[analytic] Haecceity Revisited
J L Speranza
Strictly, 'haecceity' is, indeed, 'thisness' (I append the definition and
quotes from the OED below), and thus relates to Lord Russell's idea of an
"egocentric particular" (viz. "this"). It contrasts, too, with F. H.
Bradley's "thatness" ("the quality of being that" -- as per the Athenaeum
quote in the OED for 'thatness') -- and, perhaps, too, with Putnam's
'such-and-such[ness]' (as per a quote by Seth below under OED entry for
'such and such'. I explore all this below, plus 'thik' and 'yon', two
forgotten forms in the speak of 'hoi polloi'. It's ultimately all about
something at which D. Kaplan excells, of course, the logic (if not plain
metaphysics) of demonstration.
How we got there. R. Helzerman speaks of the 'haeecibel' (after 'decibel')
qua unit of the 'haecceity' (or 'hocceity' -- if one sticks to 'hoc' rather
than 'haec'. Cfr. 'ad hoc'). If I may conjugate two threads, one may find
that Dunce Scot (that smart Irishman)'s notion of 'haecceity' ("thisness")
is the polar opposite of something like, to use a Putnamian idiom,
'such-and-suchness'. Thus we read from Seth, Scot Philos, 1885, p. 57:
"It is at its such-&-suchness, at
its character -- in other words, at
the _universal_ in it -- that we have
to look." (OED entry 'such and such').
Of course, one could say that the strict opposite of 'thisness' is, rather
'thatness'. Interestingly, the first cite in the OED for 'thisness' _also_
features 'thatness':
"thisness", from "this" + "-ness": rendering Latin
"haecceitas". The quality of being 'this' (as
distinct from anything else): = haecceity.
First cite:
"It is evident that [...] thisness,
and thatness belong[...] not to matter
by itself, but onely as [matter] is
distinguished & individuated by the form."
(The two further quotes for 'thisness' being: 1837 Whewell Hist Induct Sc
1857 I 244: "Which his school called haecceity or thisness.", and 1895
Rashdall Universities II 532: "An individuating form called by the later
Scotists its haecceitas or `thisness'"). We get closer to pragmatics via
Levinson's mention of the 'egocentric _particular_' in Russell's system:
"Part of the philosophical interest in [deixis]
arose from the questions of whether all indexical
expressions can be reduced to a single primary
one, and thence whether this final pragmatic
residue can be translated out into some
external context-free artificial language. Russell,
for example, thought that the reduction was possible,
by translating all indexicals (or as he preferred,
'egocentric particulars') into expressions containing
_this_, where the latter referred to a subjective
experience." (Levinson, _Pragmatics_, p. 57).
If 'this' refers, as Levinson puts it, to a subjective experience, 'that'
(and 'thatness') relates more to the 'whatness' of a _self-_existent reality:
"The investing of the content, which is
in Bradleian language a `what', with
self-existent reality or `that-ness'."
Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904 868/2.
(OED, 'thatness').
So much for Russellese and Bradleiese. What about the vernacular. Studies
on the logic of demonstration have, in my mind, overlooked the importance
of dialect. Thus J. Gundel, in 'Implicature and the form of referring
expressions', _Legacy of Grice_ (Berkeley Linguistics Society, vol. 16)
compares English with Japanese, Korean, and Spanish:
Demontrative Forms:
proximal medial distal
English this that
Japanese kore sore are
Korean i ku ca
Spanish este ese aquel
But I guess that invites some refinement. Thus, Trudgill writes in _The
Dialects of England_ (Oxford: Blackwell):
The 'this'-'that' demonstrative system
of standard English is a two-way system
which distinguishes between things which are
distant and things which are near. Interestingly,
however, a number of traditional dialects
differ from this system in having a _three_-way
distinction. For example, some northern dialects
have:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| | | |
| | singular | plural |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
| | | |
| near | this | thir |
| | | |
| medial | that | tho |
| | | |
| distal | yon/thon | yon/thon |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |
while southwestern dialects may have systems such as:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| | | |
| | singular | plural |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
| | | |
| near | these | theys |
| | | |
| medial | that | they |
| | | |
| distal | thik | thik |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |
Trudgill quotes as illustrating the form 'thik' from M. Wakelin, _The
Southwest of England_. Boston: John Benjamins:
"When I awoke one May day morn
I found an urge within me born
To see the beauteous countryside
That's all round wher'I do bide.
So I set out wi' dog & stick,
My head were just a trifle thick.
But good ole' fresh air had his say
& blowed thik trouble clean away."
B. Green,
in _The Dorset Year Book_.
Dorset: Society of Dorset Men.
(For the record, "yon" is defined by the OED as "a demonstrative word used
in concord with a sb. to indicate a thing or person as (literally, or
sometimes mentally) pointed out: cf. "that" dem. adj. Still in some
dialects, simply equivalent to "that" ("those"); but chiefly, and in later
literary use almost always, referring to a visible object at a distance but
within view: = `that (those)...over there'")).
Pragmatics gets 'conversational': in their essay, J. Gundel et al are
concerned with the 'pragmatics', as it where, in the the choice of the
right demonstrative. They write:
"Activation is necessary for _all_ pronominal
forms, and it is sufficient for appropriate
use of 'that'. In
"I couldn't sleep last night. That kept me awake."
'that' can be used appropriately to refer to, say, the
barking of a dog _only if_ a dog has actually been
barking during the speech event, or if barking had been
introduced in the immediate linguistic context.
Activation is also necessary for "this". But "this"
has the _additional_ condition that the referent be
not only activated, but *_speaker_*-activated, by
virtue of its inclusion in the speaker's 'context space'.
E.g. 'this' is inapropriate in the context of A's question:
A: Have you seen the neighbour's dog?
B: Yes, and that dog kept me awake all night.
*Yes, and this dog kept me awake all night.
But then, some may regard Gundel's constraints as pretty 'ad hoc'.
==
PS. A nebengedanke (a 'side-thought', as you'd say):
>>Tapper refers to 'Speranzic':
>>>JL prefers Speranzaic.
>>Right. After all, it's 'stanza', 'stanzaic'.
Tapper comments:
>A third possibility, which [Speranza] didn't care
>for a few months ago, is 'Speranzist', by analogy
>with 'Spinozist'.
I guess I like that. I'm thinking of _Marx_: he has 'Marxian' _and_
'Marxist', and L. Horn _has_ used 'Speranzian' (and 'Speranziana' echoing
'Sinatriana' as he witnessed on the death of Frank Sinatra, to refer to
stuff related to Sinatra)
>Then there's 'Speranzish', which would, however,
>be hard to pronounce.
Plus it may potentially implicate "_non-_Speranzic" (the OED has 'thickish'
as meaning "somewhat thick" and 'six-thirtyish' as meaning "approximately
six-thirty". But surely a potential implicature can well be cancelled
(before it's made) (A British subject is neither somewhat nor approximately
British, too).
==
J L Speranza, Esq
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J L Speranza
Mediaevals, which belongs in the '-itas' family also has not just 'entity'
(entitas), 'quantity' (quantitas), and "quality" (qualitas), but also
'quiddity' (quidditas, whatness). Into the bargain, I append (also from the
OED) some quotes for two further derivations for 'ad hoc': 'adhocism' and
'adhocery'. Cheers,
JL
===
"Scholastics could not make a rational discourse
of anything, though never so small, but they must
stuff if with their quiddities, entities,
essences, haecceities, & the like."
Cudworth, _Intell Syst_ 1678, p. 67.
"Dissent is in the quality, not in the quiddity."
Spencer Logic, 1628, p. 75
"They're fighting for a phantom, a quiddity, a
thing that wants, not only a substance, but even
a name."
Burke Sp Amer Tax Wks. 1774, p. 158
"adhocery".
1961 Economist 14 Oct. 124/1
"Britain thrives on anomalies and
adhoceries."
"adhocism":
* 1968 D. R. Gadgil in Bhagwati & Desai
India Planning for Industrialization 1970, p. 132
"The first difficulty is the lack of a coordinated
view and of a frame of considered policy. It is
related to the short-term, departmental view that
Secretaries and others take. Ad hocism in
policy decisions is the result."
* 1969 Guardian 2 Oct. 11/4
"The first rule of non-design or adhocism
is to alter as little as possible."
* 1972 N. Silver in Silver & Jencks Adhocism 105
"As soon as one sees that there can be an
actual policy of contingent, resourceful action,
or adhocism, this mongrel creativity appears
everywhere.
* 1981 Times of India 30 Aug. 8/5
The adhocism exhibited at all levels.
Furthering Cudworth's quote cited above ("Scholastics could not make a
rational discourse of anything, though never so small, but they must stuff
if with their quiddities, entities, [...] haecceities, & the like.", I
append some quotes for 'quiddity' and 'entity':
"quiddity":
whatness, transl. L. "quidditas", quiddity.
That which makes a thing what it is;
essential nature, essence.
From "quid" + "-ity". The real nature or
essence of a thing; that which makes a thing
what it is.
1569 J. Sanford tr. Agrippa's Van. Artes 21
"The true demonstration is that which is made
(as the Logitioners speak) by quiddities, and
by the proper difference of things."
1628 T. Spencer Logick 75
"Dissent is in the quality not the quiddity,
or being of the subject."
1670 Maynwaring Vita Sana 106
"These notions being too remote from the
quiddity, essence and spring of the disease."
1710 Berkeley Princ. Hum. Knowl. §81
"The positive abstract idea of quiddity,
entity, or existence."
1828 De Quincey Rhetoric Wks. 1862 76
"The quiddity, or characteristic difference,
of poetry as distinguished from prose."
1897 S. S. Sprigge Life of T. Wakley 125
"The quiddity of each attitude was
the desire to curtail the privileges of
the hospital surgeons."
Meaning "something intangible":
1774 Burke Sp. Amer. Tax. Wks. 1842 I. 158
"Fighting for a phantom; a quiddity; a thing
that wants, not only a substance, but even a name."
A subtlety or captious nicety in argument;
a quirk, quibble. Alluding to scholastic arguments
on the quiddity of things.
1539 Taverner Gard. Wysed. i. 18 b,
"He must not play with his sophemes & quiddities".
1579 Fulke Heskins' Parl. 475
"He says he will not use the quiddities
of the schools, but plain examples."
