[analytic] Re: Water's Essence
Stephen R. Diamond
> I can agree that water is naturally necessarily H2O, because I agree that
> however the world might have been, provided the laws of nature were as they
> actually are, *this* liquid [pointing at a glass of water] would have been
> H2O.
Let's examine the two possibilities regarding the very existence of "this"
liquid.
1. If the world were different in some ways, despite holding the laws of
nature constant, "this" liquid does not exist. It seems to me you need to
assume not only constant laws of nature, but other circumstances such that
"this" liquid exists, on pain of incoherence. But then, *a)* what counts as
"this" liquid? A liquid containing the same elementary particles? Certainly
not a liquid at the same space-time coordinates. You are driven to say that
what you mean by this liquid is a substance having the chemical composition
of water as we know it. But then what you call natural necessity is merely a
convention. And, I don't think it is a convention we are bound to follow.
Someone might announce that he means by "this" liquid "whatever is suitable
for drinking and has no calories." In either case the convention is a
stipulation; I don't even think there is a default stipulation.
2. If the world were different in some ways, despite holding the laws of
nature constant, "this" liquid does exist. Then to know what you are
assuming, you must address *a)* above. The same problem ensues from *a)*.
That water is H2O requires a stipulation as to the meaning of "water."
Nothing forces us to define water by chemical composition. That definition
might be the most perspicuous, but it isn't mandatory. (Actually, I don't
think it _is_ the most perspicuous. The interestingness of the explanation
of the properties of water by its chemical composition depends on our
ability to identify water by means other than chemical composition.)
What is scientifically mandatory, I think, is that we have some concept for
the non-chemical properties of H2O, if we are to engage in the scientific
task of explaining those properties by means of the chemical properties plus
bridge laws. If water on Twin Earth has a different chemical composition,
but the exact same non-chemical properties, this would conflict with our
assumption that the properties of spatio-temporal objects can be explained
by the laws of physics and chemistry. The remedy would not be to restrict
the reference of water to H2O. On the contrary, it would make this chemical
formula irrelevant to explaining water's properties; the need for a
distinction would be eliminated.
The problem is the assumption that there must be some mandatory rules
governing the assignment of terms to sortal kinds, because otherwise any
non-mandatory stipulation set produces a vicious regress. But the same
problem arises for mandatory rules. If water is H2O, are we to have rules
governing how we sort the elements in different possible worlds? Rules all
the way down to the most elementary particles? These particles are defined
by their properties, and that assignment of properties to kinds would
require the impossible--semantic rules for sorting particles independently
of their properties.
Stephen Diamond
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Rodrigo Vanegas
At 0652 PM 8/24/2001 +0000, Larry wrote:
>My only intention, roughly sketching these three alternatives in #800,
>was to show that there are conceivable ways around the argument
>nothing is safely analytic, therefore there are no necessary
>properties. My main point was only that the traditional Carnapian
>concept of analyticity need not take center stage, in this discussion.
I know you were only reminding me of a larger world, but having asked
others to enter the stage, it seemed only natural to fix my sling on them. -)
>So I wasn't endorsing any of the three possibilities, I was just
>mentioning them. However, I do admit to feeling a certain sympathy
>toward approach #2, which is commonsensical though it may be 'anti-
>realist' or 'epistemic'.
Well, anti-realism does come naturally and is commonsensical to many. We
could discuss why we would want to avoid these intuitions in giving a
semantics to modal logic, or we can rest the subject by just noting that
the essentialist would clearly not be happy with an anti-realistic
conception of logical necessity, which is enough for my larger purposes.
>So in your view, Grice defending analyticity is about the same as
>Kreeft defending the Ontological Argument, eh? I imagine we'll be
>hearing something from Grice HQ about this one.
We have. I said that Grice defended only an unprincipled distinction, and
Speranza replied, "Oh well, better than nothing, I say." He then went on
to describe the defended distinction.
