[analytic-borders] Rob on the standard meter
Kelvin Mcqueen
Rob, in this discussion, there is one thing that we have to keep in mind,
and have as our common ground of agreement, and that's this:
Wittgenstein's exact words are:
"There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter
long, nor that it is not one meter long, and that is the standard meter in
Paris"
(As a side note, consider another idiotic thing that Witt says at PI50: he
talks of the colour sepia being preserved as a standard in a similar way
and says: "Then it will not make sense to say of this sample either that
it is of this colour or that it is not". But, against Witt, we can easily
imagine a context in which it makes sense. Imagine that this place in
Paris is opened up as is a museum. A mother walks her child through, the
child then, pointing at the standard for sepia asks: "Mum, what's that
colour called?" the mother then replies "that colour is sepia". Now do you
seriously think the tour guide is going to say "Um excuse me miss, but
what you said is actually just nonsense", or do you think the mother would
say to the child "well actually what your pointing to is neither coloured
nor colourless". COME ON ROB!).
Now onto your strained attempts to try and dig Wittgenstein out of this
hole:
(And lets keep in mind what started this all off - Wittgenstein identifies
the analytic with the a priori with the necessary. In giving this example
I was trying to show a place in which Wittgenstein's identifications lead
to an extremely strained and confused remark. (i.e. his inability to
distinguish the necessary from the a priori (and then with te analytic
(and then with philosophy)) The confusions reside once we breath a sigh of
relief through the frameword of the contingent a priori.)
>
> > Wittgenstein is imputing a certain property onto the stick -
> > the property of being immune from measurement.
>
> No, this is wrong. He is pointing out that it has a _role_
> in the metric system of measurement and that, as we shall
> see, that role entails that it is "immune from", precluded from
> measurement _in that metric system_. He never denied that it
> could be measured in the Imperial (or whatever else) system
> and found to be 39.3... whatever inches long!
Look at Rob squirm! This claim you make here is totally ad hoc, but you
nonetheless repeat it throughout your post. All I need to do is, instead
of saying that he is imputing the property of being immune from
measurement onto S, is say that, he is imputing the property of being
immune from measurement WITHIN THAT SYSTEM onto S (ho hum). And when I do
this, all my arguments still apply, and so below, you have no
counterargument whatsover. So I may as well stop here - but I won't.
Moreover you actually try to say that I am imputing things onto
Wittgenstein that he never said and hence putting foward strawmans. Come
on Rob. What's happening is you are just desperatly picking up on the tiny
detail about me not specifying which metric system I was talking about (of
course, I did not think I needed to specify that, as I did not expect such
an ad hoc responce).
(Perhaps deep down you realise that if this example of Witt's doesn't
work, then neither does his identification of the a priori with the
necessary with the analytic, and then of course his entire philosophy
collapses?)
>
> > Not what I was saying at all. No matter what role the stick plays in
> > whatever context, we cannot make the stick immune from measurement.
>
> We do not "make it immune" from measurement, its logical role in the
> metric system "makes in immune" from measurement - i.e. logically
> precludes it from measurement _within that system_. That is what it
> means for _it_ to be the standard metre. And I will explain why
> further
> below.
See! So now I am just going to say: No matter what role the stick plays in
whatever context, we cannot make it immune from measurement within its
system. (Consider the museum example again. A child, after hearing that S
is actually the standard, may pull out his own meter rule (within the
system), and go up to S and measure it. "It's one meter long alright" he
might say.)
> > > What it _means_ to say, of any X, that X is one meter long is that
> > > the
> > > length of X is equal to the length of S.
>
> > That is prima facie false.
>
> That is absolutely true because that is what "one metre" means
> and that is what it means for S to be the standard metre.
>
> > The end millimeter of the stick might
> > disintegrate,
>
> If this happened to S then we would be in trouble.
No we wouldn't be. If a terrorist strapped himself and ran into the Paris
vault, we would not experience a break down in society, I don't think
anything would happen. Maybe they would build a new S out of all the S*'s
that are out there.
> That is
> precisely why a so far as possible non-corroding, chemically
> stable platinum-irridium (or whatever) bar was chosen as S
> and kept under the physical conditions that I described!
>
lol. Really? Well the French do go a bit over board sometimes.
Of course, it is still possible that the end of the stick can
disintegrate!
> > that doesn't mean that when I say of something that it is a
> > meter long, I really MEAN that it is 999 millimeters long!
>
> Of course not!
>
What? So what? So if the end of the standard disentegrates by a
millimeter, we don't mean by "one meter" "the length of S"? But you said
earlier that that is what we mean? You are in a real pickle here, I cannot
see any way of squirming out of it.
> > I think what you want to say is "X is one meter long means that the
> > length of X is equal to the length of S at t1" (e.g. time of
> > stipluation).
>
> Oh no, Kelvin. That is what _Kripke_ wants to say and it is most
> certainly
> not what I want to say and is most certainly not what those setting up
> the
> metric system said, either! Just look what a mess Kripke has got into
> now!
> Wow! What about any other time tn! Wow. "one metre" was NOT defined
> as the length of the bar S at time t1, it was (we now have a new
> standard)
> defined as the length of the bar at _temperature_ t0 (which I cannot
> off hand remember, since temperature has an effect of the length of
> things,
> while we _assume_ that time, in itself, does not). And Kripke's
> assumption that "
> one metre" is defined as the length of S at _time_ t1 is absolutely
> wrong factually
> and leads to complete and utter confusion. _Kripke_ in order to make
> "one
> metre" into a _rigid designator_ of the sort that he thinks his
> metaphysical
> theorising requires, _ties_ it to time t1 but t1 is some completely
> mythical and
> unspecified time,
It's not mythical, it was the time when the metric system, and the stick S
was firct constructed. Ever since many meter rules have been made, and
during that time, maybe the end of S has disintegrated. All the other
meter rules are not wrong because of this, and why is that? Simply because
the reference of "one meter" was fixed at the intial construction of the
metric system.
> it never was and never will be specified and this
> just goes to
> prove that Kripke is indulging in metaphysical myth making to attain
> his
> imaginary metaphysical ends! His notion is a disaster for the simple
> reason
> that if he does define it so then once the instant t1 has passed he no
> longer
> has a standard metre and therefore no longer has a metric system of
> measurement at all and so there is no longer any question of measuring
> any objects at all using that now non-existent system with its
> nonexistent
> standard metre!