1678 R. Barclay Apol. Quakers §12. 371
"To find out and invent subtle distinctions
and quiddities."
1731 Plain Reas. for Presbyt. Dissent. 138
"The most honest cause is often run down with
the torrent and speat of law-quirks and quiddities."
1807 W. Irving Salmag. (1824) 33,
"I humbly solicit a quiddity, quirk,
or remonstrance to send."
1877 C. Geikie Christ xxv. (1879) 281
"Their quiddities and quillets, and
casuistical cases."
Ability or tendency to employ quiddities.
1600 W. Watson Decacordon (1602) 140
"How shall ever those come in heaven, that have
neither quality of body to get it nor quiddity
of wit to keep it?
1881 W. S. Gilbert Patience,
To stuff his conversation full of quibble
and of quiddity.
1884 R. Buchannan in Pall Mall G. 16 Apr.,
With the intellectual strength and bodily
height of an Anak, he possessed the quiddity
and animal spirits of Tom Thumb.
Cfr. whatness:
1611 Florio,
Quidità, the whatness of any thing.
1627 W. Sclater Expos. 2 Thess. (1629) 39
The kind or quality, or if you'll so term it,
whatness of it.
1656 J. Sergeant tr. T. White's Peripat. Inst. 198
The understandableness of a thing, or the quiddity,
the whatness.
1674 N. Fairfax Bulk & Selv. 80
The definition or whatness of a thing
ought to be of a thing as a thing.
1870 Morley Stud. Lit. (1891) 266
Pressing for definition, you never get much further
than that each given quiddity means a certain whatness.
1889 Mivart Truth 212
We must have the conception of the kind of
thing the object is -- 'what' it is, or the idea
of its whatness.
"entity":
1596 Bell Surv. Popery 3 9 372
"God is the principal agent of the real
and positive entities thereof."
1647 H. More Song of Soul, Antipsychopannychia 3 29
"Both night and coldness have real entity."
1656 Hobbes Liberty, Necess & C 1841 135
"Entity is better than nonentity."
1710 Berkeley Princ. Hum. Knowl, section 81
"The positive abstract idea of quiddity,
entity, or existence."
1830 Herschell Stud Nat Phil 108
"In the "to on" and the "to me on", that
is to say, in entity and nonentity.
1837 Hallam Hist. Lit 1847) 3 9 305
"Entity or real being."
1643 R Man's Mort 7 54
"He, that is, his entity, person, even all that
went to make him man."
1648 Crashaw Steps to Temple 81
Dear hope! The entity of things that are not yet.
1688 Cudworth Immut Morality 1731 16
"It is impossible any thing should be without
a nature or entity."
1785 Reid Int Powers 399
"For the entity of all theoretical truth is
nothing else but clear intelligibility."
rahelzer
discourse of "Haeccity". The
question is whether it is a
better noun than "ad hoc-ness".
If nobody since the schoolman
has made much use of it,
I don't think we should let
it bother us that it had
a different meaning back then.
After all, "electric"
used to mean "made of amber".
Words change their meanings
all the time.
"Ad hoc-ness" is just too ugly a word,
and if we want to explicate and quantify
it, we need a noun for it. Perhaps
"Ad haeccity" would be strictly better,
but sooner or later that "ad" would drop
out anyways.
Has anybody since Plantiga used the word?
How did Plantinga use it? If it wasn't one of
his favorite buzzwords, I think I'll steal it.
-Randy
Seth Sharpless
etymology of 'haecceity' and 'such and such'. I wonder if he could be pers=
uaded to do the same for Dante's 'feltro e feltro', which has long puzzled =
literary scholars, but which may have been Dante's version of 'such and suc=
h'.
As for 'haecceities', Leibniz would certainly have had something to say abo=
ut them:
--------------------Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, 8----------
Since this is so, we can say that the nature of an individual substance or =
of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient t=
o contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subje=
ct to which this notion is attributed. An accident, on the other hand, is a=
being whose notion does not include everything that can be attributed to t=
he subject to which the notion is attributed. Thus, taken in abstraction fr=
om the subject, the quality of being a king which belongs to Alexander the =
Great is not determinate enough to constitute an individual and does not in=
clude the other qualities of the same subject, nor does it include everythi=
ng that the notion of this prince includes. On the other hand, God, seeing =
Alexander's individual notion or *haecceity*, sees in it at the same time t=
he basis and reason for all the predicates which can be said truly of him, =
for example, that he vanquished Darius and Porus; he even knows a priori (a=
nd not by experience) whether he died a natural death or whether he was poi=
soned, something we can know only through history. Thus when we consider ca=
refully the connection of things, we can say that from all time in Alexande=
r's soul there are vestiges of everything that has happened to him and mark=
s of everything that will happen to him and even traces of everything that =
happens in the universe, even though God alone could recognize them all.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Not so long ago, in what Kaplan called "The Golden Age of Semantics," Carna=
p backed off from his nominalism far enough to introduce "haecceities" even=
into the interpretation of the predicate calculus, as in "Meaning and Nece=
ssity," where he makes invidual variables take both intensions ("individual=
concepts" or "haecceities") and extensions (things). This, of course, was=
anathema to Kripke, who cast haecceities back into what he called "the dar=
k world of contingent identity," which has seemed a forbidden Inferno to ph=
ilosophers ever since.
The most interesting revival of Scotism in modern times, I think, was that =
of Charles Sanders Peirce, who considered himself a realist in the Scholast=
ic tradition and a disciple of Duns Scotus. Peirce seems to disagree somew=
hat with Speranza with respect to Scotus's origin. In speaking of the etym=
ology of the vernacular use of 'real', Peirce writes:
---------Peirce, Collected Works, 6.328------------------
Except in the legal sense, the vernacular word was derived from *realis*, w=
hich (except in the legal sense) was a vocable invented by medieval metaphy=
sicians for their own purposes. Especially, it is a prominent word in the w=
orks of Duns Scotus, of which I have been an attentive and meditative stude=
nt. Now Duns, generally believed to be the birthplace of this great thinker=
(and I have scarce a doubt of it), is less than ten statute miles north of=
the Tweed in Berwick, so that in the last quarter of the thirteenth centur=
y the logician was doubtless as almost genuinely an English boy as he would=
be if born there today. A northern dialect of Middle English was his mothe=
r tongue. No medieval logician influenced the present English of the market=
-place so much as he did; and my definition is thoroughly imbued with the s=
pirit of Scotism.
----------------------------------------------------------
Peirce thought that haecceity was not to be explained or questioned, but in=
this contention, surely, Speranza's patient researches have proved him wro=
ng.
-----------Peirce, Collected Papers, 1.405-------
What Scotus calls the *hæcceities* of things, the hereness and nowness o=
f them, are indeed ultimate. Why this which is here is such as it is; how, =
for instance, if it happens to be a grain of sand, it came to be so small a=
nd so hard, we can ask; we can also ask how it got carried here; but the ex=
planation in this case merely carries us back to the fact that it was once =
in some other place, where similar things might naturally be expected to be=
. Why IT, independently of its general characters, comes to have any defini=
te place in the world, is not a question to be asked; it is simply an ultim=
ate fact...
If we were to find that all the grains of sand on a certain beach separated=
themselves into two or more sharply discrete classes, as spherical and cub=
ical ones, there would be something to be explained, but that they are of v=
arious sizes and shapes, of no definable character, can only be referred to=
the general manifoldness of nature. Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness=
, and hæcceity, or pure secondness, are facts not calling for and not cap=
able of explanation. Indeterminacy affords us nothing to ask a question abo=
ut; hæcceity is the ultima ratio, the brutal fact that will not be questi=
oned.
---------------------------------------------------
Regards,
Seth
J L Speranza
Pope Dunc. 1742 iv. 90
Thanks to Helzerman and Sharpless for their comments.
R. A. Helzerman writes:
>Many thanks for the Speranzaic discourse
>on 'haecceity'. The question, indeed, is whether
>'haecceity' is a better noun than 'adhocness'.
>[...] "Adhocness" is just too ugly a word
>[in my humble opinion -- or one not too
>contrived enough], and if we want to explicate
>and quantify it, we need a noun for it.
But 'adhocness' _is_ already a noun, if an ugly one, as you call it.
According to the O.E.D., it was "coined" (I hate to use this verb for such
a transparent derivation as that) by a A. Flexner in 1930:
"Adhocness, if I may be permitted to invent
an indefensible word, is not confined to courses
or curricula."
_Universities_ 1930, ii, p. 71.
Problem is he was actually _not_ permitted to invent it. Fortunately, there
is an independent quote, just 6 years later, from _Mind_ -- author
unspecified --, which reads: "There is a suspicion of adhocness about the
explanation (_Mind_ 1936 45, p. 249), which may well apply to _your_ ideas
of adhocity.
Helzerman continues:
>Perhaps "adhaecceity" would be
>better.
Right. Or, if you really want to stick of the neutrality of 'hoc':
'adhocceity' (I grant the derivations I provide in my previous --
'adhocery' and 'adhocism' don't bear the air of abstractity that you seem
to be wanting).
Now, S. Sharpless writes:
>Thanks to Speranza for applying his considerable
>analytic resources to the etymology of 'haecceity'
>and 'such and such'. I wonder if he could be
>persuaded to do the same for Dante's 'feltro e feltro',
>which may have been Dante's version of 'such and such'.
Well, I just tried a Google automatic translation of
http://www.antonio-ciancaleoni.it/divinacommedia/inferno/01.htm
"Questi non cibera terra né peltro,
ma sapienza, amore e virtute,
e sua nazion sara tra feltro e feltro."
via
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=it&u=http://world.std.=
com/~wi
j/dante/inferno.txt&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dsua%2Bnazion%2Bsara%2Btra%2Bfeltro=
%2B
e%2Bfeltro%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D%26ie%3DUTF-8
and it retrieved something I can't say I'm happy with:
"These not cibera earth of pewter,
But wisdom, love, and virtue,
And its nazion sara between felt and felt."
(My favourite Inferno quote is 3, 9: 'Lasciate ogni speranza voi
ch'entrate'). Anyways, Sharpless reports Leibniz's reflections from the
_Discourse on Metaphysics_ (8) on the haecceity of Alexander the Great.
>[It's only] God, [as he sees] Alexander's
>individual notion, or haecceity, [that He]
>sees in [the haecceity] the basis and reason
>for all the predicates which can be said truly
>of [Alexander].
