on our theories of numbers and
sets. Whatever the case may be, I don't think that it would be decided by
a reflexive manual of translation. I suppose one *could* translate
"{{},{{}}}" as "{{},{{}}}" and "2" as "{{},{{}}}", as well, but a no less
useful translation would translate "{{},{{}}}" as "{{},{{}}}" and "2" as
"2". Since the manual of translation is not the sum of our knowledge about
objects, we might also believe "{{},{{}}} = 2".
But even this is not the situation that I happen to find myself in,
indeterminately, to be sure. I know perfectly well that number theory can
be reduced to set theory and that set theory can be reduced to number
theory, but my own view is that sets are not numbers and numbers are not
sets. I apply an identity translation to myself without the complication
of reflecting these reduction proofs, for I know no particular reason why
they should be represented there. You say that I have not "reflected our
new discovery" in the translation. Maybe so, but why should I have to
shoehorn it in? I can reflect it in other ways! I can believe that each
theory is reducible to the other. In logic, it would look something like this:
(s)(t)(Eu)(Ev)((if about-sets(s) and about-sets(t)
and "if ,s then ,t" is a logical truth
then not u = v and about-numbers(u) and about-numbers(v)
and "if ,u then ,v" is a logical truth)
and
(if about-numbers(s) and about-numbers(t)
and "if ,s then ,t" is a logical truth
then not u = v about-sets(u) and about-sets(v)
and "if ,u then ,v" is a logical truth))
Notice the use of commas before variables to indicate substitution,
following Lisp's backquote syntax. Quine uses a similar notation called
quasi-quotation, but Lisp is better suited to ASCII.
>The motto of Perl applies here--"there's more than one way to do it."
>... I took a programming class to learn the language Haskell, which is
>based on predicate functor logic. It is a _wonderful_ language.
Oohh, a man after my innermost heart. These are my two favorite computer
languages!
>Ok, and finally: The Linguistic Turn:
>
>>If your bright adolescent philosopher asks me whether there are really
>>numbers, I tell him that there are.
>
>Well Rodrigo, I happen to be living with a bright adolescent, and I've
>learned through hard experience that this would not wash. I was surprised
>at how remarkably good adolescents are--with no formal training--at
>spotting falacies. And even argument forms which I would consider sound
>(arguments from the authority of Randy Helzerman, for example) they look
>upon with some dubiousness. So if you would:
>
>>I tell him that because that is what I believe.
>
>it would sound to him like you said "its true because I told you
>so!" This form of argument doesn't wash with adolescents, nor should
>it--the technical name for that is begging the question.
I am still young enough to vividly remember these discussions as an
adolescent, and it doesn't surprise me one bit how good yours is at
spotting fallacies. After all, at that age, we knew everything, don't you
remember? ;-)
I wonder whether it isn't the pragmatics of this context that suggests I
would be begging the question, as you say. Certainly, if *he* asked me
whether there are numbers I would know from the context that he isn't
literally asking whether there are numbers. He would be asking me to take
a philosophical position and to give a justification for my position. My
view is just that it is only the justification that requires semantic
ascent and hence translation of the home language into predicate logic.
> "The Linguistic Turn in a Nutshell"
>
>The only way to answer questions like:
>
> (1) What objects are there?
>
>is to ask questions like:
>
> (2') What are the objects revealed by the translation of my home
> theory into predicate calculus?
>
>Because if you don't, you're just begging the question.
I would say instead that the only way to *justify* questions like (1) is to
answer questions like (2'), and you only risk begging the question when
answering (1) if pragmatics demand that you give justification for your answer.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
We give away $70,000 a month! Come to iWin.com for
your chance to win!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/olMXHC/BJVCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM
Randall Helzerman
> >... I took a programming class to learn the language Haskell, which is
> >based on predicate functor logic. It is a _wonderful_ language.
>
> Oohh, a man after my innermost heart. These are my two favorite computer
> languages!