Bahh! Now you are stepping into the shoes of the scpetic! Yes the time of
the "reference fixing ceremony" has passed, but so what? We have made
plenty of meter rules based on that intial standard, we still have them.
We still have the enduring S - all these represent the length of S at t1.
Now you come along with your scpetical scenario: "but thats in the past
and now we can no longer be sure" - well whopdy doo Sextus Empiricus!
> And so Kripke is talking about a philosophical
> metaphysical
> myth of his own manufacture, NOT the metric system that we in fact use
> to
> measure lengths!
Let me guess, this is the point where you start to try and accuse Kripke
of being a Platonist? Because of this little sceptical scenario you
create? Come on Rob!
> And this is part of my original point in telling you
> that when
> the standard metre is defined "one metre" does not thereupon Ascend
> into
> the Platonic Heaven (or anywhere else) there to serve as the basis for
> the
> metric system!
Crikey!
> and against which to measure the bar S at T3! or to
> serve as
> the "meaning" of "one metre"! And you and Kripke need to _think_ about
> this!
> And not try to find some way of playing with words like abstract
> platonic
> notions of "property" or (Kripke's preferred) "a certain length" that
> the creators
> of the standard "had in mind" ... at t1 or whenever... What I say later
> might
> explain a bit more why....
>
Well I hope so :)
> > > That is what it _means_ for S
> > > to _be_ the standard metre and for anything to be one metre long.
> > > Therefore all that it could mean to say that S is one metre long
> > > is
> > > that the length of S is equal to the length of S.
>
> > Not quite. To say that S is one meter long is to say that the length
> > of S
> > at t2 is equal to the length of S at t1.
>
> What a mess. How do you compare the length of S@t2 with the
> length of S@t1? Did that length just float off into the Platonic
> heaven to sit there so that you could measure against it? You
> think you tell a little story about this shortly but your story does
> not work, it does not show what you think it does!
>
If my goal was to defeat scepticism, then I think I would have to posit a
platonic heaven. But that is not my goal. Yes we cannot make that exact
comparison any more, however, we make the assumption that all the meter
rules constructed from S, and then all the meter rules constructed from
those meter rules, and even that S at t2, all measure the same as what the
reference of "one meter" was fixed as - as the length of S at t1. As you
say, we cannot go back in time to make the comparison - but all you can
conclude from that is that 'we cannot know for certain that a particular
stick (e.g. S at t2) is REALLY one meter long'. But so what, we know
nothing for certain.
> > > And that is just an instance of the "law" of identity: for all A,
> > > A=A.
> > > And that is all your "contingent
> > > fact" amounts to! And I very much doubt that this is a
> > > _contingent_
> > > truth or _synthetic_ truth whether a "truth" at all and whether or
> > > not
> > > a-priori.
> >
> > An instance of the law of identity: the length of S at t1 is equal to
> > the
> > length of S at t1. Yeap.
>
> Yeap. And this gets us nowhere, tells us nothing. Agreed.
>
Yeap. (a priori truths typically don't tell us much - even when they are
contingent.)
> I would happily go into this but will stick with "S is one metre long"
> for
> now....[ When naming a child one is not, I would think, _defining_
> anything. So what Kripke wants to say is that "one metre" is a proper
> name like "Bob" or "Hesperus", hence his talk about "baptism".
No, just names - they don't need to be proper. "Baptism" is just another
term he would use for "reference fixing" you don't need to take it that
literally.
> (Were
> the committee who set up the metric system carrying out a baptism?)
> Is that really so? Is "red" also a proper name in this way? If not why
> not ?
Sure, there is nothing in Kripke that rules out vague terms being rigid
designators (again, they need not be proper).
> and why then is "one metre"? Of course you could _talk_ them into
> being
> so, so long as you hurry about populating some surrogate Platonic
> Heaven
> with "entities" to serve as the designata of you purported "rigid
> designators"! what earthly use this would be I do not know!]
>
These are strange criticisms, Bruce has been doing this to me lately. So
if i'm criticising Wittgenstein, I must be a Platonist? O.k.
> > So for you, it is a contingent a priori
> > truth that your son is called "Bob". - Notice I never mentioned a
> > Platonic
> > heaven.
>
> I know you did not, but your and Kripke's argument regarding S
> implicitly
> assumes it or some surrogate for it! - namely that "the length of S @
> t1"
> exists now in some form somewhere! - as the "thing" "rigidly
> designated"
> by the words "one metre"!
The only argument you have so far provided for this claim, is basically
that Kripke and I must be Platonists, if we are to defeat 'measurement
scepticism'. But as I stated in my "private language and scepticism" post,
I do not try and defeat scepticism, therefore, I need not assume
platonism.
> And some such assumption is essential to
> Kripke's _metaphysics_.
What metaphysics? He is doing phil of language, not metaphysics!
> (Hesperus _might_ rigidly designate the planet Venus, and I can even
> point
> at Venus, but what use a rigid designator designating Venus or its
> diameter
> at time t1 would be to anyone I do not know.)
>
We keep track of what X is at t1 by trying to preserve the length of X as
of t1 and by making plenty copies of what X was like at t1. Of course, the
sceptic may come along and say "but how can you be certain". Answer: we
can't - but does that imply that we don't know what we mean by "one
meter"? Surely Wittgenstein would not agree, in fact (for some confused
reason) he thought that we use names without a fixed meaning).
>
> > > You see, one way of putting it is to say that once that particular
> > > object
> > > has been chosen as the standard metre its _role_ becomes quite
> > > special and extraordinary, _it_ becomes a part of the _grammar_
> > > of the language-game of metric measurement. It is what _measures_,
> > > and what does the measuring cannot measure itself.
> >
> > Now your getting tangled in the rules governing the use of your
> > terms. A
> > stick does not measure anything PEOPLE measure things (and they do it
> > with
> > the stick).
> > Once this linguistic confusion is cleared up, we can see how
> > easy it is to measure S. Given that PEOPLE measure things (not
> > sticks), a
> > person can take another stick, 'S*', and make it the same length as
> > S.
> > They can then use S* to measure things. They can use S* to measure
> > S!
> > Therefore S can be measured.