[from Speranza's post:]
>Grice further attempts to
>deal with the analytic/syntehtic "dogma" by allowing the philosopher (who
>is also a native speaker) the distinction in terms of the behavioural
>responses to attempts to _falsify_ a given utterance. An analytic utterance
>is that utterance which, in a falsifying situation, demands a revision of
>what we mean.
There is nothing wrong with this, except that it relativizes analyticity to
interpretive responses, which presupposes that these responses are somehow
determined. Again, we have an unprincipled distinction because there will
be statements which demand different kinds of revision on different
occasions, or even both (or neither) kinds of revision on the *same* occasion.
Grice may have been content to shrug, as does Speranza, and say that a
utterance-relative analyticity, even one that is blurry around the edges,
is fine by him. But remember that the point of all this is to find
something that could provide an anti-essentialist semantics for the
necessity operator of quantified modal logic. Maybe Grice doesn't care to
do this, but if he did, would he settle for an indeterminate, vague, and
utterance-relative analyticity? I don't think so. Speranza?
Stephen,
At 1118 AM 8/24/2001 -0700, you wrote:
>You are driven to say that
>what you mean by this liquid is a substance having the chemical composition
>of water as we know it. But then what you call natural necessity is merely a
>convention. And, I don't think it is a convention we are bound to follow.
>Someone might announce that he means by "this" liquid "whatever is suitable
>for drinking and has no calories." In either case the convention is a
>stipulation; I don't even think there is a default stipulation.
These are good questions. Putnam may or may not have anticipated them by
the time he wrote "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", but by "Is Water Necessarily
H2O?", I think it's fair to say that he caught on. Here's what he had to
say, also on page 443 of Ayer's Schilpp volume,
I would distinguish ordinary questions of substance identity
from scientific questions. I still believe that ordinary
language and scientific language are interdependent(*); but the
layman's "water" is not the chemically pure water of the
scientist, and just what "impurities" make something no longer
water but something else (say, "coffee") is not determined by
scientific theory.
The footnote I've marked with "(*)" is his and reads as follows
(*) For example, if the scientist tells a layman that fifty
percent of the liquid in the glass he has just drunk is actually
a (harmless) chemical that does not occur as a constituent of
normal water, the layman will *not* say "Well, it tasted like
water and -- you tell me -- it didn't poison me, so it *is*
water." The "man on the street" isn't that instrumentalist.
The chemist can convince the layman (sometimes) that something
isn't water *even* *in* *the* *lay* *sense*, where this isn't
something that the laymen could determine by "ordinary" non-
scientific criteria. This is why I say that the lay sense and
the scientific sense are *interdependent* -- *different* *but*
*interdependent*.
There you have it. I agree with Putnam. Whereas I would have formerly
reserved some skepticism about whether "water" is a natural kind term, I
would now just say that the scientific sense is a natural kind, and that
the lay sense is also a kind, though perhaps with a different stereotype
and tied to a modality other than natural necessity.
I would also add the usual qualification that whether any term is a kind,
natural or otherwise, in the scientific or in the lay sense, is ultimately
decided by an interpretation, and that interpretations are always more or
less indeterminate.
I take Putnam's observations as a family of evidence that make highly
favorable certain kinds of interpretations, but -- again -- they remain
unfixed, indeterminate. Nothing is mandatory.
Daniel,
At 0652 PM 8/24/2001 +0000, you wrote
>There seems to be something like a slight-of-hand in
>his argument. Can we really make sense of the notions
>of natural necessity and natural possibility? Possible
>worlds have always seemed to me to say more about the
>possibilities of language-use than fertile substance
>for arguments about the world. The point is we can
>postulate different facts and a different structure to
>the world but this says more about the possibilities
>of language-use, because how is it that the facts
>COULD have been any different?
It seems that you hold to some sort of linguistic theory of necessity. But
I don't think I can guess enough of the details just on the basis of what
you've written. Why not elaborate an example? Suppose someone rolls the
dice at the start of his turn. He rolls twelve, i.e. two sixes, and he
exclaims, "Ugh! I really needed a thirteen!" Another player relishes the
easy cut-down, "That couldn't have happened. You got the maximum roll! By
the way, three would have served you just as well." A third player says,
"He couldn't have rolled three either!" And the know-it-all second player
quits the game with, "Sure he could have. He could have rolled a one and a
two. I quit! You two can't handle elementary modal truth!"
