Is Realism a Theory?
Jan Dejnozka
> I wrote..
>
> >> To me the realism vs. anti-realism choice only makes sense within that
> >> tradition. (The sceptical one) One in which philosophy argues for
> >> Butchvarov's 2-4. The
> >> problem, as I see it, is deciding upon what would constitute
> >> evidence for or against.
>
> Do you agree? Ordinary scepticism about ordinary beliefs are resolved,
> as best we can, with evidence. What we consider to be evidence in the
> case in point. Whether JFK was shot by 3 guns...whether the unvierse
> is contracting or expanding...whether your wife has been faithful.
*****I think I already answered this in another post.
> What is the evidence for (or against) the following?
>
> > >> Very roughly, I shall mean by...realism with respect to x the
> > >> view that (1) x exists and has certain properties, a nature, and
> > >> (2) that its existence and nature are independent of our
> > >> awareness of it, (3) of the manner in which we think of
> > >> (conceptualize) it, and (4) of the manner in which we speak of
> > >> it. (Butchvarov 1989: 3)
*****This is just a definition of a concept. If you take it as a
stipulation, no evidence is needed. If you take it as a theoretical
definition, I'd say it is intrinsically plausible as spelling out a
common, ordinary meaning of "real," and goes very little beyond a
merely lexical (dictionary) definition. It would be philosophically
important even if there are other important philosophical meanings of
the word "realism," as in theory of universals.
> >But another reason to be anti-realist concerning material
> >things is that the very concept of a material thing is
> >incoherent.
>
> You seem convinced. Perhaps I don't see it. I'm always intrigued
> when
> a concept which serves me well is labelled incoherent,
*****I was just reporting Butchvarov's view. It's not my view.
>
> >If there is no evidence that there are real things, then there
> >is no reason to believe that there are real things. You are right
> on
> >track there!
>
> Did I say that there is no evidence for real things? I'm still
> trying
> to figure out what would serve as evidence for such claims.
*****That's a deep epistemological question, but my book is about
ontology, not skepticism.
> It strikes me that having a theory which applies to everything is
> somewhat paradoxical. It's like having everything and hence having
> no
> place to put it.
*****I discuss this in my book in chapter 4, as the question whether
all concepts must be classificatory in order to be informative. I
argue that concepts can apply to everything and still be informative
in an important sense. Here I sharply disagree with Butchvarov. It's a
controversial and important issue.
> Seriously, to evaluate a theory mustn't one turn to
> some facts. But if the facts are within the theory...This would
> suggest that we can't start with theory.
*****This is the whole point behind saying you cannot prove a
philosophy of science false by performing an experiment. The
experiment itself would be part of what the philosopher of science is
or should be interpreting. It is also why you cannot prove Berkeley
false by kicking a stone. Berkeley would have an interpretation of
that. You have to go beyond the kick to argue why it would prove
Berkeley false. This is related to whether all informative concepts
are classificatory.
> Kantian transcendental arguments are not theoretical. They're not
> psychological claims about the workings of mind. They are arguments
> which to take the form of "if you agree that such and such is the
> case, then it follows that...Kant doesn't have a theory of what is
> real. He begins with everyday distinctions between reality and
> fantasy. He asks: "What is there about us which allows for us to
> make
> that distinction between reality and fantasy?"
Your statement of the form of a transcendental argument is incomplete.
Your if-then is not an argument but only a conditional statement. The
if-then statement is only a premiss in the argument. A better way to
put the statement is "P only if Q." Or closer to Kant, who asks how
our experience of the world is possible, "P is possible only if Q." So
the form of the argument is
1. P is possible only if Q.
2. P.
3. Therefore Q.
Or:
1. Our experience of the world as an external world of
causally interacting physical things is possible only if there exists
a transcendental self which imposes transcendental concepts on our
manifold of presented, public, empirically real phenomena.
2. We do experience the world as an external world of causally
interacting physical things.
3. Thereforethere exists a transcendental self which imposes
transcendental concepts on our manifold of presented, public,
empirically real phenomena.
What you were giving was only a quick version of premiss (1). Now
Kant's transcendental idealism is described by the phrase, "which
imposes transcendental concepts on our manifold of presented, public,
empirically real phenomena," plus the thesis that whether there are
material things in themselves lurking beyond the curtain of
impositions is unknowable. Kant's empirical realism is described by
the sub-phrase, "our manifold of presented, public, empirically real
phenomena." These two items-- transcendental idealism plus empirical
realism-- give me modified realism right there. The phenomenal are the
empirically real things being conceptually organized into
transcendentally ideal items which we pre-philosophically take to be
perceived material things. But there is more. The transcendental self
is a real self. It is an agent. It is postulated as a very active
agent, since it organizes the manifold into a world of things. There
is even more. As I noted in an earlier post, in his moral theory, Kant
postulates a noumenal self as a moral agent. These two selves are in
addition to Kant's empirical self, which is how I ordinarily,
pre-philosophically appear to myself as a person. This is Kant's
famous theory of the three selves, and all three look real. Once
again, one must not confuse materialism with realism. Selves can be
real. But that is not all! In _Prolegomena_ Kant, as I noted in an
earlier post, admits things in themselves! So, much like Wittgenstein,
Kant has lots of realist aspects.
Now I come back to your denial that Kant's arguments are not
psychological claims about the workings of the mind. To begin with an
argument is never a claim. Only a premiss or conclusion of an argument
can state a claim. And it seems to me that conclusion (3) of the
transcendental argument I stated above is precisely a psychological
claim about the workings of the mind. Granted, my statement of the
argument grossly simplifies Kant. And granted, Kant rejects
traditional rational psychology. But far from rejecting psychology, he
has three selves and three psychologies-- empirical, transcendental,
and noumenal/moral! My quickie interpretation of Kant is at least
comprehensive enough to include them.
Best wishes,
Jan
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Bruce Denner
>Kant's empirical realism is described by the sub-phrase, "our
>manifold of presented, public, empirically realphenomena." These two
>items-- transcendental idealism plus empirical realism-- give me
>modified realism right there. The phenomenal are the empirically real
>things being conceptually organized into transcendentally ideal items
>which we pre-philosophically take to be perceived material things.
What does the word "modified" modify here. I'd say *not* that we have
just have some purchase on reality, some limited vision, but that
reality (for Kant) can only mean *appearances*, how the world comes to
be for us. From my viewpoint, this changes the meaning of the word
"realism" so that it no longer can be used in the idealist-realist
debate. I know my position is controversial.
> Now I come back to your denial that Kant's arguments are not
>>psychological claims about the workings of the mind. To begin with an
>>argument is never a claim. Only a premiss or conclusion of an argument
>>can state a claim.
Yes. Thank you.
>And it seems to me that conclusion (3) (copied below) of the
>transcendental argument I stated above is precisely a psychological
>claim about the workings of the mind.
> 3. Thereforethere exists a transcendental self which imposes
>transcendental concepts on our manifold of presented, public,
>empirically real phenomena.
By a psychological claim, I mean a explanatory (theoretical) account
which can be tested against a background of facts. Which runs the risk
of beginning true or false. There is no way we can test whether there
is a trancendental self-mechanism which "imposes" anything because
here there is no separating facts from theory. Which is not say that
we can't describe folks as gathering data, sorting things out. We have
that choice.
Still, Kant's *metaphor* (way of talkin about mind) fits both S-R
Behaviorism and Psychoanalysis. What is it inconsistent with? Well,
perhaps mind as a piece of wax or a container of entitites. However,
these metaphors may be more apt in certain contexts.
Look forward to hearing from you.
bruce