>
> How sweet. Good try, but no cigar. If they now take S* as the standard
> of measuring things and the standard of what "one metre" means they
> are no longer using the metric system (M), but a new system which we
> could call the metric* system (M*)!
Ummm, the standard I use, to work out whether something is a meter, is my
meter rule - but I am not using a different system just because I can't go
all the way to paris and use S!
> (And if you do not do this then
> what
> is the point of laying S* alongside S to measure it?
I gave an example of a child doing it for fun above. Another purpose for
doing so would be to check whether or not the end of S has disintegrated!
> Which bar is
> being
> used to measure which? and in _what units_, how defined? Unless you
> can answer these questions your act of measuring is just an _empty
> ceremony_. Do you see the point?)
The usual units are being used. We can quite easily imagine an annual
ceremony in which it is checked and verfied that S has stayed the same
length, and has not disintegrated at all - and this check would be done
with a whole bunch of S*'s (a whole bunch just to make sure (and don't say
that we cannot, on the basis of these S*'s be certain, given that they are
not the original stadards - for that is nothing more than a sceptical
scenario)).
> Now M* might be quite "close" to the
> original metric system (M) but is in fact a different language-game,
> based
> on a different standard S*!
Do you see what you are doing here? M* might be "close" --- but we cannot
be CERTAIN that it is identical with M! You have constructed the notion of
M* out of the possibiltiy of a sceptical scenario - which just says to me
that your notion of M* has no worth here (giving that I never set out to
defeat the sceptic).
> And of course you could now find that the
> old bar (ex-S) was 1.001 metres* (where 1 meter* =length of S* in this
> new measuring system M*), but then you could just as well have
> measured
> S in the Imperial system and found it to be 39.37... or whatever
> _inches_ long.
So this is how you slip into speaking of the imperical system - nice!
> Neither I nor LW ever denied that it was meaningless to measure the
> original
> S in the Imperial system or the M* system of measurement, or to measure
> it
> against my leg and say that it is about the length of my inside leg!
> OK.
> I suspect that you might have rather hastily jumped to such a
> conclusion!
I never made that conclusion. You have imposed that on me by assuming that
we must defeat the "measurement scpetics"!
> Let me put it this way: Go back to the original S - if you measure S
> against
> some surrogate for S _in the metric system_, say my wooden metre stick
> S*
> in the shed, and find that S (which after all has no graduation marks
> on it!!!! if I am not mistaken) according to _my metre stick_ S* is
> 1.001
> "metres" long. What do we do now?
Good question. In this case, probably throw out S*. But what if 100 S*'s
which are much more trustworthy give us such a result? - Well, perhaps
some of S has disintegrated.
> Do we say that S is 1.001 "metres"
> or "metres*" long, or that my wooden metre stick is not very
> accurately
> calibrated? What do you think?
In this case, the latter.
> What is this ceremony of laying my
> carpenters metre rule against S supposed to be doing? What is
> measuring
> what? And what system and units of measurement is being used? How
> defined? Please explain.
>
I think I have done so already.
> Of course you (even Kripke does not make _this_ mistake!) can go
> through the motions of "measuring" S with S* and S** and S*** etc.,
> or any damn thing else you like, no one, neither LW or I ever denied
> _that_ - the question is when you do so what is the _meaning_ of what
> you are _doing_ and _saying_; when you then pronounce that S is one
> metre long! or 1.001 metre*s long!
>
I have given scenarios of what might be 'meant'.
> Let me just try to clarify a bit further Kripke's crippling mistake:
> He says that "one metre" rigidly designates the length that S
> had at time t1.
yeap.
> But of course that is not how the committee
> defined "one metre" they just defined it as the length of S a
> _temperature_ t0, and presumably stipulated some other things
> like that S would be lying horizontally rather than standing
> vertically because conceivably there might be some miniscule
> (but perhaps one day detectable) effect on its length due to
> vertical compression under its own weight, etc....
But, as I have argued, you need to add "at t1" on the end (for at t2 S may
have disintegrated somewhat).
> Now suppose
> they had, like Kripke, defined "one metre" as the length of S at
> _time_ t1. Can't you see immediately what a pickle they are in?
> At ANY t2 or t3 or t4, and so on add infinitum, they do not know
> whether their _system of measurement_ has become _unstable_
Here you are with your sceptical scenarios again. This is like saying that
we don't know that what I experience is anything like what is in the
external world, because I cannot compare my experience with whats in the
world. Ho hum.
> and now scientific statements or observations from yesterday
> may no longer be commensurable with statements today! What a
> pickle!
That is perfectly imaginable. Although, perhaps "no longer commensurable"
is going a bit too far. If a terrorist runs into the paris vault and blows
it to peices do you really think that science is screwed?? Come on Rob -
it's time to give Wittgenstein up - we are in the post-kripkean era now!
> At every moment t1, t2, t3, t4, ..... t(infinity) they would
> have to run around like blue-arsed flies finding some other sticks
> presumably of even greater rigidity and durability than the original
> paltinum-irridium S to check from moment to moment whether their
> _metric system of measurement_ was still in sync with their original
> _time dependent_ definition!
Only if they had Cartesian inclinations and were deeply scared of not
having certainty.
> Or else form moment to moment they
> would just have to redefine one metre to be the length of S _now_,
> But what would that empty ceremony amount to! Can you imagine
> anything more utterly bloody daft? Why not just replace S by the
> other,
> presumably more stable wotnot that you are using to check it with, in
> the first place, forget bloody time t0 and just damn well get on with
> it as
> we infact do!!!!!!!!!!!!! Can't any sane person see at a glance what
> an utter and unmitigated _disaster_ Kripke's twaddle on this subject
> is!
Your Cartesianism has not, i'm afraid, shown that what Kripke says is
totally intuitive, as I think it is.
>
> You will say this is not the _point_ of Kripke's notion? But what then
> _is_ the point of it other than to furnish items for _his_
> Metaphysical
> Heaven, if not Plato's?!
>
> And then he says (N&N p. 56) that the statement
> "S is one metre" has the "_metaphysical_ status" of a contingent
> statement. Rubbish. "S is one metre" has the _cognitive_ status of
> A=A,
Here is a classical confusion between the epistemological and the
metaphysical. And might I add that Kripke was the first to properly
distinguish these - something Wittgenstein was incapable of and falls foul
of, for example, in his remarks about the standard meter.