Now, are you telling me that these players were arguing about possibilities
of language-use, and not about the possibilities of dice rolls? Maybe you
can clarify...
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
Daniel Language
Rodrigo,
<It seems that you hold to some sort of linguistic
<theory of necessity.
Not really. I'm not proposing anything, much less a
linguistic theory of necessity. If we just look at the
use of "possibility" we can see that the notion of
"natural possibility and necessity" is senseless.
<But
<I don't think I can guess enough of the details just
<on the basis of what
<you've written. Why not elaborate an example?
<Suppose someone rolls the
<dice at the start of his turn. He rolls twelve, i.e.
<two sixes, and he
<exclaims, "Ugh! I really needed a thirteen!" Another
<player relishes the
<easy cut-down, "That couldn't have happened. You got
<the maximum roll! By
<the way, three would have served you just as well."
<A <third player says,
<"He couldn't have rolled three either!" And the
know-<it-all second player
<quits the game with, "Sure he could have. He could
<have rolled a one and a
<two. I quit! You two can't handle elementary modal
<truth!"
<
<Now, are you telling me that these players were
<arguing about possibilities
<of language-use, and not about the possibilities of
<dice rolls? Maybe you
<can clarify...
Well, you left an important bit out from my post but
I'll paraphrase it in what follows. To use your
example, I would say that the players are talking
about the outcomes that ARE logically possible, not
WERE actually possible. Let's say that we have a list
of all the possible outcomes (we can call this
knowledge). When we say, "He could have gotten a 13."
we are referring to the list (saying that we KNOW 13
IS a possible outcome). We are not referring to what
just happened, because what could that mean? Do we
mean that the past could actually be different? No, we
are just talking about the logical possibilities of
dice-rolls. In other words, we are just stating the
fact that we KNOW there are all these possible
outcomes. We say, "Look here, on the list, 13 IS a
possibility so he COULD have rolled it". This "could"
ALWAYS refers to our knowledge (as in, it is logically
possible) not to what just occured. To say that
something is "actually possible" is complete nonsense.
What could we be referring to in saying "natural
possibility"? Is there a law in the universe that fits
this description? Is there some sort of "possibility"
mechanism that would allow facts, or the actual state
of the world to be any different? No, there just
isn't. The very notion is a confusion.
Daniel
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J L Speranza
"Grice may have been content to shrug, as does Speranza, and say that a
utterance-relative analyticity, even one that is blurry around the edges,
is fine by him. But remember that the point of all this is to find
something that could provide an anti-essentialist semantics for the
necessity operator of quantified modal logic. Maybe Grice doesn't care to
do this, but if he did, would he settle for an indeterminate, vague, and
utterance-relative analyticity? I don't think so. Speranza?"
You are right to doubt that Grice may _not_ be into "anti-essentialism". In
his 'Reply to Richards' (which I would have personally, more familiarly,
titled "Reply to Dicks" -- as it's not a reply to someone called
"Richards", but a reply to Richard Grandy and Richard Warner), Grice says
that "man"'s essence is "to be rational", so I doubt he found "essence" so
unproblematic as to be "eliminated". Reduced, at most ... or, as he'd say,
"constructed"...
You are also right that Grice would probably not settle for an
indeterminate vague notion of "analyticity". You refer to the necessity
operator. I did some research on "may", and would point, further to work by
DAVIES, M.K. work on necessity (he an Oxford educated English philosopher:
my target of study... Incidentally, in my previous post, my referecene to
"Wayne Daniels" should read "Wayne Davies" -- yet another Davies...)
BURTON-ROBERTS, N. Prof of Linguistics at Newcastle, England. Work on
"modal" logic ala Grice).