Interesting quote, and the equation Leibniz makes, "haecceity" =
"individual notion". Sharpless further refers to Carnap:
>Carnap [introduced] "haecceities" [back ...]
>into the interpretation of the predicate calculus,
>as in _Meaning & Necessity_, where he makes invidual
>variables take both intensions ("individual concepts"
>or "haecceities") and extensions (things). This, of
>course, was anathema to Kripke, who cast haecceities
>back into what he called "the dark world of contingent
>identity".
-- till Plantinga brought it back to Purgatory, as it were. It all relates
to the question, it seems, of whether an individual (such as Alexander, to
use Leibniz's example) can be said to have an essence. It's slightly odd --
but then he teaches at Princeton -- that Kripke should be denying the idea
of an individual's essence' (or 'haecceity' = 'individual notion', to use
Leibniz's phrasing) and still be happily called a committed 'essentialist'.=
Sharpless further refers to the 'Scotism' of Pierce
>The most interesting revival of Scotism [is]
>that of Peirce, who considered [himself] a disciple
>of Duns. Peirce seems to disagree with Speranza
>with respect to Scotus's origin.
Sharpless quotes from Pierce (Collected Works, 6, p. 328):
>"Duns, generally believed to be the birthplace
>of [John Duns Scotus] (and I have scarce a doubt
>of it)...
-- meaning he _does_ have a scarce.
>is less than 10 statute miles N. of the Tweed in
>Berwick, so that in the last 1/4 of the XIIIth
>century [Duns] was doubtless as almost genuinely
>an English boy as he would be if born there today.
I think they call theirselves [sic] 'lowlanders', rather. Never so sure
about 'English boy' being their self-epithet of choice.
>A northern dialect of Middle English was his mother
>tongue.
As usual, one is never told about what one's _father_ tongue is. Indeed,
Ireland, England, and Scotland have all claimed this Oxford philosopher.
While Peirce opts for the Englis side, I read below that a stronger case
can be made with Dunstane in _Northumberland_, England (rather than Duns in
Berwickshire, Scotland):
http://www.electricscotland.com/history/other/duns_john.htm
"Those who claim [Duns] as a native of England
set forward the village of Dunstane in Northumberland
as the place of his birth; but while the word Dunse
is exactly his name, Dunstane is not so, and therefore,
without other proof, we must hold the English locality
as a mere dream."
We _can_ yet dream, can't we. (For the record, I append below some notes
from the OED on the derivation of the word 'dunce' to rigidly mean the
Oxonian 'Subtle Doctor' to, via conversational implicature, a picker of
nits. Sharpless writes:
>Peirce thought that haecceity was not
>to be explained or questioned, but in this
>contention, surely, Speranza's
>patient researches have proved him
>wrong.
Mmm. Let's see. Sharpless her quotes from Pierce's Collected Papers, 1, p.
405:
>"What Scotus calls the *haecceities* of things,
>the hereness and nowness of them, are indeed
>ultimate. Why this which is here is such as it is;
>Why IT [a grain of sand]
-- its "itness", as I call it.
>independently of its general characters, comes
>to have any definite place in the world, is
>not a question to be asked; it is simply an
>ultimate fact... That [grains of sand] are
>of various sizes and shapes, of no definable
>character, can only be referred to the general
>manifoldness of nature. Indeterminacy, then,
>or pure firstness, and haecceity, or pure
>secondness, are facts not calling for and not
>capable of explanation."
This dogmatic claim somewhat reminds me, I'm afraid, of Strawson's unproved
dictum when he says (in _Introduction to Logical Theory_, p. 145),
exploring the 'logical form' underlying 'grammar':
"There is no question 'What is raining?' to
which 'It' is an answer."
Surely as Wittgenstein and Rhees used to say, anything is _questionable_.
Pierce continues:
>Indeterminacy affords us nothing to ask a
>question about; haecceity is the ultima ratio,
>the brutal fact that will not be questioned.
Well, Helzerman has made 'adhocceity' a 'ratio' alright (of this and that)
and it's an ironic proof that Peirce is perhaps wrong that it's Helzerman
himself who is questioning himself if he made the right ratio all right.
Cheers,
JL
Appendix: Quotes for 'dunce' in the OED.
1530 Tindale Answ. to More Wks 1573 278
"Remember ye not how the old barking curres,
Dunces disciples & like draffe called Scotists,
the children of darkeness, raged in every pulpit
against Greek, Latin & Hebrew."
1553 T. Wilson Rhet. (1567) 101 a,
"Use the quiddities of Dunce, to set forth
God's mysteries: & you shall se thignorant either
fall asleep, or else bid you farewell."
1679 Hobbes Behemoth i Wks 1840 VI 214
"Peter Lombard, who first brought in the learning
called School divinity was seconded by John Scot
of Duns whom any ingenious reader, not knowing
what was the design, would judge to have been
two of the most egregious blockheads in the world,
so obscure and senseless are their writings."
1691 Wood Ath. Oxon. I. 673
"That the said Winter should study the dunces
logic questions, meaning I suppose the logic
questions of John Dunse."
1527 Tindale Par. Wicked Mammon Wks. (1573) 88
"A Duns man would make xx distinctions."
1540 Barnes Free Will Wks. (1573) 267
"Now where will our Duns men bring in their bonum conatum?"
1546 Confut. Shaxton F iij (T.),
"The pure word of God, void of all the
dregges of Dunse learning and man's traditions."
1581 Marbeck Bk. of Notes 479
"The Dunce-men and Sophisters the inventers
and finders, yea, and the very makers of Purgatory."
1626 W. Sclater Exp. 2 Thess 1629 184
"That self-conceited dunce critique."
1641 Milton Ch. Govt. v. (1851) 115
"It were a great folly to seeke for counsell
from a Dunce Prelat."
1579 Lyly Euphues (Arb.) 47
"If one be hard in conceiving, they pronounce
him a dowlt: if given to study, they proclaim
him a dunce."
1592 G. Harvey Pierce's Super. 25
"You that purpose with great sums of study
and candles to purchase the worshipful names
of Dunses and Dodipoles may closely sit or
sokingly lie at your books."
1614 T. Adams Devil's Banquet 322
"When a man courts to be a doctor in all arts,
he lightly proves a dunce in many."
1642 Fuller Holy & Prof. St. iii. xviii. 199
"A dunce, void of learning but full of books."
1742 Pope Dunc. iv. 90
"A wit with dunces, and a dunce with wits."
1577 Holinshed Chron. Scot. 461/1
"But now in our age it is grown to be a
common proverb in derision, to call such
a person as is senselesse or without learning
a Duns, which is as much as a fool."
1611 Cotgr.,
"Lourdaut, a sot, dunce, dullard. Viedaze,..
an old dunce, doult, blockhead."
1669 Sturmy Mariner's Mag. iv. 202
"I confess the greatest Dunces have commonly
the best employments, and many abler men before
the mast."
1712 Arbuthnot John Bull iv. i,
"Blockhead! dunce! ass! coxcomb!
were the best epithets he gave poor John."
1852 Blackie Stud. Lang. 21
"Let the hopeless dunce of the Grammar
School be tried with Natural History."
1866 R. W. Dale Disc. Spec. Occ. ii. 39
"As some boys remain dunces though they
are sent to the best schools."
==
J L Speranza, Esq
Country Town
St Michael's Hall Suite 5/8
Calle 58, No 611 Calle Arenales 2021
La Plata CP 1900 Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 00541148241050 Tel 00542214257817
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http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls/
j...@netverk.com.ar
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rahelzer
> a noun, if an ugly one,
> as you call it.
Well, I think its misguided
sire said it best:
> "Adhocness, if I may be
> permitted to invent
> an indefensible word,
Yeah.
> Right. Or, if you really want to stick of the neutrality of 'hoc':
> 'adhocceity'
Why my preference for the feminine form? Best answered with
a sonnet:
Shall I compare thee to a fair coin toss?
Thou art more random and more hard to guess
I can't predict just how I'll come across
no matter what I say I make a mess.
I wonder why it is with Southern Bells
you have to form an ad hoc theo'ry
confronted with such awful Haeccibels
her love is like a raging storming sea.
No formal theory can avail me now,
No program small or large can help me out
I can't describe her since I don't know how
to make her happy when she starts to pout.
....So Kolmogorov is no use to me;
....I cannot cope with such complexity.
What worries me more is this:
> >Carnap [introduced] "haecceities" [back ...]
> >into the interpretation of the predicate calculus,
If the logical positivists were bandying about
"haecceity" I suppose its too early to recyclte
the word. Can you (or anybody else) think of
a better word? I refuse to use "ad hoc ness"
monster; remindes me of a mythical beast in
some scottish lake.
-Randy
Seth Sharpless
-------------------------------
Carnap [introduced] "haecceities" [back ...] into the interpretation of the predicate calculus, as in _Meaning & Necessity_, where he makes individual variables take both intensions ("individual concepts" or "haecceities") and extensions (things).
--------------------------------
Speranza's elisions here may be confusing. For Speranza's 'Carnap [introduced] "haecceities" [back ...] into the interpretation of the predicate calculus', read 'Carnap backed off from his nominalism far enough to introduce "haecceities" even into the interpretation of the predicate calculus'.
I'm not sure one could say that Carnap put "back" what had never been there, for it is not clear that Frege's "criteria of identity" for proper names had ever been invoked as necessary to the proper interpretation of variables of quantification.
The predicate calculus was designed, after all, for purposes of mathematics, and for such purposes, an extensional language is adequate. It is only when one endeavours to translate natural language statements into a predicate calculus that the problems calling for intensions ("heacceities" or "individual concepts") as possible values of individual variables become evident, though, sadly, overlooked by most of the "possible worlds" philosophers who followed Carnap. Most of the discussion concerning "individual concepts" was focused on proper names, not on the quantifiable variables of a calculus, which, it was just taken for granted, had to be extensional.
Speranza wrote:
----------------------------
It's slightly odd --but then he teaches at Princeton -- that Kripke should be denying the idea of an individual's essence' (or 'haecceity' == 'individual notion', to use Leibniz's phrasing) and still be happily called a committed 'essentialist'.
-----------------------------
Yes, it is odd, isn't it? I suppose it has to do with some distinction between _de re_ and _de dicto_ essences, _de re_ essences being the currency of the new essentialists, the _de dicto_ haecceities of Frege and Carnap having been declared _ratio non grata_.
