[analytic-borders] Derrida's Metaphor
ggos...@aol.com
I recently sent, as an example of Derrida criticism,
two quotes from Margolis. The example I'm going to discuss
here comes from the writings of Newton Garver, who
puts emphasis on the conflict between Derrida's
structuralism (language is a self-enclosed structure
with nothing beyond the text)
and Derrida's claim that all language is metaphorical.
Both statements are, in my view, misleading, but put that aside.
They contradict one another.
Broadly speaking, a metaphor, Aristotle wrote, consists of
giving something a name that belongs to something else.
For instance, I might say that, in times of trouble, my wife
is a fortress. This sort of thing has always given fits to
philosophers interested in defining language.
("Form of life," by the way, is not a metaphor. It is not a
case of giving something a name that belongs to something
else. It's just a family resemblance word.)
***
Structuralism hearkens back to a remarkable insight by
de Saussure, which was that on a certain level language
operates entirely as a closed system of phonemes that work
in contrast to one another. That insight somehow led Derrida
to claim that there is nothing outside the text.
How, then, can someone dedicated to this structuralist
view account for metaphors?
I'll put it this way. In order
to grasp that a metaphor is a metaphor, you have to
take nonlinguistic elements into account. It is obvious that
my wife is not literally a fortress. So the first step is that
we admit that the reference is deviant. I have called my wife
by the wrong name. Yet we understand that I haven't made
a simple linguistic error. From the context of the remark
("times of trouble") we get some idea of my intention in
making the remark. My tone of voice (not ironic) matters.
We grasp the meaning of the metaphor. Metaphors cannot
be understood without reference to what we take to be
reality. But within the confines of structuralist methodology,
any such reality is explicitly excluded from consideration.
Unable to recognize a metaphor (in his structuralist isolation),
Derrida "solves" the problem by saying that there is no
non-deviant language -- it's all metaphorical. But if all is
metaphorical, then the term "metaphorical" is meaningless.
The claim that all language use is metaphorical is empty.
*******
One outcome of all this that Garver notes is that Derrida ends
up as a determinist.
As Iris Murdoch disapprovingly pointed out, "we must now
(the structuralist argument goes on) realize that all language consists
of internal relations, is in fact an internally related network
which no individual can survey. We are not masters of
language, we are ourselves, as utterers, simply parts
of language, we do not and cannot really know what we
are saying, or possess any intelligible 'present' which is
'our own.'"
As Garver notes, this theory makes us the pawns of
linguistic structures rather than the masters of them. What
a person really says is held to be _determined_ by
hidden meanings of the words rather than by the ordinary
but tainted meanings the speaker appears to know.
I doubt it.
Best,
Gary
What a beautiful thought I am thinking
concerning a great speckled bird. . . .
-- from "The Great Speckled Bird"
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John
> Derrida and Metaphor
> ("Form of life," by the way, is not a metaphor. It is not a
> case of giving something a name that belongs to something
> else. It's just a family resemblance word.)
>
post.
I conceded the point to Bruce mainly because I saw it as a side issue
that unnecessarily distract, though perhaps I should have been less
diplomatic.
I also recognized that as someone who seemed to be subscribing to the
Derrida view of metaphor (although actually on that view to call a
phrase metaphorical is to say nothing at all because the distinction
is denied as you say) in which case it is "metaphor".
I would say that "form of life" is not a metaphor in the strictest
sense. However, both "form" and "life" are highly polysemous and it
could be argued that there is a metaphor underlying the way that
the "form of life" is to be understood. A collection of rule-governed
activities is my reading, "life" meaning "activities engaged in as
part of living", which is metonymy or more precisely synecdoche,
and "form" meaning both the rule-governed nature of the activity and
a group of particular activities classified by reference to their
shared rules, i.e. there is both exhibiting a form and being a form.
It has been argued by some linguists that metaphor is key to
understanding polysemy, where we are not merely talking about the
same word having entirely different senses, but rather overlapping
and related senses, so some family resemblance words, on this view,
are understood through metaphor.
