[analytic-borders] Aesthetics 8: Formalism
ggos...@aol.com
This summary is based mostly on a piece by
Noel Carroll, a writer who seems at home with
the writings of Wittgenstein.
"Formalism" is a term that means different things in
different fields. In philosophical aesthetics the term
refers to a belief that the essence of a piece of art is
its structure. Clive Bell called this "significant form,"
referring to the play of organized
arrangements of lines, colors, shapes, volumes,
space and so on. Exactly which forms are significant
and which are insignificant is hard to say.
Bell, writing in 1914, maintained that we "gibber" if we
do not base our theories about art on an explicit definition
of art. Bell rejects the claim that art is essentially an
imitation of nature. A painting might be an imitation
of a waterfall, but that is not what makes it art --
something other than representational content does
that. Many great paintings have no representational
content. Significant form is what makes a painting art.
In a similar way, the fact that some paintings
express something about its painter (usually an
emotion) will not make it art. Many great paintings
do not express an emotion. Only its structure can
make a painting art. The expression of emotion
is irrelevant.
Bell's approach was extended to many arts: music
can be critiqued as form, along with ballet, architecture,
etc. In literature the focus can be on meter, narrative
structures, etc. Bell's art theories were turned into a
comprehensive theory of art, one that competed with
the representational theory and the expression theory.
X is art if and only if X has significant form. Significant
form is a sufficient condition for X to be art,
according to Bell.
THE COMMON DENOMINATOR ARGUMENT
If something is to count as a necessary condition for
art status, then it must be a property possessed by
every art work. Not all works of art are representational,
and not all art expresses the emotions of its creator.
Only form is left as a viable candidate.
PRIMARY FUNCTION
Yet there is a sense in which nearly everything has
form. That is why the formalist focuses on "significant"
form. Of course there are non-art items that also
possess significant form (for example, a speech read
rather painfully by George W. Bush). In that case a
formalist may add a discussion of the _function_ of art
in order to screen out art from other items with
significant form. The primary function of a Bush speech
is to manipulate American voters into ignoring his
commitment to robbing and killing poor people while
further enriching oil billionaires. The primary purpose
of an oil painting is to display significant form -- according
to Bell.
No other human activity has as its main function the
displaying of significant form, according to the formalists.
(This strikes me as doubtful -- doesn't platform diving
have as its main function the displaying of significant form?)
It's true that art works possess form. That makes form
a common denominator among all types of art in a
way that representationalism and expressionism are
not. In a contest with representationalism and
expression, formalism wins because it seems sounder
and it explains more.
***
PROBLEMS
Formalism tells us that the intended function of art of
exhibiting form is what defines something as art. But
that cannot be right because the intended function of
piece of art is often something else. The primary intended
function of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D. C.,
was not and is not to exhibit form. Found Object Art
often lacks significant form. The primary intended function
of a given piece of art might be religious or it might be
to guard a house from evil spirits. As a consequence the
intended primary function of exhibiting form cannot be
a _necessary_ condition for art status, although it might
sometimes be the case.
The problem with the common denominator argument
and the function argument is that both contain
false premises.
The common denominator argument presupposes
that the possession of representational, expressive or
formal properties constitutes a necessary condition for
art status. But this supposition does not include all the
possible options. There are other candidates, so the
argument by elimination of representation and
expression gets us nowhere. The central premise claims
that form, representation and expression have
exhausted all the pertinent alternatives when they
have not.
Wittgenstein would probably have presented another
objection which is that the formalist argument
presupposes that all art works share a common feature.
On what grounds should we accept that claim? Art is
diverse. Bell claims that we must find a feature common
to all art works or we will gibber. But many useful
words apparently lack a meaning common to all uses
(these words lack an essence). We can use terms like
"freedom" without gibbering -- Bell's fear of gibbering
is unrealistic.
On the other hand, we don't know what "significant
form" really means. What is "insignificant form"? We have
no way to decide. "Significant form" is obscure jargon --
in the theory of Formalism, the main term remains
undefined, rendering the theory useless, given
Bell's mistrust of "gibbering."
Formalists have attempted to meet this objection by
claiming that significant form creates a special mental
state in viewers, but then they cannot define the
mental state.
Finally, in order to discuss the significant form of a novel,
we are forced to discuss the actions, settings and
characters presented in the fiction. How, then, is it
possible to maintain that the actions, settings and
characters are irrelevant to the Form?
Formalism has certain virtues, and among them is its
focus on structure, which might otherwise be neglected.
Best,
Gary Goss
To all Patriot Act Email Snoopers:
"Lafayette, we are here."
-- John J. Pershing
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