You are right, "S is one metre" does have the same cognitive status as an
identity statement - Kripke agrees. Of course, this amounts to nothing
more than saying that it is a priori. But that epistemological point, has
no bearing on the metaphysical fact that S could have been a length other
than one meter! In other words it is contingent.
Therefore it is a contingent a priori truth that S is one meter!!!!
> If the length of S at time t1 is the designatum of the rigid
> designator
> "one metre" then why not have simply baptised the length of a piece
> of string as this and then chuck it away? Well "one metre" is now
> the rigid designator of this "length" and so we can just get on with
> it and use the word with out any bally hoo-haa about bars of platinum
> kept in palaces?!
With the string, it has hard to make copies, with the bars, it is easy to
make plenty of S*'s, and in doing so, we can use the S*'s to moniter and
maintain the length of S!
I have just snipped two "morals of the story" as they simply misrepresent
Kripke as doing metaphysics. Here is your third:
>
> Another moral of the story:
> As LW said: "Consider: the only necessity you can milk
> out of a proposition is an arbitrary rule". And I would suggest:
> give me a metaphysical necessary truth and I will show you
> an arbitrary rule or a degenerate statement or tautology such
> as A=A that has no content.
>
Well Rob, we are well and truly getting to the guts of things here!!
This quote of yours shows Wittgenstein idenitfying the necessary with the
analytic. So all I need to do is give you an example of a necessary a
posteriori:
(1) If this table exists then it is made of molecules
(2) Rob is not identical with Borat
Now, if these are true, then they could not be otherwise, therefore they
are true in all possible worlds and hence necessary. This is because the
bearers of rigid designators are being predicated with essential
properties.
Go on Rob. Save your hero Wittgenstein from the dominent trends in
contemporary analytic philosophy, go on, show me why these are arbitrary
rules!
ahhhh I love philosphy
Kelvin.
Kelvin Mcqueen
Alex. Arthur
I'm too corrupt to be properly confused by it.
If we say 'the standard meter is a meter long' we're not describing the
standard meter in the same way as when we say I am describing my desk when I
say 'my desk is slighlty less than a metre high'. It's at least tautologous
that the standard meter is a meter long - well, it isn't now because the
standard meter isn't the standard for the meter any more, but let's go back
to when it was.
So we can't 'discover' that the standard meter is a meter long (if we know
what it is - i.e. that it's the standard meter). I don't measure my
measuring tape before using it to measure things.
So we can't say that it's *not* a meter long. And we can't say the it *is*
a meter long in the same way that we might say that a table is a meter high.
Why is this confusing? And why threatening? It seems like common sense,
sort of ...
W has a slightly odd way of putting it, but it seems perverse to interpret
him a deliberately mystifying way, or as saying something obscure and
ridiculous, when there's a perfectly intelligible interpretation so readily
to hand.
?
Alex.
Crikey!
yeap.
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Eray Ozkural
> So we can't 'discover' that the standard meter is a meter long (if we know
> what it is - i.e. that it's the standard meter). I don't measure my
> measuring tape before using it to measure things.
>
> So we can't say that it's *not* a meter long. And we can't say the it *is*
> a meter long in the same way that we might say that a table is a meter high.
You call this an intelligible interpretation? It's not so hard to
accept that the standard meter was in fact one meter long. Try it.
That's a lot more sensible than anything W. had to say. Which seems
more and more in the way of an extraordinary bull excrement, if not
obscure and ridiculous. It's a straightforward lie. And he does not
know what 'is' means, because as the passage demonstrates, he never
learnt how to use it.
--
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~erayo Malfunct: http://myspace.com/malfunct
ai-philosophy: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
Alex. Arthur
table. If I say 'the standard meter is a meter long', I'm telling you
nothing at all.
If I said, one day 'I've measured the standard meter, and it's only 99
centimeters', would you think I'd got this right? I might do this with my
table 'Oh - it wasn't a meter, it was .99 of a meter'. I can't do it with
the standard.
It's easy to make fun of things, or to make them sound unintelligible. It
seems to me that there is an interpretation of W here that is interesting,
and that it isn't unreasonable to suppose it's correct ...
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: anal...@yahoogroups.com [mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
Randall Helzerman
> If I say 'my table is a meter high' I'm telling you something about my
> table. If I say 'the standard meter is a meter long', I'm telling you
> nothing at all.
I'm not so sure that statements like
'the standard meter is a meter long'
say nothing. Have you heard the parable of
the standard kilogram? It looks like its getting
lighter! I kid you not, see:
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/Kilogram.htm
Looks like it has lost about 50 micrograms of weight since it was
originally constructed, and nobody seems to know why.
Now I put it to you, if there is a candidate for
an analytic sentence, the sentence:
[k] The standard kilogram weighs exactly one kilogram
has got to be a candidate. What experience could possibly
falsify it? And yet, if you click on the above link, you'll
see the New York Times quoting apparently sane
scientist saying things like "It's certainly not helpful to
have a standard that keeps changing", presumably because
they have had some experience.
-Randy
Sbk...@aol.com
In a message dated 12/4/06 4:19:32 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
aja...@yahoo.co.uk writes:
If I say 'my table is a meter high' I'm telling you something about my
table. If I say 'the standard meter is a meter long', I'm telling you
nothing at all.
If I said, one day 'I've measured the standard meter, and it's only 99
centimeters'centimeters'<WBR>, would you think I'd got this right? I migh
table 'Oh - it wasn't a meter, it was .99 of a meter'. I can't do it with
the standard.
It's easy to make fun of things, or to make them sound unintelligible. It
seems to me that there is an interpretation of W here that is interesting,
and that it isn't unreasonable to suppose it's correct ...
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: _analytic@yahoogroupanaly_ (mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com)
[mailto:_analytic@yahoogroupanaly_ (mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com) ] On Behalf
Of Eray Ozkural
Sent: 04 December 2006 19:01
To: _analytic@yahoogroupanaly_ (mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com)
Subject: Re: RE: [analytic] Rob on the standard meter
On 12/4/06, Alex. Arthur <_aja...@yahoo.ajax__ (mailto:aja...@yahoo.co.uk)
> wrote:
> So we can't 'discover' that the standard meter is a meter long (if we
> know what it is - i.e. that it's the standard meter). I don't measure
> my measuring tape before using it to measure things.