I am not entirely convinced of this view and I am not advocating it
(nor do I believe I have made a particularly exact or compelling case
for it), but knowing that it is out there and seems at least
plausible, I didn't want to debate the point.
ggos...@aol.com
In a message dated 8/7/03 8:07:20 PM, sceptic...@yahoo.com writes:
>I would say that "form of life" is not a metaphor in the strictest
>sense. However, both "form" and "life" are highly polysemous and it
>could be argued that there is a metaphor underlying the way that
>the "form of life" is to be understood. A collection of rule-governed
>activities is my reading, "life" meaning "activities engaged in as
>part of living", which is metonymy or more precisely synecdoche,
>and "form" meaning both the rule-governed nature of the activity and
>a group of particular activities classified by reference to their
>shared rules, i.e. there is both exhibiting a form and being a form.
>It has been argued by some linguists that metaphor is key to
>understanding polysemy, where we are not merely talking about the
>same word having entirely different senses, but rather overlapping
>and related senses, so some family resemblance words, on this view,
>are understood through metaphor.
An interesting idea and new to me. Thanks.
Gary
What a beautiful thought I am thinking
concerning a great speckled bird. . . .
-- from "The Great Speckled Bird"
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John
If you're interested, some of the literature on this topic includes:
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By.University of
Chicago,1980.
Johnson, Mark.The Body in the Mind.University of Chicago,1987.
Switser, Eve. From Etymology to Pragmatics. Cambridge University
Press,1990.
http://www.sfu.ca/~psimpson/colloqWWW.htm provides a brief online
introduction to some of the research.
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, ggoss123@a... wrote:
>
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bruce denner
> --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com,
> ggoss123@a... wrote:
> > Derrida and Metaphor
>
> > ("Form of life," by the way, is not a metaphor. It
> is not a case of giving something a name that
>>belongs to something else. It's just a family
>>resemblance word.)
I've said this before. I know know of no words that
aren't "family resemblance", i.e., concepts And, a
metaphor isn't a "name that belongs" (that's the
Augustinian picture). A metaphor is an invention that
(if it works) creates a new concept.
> I also recognized that as someone who seemed to be
> subscribing to the Derrida view of metaphor...is to
>say nothing at all
Yes and No. My point is that Derrida doesn't trade in
naturalized concepts.
Can I take back "metaphor" and use "figure of speech?"
My point doesn't change.
> I would say that "form of life" is not a metaphor
If it isn't, then we can establish a protocol for
testing its reliability in application. As a
researcher I would't know where to begin.
John you go on to spell out some interesting
possibilities for the use of these metaphors. And
possibly they would be of interest to Anthropologists
or ethnomethodologists, folks who study everyday
behavior, but, as you already know, I question the
philosophical relevance.
> ggoss123@a... wrote:
> Unable to recognize a metaphor (in his structuralist
> isolation)
Structuralists are isolated only if you think there
are two realities, mental and material, and they are
trapped in one.
>Derrida "solves" the problem by saying that there is
>no non-deviant language --
Derrida solves no problems.
> What does Derrida(arch skeptic)) tells us about why
>he believes that there is a text?
1. D. is not a sceptic. He isn't asking "how mind
works" or is doubting some other account.
2. D. is not putting forth any beliefs, i.e., claims
to knowledge.
3. D works with texts because that is "level of
organization of philosophy", not individual
propositions.
>But within the confines of structuralist
>methodology, any such reality is explicitly excluded
>from consideration.
The empiricist's given, his sense-data, non-linguistic
pre-conceptual reality is what is excluded. More
precisely, nothing is excluded because all that stuff
are just metaphysical entities.
> As Garver notes, this theory makes us the pawns of
> linguistic structures rather than the masters of
> them. What a person really says is held to be
>determined_ by hidden meanings of the words rather
>than by th ordinary but tainted meanings the speaker
>appears to know.
Words like "pawns", "tainted"...are metaphos are in
the loose.
> "The largest, perhaps the most comprehensive,
> difference(actually more than a difference, a
genuine opposition) between Wittgenstein and Derrida
>...Derrida insists on the radically metaphorical
>nature of language, in the Nietzschean sense, and
>Wittgenstein insists on natural languages as
>socially viable
I'm sorry, but that sounds like word play. Difference
between metaphorical and radically metaphorical? If D
didn't think language viable, he'd be silent.
> Derrida has confused (perhaps deliberately) the
> false realism of a completely transparent
>metaphysics with the mundane realism
>of actually functioning societies which it would be
> merely mad to deny."