I imagine this suspicious distinction between _de re_ and _de dicto_ essences has been discussed before on this list. Is there a way to search the archives, overall, for mention of such terms in the subject headings? I do not wish to revive a subject that you may have put to rest, but if it has not been dispatched, I should like to raise it again. Platinga's _The Nature of Necessity_ in which this distinction is the fulcrum for much argument is a delightful book, clear and elegant prose of the quality of Russell's or Moore's. Indeed, his arguments may even be explicit enough to refute, if the subject has not already been done to death in previous threads?
Thanks to Speranza for his wit and grace, as always,
Seth Sharpless
Jon Neivens
From: "J L Speranza" <j...@netverk.com.ar>
To: <anal...@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2002 2:01 AM
Subject: Re: [analytic] Haecceity Revisited
A few (very) random thoughts on this. I probably need to look back at the
original thread, but when it comes to scholastic terminology and what
Speranza refers to as "The -Itas Family," I find it more helpful to
trace
this back to ol' Aristotle himself.
> R. A. Helzerman writes:
>
> >Many thanks for the Speranzaic discourse
> >on 'haecceity'. The question, indeed, is whether
> >'haecceity' is a better noun than 'adhocness'.
> >[...] "Adhocness" is just too ugly a word
> >[in my humble opinion -- or one not too
> >contrived enough], and if we want to explicate
> >and quantify it, we need a noun for it.
> >Perhaps "adhaecceity" would be
> >better.
>
> Right. Or, if you really want to stick of the neutrality of 'hoc':
> 'adhocceity' (I grant the derivations I provide in my previous --
> 'adhocery' and 'adhocism' don't bear the air of abstractity that you seem
> to be wanting).
Maybe "haecceitic" would be another option?
The similarity to "hectic" may (or may not) be fortunate, but there's
perhaps an interesting connection, indicated at:
http://www.m-w.com/netdict.htm
Main Entry: hec·tic
Pronunciation: 'hek-tik
Function: adjective
Etymology: Middle English etyk, from Middle French etique, from Late
Latin
hecticus, from Greek hektikos habitual, consumptive, from echein to
have,
hold, be in (such) a condition
My suspicion is that "haecceity" _might_ have a similar derivation from
"echein." (You can get the Liddell-Scott Entry for _echein_ by typing
"echo^" as the search item at:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/resolveform )
Unfortunately I haven't been able to find anything that might confirm or
deny this hunch.
On the one hand, in the Aristotelian terminology, "echein" appears as part
of "entelecheia," which, by adding in the idea of "telos" or "end,"
indicates something like an "having its end in itself." On the other hand,
"haeccitas" is the scholastics translation of "tode ti," the particular.
But both are part of the notion of "ousia" or "substance."
> Sharpless reports Leibniz's reflections from the
> _Discourse on Metaphysics_ (8) on the haecceity of Alexander the Great.
>
> >[It's only] God, [as he sees] Alexander's
> >individual notion, or haecceity, [that He]
> >sees in [the haecceity] the basis and reason
> >for all the predicates which can be said truly
> >of [Alexander].
>
> Interesting quote, and the equation Leibniz makes, "haecceity" =
> "individual notion". Sharpless further refers to Carnap:
>
> >Carnap [introduced] "haecceities" [back ...]
> >into the interpretation of the predicate calculus,
> >as in _Meaning & Necessity_, where he makes invidual
> >variables take both intensions ("individual concepts"
> >or "haecceities") and extensions (things). This, of
> >course, was anathema to Kripke, who cast haecceities
> >back into what he called "the dark world of contingent
> >identity".
>
> -- till Plantinga brought it back to Purgatory, as it were. It all
relates
> to the question, it seems, of whether an individual (such as Alexander,
to
> use Leibniz's example) can be said to have an essence. It's slightly
odd --
> but then he teaches at Princeton -- that Kripke should be denying the
idea
> of an individual's essence' (or 'haecceity' = 'individual notion', to use
> Leibniz's phrasing) and still be happily called a committed
'essentialist'.
The whole question of "essence" as regards Aristotle is something I find
pretty curious. In the first case it seems to be another one of his
coinages-- "essentia" is used by the scholastics to translate his term "to
ti en einai," which literally translates as "what it was to be." But the
thing that strikes me about this odd phrase (on the meaning of which much
ink has been expended) is its similarity to the idiomatic English phrase
"what it takes to be." The sense I'm thinking of here is when we'd ask
whether someone "has what it takes" to be or to do some particular thing.
The only argument I could offer in favour of this line of interpretation is
that
Aristotle did tend to make use of idiomatic phrases in constructing his
terminology, as with "kategoria."
But regarding the question of "haecceitic quantification."
Suppose we take "Socrates is wise" and want to assign values to other
predicates in terms of how they contribute to "what it takes to be wise,"
or the "essential" character of wisdom. And suppose we say that for
"Socrates is hirsute," this predication would contribute nothing to his
wisdom. So we could assign H(x) a
haecceitic value "1" with respect to W(x), or something along those lines,
and also say that
W(x), has haecceitic value "0" with respect to itself.
On the other hand, haecceitic value of, say "0.2" with respect to W(x)
would probably remain strictly notional, although we could perhaps assume
that if
H(x) has haecceitic value "1" with respect to W(x), then W(x) a haecceitic
value "1" with respect to H(x). Similarly, I suppose we could define
synonymy with regard to W(x) as haecceitic value "0".
So, where B is "bachelor" and U is "unmarried man," if U(x) has haecceitic
value "0" with regard to B(x), then U=B.
In some respects this reminds me of the conversation I had with Speranza
recently concerning Grice's idea of "x izz y" and "x hazz y" although the
idea of "x izz y" as meaning y is essential to x's existence (and hazz as
non-essential) still begs the question "x's existence as _what._" So again
we'd get something like "x hazz H" with regard to "x izz W" and vice versa.
The "haecceity" in the sense of Socrates' "thisness" would come out to the
extent that "hirsute" belongs to Socrates inasmuch as it does not belong to
Socrates' belonging to "wisdom" --where wisdom is treated as "essence," and
hence as universal, since the universe class is "what it takes to be W."
Anyway, I don't know how well that kind of system would pan out, or whether
it's the kind of thing Helzerman was proposing, but it's perhaps an
interesting idea to play around with.
Cheers,
Jon.
Gerald Koenig
So far I have gathered that Haecceity (my God, how is that
pronounced?) means, among other things, "thisness". Quite recently I
have been coining and promoting a set of words for Semantic Primes,
among them, "this".
"This" has a rather unique property as a Semantic Prime:
"Despite occasional claims to the contrary, careful examination of the
available cross-linguistic evidence suggests that all languages have a
clear and unproblematic exponent for THIS. The other demonstrative
pronouns often do not match semantically across language
boundaries....." Anna Wierzbicka.
But here we have a word which means more than just "this"; it means
"thisness". Well, "thisness" is not identical to "this", or is it?
Neivens brings in the idea of "essence" which seems entirely
appropriate because -ness is the suffix which abstracts the essence of
things. Generally, speaking about essences brings to mind a set of
properties whose absence will destroy the meaning of the concept
essentialized. Here we have a Prime, a universal hard-wired concept we
are born with. I have vivid memories of my grandson's skill at
pointing out things he wanted before he could speak. He certainly
understood "this".
Is it meaningfull to speak of the essential properties of a Prime?
What property would we remove from the idea of "this (thing)" to
destroy its sense? I can only think of: not-this and nothing. Another
prime I recently lexicalized is "good". As a prime it does not refer
to any specific acts or qualities, because that can be a matter of
disagreement betweeen cultures. It's just a space-holder for something
evaluated by the speaker. Likewise "this" has to be instantiated with
some object within or without the mind of the speaker. Lacking that
object there is an empty "this" and no thisness. I wouldn't speak of
bare "thisness". I might speak of the thisness of something. If "this"
has a context a lá Grice it infers someone communicating with the self
_or_ others, and narrowing the field of attention to a foreground;
selecting a single object or set. Thus it is related to "there
is/are"; although it seems to have a more implicit existence claim and
a sense of "let's consider the subject pointed to" as opposed to the
more explicit, imperative and assertive "Please foreground something
(and it exists)". Its modality or attitude differs from "there
is/are". "Modality is those speaker attitudes which are
grammaticalized in language." (From memory by Claire Bowren). "This
(object)" ...seems to have a subject role and expects a verb. "There
is/are (object)" is verbal and complete in itself. There is a
difference in grammatical role as well as modality.
Well as to haecceity ( my God, I spelled it right), I think that part
of the problem is that it is a polysemous "this": with its other
senses documented here, it seems to violate a languæge universal.
Perhaps because it was in intense linguistic evolution, whatever the
cause, it is really anomalous in not being a clear and unproblematic
exponent of its prime sense. So as the product of an age of linguistic
transition and confusion, we cannot expect it ever to be clear.
Perhaps that explains its infrequency, aside from the spelling and
pronunciation. As a conversation piece it continues to reign supreme.
GLK
mjmurphy
>Speranza wrote:
>----------------------------
>It's slightly odd --but then he teaches at Princeton -- that Kripke should
be denying the idea of an individual's essence' (or 'haecceity' ==
'individual notion', to use Leibniz's phrasing) and still be happily called
a committed 'essentialist'.
>-----------------------------
Seth replied:
>Yes, it is odd, isn't it? I suppose it has to do with some distinction
between _de re_ and _de dicto_ essences, _de re_ essences being the currency
of the new essentialists, the _de dicto_ haecceities of Frege and Carnap
having been declared _ratio non grata_.
>
>I imagine this suspicious distinction between _de re_ and _de dicto_
essences has been discussed before on this list. Is there a way to search
the archives, overall, for mention of such terms in the subject headings? I
do not wish to revive a subject that you may have put to rest, but if it has
not been dispatched, I should like to raise it again. Platinga's _The
Nature of Necessity_ in which this distinction is the fulcrum for much
argument is a delightful book, clear and elegant prose of the quality of
Russell's or Moore's. Indeed, his arguments may even be explicit enough to
refute, if the subject has not already been done to death in previous
threads?
Seth,
There was a discussion of Kripke and his essentiallism in about May of 2001.