>
> So we can't say that it's *not* a meter long. And we can't say the it
> *is* a meter long in the same way that we might say that a table is a
meter high.
You call this an intelligible interpretation? It's not so hard to accept
that the standard meter was in fact one meter long. Try it.
That's a lot more sensible than anything W. had to say. Which seems more and
more in the way of an extraordinary bull excrement, if not obscure and
ridiculous. It's a straightforward lie. And he does not know what 'is'
means, because as the passage demonstrates, he never learnt how to use it.
===============
Context usually clarifies the meaning of a tautological statement. If, for
example, someone was saying something like "A meter is the same as a yard,
it's longer than your foot" when precise measurement is important, then the
statement "A standard meter is a meter long" has significant meaning.
The basic import is that there are times when things have to be measured for
safety, health or other practical reasons. When things are being measured
by meters, it is important that a tool or instrument like a meter stick or a
measuring tape be used so there is A standard of measure that is based on THE
standard definition of a meter (in Paris, France?).
Steve K.
_http://www.myspace.com/sbkidde_ (http://www.myspace.com/sbkidde)
_http://blog.myspace.com/sbkidde_ (http://blog.myspace.com/sbkidde)
"...Except for the point, the still point,
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance."
T.S. Eliot, "Burnt Norton"
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
Rob de Villiers
Alexhad said:
>
> > If I say 'my table is a meter high' I'm telling you something about my
> > table. If I say 'the standard meter is a meter long', I'm telling you
> > nothing at all.
>
> I'm not so sure that statements like
> 'the standard meter is a meter long'
> say nothing. Have you heard the parable of
> the standard kilogram? It looks like its getting
> lighter! I kid you not, see:
Sure that may be a problem of the system. It brings
into question the usefulness of the standard? It requires
some sort of independent standard against which to
weight it. Until we provide ourselves with an alternative
we are in a bit of a fix. The standards status as the
standard is in question. No one denied the possibility
of this.
> http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/Kilogram.htm
> <http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/Kilogram.htm>
>
> Looks like it has lost about 50 micrograms of weight since it was
> originally constructed, and nobody seems to know why.
>
> Now I put it to you, if there is a candidate for
> an analytic sentence, the sentence:
>
> [k] The standard kilogram weighs exactly one kilogram
> has got to be a candidate. What experience could possibly
> falsify it? And yet, if you click on the above link, you'll
> see the New York Times quoting apparently sane
> scientist saying things like "It's certainly not helpful to
> have a standard that keeps changing", presumably because
> they have had some experience.
No one denies this. As I said above.
Rob.
Rob de Villiers
Kelvin,
You are a complete fool. All your gassing comes to naught.
> Now onto your strained attempts to try and dig Wittgenstein out of this
> hole:
>
> (And lets keep in mind what started this all off - Wittgenstein identifies
> the analytic with the a priori with the necessary.
Rubbish! He does not use the notion. This is an imposition of yours
because you are incapable of understanding anyone else except
in terms of you pre-set mind-set that you impose upon them. You
have given no single shred of textual evidence that entails this -
only that it was the only way that _you_ can understand LW - well
you do not understand LW and have not even begun to.
> In giving this example
> I was trying to show a place in which Wittgenstein's identifications lead
> to an extremely strained and confused remark. (i.e. his inability to
> distinguish the necessary from the a priori (and then with te analytic
> (and then with philosophy)) The confusions reside once we breath a sigh of
> relief through the frameword of the contingent a priori.)
>
> >
> > > Wittgenstein is imputing a certain property onto the stick -
> > > the property of being immune from measurement.
> >
> > No, this is wrong. He is pointing out that it has a _role_
> > in the metric system of measurement and that, as we shall
> > see, that role entails that it is "immune from", precluded from
> > measurement _in that metric system_. He never denied that it
> > could be measured in the Imperial (or whatever else) system
> > and found to be 39.3... whatever inches long!
>
> Look at Rob squirm! This claim you make here is totally ad hoc,
It is absolutely NOT. What else do you suppose LW meant by
its _role_!!!! Some figment of your imagination, like his equation
of the a-priori with the synthetic!
You tell us where LW puts this property of being "immune from
measurement" "on" the standard metre. Where? You and H. are
the only ones that impose fictitious properties on things!
but you
> nonetheless repeat it throughout your post.
Yes, it is utterly crucial.
All I need to do is, instead
> of saying that he is imputing the property of being immune from
> measurement onto S, is say that, he is imputing the property of being
> immune from measurement WITHIN THAT SYSTEM onto S (ho hum). And when I do
> this, all my arguments still apply, and so below, you have no
> counterargument whatsover. So I may as well stop here - but I won't.
> Moreover you actually try to say that I am imputing things onto
> Wittgenstein that he never said and hence putting foward strawmans. Come
> on Rob. What's happening is you are just desperatly picking up on the tiny
> detail
Yes, the devil is in the detail in so many such issues, which you and
your overweening habit of over generalisation are blinding yourself to.
> > > Not what I was saying at all. No matter what role the stick plays in
> > > whatever context, we cannot make the stick immune from measurement.
> >
> > We do not "make it immune" from measurement, its logical role in the
> > metric system "makes in immune" from measurement - i.e. logically
> > precludes it from measurement _within that system_. That is what it
> > means for _it_ to be the standard metre. And I will explain why
> > further
> > below.
>
> See! So now I am just going to say: No matter what role the stick plays in
> whatever context, we cannot make it immune from measurement within its
> system. (Consider the museum example again. A child, after hearing that S
> is actually the standard, may pull out his own meter rule (within the
> system), and go up to S and measure it. "It's one meter long alright" he
> might say.)
Ho Ho Ho. If the child is taking his metre rule as the definition of "one
metre" he is using a different _system_ to the metric system. If when
he measures he finds that S is 0.99 or 1.01 according to his metre
rule what does he say? That S is not one metre long? Or that his
ruler is poorly calibrated? Please explain.
> No we wouldn't be. If a terrorist strapped himself and ran into the Paris
> vault, we would not experience a break down in society, I don't think
> anything would happen. Maybe they would build a new S out of all the S*'s
> that are out there.
Ho, Ho, Ho. In such straights we might temporarily substitute our non
existent standard for you metric democracy. Immediately thereafter
the plebs would return to their former status of needing to be calibrated
against the standard (that what it means to be the standard) and no
longer have any right to determine that standard. And of course that
is not what we do. The metric system is not a democracy of all your
little S*s!