Arggghh!! I wish I would have known that--it would have made some of my
earlier posts easier to write. But I'll avail myself of the shared
knowledge now--at the risk of further losing our audience...Haskell is
awesome. I took a class from Dr. Launchbury, who is a prof here at OGI and
is the chair of the Haskell standardization committee. I'm taking another
class from him in category theory this spring, which I'm really looking
forward to. (BTW, thanks for silently correcting my spelling of "Perl". I
cringed when I reread it on the website).
> Yes. (Is "zuliebe" nonsense? Or is it German for "sake"?)
Indeed, "zuliebe" is a german word which is often translated as "sake".
Actually, it is itself and interesting miniature example of indeterminacy of
reference. "Zu" is a common German proposition, and "liebe" means
in this context something like "that which is desired". So I could either
view the whole word "zuliebe" as atomic, and translate it as "sake", or I
could analyze its component phonemes and translate it as "for that which is
desired".
> Meaning what? Whose objects are they? I would say that they are no one's
> objects.
Oh just meaning what you write here:
> Yes, if ""sakes" refers to sakes" is true according to the manual of
> translation then there are sakes, and if it is false then there are no
> sakes,
That's all.
> Eeek! Do you really want to say that there is a causal relationship
> between your choice of translation manual and the existence of the objects
> you talk about?? I hope you are only speaking figuratively, but this is
> dangerous ground in which to use any idiom but the literal.
You're right; careless, 3am wording. I merely wanted to emphasize our
ability to choose a translation manuel, and therefore our ability to choose
what our terms refer to and what objects exist, nothing more.
> Right.
>
> >Nevertheless I would not consider FOPC as some sort of God's own language
> >of reality or superiour in all respects to natural languages. Each
> >language has its own uses.
>
> It isn't "superior in all respects", but it is special in one important
> respect which is that it is the measure by which we judge our ontological
> commitments. Ontology, hence our conceptions of objects and of
> objectivity, are, as it were, entangled with the very special language that
> is predicate logic.
Yes, Quine explicates the once obscure notion of "existence" as
translatability to a bound variable in FOPC. But Quine does go to some
lengths to show that this doesn't make FOPC special. He talks at length in
"Stimulus" and in his essay "existence and quantification" (in "ontological
relativity", starting around page 108) about this. The effect is not so
much to elivate FOPC to the lofty heights of existence, but to take exitence
down to the level of a rather parochial device of only one logic--just one
logic among many, some which don't need to rely upon existance or ontology
at all.
Haskell vs. Prolog is a good way to illustrate this point. Prolog has
our old familier, quntified variables, and thus the objects which are
expressed in it really "exist" in Quine's sense. Haskell is
different--lambda abstraction binds variables in a very different way than
FOPC quantifiers do. Therefore, a Haskell variable behaves radically
differently from a prolog variable (which is frustrating for someone like me
who learned prolog first. I like my homie logical variables!). Therefore,
the pseudo-"objects" we describe in Haskell can't really be said to exist in
the same way that prolog objects do. A translation manuel from prolog to Haskell
is actually distrbuted with the Hugs source--it is a prolog interpreter
written in Haskell. Looking at the source code makes it abundantly clear
that we can't identify quantification in prolog with any particular device
in Haskell--the sentences must be translated holophrastically from one
language to another.
Nevertheless, Haskell and prolog have equivalent power--they both can
perform any computation that a universal Turing machine does. This shows
quite clearly that we could dispense with the idea of reference (with all
its indeterminacies) and existence altogether and still cope. Amazingly,
there's nothing really even that special about existence.
One reason to prefer haskellesque versions of logic over orthodox logic is a
subject near and dear to our hearts--theories of truth. Check out page #310
in "Ways of Paradox" where Quine gives a 2-line theory of truth (equasions
(3) and (4)) for combinatory catagorical logic, which over the course of the
next page he reduces to a single line in equasion (6). (the definitions of
"S" and "C" are on page #287, in case you don't remember them). He then
points out the pros and cons vis-a-vis Tarksian truth for FOPC in the next
section.
> Are we definitely "talking about the same objects" "using different
> vocabularies"?