Mundane realism doesn't need philosophy. What Derrida
doesn't deny Reality, but that all that talk about
Reality, mundane or otherwise, goes anywhere.
--- ggos...@aol.com wrote:
> If Bruce is correct, then any time a word is used,
> it is being used in a new and different way. This
> contradicts the essential notion that language must
>be repeatable. If a word means something new each
>time it is used, then it isn't being repeated.
Gary, you've finally got it!!! You just on the verge
of discovering the "diffearance." As you see, if a
word just means one thing (as in St A's picture( then
it's use is too restricted. If it can mean anything,
then it is meaningless. There must be a continuity
with difference. What's the alternative?
>Wittgenstein demonstrated that it does not make
>grammatical sense to claim that objects do or do
>not exist (on the philosophical level, not the
>naturalistic level).
Great, philosophical. No more pass the salt as
evidence. It's a conceptual problem.
Now, show me the grammatical error in wondering just
what object deserves the attribution of "existence."
bruce
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Michael_Dorfman
>
> I recently sent, as an example of Derrida criticism,
> two quotes from Margolis. The example I'm going to discuss
> here comes from the writings of Newton Garver, who
> puts emphasis on the conflict between Derrida's
> structuralism (language is a self-enclosed structure
> with nothing beyond the text)
> and Derrida's claim that all language is metaphorical.
> Both statements are, in my view, misleading, but put that aside.
Oh, let's not put that aside. Because I think that the issue of
which "statements" above are misleading gets straight to the heart
of the matter.
It would appear that (at least) somebody here is confused: perhaps
it is me, perhaps it is Newton Garver, perhaps it is Derrida.
So let's break the "statements" down into a few component parts, and
see what we find.
First, we have a reference to "Derrida's structuralism", which sets
up red flags all over the place-- Derrida's fame (in the English
speaking world, at least) rests, in large part, from his attack on
structuralism, and Derrida is generally considered to be one of the
primary forces connected with post-Structuralism. To refer
to "Derrida's structuralism", as if such a thing existed, does not
bode well. Has Garver given any indication in his writings (of
which I am completely ignorant) of ever having actually read Derrida?
Next, we have an apparent explanation of "Derrida's structuralism"
(to wit: "language is a self-enclosed structure with nothing beyond
the text") which manages to simultaneously represent neither
structuralism nor Derrida's thought. Derrida's (in)famous
statement, that there is nothing outside the text, has been
explicated by him so many times as to leave one speechless at the
possibility that a commentator like Garver could still get it wrong.
I'll post here a brief passage by Simon Critchley, who I think
clears up this misunderstanding quite succinctly, although I could
do the same through direct references to Derrida, if anyone prefers.
Here, then, is Critchley:
"[Everybody now knows]that Derrida siad 'There is nothing outside the
text.' But what does this mean? Roughly this, that the field of
what Derrida variously calls textuality, the general text, or
context, is a limitless network of differentially ordered signs
which is not preceded by any meaning, presence or transcendental
signified, but rather which constitutes each of the latter. Derrida
extends the concept of the written sign which, from Plato's Phaedrus
onwards is characterised in terms of iterability and absence and
thus breaking with the permanent presence of speech (one needs to
write because one's interlocutor is absent and what one writes can
be repeatedly cited) - to the entire field of experience. Thus
there is no experience of pure presence but only of chains of
differential marks. The linguistic sign is arbitrary and
differential and language is a system of differences without
positive terms and without an anchor in the plenitude of presence.
The present is constituted by a differential network of traces, that
Derrida calls the *movement of differance* taking place on the
surface of the general text or context. [...]Derrida offers as one
possible definition of deconstruction 'the effort to take this
limitless context into account.' To understand the general text as
limitless context and to rewrite Il n'y a pas de hors-text as Il n'y
a pas de hors-contexte, is important because it once again [...]
frees deconstruction from the charge of bibliophilia. A generalized
concept of the text deos not wish to turn the world into some vast
Borgesian library, nor does it wish to cut off reference from
some 'extra-textual' realm. Text *qua* context is glossed by
Derrida as 'the entire "real-history-of-the-world",' and this is
said in order to emphasize the fact that the word 'text' does not
suspend reference 'to history, to the world, to reality, to being,
and especially not to the other.' Derrida's point is that all of the
latter appear in an experience which is not an experience of
presence, but rather the experience of a network of differentially
signifying traces which are constitutive of meaning."