Rob.
Alex. Arthur
But how do they *know*?? Only because they have another standard ...!
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: anal...@yahoogroups.com [mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
Hi Alex,
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/Kilogram.htm
-Randy
Randall Helzerman
Yeah, its shocking isn't it :)
> But how do they *know*?? Only because they have another standard ...!
Actually, I think the point of this parable is that a concept like
"the standard kilogram" is very holistic, and it is enlightening to think
about exactly how somebody could come to believe that the standard
kilogram is getting lighter. They don't believe its getting lighter
because they are measuring it against any _single_ other standard--
if they were, then they would just assume that the other standard was
shrinking. The only possible way you would come to think that the
standard kilogram is shrinking is if _everything_else_ (a holistic
comparison) in the universe seemed to be getting heavier relative to
the standard kilogram--which is exactly what seems to be happening.
At any rate, a sentence like "The standard kilogram weighs a kilogram"
seems very much to be a sentence which is confirmed or disconfirmed
by empirical evidence, no?
-Randy
Peter Brawley
PB
Randall Helzerman wrote:
>
> > You are a complete fool. All your gassing comes to naught.
>
> Dudes, lets not take this so serious! Now for the funniest thing I've
> seen in a long time:
>
> International Philosophy: The Germans vs. The Greeks:
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0xpNj9nhoH4
> <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0xpNj9nhoH4>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
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Larry Tapper
wrote:
RH> Actually, I think the point of this parable is that a concept
like "the standard kilogram" is very holistic, and it is
enlightening to think about exactly how somebody could come to
believe that the standard kilogram is getting lighter. They don't
believe its getting lighter because they are measuring it against
any _single_ other standard-- if they were, then they would just
assume that the other standard was shrinking. The only possible
way you would come to think that the standard kilogram is shrinking
is if _everything_else_ (a holistic comparison) in the universe
seemed to be getting heavier relative to the standard kilogram--
which is exactly what seems to be happening.
>
RH> At any rate, a sentence like "The standard kilogram weighs a
kilogram" seems very much to be a sentence which is confirmed or
disconfirmed by empirical evidence, no?
Randy,
You've convinced me.
And it doesn't have to be _everything_ out of whack to make you
question the weight of the standard kg, really, just a few obvious
things like scales you normally trust weighing a few things you
expect to have stable weights.
For example, if someone measured my height according to the Paris
metre and informed me that I'm several centimetres taller than I
thought I was, I'd immediately conclude that there was something
wrong with either the metre or the measuring procedure. Wouldn't
you? Shorter I could believe, but mature adults just don't get
taller --- though I had a boss once who insisted that he was
significantly taller after getting Rolfed in Arizona.
Stephen Law wrote a paper last year in which he suggested that the
length of the metre is governed by "majoritarian" considerations,
that it is whatever most of the best measuring instruments measure:
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-
9329.2005.00280.x
I don't know if "majoritarian" is the best word for it, but in any
event it seems substantially similar to your "holistic" idea. When
things seem to get out of whack, we consider all the relevant facts
and pick the explanation that seems most reasonable under the
circumstances, which could turn out to be that the Paris metre is
shrinking.
So, in the sober light of day, it looks like "The standard metre is
one metre in length" isn't even a priori, let alone necessary. We
can't really count on it unless we've checked the health of the
standard metre. I guess this would take most of the air out of this
beloved example.
Any other candidates, then, for Kripkean contingent a priori
propositions of this type? I suppose the sociolinguistic consensus
would have to be even stronger than it is in the case of the metre.
It would have to be something like Wittgenstein's "hinge
propositions" in On Certainty, where you'd be testing the bounds of
sensible discourse even entertaining the notion that the key
proposition is false.
If you're a Quinean, though, you might say that there _are_ no hinge
propositions in LW's sense, just propositions that have a high
degree of centrality in one's web of belief.
Then there are Kripke's Neptune-type examples to deal with, e.g.
(1) If Neptune exists, it is the cause of the perturbations of the
orbit of Uranus.
Cheers, Larry
PS Speaking of planets and events overtaking famous examples, did
you ever think you'd see the day when "Nine is the number of
planets" turned out to be false?
PPS There are a number of passages in On Certainty about the
absurdity of someone claiming he'd been to the moon.
Alex. Arthur
can vary, then we have to ask 'against what?' - and the answer, of course,
is the 'real' standard metre, which may be defined in a number of ways.
They would all have 'social' aspects to them, but I think 'majoritarian'
would be far too simple.
In any case, I think we can read W as referring to whatever standard defines
the metre. This gets rid of contingent issues relating to a specific object
in Paris (see also the varying standard kilogram).
Instead of talking about the 'standard metre' we should ask: how do we
(ultimately) check our measuring devices?
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metre) says the standard metre is
"distance travelled by light in absolute vacuum in 1/299,792,458 of a
second". I suppose this standard, as well, might some day be re-defined -
but re-defined, not re-measured. The reasons for the redefinition would
form part of our (subtly changing) way of establishing the 'standard metre'.
Searching around the internet, it seems the kilogram is the only SI unit
defined by a physical prototype, so the change in the prototype is a
peculiarity. A definition based on physical constants is apparently on the
cards.
Perhaps the best way of thinking of the kilogram definition is as a value
passed, like a parcel, from one measuring device to another - with more or
less reliability - so that they can be tested against one another for mutual
consistency. When one seems to drift (even if its the prototype) the
pragmatic conclusion would be that it's that one that's wrong, and not the
others ...
Which means that the prototype *isn't* the 'standard' in Wittgenstein's
(slighlty colourfully indicated) sense.
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: anal...@yahoogroups.com [mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
Randy,
You've convinced me.
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-
9329.2005.00280.x
Cheers, Larry
---
Hugh Watkins
Wittgenstein's exact words are in german
Philosophische Untersuchungen
50. What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor
non-being to elements? --One might say: if everything that we call
"being" and "non-being" consists in the existence and non-existence of
connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element's
being (non-being); just as when everything that we call "destruction"
lies in the separation of elements, it makes no sense to speak of the
destruction of an element.
One would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed to an
element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so one
could say nothing at all of it.
--But let us consider an analogous case. There is one thing of which
one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one
metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.-But this is, of
course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to
mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a
metre-rule.-Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris
like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the
standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will
make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or
that it is not.