I think it began with some posts by Rodrigo on "Kripke on Definete
Descriptions".
Cheers,
M.J. Murphy
The shapes of things are dumb.
-L. Wittgenstein
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Seth Sharpless
Seth
Seth,
There was a discussion of Kripke and his essentiallism in about May of 2001.
I think it began with some posts by Rodrigo on "Kripke on Definete
Descriptions".
Cheers,
M.J. Murphy
The shapes of things are dumb.
-L. Wittgenstein
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
J L Speranza
for their observations. Some comments below. I note that the thread allows
at least for 3 derivations:
i. Helzerman's quantifying (and ratio-ing) the explanans and
explanandum, with "adhocceity" and "adhocceibel" and -- as I may add -- the
'deci-adhocceibel'.
ii. an exploration of 'haecceity' ('haecceitas') as the Latin rendering
of Aristotle's 'tode ti' (literally, "this here thing") as used, mainly in
its _de re_ reading, by contemporary ontologists such as Platinga,
Chisholm, and Greenberg -- some references below.
iii. a focus on the 'this' of the 'thisness' by which 'haecceitias' is
sometimes translated, qua Russellian ego-centric particular to develop, a
la Kaplan or Perry, a logic of 'demonstratives', aimed at providing a
representation of deixis in logical form and its contribution to
truth-conditions.
R. Helzerman writes:
>I think [adhocness] is misguided.
Showing a preference for the feminine form ('haec', rather than 'hoc') ("I
wonder why it is with Southern Bells/You have to form an adhoc
theory/confronted with such awful Haeccibels/her love is like a raging
storming sea") he adds:
>What worries me more is this: if
>[some contemporary authors are] bandying about
>[the word] I suppose its too early to recycle
>[it]. Can you (or anybody else) think of
>a better word? I refuse to use "adhocness"
>monster; remindes me of a mythical beast in
>some scottish lake."
Well, I'd stick with 'adhocceity' and use 'adhocceibel' as the unit,
making, too, a distinction (a la 'bel' vs. 'decibel') between the
_deci_-adhocceibel and the adhocceibel proper.
G. L. Koenig writes:
>I have gathered that haecceity (my God, how is that
>pronounced?)
/'heksiti/, and apparently Duns dropped the 'h'.
>means, among other things, "thisness". I have been
>promoting a set of semantic primes. 'this' has a
>rather unique property as a semantic prime.
Koenig quotes from Wierzbicka:
>"Despite occasional claims to the contrary,
>careful examination of the available cross-linguistic
>evidence suggests that all languages have a
>clear and unproblematic exponent for THIS. The other demonstrative
>pronouns often do not match semantically across language
>boundaries."
Right. As I quote in the appendix below from the OED's entry for
'demonstrative', some linguists refer at this stage to what they call a
'demonstrative root'. In English, this root is the mere sound "th-"
(cognate with L. "tam". and Gk. "ti" -- this is relevant vis a vis
Neivens's comments below). Thus: "the", "this", "that" -- and "there" --
all participate of this basic demonstrative root.
If you want to see at the 'system of demonstratives' as such, English seems
somewhat particular, in that there probably are various systems at play, as
I mentioned in passing in my previous post. The basic, standard dyadic has
'this' contrasted with 'that' -- and that, as they say, is that. However,
there is evidence, in some idiolects, for a basic three-valued system, with
'thick' (featuring the same 'demonstrative root') or 'yon'. An American
friend with whom I was discussing the prevalence of one's idiolect commente=
d:
"[J]udging from my own experience with living
in different dialect areas. I have sometimes
altered my own use of language when I move into
a new area and find that people think the way I
say something is strange. One example that comes
to mind is my own dialect's use of 'yonder.' Where
I come from, it is normal to use the word,
so that you have 'over here,' 'over there,' and
'over yonder.' But in order not to sound quaint where
I live now, I have emended that to 'over here,'
'over there,' and 'way over there.'"
I believe the Spanish equivalence is "aca, alla, and aculla" -- but,
typicall to complicate things, Spanish also has "aqui, and alli" (but, to
my knowledge, no "aculli"). In linguistic parlance, 'this' is the proximal
demonstrative, 'that' is the 'medial' one, and 'thik' (or 'yon') the
'distal' one. Talking of cross-linguistic evidence, I am unaware if
_German_ has a third possibility corresponding to 'thik' or 'yon'. On the
face of it, it would seem as though English 'this' and 'that' are cognate
with German 'dieser' and 'das'. But there seems to be, as Wierzbicka notes,
one problem here with the 'distal' (or 'medial') demonstrative: unlike
English 'that', the German cognate 'das' is just the neutral _definite_
article ('Das Mensch'), rather than anything 'strictly' demonstrative.
Koenig goes on:
>Here we have a word which means more than just "this";
>it means "thisness". Well, "thisness" is not identical to
>"this", or is it?
Right. The received idea is that "-ness" contributes, as you later put it,
with an element of 'abstractivity'. One good quote here is due to Spencer:
"The truth we have arrived at is one
exceeding in abstractness the most abstract religious doctrines." H.
Spencer, _First Principles_, 1862 (1875) i ii 14, p. 44. (OED under
'abstract'). However, I tend to believe that there is no actual need to
_think_ that "-ness" does that. Formally, it seems to be just a
_productive_ device to make a noun out of something, including _another
noun_. Thus, the OED has entries for
'loveness' and 'manness'. ("-ness" can be profitable compared with a suffix
in Latin which gets discussed by Neivens below, viz. "-ance", or "-ence",
as in, respectively, 'substance' and 'essence').
>The idea of "essence" which seems entirely appropriate
>[in discussing 'haecceity'] because "-ness" is the suffix
>which abstracts the essence. Speaking about essences
>brings to mind a [property] whose absence will destroy
>the meaning of the concept essentialized.
>What property would we remove from the idea of
>"this" destroy its sense? I can only think of:
>"not-this".
Well, I can also think of 'that'. As in 'this and that'. If it's _this_ it
can't really be _that_. Note that 'this and that' seems to mean,
colloquially, almost everything. (And 'thatness' _is_ a technicism in the
philosophy of Bradley, as I noted in a previous post on this thread).
>Another prime is 'good'. 'Good' does not refer
>to any specific act or quality. It's just a
>space-holder for something evaluated by the speaker.
Again, we have a _binary_ system here, with _bad_ (if that's a semantic
prime too) as "(-)-evaluation". L. Horn has explored the relevance of this
binary system in lexicalisation patterns.
You won't find too many instances of, for example, 'unboring', because
'boring' happens to be "(-)-evaluated" in English culture. Cfr. "His
boringness is a quality inherent in him. Boringness springs, surely, in
some measure from want of tact." Sketch 1893, 316/2 (OED 'boring').
>Likewise, "this" has to be instantiated with
>some object within or without the mind of the
>speaker. Lacking that object there is an empty
>"this" and no thisness.
Lord Russell seems to disagree with you over this (M Winther who has
researched on Russell's particular-universal distinction may help here). It
seems Russell spoke, precisely of this _simple_ demonstrative 'this' -- the
demonstrative _pronoun_ rather than adjective -- as the ultimate
"egocentric particular". Adding a noun spoils it for the sense-datum
theorist, it seems. As per the course of the history of the English
langauge, though, I guess you are right that the demonstrative pronoun got
evolved from the adjectival use.
>If "this" has a context, a la Grice, it
>[implies] narrowing the field of attention
>to a foreground; selecting a single object or set.
>It seems to have an implicit existence claim and
>a sense of "let's consider the subject pointed to".
>As to "haecceity", I think that part of the problem
>is that it is a polysemous "this": with its other
>senses documented here, it seems to violate a
>language universal.
I agree that 'haecceity' is probably _not_ a semantic 'prime', but rather a
philosophical technicism. I would be careful in dealing with 'this' as
'polysemous', though, rather than plain 'ambiguous' (on occasion). In a
way, 'this' compares to 'a'. As Levinson notes in his _Pragmatics_, "this"
seems to have developed a 'non-deictic use'. His example being: "I met this
weird guy the other day." (p. 66). Interestingly, the deictic usage (rather
than sense) can "combine with a non-deictic use". Levinson's example: "I
cut a finger: this one." Levinson writes: "Here, "this one" refers to
whatever 'a finger' refers to, but simultaneously must be
accompanied by a presentation of the relevant finger." Somewhat
analogously, Grice refers to how an implicature of either 'closeness' or
'remoteness' can attach to the phrase 'an x', as in respectively: "I broke
a finger yesterday" and "Jones is meeting a woman this evening". Grice writ=
es:
"one would _not_ lend a sympathetic
ear to a philosopher who suggested that
there are _three_ "senses" of 'an x':
(i) one in which it means
'something which satisfies the
conditions [of being x]',
(ii) another in which it means 'an x
that is remotely related to some
person indicated in the context', and
(iii) yet another in which it means 'an x
that is _closely_ related to some
person indicated by the context."
_Studies in the Way of Words_, p. 38.
Rather, 'an x' has just _sense_ (i) -- with (ii) and (iii) thrown in as
conversational implicature on occasion.
Koenig:
>Perhaps because it was in intense linguistic evolution,
>whatever the cause, ['haecceity'] is really anomalous
>in not being an unproblematic exponent of [a] prime sense.
>So we cannot expect it ever to be clear.
Well, part of David Kaplan's motivation, since he coined 'dthat', was to
provide some regimentation for a 'logic of demonstratives'. J. Perry deals
with some of the truth-conditions and contributions to the logical form of
utterances containing demonstratives in an appendix below. (Both Kaplan and
Perry contribute to Yourgrau's Oxford Reading in Philosophy on
_Demonstratives_).
J. Neivens is more interested in the relevance of 'haecceity' to, as it
were, its _Greek_ roots in Aristotelian metaphysics.
>When it comes to scholastic terminology and
>what Speranza refers to as the "-itas" family,
>I find it more helpful to trace this back to ol'
>Aristotle himself.
Neivens brings in Aristotle's 'entelechia' as perhaps relevant, deriving as
it does from 'echein', "to be in (such) a condition."
>My suspicion is that "haecceity" _might_ have
>a similar derivation from "echein."