It would seem that Garver is reading Derrida quite recklessly, if at
all.
We then find a reference to "Derrida's claim that all language is
metaphorical." I hate to be as old-fashioned as to ask for a
citation, but having read Derrida's work on Metaphor, I have trouble
imagining him putting matters quite that way. The question of
metaphor relies (as you indicate below) on a notion of what
is "proper" to language, a question which is by no means closed.
Certainly there is speech which is clearly metaphorical; just as
certainly, there is speech which appears, on first blush, to be less
so-- but upon closer examination, can we say, with any confidence
that the "leg" in "the leg of the table" is derivative of "leg" as a
body part, or is the body part metaphorical of "leg" as "that
vertical appendage which supports a body"? And what of the "body"
here? Metaphor, or not? Is the use of the word "metaphor" itself
metaphorical, since it means (in Greek) to transport across?
In any event, would metaphor in any way conflict with the notion
that there is nothing outside the text, that is to say, as Critchley
does, that our human experience is not a direct experience of
presence, but rather the experience of a network of differentially
signifying traces which are constitutive of meaning? Quite the
contrary, I'd say-- the ubiquity of metaphor would be, in fact,
indicative of this condition.
I'd go on, but that seems enough for now. Is there anyone who
actually thinks that Garver has scored a point here, or was this
posted as an example of the shoddy work of those attempting to
critique Derrida without going to the bother of reading his work?
Michael Dorfman
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John
I may respond to some of the other comments when and if time permits,
but I wanted to respond to the part specifically addressed to me:
>
> John you go on to spell out some interesting
> possibilities for the use of these metaphors. And
> possibly they would be of interest to Anthropologists
> or ethnomethodologists, folks who study everyday
> behavior, but, as you already know, I question the
> philosophical relevance.
>
The philosophical significance of this research (should it prove
successful) would be to, among other things, provide an account of
the rule-following which Wittgenstein shows to be so difficult to
account for but which obviously occurs, as at least in part a product
of our shared experiences of embodiment.
It might provide an account of linguistic convention that did not
depend entirely upon public behavior but also on a more substantive
account of the shared dispositions which allow us to interpret
eachother with an effectiveness that seems to defy what is publicly
available.
John
<blroadies@y...> wrote:
> --- John <scepticalwhimsy@y...> wrote:
> > --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com,
> > ggoss123@a... wrote:
> > > Derrida and Metaphor
> >
> > > ("Form of life," by the way, is not a metaphor. It
> > is not a case of giving something a name that
> >>belongs to something else. It's just a family
> >>resemblance word.)
>
> I've said this before. I know know of no words that
> aren't "family resemblance", i.e., concepts And, a
> metaphor isn't a "name that belongs" (that's the
> Augustinian picture). A metaphor is an invention that
> (if it works) creates a new concept.
>
That is not the more widespread usage of the word "metaphor" (though
as I have indicated, I do recognize extensions of the term,
extensions which are themselves metaphorical). Metaphors are figures
of speech which use a word or expression typically used to designate
one thing and apply them to another, implying a comparison. It is
atypicality which characterizes metaphor in the normal sense of the
word, but uncovering metaphors concealed in our typical uses of words
is an interesting pastime.
> > I also recognized that as someone who seemed to be
> > subscribing to the Derrida view of metaphor...is to
> >say nothing at all
>
> Yes and No. My point is that Derrida doesn't trade in
> naturalized concepts.
>
We've tried to clarify this elsewhere. I remain not entirely clear
about the distinction.
> Can I take back "metaphor" and use "figure of speech?"
> My point doesn't change.
>
If every word or phrase is a metaphor, then every word or phrase is
also a figure of speech, so the point that, given that premiss,
calling a word or phrase a metaphor adds nothing applies equally if
you change it to "figure of speech."
> > I would say that "form of life" is not a metaphor
>
> If it isn't, then we can establish a protocol for
> testing its reliability in application. As a
> researcher I would't know where to begin.
>
As an anthropologist, could you share with us what would constitute
a "research protocol" for testing the "reliability in application" of
the words "culture", "custom", or "institution"(all of which conceal
metaphors incidentally) as the terms would be used in your field?