We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language
used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something
that is represented, but is a means of representation.-- And just this
goes for an element in language-game (48) when we name it by uttering
the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-game; it is
now a means of representation. And to say "If it did not exist, it could
have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not
exist, we could not use it in our language-game.--
What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a
paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made.
And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an
observation concerning our language-game-our method of representation.
http://www.voidspace.org.uk/psychology/wittgenstein/five.shtml
these are not aphorisms as the web site says
Hugh W
--
Beta blogger
http://nanowrimo3.blogspot.com/ visiting my past
http://hughw36-2.blogspot.com/ re-entry
http://snaps4.blogspot.com/" photographs and walks
old blogger
http://hughw36.blogspot.com/ MAIN BLOG
Rob de Villiers
I do not think this really works:
> I think the 'standard metre' needs to be properly understood here - if it
> can vary,
The length of the actual original bar could indeed vary with temperature,
that is why the SM was defined as the length of that bar at a certain
temperature.
then we have to ask 'against what?' - and the answer, of course,
> is the 'real' standard metre,
This cannot possibly be the answer - there is no such thing as
the "real" standard meter until we have identified it. If we have
any relatively stable object to measure against we can work out
that a rods length has changed by say +0.5%...
> which may be defined in a number of ways.
> They would all have 'social' aspects to them, but I think 'majoritarian'
> would be far too simple.
Indeed. And too complex and utterly impractical and in principle irrelevant
to the things we want from a standard. The Metric system is not a democracy.
I do not really see what social aspects are of much relevance. All the standard
metre needs to be is available for use to calibrate our carpenter's rulers, scientific
instruments, etc., I do not see what "social" aspects this involves other that the
thing being available to people.
> In any case, I think we can read W as referring to whatever standard defines
> the metre. This gets rid of contingent issues relating to a specific object
> in Paris (see also the varying standard kilogram).
Quite so. Until we _replaced_ (as we now have done) the object in Paris with
a new standard defined in terms of the length of some specific number of
wavelengths of some specific light emitted from some type of atom, or the
distance travelled by light in a vacuum in such and such a fraction of a
second.... the Paris object was the standard. I think everyone knows
that the old bar in Paris is no longer the standard, and that makes no
difference to the argument.
> Instead of talking about the 'standard metre' we should ask: how do we
> (ultimately) check our measuring devices?
In all sorts of ways but none of them obviate the need to a standard in the
end of the day because it is against that that we ultimately check our
measuring devices. That's what it means for it to be the standard metre.
> Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metre <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metre> ) says the standard metre is
> "distance travelled by light in absolute vacuum in 1/299,792,458 of a
> second". I suppose this standard, as well, might some day be re-defined -
> but re-defined, not re-measured. The reasons for the redefinition would
> form part of our (subtly changing) way of establishing the 'standard metre'.
>
> Searching around the internet, it seems the kilogram is the only SI unit
> defined by a physical prototype, so the change in the prototype is a
> peculiarity. A definition based on physical constants is apparently on the
> cards.
Yes, quite likely.
> Perhaps the best way of thinking of the kilogram definition is as a value
> passed, like a parcel, from one measuring device to another - with more or
> less reliability - so that they can be tested against one another for mutual
> consistency. When one seems to drift (even if its the prototype) the
> pragmatic conclusion would be that it's that one that's wrong, and not the
> others ...
Some such might be what is done with several clocks who's average defines
some sort of Standard Time or whatever, I am not sure.
> Which means that the prototype *isn't* the 'standard' in Wittgenstein's
> (slighlty colourfully indicated) sense.
The "standard metre" is NOT Wittgenstein's slightly colourful notion!
It is exactly what those who set it up intended it to be and there is
absolutely nothing colourful about W's sense of its role. The Standard
Metre was never conceived as a _prototype_, there is a world of logical
difference between a prototype and a standard - partly reflected in the
fact that a prototype is generally conceived as something of an interim
attempt, something that can, to all intents and purposes, be disposed of
once the "real" thing is available. And this is most emphatically not
the case with the Standard Metre in Paris! It is (was) the real thing not
the prototype for it!
Regards,
Rob.
Rob de Villiers
I do not think this really works:
> I think the 'standard metre' needs to be properly understood here - if it
> can vary,
The length of the actual original bar could indeed vary with temperature,
that is why the SM was defined as the length of that bar at a certain
temperature.
then we have to ask 'against what?' - and the answer, of course,
> is the 'real' standard metre,
This cannot possibly be the answer - there is no such thing as
the "real" standard meter until we have identified it. If we have
any relatively stable object to measure against we can work out
that a rods length has changed by say +0.5%...
> which may be defined in a number of ways.
> They would all have 'social' aspects to them, but I think 'majoritarian'
> would be far too simple.
Indeed. And too complex and utterly impractical and in principle irrelevant
to the things we want from a standard. The Metric system is not a democracy.
I do not really see what social aspects are of much relevance. All the standard
metre needs to be is available for use to calibrate our carpenter's rulers, scientific
instruments, etc., I do not see what "social" aspects this involves other that the
thing being available to people.
> In any case, I think we can read W as referring to whatever standard defines
> the metre. This gets rid of contingent issues relating to a specific object
> in Paris (see also the varying standard kilogram).
Quite so. Until we _replaced_ (as we now have done) the object in Paris with
a new standard defined in terms of the length of some specific number of
wavelengths of some specific light emitted from some type of atom, or the
distance travelled by light in a vacuum in such and such a fraction of a
second.... the Paris object was the standard. I think everyone knows
that the old bar in Paris is no longer the standard, and that makes no
difference to the argument.
> Instead of talking about the 'standard metre' we should ask: how do we
> (ultimately) check our measuring devices?
In all sorts of ways but none of them obviate the need to a standard in the
end of the day because it is against that that we ultimately check our
measuring devices. That's what it means for it to be the standard metre.
> Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metre <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metre> ) says the standard metre is
> "distance travelled by light in absolute vacuum in 1/299,792,458 of a
> second". I suppose this standard, as well, might some day be re-defined -
> but re-defined, not re-measured. The reasons for the redefinition would
> form part of our (subtly changing) way of establishing the 'standard metre'.