We've dealt with this (SR Bayne and I did) when dealing with a query in
ANALYTIC, some time ago. The querier was looking for some relevant argument
where the premisses involved the modal operator. I developed in the reply
epistemic Gricean (I thought) view on "may". The idea being that, say,
there would be nothing wrong with either 1 or 2:
1. Water may not be H20.
or
2. Water may be XYZ.
So, a Gricean, unlike Putnam, would NOT be concerned with
"un-grammaticalness" of, say, (2). The Gricean, unlike Putnam, would say
that the fact that (2) may be found to have some _pragmatic_ sense
indicates that the view on RIGIDITY is, perhaps, too rigid? But I'm being
too obscure...
In my Gricean reply, I noted that "may" may involve an epistemic reading. I
was happy to see that, for dialectologists, indeed, "may" has these very
two readings, "metaphyisical" and "epistemic" (e.g. GN Leech, "Meaning and
the English Verb", London: Longman. Leech being the main English Gricean
linguist, in my view).
I was further told that one way to tell whether a speaker comes from, say,
the _North_ of England, has to do with this. If he says "mustn't" (and
means it metaphysically rather than merely epistemically) he's Northern.
But back to MK Davies. He has written a book for RKP Philosophical Library,
where he discusses at length both Grice and necessity. But in different
chapters, and I was never able to make the connection. On the other ahdn,
Geo Myro has invented a "System G" (after Grice), in unpublished work I
have access to, but I don't think Myro has focuses on modal operators
(much). On the linguistics side, N. P. Burton-Roberts' work involves the
explicit notion of a conversational "implicature" being at play. The point
being that if you say "may" you are merely conversationally implicate "must
not", but that that is not a matter of entailment. Burton Roberts points
that this is a matter of mere conversational implicature, relying on
orthodox "truth-conditional" (as it were), semantics, as it were, for modal
logic, where 3 is an instance of a theorem...
3. If mater must be H20, water may be H20.
I'd also point that Grice would, perhaps, distinguish between questions of
"analyticity", questions of "necessity", and questions of "INTENSIONALITY".
He does see Quinean extensionalism as "empovering" (if that's the word) the
metaphysical panorama, and deals with this at length in his reply to
Richard and Richard in a sort of vindication of INTENSIONALISM. He writes:
"We may relieve certain vacuous predicate"
e.g.
4. This bucket of water contains water which is _not_ H20.
"or general terms"
5. Ah. Now _this_ is some tasty, non-H20, water.
"from the embarrassing consequence of denoting the empty set by exploiting
the non-vacuousness of other predicates (or general terms) which are
_constituents_ in a DEFINITION of the origial vacuous terms". Consider 6
and 7:
6. x is married to
a daugther of an English queen
& a pope.
7. y is a climber oh hands and knees
of a 29,000 ft mountain.
"If those predicates are vacuous, 8 and 9 refer to predicates are satisfied
by the empty set:
8. x is a set composed of
daughters of an English queen
& a pope.
9. y is a set composed of
climbers on hands and knees
of a 29,000 ft. mountain.
"Now, 8 and 9 could be treated as CO-EXTENSIVE, respectivly, with 10 and 11:
10. x stands in relation R1
to a sequence composed of the sets
1. "married to",
2. "daughters",
3. "English queens", and
4. "popes".
11. y stands in relation R2
to a sequence composed of the sets
5. "climbers"
6. "29,000 ft mountain" and
7. "things done on hands and knees".
"We may now correlate our original claims (6 and 7) with, respectively, 12
and 13:
12. x is the sequence composed of the
relation R1 (taken in extension),
and the sets "married to", "daughters",
"English queens" & "popes".
13. y is the sequence composed of the
relation R2,
and the set "climbers", "29,000 ft mountains"
and "things done on hands and knees"
"But 12 and 13 are, qua sequences, certainly distinct and the
[intensionalist] proposal is that _they_, rather than the empty set, should
be used for determining the EXPLANATORY potentiality of the vacuous
predicate".
Grice refers to WC Kneale, Probability and Induction, p.104 for the idea
that the introduction of a property, even if vacuous ("being water and not
H20") may be allowed if some motivation be found. Grice writes:
"what sort of motivation is called for is not immediately clear, I grant.