This would give us a clearer idea of what you are asking for and at
the same time I suspect it would lead you closer to your own answer.
I really don't see the reasoning behind equating being a metaphor
with whether it can be reliably applied.
On the one hand, there are many words whose metaphorical roots are so
obscure as to play negligible role in our ability to understand them,
but which still present serious difficulties when we try to define
them with any precision. "Good", "beautiful", and "just" come to
mind. "Fact" and "truth" present their difficulties of their own,
although a "research protocol" is itself actually an example of how
these are applied.
If you object that the problem here is with their normative
character, less normative are the terms "art" and "religion", whose
metaphorical roots are still fairly obscure. "Game" doesn't seem
normative at all and it's metaphorical basis is quite well hidden,
but there's no necessary and sufficient conditions definition.
On the other hand, there are words whose origins are clearly
metaphorical which we nevertheless apply with some degree of
consistency. Referring to a musical pitch as "higher" or "lower" is
metaphorical (although it is a metaphor so ubiquitous as to typically
escape notice and become a case of polysemy). Would you say that
therefore the term cannot be applied with some reliability?
"Depression" is another polysemous word whose uses in psychology and
economics are clearly metaphorical (though somewhat concealed by
their ubiquity) and yet there are fairly standardized procedures for
appying it in both those fields.
For a more clearly metaphorical example, a perhaps less erudite and
enlightened acquaintance of mine is fond of referring to some women
as "hogs." This is clearly metaphorical, yet I could with reasonable
degree of accuracy anticipate when this epithet was likely to come
from his mouth.
Interestingly, I have other acquaintances who sometimes refer to men
as "pigs", an apparently similar metaphor, but with rather different
criteria for application. Coincidentally, I successfully predicted
that one of them would refer to the acquaintance mentioned previously
in just that way.
Were one so inclined, I suspect one could come up with some sort of
standard for their application, but the reason they are metaphors in
even the normal sense of the word (not just words with metaphorical
origins) is that they haven't yet become standardized.
> John you go on to spell out some interesting
> possibilities for the use of these metaphors. And
> possibly they would be of interest to Anthropologists
> or ethnomethodologists, folks who study everyday
> behavior, but, as you already know, I question the
> philosophical relevance.
>
Replied earlier to this.
> > ggoss123@a... wrote:
>
> > Unable to recognize a metaphor (in his structuralist
> > isolation)
>
> Structuralists are isolated only if you think there
> are two realities, mental and material, and they are
> trapped in one.
>
> >Derrida "solves" the problem by saying that there is
> >no non-deviant language --
>
> Derrida solves no problems.
>
Can we quote you?
That's part of the argument against him.
> > Derrida has confused (perhaps deliberately) the
> > false realism of a completely transparent
> >metaphysics with the mundane realism
> >of actually functioning societies which it would be
> > merely mad to deny."
>
> Mundane realism doesn't need philosophy. What Derrida
> doesn't deny Reality, but that all that talk about
> Reality, mundane or otherwise, goes anywhere.
>
If talk about reality, including "mundane" is said to go nowhere,
then maybe "mundane realism" does need a philosophical defense.
> --- ggoss123@a... wrote:
>
> > If Bruce is correct, then any time a word is used,
> > it is being used in a new and different way. This
> > contradicts the essential notion that language must
> >be repeatable. If a word means something new each
> >time it is used, then it isn't being repeated.
>
> Gary, you've finally got it!!! You just on the verge
> of discovering the "diffearance." As you see, if a
> word just means one thing (as in St A's picture( then
> it's use is too restricted. If it can mean anything,
> then it is meaningless. There must be a continuity
> with difference. What's the alternative?
>
> >Wittgenstein demonstrated that it does not make
> >grammatical sense to claim that objects do or do
> >not exist (on the philosophical level, not the
> >naturalistic level).
>
Gary, can you perhaps help me with this philosophical/naturalistic
distinction since you seem to get it? What use of the word "object"
even makes sense apart from a naturalistic context?
> Great, philosophical. No more pass the salt as
> evidence. It's a conceptual problem.
>
> Now, show me the grammatical error in wondering just
> what object deserves the attribution of "existence."
>
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