>
> Searching around the internet, it seems the kilogram is the only SI unit
> defined by a physical prototype, so the change in the prototype is a
> peculiarity. A definition based on physical constants is apparently on the
> cards.
Yes, quite likely.
> Perhaps the best way of thinking of the kilogram definition is as a value
> passed, like a parcel, from one measuring device to another - with more or
> less reliability - so that they can be tested against one another for mutual
> consistency. When one seems to drift (even if its the prototype) the
> pragmatic conclusion would be that it's that one that's wrong, and not the
> others ...
Some such might be what is done with several clocks who's average defines
some sort of Standard Time or whatever, I am not sure.
> Which means that the prototype *isn't* the 'standard' in Wittgenstein's
> (slighlty colourfully indicated) sense.
The "standard metre" is NOT Wittgenstein's slightly colourful notion!
Alex. Arthur
Re the 'real' standard - I was being a bit lazy. I meant something like
'the place the questions stop' ...
Also, what I meant was that if the standard appears to vary, then it's not
the standard - which I think you acknowledge.
By 'social' I simply meant to point to the fact that these things makes
sense against a background of linguistic practices, in W's sense.
I was using 'prototype' because it was how the web page I found the info on
the kilogram referred to the standard kilogram. I should have thought more
carefully about what it would mean on this list! Interestingly, the first
'standard' kilogram *was*, intentionally, a 'prototype' for use while some
more accurate measurment techniques were worked out in preparation for
casting the 'real' standard kilograms. The final standard differed from the
prototype by a few hundredths of a gram, I think.
What I meant by 'colourful' - W's concrete examples can sometimes divert us
from the insight that's behind them. Although the Paris bar was the
standard when he wrote, the transition to measurement based on a physical
constant in 1960 doesn't change point of the example.
I'm not sure I agree with you about the existence of the standard, though -
in practice we need a credible validation procedure, which will ultimately
depend on a test related to the standard presently in existence. However,
the very fact that these standards are periodically revised or clarified
points to a background (of Wittgensteinian 'practices'?) which (tacitly?)
defines the ultimate test conditions.
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: anal...@yahoogroups.com [mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
Alex,
Yes, quite likely.
Regards,
Rob.
---
Hugh Watkins
> Alex,
>
> I do not think this really works:
>
>
>>I think the 'standard metre' needs to be properly understood here - if it
>>can vary,
verbage snipped:-
as a young musician in the 1950ies I learned what an urtext edition was
and how to evaluate the version of the ("classical") music I was
planning to perform and to evaluate the quality of the edition with what
corrections and changes had been made by generations of editors
EG an added sharp thus [#] in square brackets is not in the original mss
but editorial. see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urtext_edition
In order to get ready for old age and my retirement and a return to a
career as a writer I studied english literature at Copenhagen
University's Open University whilst working as a taxi driver.
http://www1.hum.ku.dk/
After an amusing conversation with a fare from England who was giving a
guest lecture at Copenhagen University, and who turned out to be a
visiting professor of philosophy from Oxford or Cambridge, as a sort of
dare to myself I enrolled and took five semesters of philosphy
http://filosofi.ku.dk/
Generally speaking, the language of instruction at the University of
Copenhagen is Danish but in the Afdelingen for Filosofi (Department of
Philosophy) you also had to be fluent in english and german. I was
surprised old greek and latin whee not included as they were in the 1950ies.
Which means you read a text in the ursprache and discuss it in that
language.
Well many of us faked it with Kant using a parallel text with danish
or english and a german dictionary and my own german is very much of the
passive variety in the early stage of aquiring another language
partially understanding but neither speaking nor writing, in fact
danish is a kind of low german with many words shared with high german
but a simpler modernised grammar.
Back to Wittegenstein, Blackwell defends the copyrights and an urtext of
Philosophical Investigations may not be on the net until 2021
This morning I found my copy of Philosophical Investigations (reprinted
2001)
page 25 "das Urmeter i Paris"
(franz. mètre des archives, Archivmeter)
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urmeter
and I find support for my own idea that the provisional brass metre
stick was the urmeter 1795
You guys are busy with the Internationaler Meterprototyp von 1889
(zweites Urmeter)
but if LW had meant standard metre as the translators write
he might have writen (provisorischen) Messing-Prototyp
or even (Internationaler) Meterprototyp, (Standardbarren aus
Platin-Iridium. Dies waren die Längennormale bis 1960) which is after
his death
http://www.studentenpilot.de/studieninhalte/onlinelexikon/in/Internationaler%20Meterprototyp/
and LW did not write of das zweites Urmeter Internationaler
Meterprototyp von 1889
the prefix Ur- carries a load of associations lost in translation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ur-
Ur- - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: ". New words include the
colloquialisms urfad ('very boring') and urgeil and urcool (both meaning
'super', 'very nice').
It is also used with names for relatives where great is used in English,
e.g. Urgroßmutter ('Great Grandmother') and Urenkel ('Great Grandson').
As in English, this is repeated for the next generation back or forward:
Ururgroßvater ('Great Great Grandfather').
In English when combined with another noun, usually retaining the
hyphen, it has a similar meaning to that in German. A well-known example
is ur-Hamlet, used by literary scholars to denote an anonymously
authored lost play of the 16th century, the story of which was adapted
by Shakespeare for the plot of his play The Tragedie of Hamlet, Prince
of Denmark."
continuing with LW and his ursprache in PI
have a look at page 94 #266 and enjoy the word play on "uhr" which
dissappears in translation on page 95
be cool and enjoy the urtext
Rob de Villiers
> Re the 'real' standard - I was being a bit lazy. I meant something like
> 'the place the questions stop' ...
>
> Also, what I meant was that if the standard appears to vary, then it's not
> the standard - which I think you acknowledge.
>
> By 'social' I simply meant to point to the fact that these things makes
> sense against a background of linguistic practices, in W's sense.
You are absolutely right! Our language-games of, linguistic practices
regarding, length and measurement did not and do not begin and
end with the Standard Metre! Goodness!
Very much agree with this and all the rest. Apologies for getting
so brusque! Lame _excuse_: in a hell of a hurry!
Regards,
Rob.
Alex. Arthur
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: anal...@yahoogroups.com [mailto:anal...@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
Of Rob de Villiers
Sent: 06 December 2006 19:53
To: anal...@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [analytic] Re: Rob on the standard meter
Alex,
Regards,
Rob.
---