Alas, I have not been able to confirm this, either. There is an entry for
the plain 'hoc' in the OED, but, rather unphilosophically, it refers to a
card game "in which certain privileged cards give to the person who plays
them the right of attributing to them whatever value he wishes" (Three
cites are given: 1730 Bailey (folio), Hock, Hoca; 1838 Southey Doctor 143 5
46; "The Game of Hoc, the Reverse, the Beast, the Cuckoo & the Comet."; and
1887 All Year Round 5 Feb. 66: "Hoc was the favourite game of Cardinal
Mazarin, which he introduced from Italy.").
Neivens:
>In the Aristotelian terminology, "echein" appears [in]
>"entelecheia" [while] "haeccitas" is the scholastics'
>translation of "tode ti," the particular.
>Both are part of the notion of "ousia" or "substance."
>The whole question of "essence" as regards Aristotle is
>something I find pretty curious. In the first case it
>seems to be another one of his coinages -- "essentia"
>is used by the scholastics to translate his term "to
>ti en einai," which literally translates as "what it was to be."
>But the thing that strikes me about this odd phrase
>(on the meaning of which much ink has been expended)
>is its similarity to the idiomatic English phrase
>"what it _takes_ to be." The sense I'm thinking of
>here is when we'd ask whether someone "has what it takes"
>to be or to do some particular thing. The only argument
>I could offer in favour of this line of interpretation is
>that Aristotle did tend to make use of idiomatic phrases
>in constructing his terminology, as with "kategoria."
I see what you mean. Indeed, 'idiomatic' should perhaps read 'idiolectal'.
I queried a Greek translator (M. Chase) about this, and he wrote back:
"Aristotle's terminology was *not* ordinary:
no Greek (with the possible exception of Antisthenes)
had ever used the expression *to ti En einai* before
him. *Tode ti* literally means "this thing here";
but Aristotle was the first to but the definite article
in front of it and use it to mean "essence". All the
Aristotelian commentators devoted an obligatory
introductory chapter to the topic "why is Aristotle so
obscure?", and the answer, inter alia, is that he
found it necesary *to invent new words and phrases*,
as Aristotle himself admits at Categories 7a5-6.
Porphyry (In Cat., p. 56 sqq. Busse) begins his
minor commentary on the Categories by explaining
this phenomenon (translation Steven Strange):
"[O]rdinary language is for communicating
about everyday things, and employs the
expressions that are commonly used to
indicate such things, but philosophers are
interpreters of things that are unknown to
most people and need new words to communicate
the things they have discovered. Hence either
they have invented new and unfamiliar expressions
or else they have used established ones in
order to indicate the things they have discovered...".
Some of the examples Porphyry cites include *entelechy*
and *category*".
Neivens writes:
>the notion of "ousia" or "substance."
Right. Strictly, though, it is indeed 'essentia' which translates 'ousia',
right. Thus I read from the OED:
"essence", from the Latin "essentia", f. *essentem,
fictitious present participle of "esse", to be,
in imitation of Gr. "ousia" being, from "ont-",
stem of present participle of "einai", to be."
(Earliest record in English:
1398 Trevisa Barth. De PR i 1495 6
"Thise thre persones be not thre goddes, but one very
god, one essence or one beyng.")
"Substance" rather would translate 'hypostasis'. Again from the OED.
"substance": from the Latin "substantia", f.
"substans", "-ant-", present participle of "substare",
to stand or be under, be present, from "sub-" +
"stare", to stand. L. "substantia" was adopted
as the representative of Gr. "ousia".
(Earliest record in English:
1300 Cursor M. 9762: "An-fald godd vndelt es he,
And a substance wit-in þir thre".)
(Apparently, this brought a little problem to theology, with 'person'
thrown in for good measure, as I read at
http://www.bfpubs.demon.co.uk/trinity.htm: "_hypostasis_ is a
straightforward combination of "hypo-" and "-stasis": standing beneath, or
below. The Latin translation is obvious: "sub" and "stantia" –
"substantia". But no; this simple solution could not be, because "ousia"
was _already_ traditionally translated by "substantia". A new word in Latin
had to be found -- and the word chosen was persona." And cfr. the OED entry
for 'hypostasis': "that which stands under, substance, subsistence,
existence, reality, essence. The development of sense,
esp. in Metaphysics and Theology, belongs to Neo-Platonic and Early
Christian use; the English senses only reflect those established in late
Greek.").
For the record -- and this relates to Neivens's ref. below to Grice on
'hizzing' and 'hazzing' -- perhaps the closest Anglo-Saxon phrase here
being the plain, if abstract, 'beingness', as per the OED quote:
"It may be possible to isolate certain aspects
of the Aristotelian doctrine of `beingness' or
essence which have an obvious affinity with the
ideas connoted by the word `substance'".
Mind 42 1933 319
But surely the point of Aristotle's 'tode ti' or Duns's 'haecceitas' is to
focus not so much on _general_ beingness but on the _particular_ (as
Neivens puts it) beingness of a particular individual.
Neivens refers to Aristotle's
>"to ti en einai," which literally translates
>as "what it was to be."
Interesting how this little phrase 'implicates' (on occasion, and in a
cancellable sort of way) that 'it' never actually _got_ to be.
>The thing that strikes me about this odd phrase
>is its similarity to the idiomatic English phrase
>"what it _takes_ to be", when we'd ask whether
>[an individual] "has what it takes" to be
>some[thing]. ... Suppose we take "Socrates is wise"
>Suppose we say that for "Socrates is hirsute,"
>this predication would contribute nothing to his
>being wise. So we could assign "HIRSUTE(x)" a haecceitic
>value [0] with respect to WISE(x). We could perhaps
>[also] assume that if "HIRSUTE(x)" has
>haecceitic value [0] with respect to "WISE(x)",
>then [symmetrically] "WISE"(x) [would have] a haecceitic
>value [0] with respect to "HIRSUTE(x)." [Neither predicate
>entailing the other, as it were]. Similarly, we could
>define synonymy with regard to "WISE(x)" as haecceitic
>value [1]. Where B is "bachelor" and U is "unmarried"
>if "UNMARRIED(x)" has haecceitic value [1] with
>regard to "BACHELOR(x)", then "Bachelor" = "Unmarried".
Neivens compares this with Grice's idea in 'Aristotle on the multiplicty of
being' (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 60) of
>"x izz y" and "x hazz y" although the
>idea of "x izz y" (vs. x haxx y") as
>meaning y is _essential_ to x's existence,
>begs the question "x's existence as _what._"
Right. What Grice elsewhere calls the individual's 'metier':
"One might label the _active_ kind of finality
property as a 'metier'. The activity of a tiger,
e.g. might be activity different from the activity
of a scholar. Now: every individual belonging to
any sort must, by virtue of that, posess as an
_essential property_ an 'active finality'. To be
a tiger is to possess as an 'essential property' the
capacity to _tigerise_.
Grice, _The Conception of Value_, p. 81.
(Grice expands on two alternative views on 'essence' further on pp. 111ff:
an "essential property" as (i) "the individuating property of an individual
member of a kind: a property such that if an individual were to lose it, it
would cease to belong to the kind, and so cease to exist", and (ii) the
'generator' property (a la Keynes) of a substantive kind." He concludes
that it may well be the case that both approaches are supplementary: (i) a
substance having an essence requires a theory to give expression to its
nature, and (ii) a theory requires a substance with an essence to govern
them".
Neivens:
>We'd get something like "x hazz HIRSUTE" with regard
>to "x izz WISE". The "haecceity" (Socrates's "thisness")
>would come out to the extent that "hirsute" belongs to
>Socrates inasmuch as it does _not_ belong to Socrates's
>belonging to "wisdom". Anyway, I don't know how well
>that kind of system would pan out, but it's perhaps an
>interesting idea to play around with.
Indeed it is. I actually like this idea that if Socrates's hisuteness is
regarded as 'essential' to his being hirsute, then the moment he shaves, he
eo ipso ceases to exist.
It's Alan Code who has 'played around' some of these Aristotelian ideas by
Grice. In his contribution to the Grice festschrift (R. Grandy/R. Warner,
PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Clarendon Press), Code offers
a sort of formal system with principles, definitions, and theorems.
Appendix below.
S. Sharpless re-assesses Carnap's take on 'haecceity'. What happens was tha=
t
>Carnap backed off from his nominalism far
>enough to introduce "haecceities". I'm not
>sure one could say that Carnap put _back_ what
>had never been there.
Oops, I see what you mean. Sorry for the misleading elision.
Re: Kripke, Sharpless refers to the
>distinction between "de re" and "de dicto"
>essences. ... Platinga's _The Nature of Necessity_
>in which this distinction is the fulcrum for much
>argument is a delightful book.
As Murphy notes, Vanegas introduced a thread on 'Kripke on definite
descriptions' which touched on these issues, but we never went the whole
essentialist hog, as you may put it. So, it sounds like a nice idea to me
to explore all this. A ref. to an online work by J. Greenberg below --
Appendix I -- (as he compares his 'haecceity' with _Adams's_ 'thisness' may
be relevant here).
>Thanks to Speranza.
You're welcome. Actually, this is a second version of a reply -- the first,
which had a few more bibliographical references, as I recall, got erased
when my mailer decided that there was some error somewhere...
Cheers,
JL
References:
Abbot, B. Donkey demonstratives.
Available online.
Adams R. Primitive thisness. Journal of Philosophy, vol. 76
Adams R. Thisness. Synthese 49
Braun D. Complex Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 74.
Caplan B. Comments on N. Salmon, 'Demonstrating & necessity'.
Chisholm R. Haecceity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11
Evans G. Understanding demonstratives. In Bouveresse & Parrett,
Meaning and Understanding. Repr. in P. Yourgrau, ed.
Demonstratives. Oxford Readings in Philosophy.
Grandy R & R. Warner, PGRICE. Philosophical grounds of rationality:
intentions, categories, ends. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kaplan, D. Demonstratives in Perry, Themes from Kaplan. Repr.
in P. Yourgrau, Demonstratives.
Kaplan, D. Dthat. Repr. in P. Yourgrau, Demonstratives.
Levinson, S C. Pragmatics. Ch. ii: Deixis. On the deictic
and non-deictis uses of "this".
Mcginley W. Haecceity. Book.
Greenberg, J. Haecceity.
http://www.structuredindividuals.com/complexes/notes.html
Singular reference. Ed. L. Horn. Garland.
