Scientific Realism
Blake H. Dournaee
one of my classes. Can someone elborate some of the most common =
arguments for and against scientific realism (the most popular ones =
anyway)? I've got some of the basic ones down, but I'm looking for =
something new.
Thanks,
Blake
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Roberto Meiss
for "World". I've just read several papers, such as <Consequences of
Pragmatism>, and I need that anyone -if possible- tell me in which way a
correspondence theory of truth is in connection with a coherentist theory
of truth. I mean, in wich way "both theories are non-rival trivialities",
in Rorty's words.
[Unluckily, I have only a Spanish translation of <Consequences...>, that's
why I don't know the English title of "El Mundo Felizmente Perdido"]
Roberto F. Meiss
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Christopher Furlong
>why I don't know the English title of "El Mundo Felizmente Perdido"]
>
The english title is "A World Well Lost." It comes from a famous line of
Nelson Goodman's in _The Structure of Appearance_. Unfortunately I cannot
remember the entire line.
chris f
Philip Thonemann
(836 words) Since I'm not sure what you regard as the common, obvious,
arguments for and against scientific realism, I'll just bash out a few.
Come back to me with either "Yup, familiar stuff", or "Aha, let's think
more about that one!".
I'll take 'scientific realism' as: "People can obtain indirect evidence
sufficient to justify claiming that propositions about aspects of nature
which cannot, given our present understanding of human senses and nature,
be directly observed, nonetheless have some truth in them (ie. are not
entirely human fictions). Thus, for example, a realist judges that there
is enough evidence to claim, justifiably, that there are bacteria and
atoms, just as there are chairs."
I'll take 'scientific antirealism' as: "This indirect evidence is
insufficient. Although we can claim that observable nature behaves *as if*
there are bacteria and atoms, we cannot justifiably simply claim that there
are bacteria."
1 *Historical meta-induction*. The history of science provides evidence
for realism.
Firstly, the evidence is hardly overwhelming; although there are many
examples of supposed success (bacteria), there are also many of supposed
failure (caloric). More accurately, perhaps, there are many examples of
scientists *changing their mind*.
Secondly, the use of inductive method - that surprising observed success
cannot be the result of chance - in this meta-induction appears to be
question-begging, since it is precisely the efficacy of this method that
the antirealist questions. After all, the basis of an individual realistic
claim, for example that there are atoms, is the surprising successful
predictions of spectral frequencies.
2 *Where-do-you-draw-the-line?* How can the anti-realist justify a
qualitative change - from "is there" to "is not there" occurring at an
apparently arbitrary point? Why is it OK to say that a small dust particle
is there, because we can just still see it in a bright light, with the
naked eye, but not OK to say that a slightly smaller dust particle is
there, because it is invisible to the naked eye, and needs a magnifying
glass?
The response that this is a sophistical example of the Sorites paradox
is unsound. We know that there is a difference between a mountain of sand,
and a little pile - between touching our mother's foot and incest - but
this does not alter the existence of the continuum; the types are
artefactual, not natural.
This leads on to the next argument:
3 *Type hierarchies*. Human observability is not a natural kind (type).
We therefore have no reason to think that it is associated with any other
property, such as existing.
This is a form of the Where-do-you-draw-the-line argument. If we are
justified in using the inductive method (successful novel fact prediction
as indirect evidence for things) for cases where we are *in practice*
unable to observe directly what we are inducing (distant past, distant
planets and stars, core of stars...) then why should we be barred from
using the same method for cases which merely happen to be of the type which
*in principle* we cannot observe directly? What does the limits of our
sensing have to do with the limits of our hypothesising about nature?
4 *What science is*. Positive science is the investigation of our
experience; it is the organisation of this experience in patterns, which
can then be used to make successful predictions of further experience.
Attempting to uncover the hidden aspects of nature is not science, it is
metaphysics.
This typically analytical approach involves fallacious argument by
persuasive definition. 'Science' cannot be legislated by philosophers into
one form or another. It is a word used to refer, quite loosely, to an area
of human activity - which includes, as one aspect, attempting to uncover
the hidden aspects of nature.
If a particular researcher *prefers* to restrict herself to devising
mathematical systems for 'saving the phenomena', that is fine (Osiander;
Heisenberg). But other researchers do not so restrict themselves
(Copernicus; Schrodinger). Both are part of the broad church to which the
word 'science' refers.
5 *Indirect evidence*. Claiming that something exists on the basis of
indirect evidence, short of actual direct observation, is fundamentally
flawed. We should never include such claims in science.
This is untenable. If adopted, it would eliminate far more of science -
and everday judgements - than the anti-realist intends.
6 *Realists are metaphysicians*. Realists claim that science establishes
atoms and bacteria not just as real in the natural ontological way, but
REAL in some special,*really* real, table-thumpingly real, way (which is
incoherent).
This is not true. Realists claim that atoms and bacteria may exist,
just as a chair exists - no more, and no less. They want to be able to
claim that there is a tiny speck of dust invisible to the naked eye, *just
as there is* a slightly larger speck of dust which is directly visible.
And Yes, as you may have guessed, I do think that realistic claims about
non-observable things are justifiable...!
I hope that this is of some use to you,
Philip
P.S. A glance through the essay on my web pages might be of interest.
P.H.Thonemann
16 Shakespeare Road, Mill Hill, London, NW7 4BB Tel. 0181-959-4797
Home Page http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~thonemann/index.html
Physics Teachers Home Page
http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~thonemann/physicspages/physicshomepage.html
Bruce Denner
>Related with Dournaee's mail, I'm trying to find out what Rorty understands
>for "World". I've just read several papers, such as <Consequences of
>Pragmatism>, and I need that anyone -if possible- tell me in which way a
>correspondence theory of truth is in connection with a coherentist theory
>of truth. I mean, in wich way "both theories are non-rival trivialities",
>in Rorty's words.
My take, simply put.
Both theories are "non-rival trivialities" for Rorty, since he sets aside a
representational (a sentence is a copy of world), as well as a coherence
(if it hangs together it is truthful) account of truth. Rorty quips,
calling a sentence truthful is something like "slapping it on the back". If
the sentence works (for us), for us it is truthful. Both corresponding to
the facts (not to chunks of world) and making sense, do not guarantee
turthfulness, but surely play a part.
bruce
bde...@sonic.net