One strong candidate, though, would be the possibility of OPENING UP new
APPLICATIONS of existing MODES OF EXPLANATION. It may be, for example, that
the SUBSTANTIAL introduction of a [non-realised property] makes possible
the application of what Kneale calls "secondary induction", i.e. the
principles at work in _primary_ induction".
Again, I must catch up with all the different arguments on this and other
areas at least as discussed in Analytic! Specifically, I should also
consider Tapper's and Jones's further thoughts on, righ, "analyticity",
which I also thank.
Best,
JL
GC
====
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 11:58 AM 8/27/2001 +0000, you wrote:
>When we say, "He could have gotten a 13."
>we are referring to the list (saying that we KNOW 13
>IS a possible outcome). We are not referring to what
>just happened, because what could that mean?
Well, that's a good question, but it's hard to see what *else* we might be
referring to. Suppose we say, "I rolled a twelve, and that roll could have
been a thirteen." Wouldn't we in this case be explicitly referring to what
just happened, viz., to that roll?
>In other words, we are just stating the
>fact that we KNOW there are all these possible
>outcomes. We say, "Look here, on the list, 13 IS a
>possibility so he COULD have rolled it". This "could"
>ALWAYS refers to our knowledge (as in, it is logically
>possible) not to what just occured.
Suppose we say, "Rolling thirteen is a possibility, so his roll could have
been a roll of thirteen." What does "his roll" refer to, if not his
roll? And isn't it his roll that we say "could have been a roll of thirteen"?
Speranza,
At 08:53 AM 8/21/2001 -0300, you wrote:
>You are also right that Grice would probably not settle for an
>indeterminate vague notion of "analyticity". You refer to the necessity
>operator. I did some research on "may", and would point, further to work by
>
>DAVIES, M.K. work on necessity
...
>In my Gricean reply, I noted that "may" may involve an epistemic reading. I
>was happy to see that, for dialectologists, indeed, "may" has these very
>two readings, "metaphyisical" and "epistemic" (e.g. GN Leech, "Meaning and
>the English Verb", London: Longman. Leech being the main English Gricean
>linguist, in my view).
Okay, so the question is just whether Grice, you, or any other Gricean,
think there is a kind of non-epistemic necessity that is not vulnerable to
Quine's arguments, as is Carnap's non-epistemic necessity.
Epistemic necessity, which I take to be roughly interdefinable with
conceivability or imaginability, isn't controversial. But it also isn't
helpful to the essentialist.
By the way, in another thread you asked what I meant by
"lexicalization". I meant what Jim meant in #966. Also, do you really
think that I implicated your philosophy is "fancy"? I don't actually think
so, nor do I have any other complaints. Honest!
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
J L Speranza
He writes: "Epistemic necessity, which I take to be roughly interdefinable
with conceivability or imaginability, isn't controversial. But it also
isn't helpful to the essentialist."
It may not be helpful to the essentialist, but hey, I was thinking that it
may be helpful to the anti-essentialist such as you and I! -- some refs. in
PS. Best,
JL
GC.
====
In his two-volume _Semantics_, Sir John Lyons writes in the section for
"Epistemic modality": "[Strange as it seems] Epistemic modality, as the
term is used by philosophers, is less easy to charcterise non-technically
than _alethic_ modality; & there is in fact some discrepancy between the
usage that philosophers and linguists make of the term. ... We'll say that
an utterance is epistemically qualified if by it the utterer explicitly
qualifies his commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by the
sentence he utters. This may take two forms: the qualification is made
explicit in the verbal component, as in 1 or 2"
1. Water may not be H20.
2. Possibly, water is not H20.
"Else, it may be epistemically modally qualified implicitly, as in the
prosodic or paralinguistic component ... In principle, further, two
sub-kinds of EPISTEMIC MODALITY can be distinguished: objective and
subjective. This is not, admittedly, a distinction that can be drawn
sharply in the everyday use of language; and its epistemological
justification is, to say the least, uncertain. It is for starters difficult
to draw a sharp distinction between what we are here calling "objective"
EPISTEMIC modality and ALETHIC modality tout court and it should not
surprise us that both of them are subsumed by CARNAP's notion of LOGICAL
PROBABILITY. Compare 3 and 4"
