[analytic-borders] Since the Searlean question has grown quiet . . .
swmaerske
the one that survived after our former host shut down the open list
he'd set up for non-DRTsts to come and learn about DRT. Because it
was presented as a briefing to the list members about Wittgenstein, I
naturally opened it to take a look. Essentially, it seems to me to be
a fairly superficial and mostly inaccurate rendering of
Wittgenstein's ideas, presented as a "warning" to others on that list
so they would not be snookered should they inadvertently stumble
across Wittgensteinians, based on the model that forewarened is
forearmed. I was wondering what some here might have to say about
this:
Ludwig Wittgenstein had two different philosophies. They are usually
called as Wittgenstein's "earlier" and "later" philosophies. Both of
his philosophies had great influence on other philosophers. His first
philosophy was the main motivation which led to the rise of logical
positivism. His later philosophy had even moe attractions for other
philosophers and also for those who were not professional
philosophers but had some interests in philosophy.
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is one of the paradigmatic examples of
"anti-realism". Anti-realistic philosophies have always been
appealing to most people, specially to the laymen, because the laymen
have difficulties to accept the existence of abstract objects. Of
course there are many professional philosophers too who are anti-
realists, but the majority of anti-realists can be found among the
laymen and those who are beginners in philosophy.
Wittgenstein's semantics and philosophy of language is a flawed and
anti-realistic philosophy which is ONLY interesting to be studied and
understood in order to get prepared NOT to embrace it and other
similar philosophies. BUT Wittgenstein's followers do not have a
critical approach towards that philosophy. They have gradually
changed to blind and close-minded members of a cult who worship an
idol without questioning it. From what I have seen and read
of them so far, they never sit and think about what critics say;
their mere concern is to think of how to reject and reply to the
criticisms. Wittgenstein's later philosophy has changed to a religion
with fanatic followers.
My main aim in this post is just to warn against Wittgenstein's
philosophy. A thorough description and criticism of his philosophy is
beyond the scope of this post and its aim. However I will just list
some of the major unacceptable features of his philosophy:
1- Anti-realism:
Wittgenstein in his later philosophy, relates the notion of "truth"
to the community of human beings and their language games as if there
couldn't have been any truths if there was no human community. This
leads to anti-realism.
2- Confusion between sentence, statement and proposition:
Wittgenstein is well-known for his inadequate command on philosophy
of logic. But one of his most obvious mistakes was to confuse
sentences with propositions.
3- Confusing semantics with pragmatics:
By identifying or at least relating "meaning" with "use" of language,
Wittgenstein confuses between semantics and pragmatics.
It is wroth mentioning that every philosopher has made mistakes in
his career. Therefore one who respects a philosopher should have
critical approach towards his philosophy. This is exactly what
Kripkean philosophers do. Their great respect towards Kripke never
prevent them from criticizing him. BUT most unfortunately, followers
of Wittgenstein have made a religion out of his philosophy.
Since I know that there are a large number of websites and mailing
lists created by this fanatic folk, I felt it as my duty to warn you
all against them and the way they philosophise.
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paulaustinmurphy
propositions". The obvious question to ask here is: What do you take
propositions to be? In the past there have been many candidates for
the proposition role (some of which, admittedly, were variations on a
theme). For example, are propositions the meanings of sentences (or
their "senses" or the "modes of presentations")? Are they the
denotations of sentences? Or, the current popular choice, the sets of
possible worlds that make a sentence true?
You clearly think that there is a vital distinction to be made
between sentences and propositions. You mentioned "abstract objects"
early in your posting. Perhaps you think that propositions are
abstract objects of some description.
It can be accepted that propositions may be distinguishable from
particular sentences, but not that they can exist separately from all
sentences. And if they necessarily require sentences to be the
propositions they are, then perhaps propositions shouldn't have so
much kudos attached to them. For example, it is easy to accept that
the following sentences express the same proposition:
#) "Tony Blair is a liar."
##) "The current incumbent in Number Ten is known to tell lies."
(Actually, they are not exact equivalents. And if two sentences can't
be exact equivalents, then perhaps it is incorrect to speak of their
shared proposition.)Here's Quine on meanings rather than
propositions, but the argument is more r less the same:
"…the *having* of meanings [or propositions], which is
significance, and *sameness* of meaning [or proposition], or
synonymy. What is called *giving* the meaning [or proposition]of an
utterance is simply the uttering of a synonym, couched, ordinarily,
in clearer language than the original." ( 'On What There Is', 1948)
So it could be said that #) and ##) above are simply synonyms. When
we say that #) and ##) are the same proposition, we mean that ##)
is "simply the uttering of a synonym". Or if #) came second, that
would be "simply the uttering of a synonym". (It need not
be "clearer" as Quine said, simply different.) So it the synonymous
nature, or near-synonymous nature, of sentences that makes us think
in terms of propositions. They are indeed all - nearly - saying the
same thing, but not by virtue of a proposition (unless the concept
[proposition] is fleshed out in an acceptable way).