....this was bad, vague, wording--but it was the best I could do at 3:00am
when I was writing it. Perhaps now I can do better. Instead of "talking
about the same thing" I should have said that set theory and number theory
are "isomorphic" which is much more precise. Any sentence in set theory can
be mapped (in many ways, hence indeterminacy) onto an isomorphic sentence in
number theory.
> I still think not. The fact that we can "reduce" the truths of one
> subject to another doesn't establish a mandatory reduction in our
> ontology.
Right, that's the point of anomolous monism with respect to the physical and
the mental. But Davidson isn't saying that the mind isn't part of the
body. Anomolous it is, but it is still monism. If we're talking about the
mind, we're talking about the body.
> Quine likes to say that math is just set theory, by which he
> means that he takes this reduction more seriously than I do. But he also
> has a taste for "desert landscapes", whereas I am from the tropics. It's
> a matter of taste.
Indeed, it _is_ a matter of taste--that's what the indeterminacy of
reference shows. Quine can have his Cantor's paradise, and you can have
your tropical paradise, but if you two were to converse about number theory
you'd never know that he was thinking about 2 as a set all along, and he'd
never know that you weren't.
> This is not convincing me just yet, though I feel the potential. I don't
> yet see that it is a discovery that the two vocabularies are about the same
> thing.
Does it help actuate the potential if I talk about isomorphisms rather than
using vague 3 am language?
> But even this is not the situation that I happen to find myself in,
> indeterminately, to be sure. I know perfectly well that number theory can
> be reduced to set theory and that set theory can be reduced to number
> theory, but my own view is that sets are not numbers and numbers are not
> sets. I apply an identity translation to myself without the complication
> of reflecting these reduction proofs, for I know no particular reason why
> they should be represented there.
I shouldn't have said that the translation manuel was obviously
wrong--holistic considerations would forbid me to deny you your choice of
translation manuel. But those who live by the holism will die by the
holism! In order to avoid indeterminacy, you can't just choose a
translation manuel as our favorite--you *also* have to be able to deny the
right of everybody else to chose their manuel too. There must be some sense
in which you are right and everybody else is wrong. But of course, there is
not. Just as holistic considerations show that no amount of evidence can
prove you wrong, but no amount of evidence can prove _me_ wrong either.
Hence the indeterminacy.
> You say that I have not "reflected our new discovery" in the translation.
> Maybe so, but why should I have to shoehorn it in? I can reflect it in
> other ways!
True, you can reflect it in other ways--in fact, in infinitely many
ways...but again, that's the whole point. The important thing to bear in
mind is that by representing this connection outside of the translation
manuel, you haven't _eliminated_ complexity from your total system (which,
being holists, is what we care about)--you've just moved it around. Since
the *total* resulting system isn't any simpler than the old, there's no
reason to prefer it. Hence, the indeterminacy.
And lets scotch this whole concept of their being "the" identity
translation--even for FOPC! Quine talks in "philosophy of logic" about
whether or not to include the equality predicate as a logical constant, or
as a predicate in the object language. In one case, you'd be adding axioms
for equality to the translation manual, in the other case, you'd be adding
axioms to equality to rest of your home theory. So which one is so
obviously the identity translation? They ain't no sech thang!
> I am still young enough to vividly remember these discussions as an
> adolescent, and it doesn't surprise me one bit how good yours is at
> spotting fallacies. After all, at that age, we knew everything, don't you
> remember? ;-)
:-) indeed.
> My view is just that it is only the justification that requires semantic
> ascent and hence translation of the home language into predicate logic.
I'd be happy to gloss the naturalized linguistic turn in the way you
suggest:
"The Linguistic Turn in a Nutshell"
The only way to justify answers to questions like:
(1) What objects are there?
is to ask questions like:
(2') What are the objects revealed by the translation of my home
theory into predicate calculus?
Because if you don't, you're just begging the question.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
So are we (*gasp*) 100% in sync? If not, can you characterize our differences?
-Randy
P.S. Davidsons "Actions & Events" just arrived! Yet more reading to do......
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
Make good on the promise you made at graduation to keep
in touch. Classmates.com has over 14 million registered
high school alumni--chances are you'll find your friends!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/03IJGA/DMUCAA/4ihDAA/BE_UlB/TM