the given as real, and mix-and-match realism
M Murphy
> Dear M. J.,
>
> That
> is expressly part of my interpretation, and no argument against it. In my
> list of aspects, I expressly incorporate this aspect as relativist aspect
> number five. But I seek to show that there is more to Wittgenstein than
> just this one aspect of him. Namely, I find 22 more aspects to him,
> fifteen of which are realist. What Wittgenstein specifically finds
> puzzling about "There are physical objects" doesn't change this list of
> aspects, since whatever it is would simply be contained in relativist
> aspect number five.
-----------
A very general and perhaps vague remark here. Put this way, it is as
though the "realist" LW "defeats" the "relativist" LW by weight of
force, as it were, the greater number of pro-realist aspects simply
outweighing the relativist ones. This seems to imply that the
arguments of LW the relativist simply fail against the arguments of LW
the realist, which seems to imply that one can set LW against
himself--that some of his arguments contradict others. I would agree
with this to a certain extent, on this and several other topics, but I
also think the relativist/non-relativist (I wont say realist yet)
sides integrate rather neatly in LW, as opposed to some of the
philosophers who were influenced by him--Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, and
a few others. That is, with Wittgenstein, one can live in the same
world and yet have incommensurable paradigms.
[clip]
You write:
> I do speak of
> Wittgenstein's "nondescript physicalism," meaning only by "physicalism"
> that for Wittgenstein these things are are as they are independently of
> our minds, concepts, and languages, and meaning by "nondescript" that he
> is not committed to any particular philosophical theory of physical
> objects. If the phrase "nondescript physicalism" is confusing, please
> discard it! It's not necessary to my book.
Then you quote Butchvarov and his definition of realism:
> Very roughly, I shall mean by...realism with respect to x the
> view that (1) x exists and has certain properties, a nature, and
> (2) that its existence and nature are independent of our
> awareness of it, (3) of the manner in which we think of
> (conceptualize) it, and (4) of the manner in which we speak of
> it. (Butchvarov 1989: 3)
--
On this definition I would probably concede that LW is a realist. But
then can you tell me who isn't? (I am not being glib; a quick list of
relativists under your view would be nice). That is, I don't know of
any philosophers who can be considered through and through skeptic--as
someone once said, skepticism is a view one can entertain, not really
commit too. In Hume, Feyerabend, Rorty, Goodman, Derrida, and etc.,
it is almost always possible to find a place where they in effect
renege on their solipsism/skepticism--in other words admit that there
are things that satisfy at least a few of Butchvarov's 1) through 4).
The problem with skeptical philosophers is not their inevitable degree
of realism, but that they cannot really square their realism with
certain other assumptions that they make (that we are immediately
aware only of our own perceptions, etc.).
Maybe you can expand a bit on Carnap in particular. My understanding
is that while Logical Structure hovers between choosing a phenomonal
vs. physical vocabulary as basic, by Unity of Science Carnap is
treating the observation language as a sub-vocabulary of the language
of physical objects, to ensure the intersubjectivity of perception (to
ensure several of your conditions above, in other words). I have
thought his relativism applied entirely to our choice of (crudely put)
various Logics--our means of representing the `given' in a technical
language.
[clip]
> As to clouds and rainbows, if they are publicly given, are as
> they are independently of how we conceptualize or speak about them,
> remain the same clouds and rainbows through changes, and are ultimate
> subjects of predication, they are astonishingly like Aristotelian
> substances, whether they are strictly Aristotelian substances or
> not. I would suggest that they are virtually substances, if they are
> not strictly substances.
----
Just questions here:
If a cloud splits in two, do both resultant clouds have an individual
substance, or do they share a single substance?
Also, can you give a brief definition of what is and is not an
"ultimate subject of predication"? I am not sure I am understanding
you correctly here?
Cheers,
M.J. Murphy
`The shapes of things are dumb.'
-L. Wittgenstein
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