We could say that they express the same proposition, that of Blair
telling lies. However, could that proposition escape all sentential
expressions? Simply because earlier it was written Blair telling lies
without inverted commas, that does not make the fact or state of
affairs escape all sentential expressions. Sentences individuate and
determine the facts and states of affairs. The fact of Blair telling
lies is a gerrymandered entity, that is cut off the before, the
after, and the surrounding of Blair telling lies. The world has been
cut up, not only by the sentence, but also by the proposition that
requires sentences and, therefore, is sentences (the set of sentences
which say the same thing).
Again, it all depends on what you mean by "propositions".
It can be admitted that what constitutes a proposition (facts, truth
conditions, abstract objects, possible worlds, take your pick) exist
separately from all sentences, but not the proposition itself. Books
can exist separately from libraries, but when they are brought
together, they constitute a library but were not themselves libraries
before they were brought together. Many mind-independent things may
be necessary, perhaps, for propositions, but only these things *plus*
sentences (and minds) are sufficient for propositions. This is what
makes the metaphysical realist make a fundamental mistake. Many of
the constituents of truth, truth conditions, propositions etc. may
indeed be mind-independent, or even abstract, and therefore separate
and separable from sentences. Many realists therefore sometimes
conclude that truth, truth conditions, propositions etc. are
separable from sentences (and minds).
Is your "abstract object" non-spatiotemporal or simply mind-
independent (or both)? If it is non-spatiotemporal, how do we have
causal access to it? If it is mind-independent, then why are we
speaking about it?
It's best to leave this account of propositions until you tell us
what your particular take on propositions is and what they are.
*) However, many of the points made earlier about propositions can be
now made with your account of Wittgenstein's notion of truth. You
wrote that Wittgenstein "relates the notion of 'truth' to the
community of human beings and their language games". Do you believe
that truth could exist "if there was no human community"? Again, the
things that may *constitute* truth may exist with "no human
community". And the things that truths are *about* may exist with the
same things. But truths themselves? Again, it depends on what you
take truth or truths to be (there's a new candidate for the job
almost every week).
The implication from what you wrote is that you think that truths can
exist without minds (or at least without human communities). This
sounds like a very strange conception of truth. Truths, on this
reading, have nothing to do with sentences, statements and minds. So
what are they?
Perhaps all that Wittgenstein meant (whatever work you are referring
to) is that truths are dependent on communities (that is, their
formulations), but not what they are about. However, this may be
putting into Wittgenstein's mouth the position articulated above. He
could, however, be deemed anti-realist about truth, but not anti-
realist about *what truths are about or about* - what is necessary
but not sufficient for truth. It's hard to say unless one is an
expert on what Wittgenstein's notion of truth was at a particular
time.
*) It is easy to see your general point about Wittgenstein worship.
There seems to be some kind of Wittgenstein Industry within analytic
philosophy, and outside it for that matter. Many of us don't like to
say much about Wittgenstein in case we are shot down in flames by a
Wittgenstein expert or a soi-disant Wittgenstein expert. There are
many reasons for his massive fame and veneration. The prime reason
is that he was a great philosophy (if an infuriating one, like
Derrida). Other reasons for his fames, less acceptable perhaps, are
his gnomic utterances that seem to appeal to those who don't like
hard argumentation. However, those who do like hard argumentation
also love Wittgenstein. His unconventional lifestyle may also be part
of the appeal (he was suspicious of philosophy and academia, despite
the fact that he was an academic for quite a long time). He
formulated two very different philosophies (although certain
commentators stress the similarities between late and early
Wittgenstein rather than the dissimilarities). His prose style was
also, one could say, quite flamboyant (plenty of metaphors, similes,
analogies, stories etc). And the subjects he covered (life, death,
existence, religion, the mystical, etc.) must also be part of the
appeal. And also because he is deemed to be the ultimate intellect
(which he may well have been). This fact alone often means that many
lesser minds are overawed by Wittgenstein and therefore embrace him.
However, we mustn't single out Wittgenstein as the sole object of
veneration within and outside analytic philosophy. The same could be
said of Frege. And, to a lesser extent, any great philosopher within
the analytic tradition (fill in the blanks here yourself).
Best to leave it there for now.
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swmaerske
everything else. Also, your points about the notions of truth and
Wittgenstein are useful and well put. However, I wasn't clear from
what you were writing if you were directing your comments to me. If
you were, you may have misread my post. I was not posting my
positions but the comments of another for reaction by members of this
list. In fact I hold views largely similar to yours (except if you
hold it to be the case that Tony Blair is, in fact, a liar with
regard to the Iraq War . . . I happen to think he is not, though I
have no opinion on any of his other other non-Iraq related claims
made in the course of his political career in Britain). It's a pity I
don't feel free to post your response to the claimant who wrote the
material I placed here back on his list. I would dearly like to see
his rejoinder to, if any, your very perspicacious points about
propositions and truth. -- SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "paulaustinmurphy"