Perry, Indexicals and demonstratives
http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~john/indanddem/indanddem/node5.html
Rosenkrantz G. Haecceity: an ontological study. Philosophical Studies 57,
Kluwer.
Salmon N. Demonstrating and necessity.
Wettstein H. Demonstrative reference. Philosophical Studies 40
Yougrau, P. Introduction to _Demonstratives_. Oxford Readings
in Philosophy.
Yourgrau, P. Demonstratives: the path back to Frege. In his _Demonstratives=
_.
Yourgrau, P. Demonstratives. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Section I:
'Frege & demonstratives'. 1. D Kaplan, 'Dthat'. 2. D. Kaplan, 'Thoughts on
Demonstratives'. 3. J. Perry, 'Frege on Demonstratives' 4. G. Evans,
'Understanding Demonstratives' 5. P Yourgrau: The Path Back to Frege;
Section II: 'The first person'. 1. G Anscombe: The First Person; 2. J Katz:
Descartes's Cogito; Section III: 'Thought & Touch'. 1. S. Rosen: Thought &
Touch; C. Parsons, 'Mathematical Intuition', 3. M. Friedman: 'Form and
Content'. Section IV. Reality and the Present. 1. N. Kretzmann,
'Omniscience and Immutability', 2. L. Sklar, 'Time, Reality, and
Relativity'; 3. K. Goedel, 'A Remark about the Relationship between
Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy'. Index.
Appendix I. Greenberg on 'haecceity':
From http://www.structuredindividuals.com/complexes/notes.html
"Between my "haecceity" and Adams' "thisness" there are two key differences=
:
i. Adams's "thisness" depends for its features upon Adams'
conception of what a thisness is. In contrast, every
feature of a "haecceity" is engendered by the mutual
relations of a complex and its constituents. While
the features of a "thisness" are thus the artefacts
of arbitrary legislative postulation, the features of
a "haecceity" are conferred upon it by the role it
plays in a system.
ii. Adams makes it clear that a thisness is not
"a special sort of metaphysical component of
[a particular]": "I am not proposing to revive
this aspect of [Scotus'] conception of a haecceity,
because I am _not_ committed to regarding properties
as components of [particulars]." (p.7). But a
"haecceity" retains this feature of its Scotian
progenitor, for any haecceity constitutes a complex
whose existence but not whose being, depends upon the
haecceity being one in substance."
A search with 'Amazon' retrieves one book with 'haecceity' in its title, vi=
z.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0761804536/qid=1029576975/sr=1-1=
/ref=
sr_1_1/002-7307335-3016802
Mcginley, Haecceity:
"This book [by philo prof. at Scranton, Penn] explains how Duns Scotus's
concept of "Haecceitas"--thisness, or individuation--represents an
insufficiently recognized yet central aspect of
Aristotelianism, namely its denial of and flight from "the play of
difference" that was a core
aspect of Plato's philosophy. The difficulty, the author asserts, is that
there has been
historically an all too common tendency to read Plato through the
distorting lens of Aristotle's
view of him. The author further asserts that Aristotelianism has informed
Neo-Platonism
to the extent that it too becomes a corruption of Plato's thought, because
of their common
flight from Plato's "difference-oriented" theory of forms. Throughout this
work is
a concern with the thinking of Derrida and Heidegger, especially in terms
of their readings of the classical and medieval traditions."
(There is also a Philosophical Studies Series book ed. by Kluwer by
Rosenkrantz, as mentioned in the refs. below).
Appendix II: A. Code on 'tode ti'.
(Further to J. Neivens's considerations on the formalisation of
'haecceity', A. Code (in his contribution to PGRICE (op cit above under
Grandy)) introduces some principles, definitions, and theorems which
feature 'tode ti' and other Aristotelian constructions. Code writes:
"The logic of being".
1. Principles:
1. x is x.
2. If x is y and y is z, the x is z.
3. If x has y, it is not the case that x is y.
4. x has y iff x has something that is y.
2. Total definitions:
1. x is predicable (kategoreitai) of y iff
either y is x or y has something that is x.
2. x is I-predicable (predicable kath'autho,
essentially predicable) of y iff y is x.
3. x is h-predicable (predicale kath'symbebekos,
accidentally predicable) of y iff y has something
that is x.
4. x = y iff x is y and y is x.
5. x is individual (atomon) iff (necessarily)
for all y it is the case that if y is x, then x is
y.
6. x is particular (kath'ekaston) iff necessarily
for all y it is the case that if x is predicable
of y, then x is y and y is x.
7. x is universal (katholou) iff (possibly) there
is a y such that x is predicable of y and it is not
the case that x is y and y is x.
3. Partial definitions:
1. If x is "tode ti" (as this somewhat), then
x is individual.
2. If x is a (separable) platonic form, then x is "tode
ti" and x is universal).
4. Ontological theorems:
1. x is predicable of y iff either y is x or y has
something that is x, but not both.
2. x is i-predicable of x.
3. If x is h-predicable of y, then ~(x = y)
4. x is not h-predicable of x.
5. If x is particular, then x is individual
(Note: the converse is _not_ a theorem).
6. If x is particular, then nothing that is not
identical with x is x.
7. Nothing is both particular and a separable
platonic form.
8. If x is a separable platoic form, then nothing
that is not identical with x is x.
9. If x is particular, then there is no separable
platonic form y such that x is y.
10. If x is a separable platonic form, then if x is
predicable of y and ~(x = y), then y has x.
11. If x is a separable platonic form and y is
particular, then x is predicable of y iff y has x.
5. Platonic principle:
Each universal is a separable platonic form
6. Platonic theorem:
1. Each universal is "tode ti".
2. If x is particular, then there is no y such that
~(x = y) and y is i-predicable of x.
3. If x is predicable of y and ~(x = y), then
x is h-predicable of y.
7. Aristotelian principle:
If x has y and x is particular, then there is a Z
such tht ~(z = x) and x is z.
8. Aristotelian theorems:
1. If x is particular and y is universal and
predicable of x, then there is a Z such that
~(x = z) and z is i-predicable of x).
2. If there are particulars of which universals
are predicable, then not every universal is
"tode ti"."
Appendix III. OED on 'demonstrative' and 'demonstrative' roots. "In
grammar, serving to point out or indicate the particular thing referred to:
applied esp. to certain adjectives (often used pronominally) having this
function. Also: "demonstrative root": a linguistic root which appears to
have had no other signification than that of pointing to a near or remote
object, as Gr.
"to", "tote", L. "tam", "tunc", or its Teutonic representative "the",
"then", "there"".
Cites:
1520 Whitinton Vulg. (1527) 5 b,
"Whan a noun demonstrative is referred to the whole sentence folowing."
1530 Palsgr. Introd. 29
"Pronouns demonstratyves they have but three "il", "le" and "on" or "len."=
1668 Wilkins Real Char. iii. ii. §3. 305
"As "this" or "that" man or book. In these cases the pronouns are commonly
called demonstrative."
1835 Mrs. Marcet Mary's Gram. ii. ix. 250
"When we use the demonstrative pronoun, it seems as if we were pointing our
finger to show the things we were speaking of."
1865 Tylor Early Hist. Man. iv. 61
"The demonstrative roots, a small class of independent radicals."
1892 Davidson Heb. Gram. (ed. 10) 81
"The letter n, having demonstrative force, is often inserted."
Appendix IV. Towards a logic of demonstratives.
Excerpts from J. Perry, 'Indexicals and demonstratives'. (Perry contributes
with an essay on Frege on demonstratives in Yorgrau's collection mentioned
in the refs. list).
At http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~john/indanddem/indanddem/node5.html. Perry
writes:
"The standard list of indexicals includes the demonstrative pronouns:
"this" and "that". The list is from the work of Kaplan whose work on the
"logic of demonstratives" is responsible for much of the increased
attention given to indexicals by philosophers of language in recent years."
"Philosophers have found indexicals interesting for at least two
reasons. First, such words as "this" plays a crucial role in many
arguments. Second, although the meaning of this word seems relatively
straightforward, it has not been so obvious how to incorporate this meaning
into a semantical theory. In his pioneering work A. Burks distinguishes the
following aspects of an utterance containing indexicals: (i) The sign
itself, which is a token that occurs at a spatiotemporal location and which
belongs to a certain linguistic type; (ii) The existential relations of the
token to other objects; (iii) The meaning associated with the type. (iv)
The indexical meaning of the token, which, in the case of tokens involving
indexicals, goes beyond the type meaning; (v) The information conveyed by
the sign." "The reflexive-referential theory that I advocate builds on
Burks' basic framework. Here is an overview, highlighting the differences
in terminology. Burks takes the signs itself to be the token. I think there
is an ambiguity in "token"; it is sometimes used for the act, and sometimes
for something produced by or at least used in the act. I'll use "utterance"
for the first and reserve "token" for the second. In some kinds of
discourse tokens are epistemically basic, but utterances are always
semantically basic. (As I use the term "utterance" it does not have the
implication of speech as opposed to writing.). Aspect (ii): What Burks
calls the "existential relations" is now usually referred to as the
"context"; indexicals are expressions whose designation shifts from context
to context. I will distinguish several different uses we make of context,
and distinguish various contextual factors that are relevant to different
types of indexicals. Aspect (iii): For Burks the "type meaning" is
associated by language with expressions. I simply call this "meaning" -- I
try to always use "meaning" for what the conventions of language associate
with types. The key idea here in our account of the meaning of indexicals
comes from Reichenbach, who emphasized the reflexivity of indexicals. I
take content to be a property of specific utterances. Burks recognizes two
kinds of content, while I recognize (at least) three. What Burks calls
"indexical meaning" I call "content given facts about meaning" or
"content". What Burks calls "information conveyed" I call "content given
facts about designation" or "content". I claim that neither of these is our
official, intuitive notion of content; that is, neither corresponds to
"what is said" by an utterance. That role is played by "content given facts
about context," or "content". All three kinds of content, however, play
important roles in the epistemology of language."
"It seems then that a defining feature of indexicals is that the
meanings of these words fix the designation of specific utterances of them
in terms of facts about those specific utterances. The facts that meaning
of a particular indexical deems relevant are the contextual facts for
particular uses of it. The designation of an utterance of "that man",
however, is not automatic. The speaker's intention is relevant. There may
be several men standing across the street when I say, "That man stole my
jacket". Which of them I refer to depends on my intention. However, we need
to be careful here. Suppose there are two men across the street, Harold
dressed in brown and Fred in blue. I think that Harold stole my wallet and
I also think wrongly that the man dressed in blue is Harold. I intend to
designate Harold by designating the man in blue. So I point towards the man
in blue as I say "that man". In this case I designate the man in blue --
even if my pointing is a bit off target. My intention to point to the man
in blue is relevant to the issue of whom I designate, and what I say, but
my intention to refer to Harold is not. In this case, I say something I
don't intend to say, that Fred, the man in blue, stole my wallet, and fail
say what I intended to, that Harold did. So it is not just any referential
intention that is relevant to demonstratives, but only the more basic ones,
which I will call directing intentions, following Kaplan. In a case like
this I will typically perceive the man I refer to, and may often point to
or otherwise demonstrate that person. But neither perceiving nor pointing
seems necessary to referring with a demonstrative."
"Here are the conditions of designation for some familiar indexicals:
that: u designates y iff x (x is the speaker of u & x directs u towards y)"
"An utterance u of the form "this x is y", where is the sub-utterance of
an demonstrative THIS, is true iff x esignates y)."
"On Kaplan's approach, the meaning of expressions in languages with
indexicals are regarded as characters. Characters are functions from
contexts to contents. His theory neatly captures what is special about
context in the case of indexicality; that it plays a semantic role, rather
than merely a pre-semantic one. I don't think Kaplan's view does as well
with what is special about content in the case of indexicals, however. "The
meaning, or character, of an indexical is, on Kaplan's theory, a function
from context to official content, to what is said. The approach Barwise and
I took in Situations and Attitudes was similar, although we did compensate
somewhat with what we called ``inverse interpretation''. Stalnaker
complained that something was missing from such approaches, and I have come
to think that he and Burks were correct. In fact, we need a variety of
contents.
"I use three different kinds of content in the account of
indexicals. These correspond to three kinds of facts one might take as
fixed in assessing truth-conditions: The content of an utterance
corresponds to the truth-conditions of the utterance given the facts that
fix the language of the utterance, the words involved, their syntax and
their meaning. The content of an utterance corresponds to the
truth-conditions given all of these factors, plus the facts about the
context of the utterance that are needed to fix the designation of
indexicals. The content of an utterance corresponds to the
truth-conditions given all of these factors, plus the additional facts that
are needed to fix the designation of the terms that remain (definite
descriptions in particular, but also possessives, etc.)."
"Consider "This man is the most brilliant philosopher in the hall."
We could construct a whole hierarchy of relative truth-conditions for such
a message, of the form, given that such and such, m is true iff so and so."
"Cet homme est l'homme le plus brillant dans cette salle", that in French
these words mean that the man the speaker directly intends to refer to is
the most brillant man in the room, m is true iff there is a man the speaker
of m directly intends to refers to and that man is the most brillant man in
the room. Given that m is in French, the words are "Cet homme est l'homme
le plus brillant dans cette salle," that in French these words mean that
the man the speaker directly intends to refer to is the most brillant man
in the room, and that the speaker of m directly intends to refer to Henri,
m is true iff Henri is the most brilliant man in the room. Given that m is
in French, the words are "Cet homme est l'homme le plus brillant dans cette
salle," that in French these words mean that the man the speaker directly
intends to refer to is the most brilliant man in the room, and that the
speaker of m directly intends to refer to Henri, and given that the most
brilliant man in the room is Jacques, m is true iff Henri is Jacques. Given
that m is in French, the words are "Cet homme est l'homme
le plus brillant dans cette salle," that in French these words mean that
the man the speaker directly intends to refer to is the most brilliant man
in the room, and that the speaker of m directly intends to refer to Henri,
and given that the most brilliant man in the room is Jacques, and given
that Henry is not Jacques, m is true iff The False."
"One often hears that indexicality is pervasive, that practially
every bit of language has a hidden indexicality. This is not quite right.
Indexicality is widespread, but much of what passes for discoveries of new
instances of indexicality are actually discoveries about the utility of
reflexive content at a pre-indexical level in understanding how we
understand language. The importance of indexicality is really that, as the
highest form of reflexivity, it is the gateway to the riches of reflexivity=
."
==
J L Speranza, Esq
Country Town
St Michael's Hall Suite 5/8
Calle 58, No 611 Calle Arenales 2021
La Plata CP 1900 Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 00541148241050 Tel 00542214257817
BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
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http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls/
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J L Speranza
Code's) ideas on 'particular' (vs. 'individual') and the
'quasi-demonstrative'. A summary of the Grice-Code view on Aristotelian
predication may be seen at
http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Courses/Ancient/predication.html
IZZING HAZZING
Subject & predicate Subject & predicate
in the same category. in different categories
Predicate says Predicate says
what subject is. what subject has.
Subject & predicate Subject is
are synonymous paronymous with the predicate.
Whatever is said What is said
of the predicate of the predicate
is said of the subject. cannot be said of the subject.
Definition of the Definition of the
predicate predicate
applies to the subject does not apply to the subject.
Grice introduces 'individual' in terms of 'izzing' and 'hazzing': "x is an
_individual_ iff nothing other than x izz x. x is a _primary individual_
iff x is an individual and nothing hazz x (Grice, 'Aristotle on the
multiplicity of being, p. 182). Code, in those same terms, further
contrasts an 'individual' from a _particular_ proper:
* (x). x is individual ("_atomon_")
<-> Nec. (y) (y is x) -> (x is y).
* (x) x is particular ("_kath'ekaston_") <->
Nec. (y). x is predicable of y -> x is y & y is x.
* x is _tode ti_ (a this somewhat) ->
x is individual.
* (x)(x is particular -> x is individual).
(The converse is not a theorem).
A. Code, in _PGRICE_ (Grandy/Warner,
in refs, below), p. 414.
Code writes:
"It is important not to confuse 'individual'
with 'particular': an _individual_ is an item
that cannot be truly "i[zz]"-predicated
of another item. An individual (e.g. an
individual white ("to ti leukon", Cat. 2.1a27))
may be "h"-predicable of another thing. A
_particular_, on the other hand, cannot be neither
"i"-predicated nor "h-"predicated of any other
item. While every particular is an individual,
the converse implication does not hold. A particular
cannot receive a property unless the particular
is something essentially. A particular must be
_something_ or other definable in order to _have_
a property. A particular must be _tode ti_,
a 'this some_what_', where the 'ti' is the
something definable that _tode_ is (v. Owen, p.
24). "Tode ti" is sometimes used so that "ti"
is the 'something' that "tode" picks out.
It may also involve quantification over an
the essence (essential property) of the
_tode_. _Tode_ may pick out the essence,
and the _ti_ range over the particulars
endowed with that essence: 'Socrates is
tode ti' may thus generalise either
'Socrates is _this_ man' or 'Socrates is _a_
man'. In the Categories, a "primary substance"
(_prote ousia_) is an individual "_tode ti_"
(Cat. 1b6-9 3b10-15). The primary substance
-- indeed, the _tode ti_ -- is the particular
(e.g. a particular man), which is _not_
predicable of anything further. Only
a primary substance is a 'this', i.e. a
particular. A particular man is a 'this',
and no 'this' is predicable of this 'this'.
For Aristotle, however, matter is _not_
"tode ti", and hence matter is _not_ a primary
substance. The matter of which a particular is
made is not a 'this'.
(Code, op. cit., p. 439).
Code makes on p. 439 an acknowledgment to M. Cohen whose refs. on these
concerns I've made avail of in the list below. As for the _linguistic_ side
to this (and "this"), may I append Grice's brief consideration on
'[quasi-]demonstrat[ion] in _Studies in the Way of Words_:
"Consider utterances of such a sentence as,
'The book on the table is not open'. As there
are, obviously, _many_ books on [many] tables
in the world, if we are to treat such a sentence
as being of the form "the A is not G" and
as being, on that account, ripe for Russellian
expansion, we might do well to treat it as
exemplifying a more _specific_ form, 'The A'
_which is Phi_ is not G', where 'phi' represents
an epithet to be identified in a _particular_
context of utterance ("phi" being a sort of
quasi-demonstrative). Standardly, to identify
the reference of "phi" for a particular utterance
of 'The book on the table is open', the addressee
would proceed via the identification of a particular
book as being a good _candidate_ for being the
book meant, and would identify the candidate
of "phi" by finding in the candidate a feature,
for example, that of _being in *this* room_, which
could be used to yield a composite epithet ("book
on the table in _this_ room"), which would
in turn fill the bill of being the epithet which
the speaker had in mind as being uniquely satisfied
by the book selected as candidate. Determining
the reference of "phi" would, standardly, involve
determining what feature the utterer might have in
mind as being _uniquely instantiated_ by an _actual
object_, and this in turn would standardly involve
satisfying oneself that some particular feature
actually is uniquely satisfied by a particular
actual object (e.g. a particular book)."
Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, WOW, p. 277.
& cf. Schiffer in _Synthese_.
Cheers,
JL
===
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Allen R. Individual properties in Aristotle's Categories.
Phronesis 14.
Annas J. Individuals in Aristotle's Categories. Phronesis 19
Aristotle, Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Anscombe, G. The Principle of Individuation.
Aristotelian Society 27. Reprinted in J. Barnes,
M. Schofield, and R. R. K. Sorabji (eds.),
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London: Duckworth
Block, I. Substance in Aristotle. In G. C. Simmons (ed.),
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Bolton, R. Science and the Science of Substance
in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z.
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Bostock, D. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Burnyeat, M. Notes on Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Oxford: Sub-faculty of Philosophy.
Chappell, V. Aristotle and the Principle of Individuation.
Phronesis 17
Chen C. Aristotle's primary substance. Phronesis 2
Code A. Aristotle’s Response to Quine's objections to modal logic.
Journal of Philosophical Logic 5
The persistence of Aristotelian matter.
Philosophical Studies 29
No universal is a substance:
an interpretation of Aristotle's _Metaphysics_ Z 13 1038b 8-15
Paideia.
What is it to be an individual?
Journal of Philosophy 75
Metaphysics & Logic, in Matthen,
Aristotle Today. Edmonton: Academic Printing.
On the origins of some Aristotelian theses about predication'
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How things are: studies in predication and the
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Aristotle: essence & accident," in
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Potentiality in Aristotle's science & metaphysics
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Aristotle’s metaphysics as a science of principles
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