3. Water may be XYZ.
4. Water must be XYZ.
"Under one interpretation of (3), the utterer may be understood as
SUBJECTIVELY QUALIFYING (MODULATING) HIS COMMITMENT TO THE POSSIBILITY of
water being XYZ -- and doing this IN TERMS OF HIS OWN UNCERTAINTY. If this
is what the utterer means, he might appropriately have added to (3) some
such clause as 5 or 6"
5. But I doubt it.
6. & I'm inclined to think that water so is.
"5 and 6 CLEARLY/explicitly INDICATE the SUBJECTIVITY of the UTTERER's
COMMITMENT. Under this interpretation, which is probably the most obvious,
(3) is more or less equivalent to (7)"
7. Perhaps water is YXZ.
"But now consider the following situation. Consider "Alfred may be
unmarried". There are 90 people. One of them is Alfred. And we know that 30
of these people are unmarried. We can say that the possibility of Alfred
being unmarried is PRESENTABLE AS AN OBJECTIVE FACT. Similarly, if we know
that 29 people are unmarried. In these circumstances, it wold be
appropriate to utter "Alfred MUST be married. However, there are
situations, and in the everyday use of language they are of more frequent
occurrence, in which it would be more natural to interpret "Alfred must be
married" in terms of SUBJECTIVE epistemic MODALITY".
Lyons further introduces here R. M. Hare's TROPHIC AND NEUSTIC distinction:
"The utterer is committed by the utterance of an OBJECTIVELY epistemically
modalised utterance to the FACTUALITY of the information that he is giving
to the addressee: he is, to use Austin's terminology, performing an act of
TELLING. What he states to be the case can be denied or questioned. And it
can be accepted as a fact by the addressee... In this respect, objective
epistemic modalisation differs from SUBJECTIVE modalisation, the very
essence of which is to express the utterer's reservations about giving an
unqualified, or categorial "I say so" NEUSTIC to the factuality of the
proposition embedded in his utterance. Subjectively modalised statements --
if indeed they can be properly called "statements" -- are statements of
opinion, or hearsay, or tentative inference, rather than statements of fact".
It is to this I wanted to draw the attention. I don't see to view epistemic
necessity as a matter of conceivability or imaginability. I see it as more
basic than that (but cfr. Forbes's discussion of Wiggins below). I would
say an epistemically modal utterance simply sees the "content" as thru the
utterer's doxastic state, as it were. This should perhaps includes the full
range from mere conceivability to full certainty/knowledge...
Lyons writes: "If the factuality of an epistemically modalised proposition
(as it is presented by the utterer) is of degree 1 it is epistemically
NECESSARY. if its factuality is of degree 0, it is epistemically
IMPOSSIBLE. ... The difference between "probably" and "possibly", when they
are used in OBJECTIVELY MODALISED STATEMENTS, would seem to correlate, at
least roughly, with the difference between a degree of factuality that is
greater than and one that is less than 0.5".
Thanks to Rodrigo for his comments on lexicalisation. Lyons writes on this,
as it pertains modality: "Different languages may well GRAMMATICALISE or
LEXICALISE modality in terms of more or fewer degrees". Lyons wonders if we
could say that, say, English, is more poss-based, or nec-based: "Is the
grammaticalisation or lexicalisation of epistemic modality in all
languages, or certain languages, such that they may be more appropriately
described as being possibility-based or necessity-based?". He being such an
English qualified person, writes, "There is some evidence to suggest that,
in English at least, epistemic modality is possibility-based." Lyons considers
8. Water mustn't not be H20.
"It is doubtful whether (8) could ever be uttererd with the meaning "I say
that it is not necessarily the case that it water is not H20"". Lyons thus
points to the centrality of the verb "may", as opposed to the impact of the
adverb "possibly" in the grammar of English: "The modal auxiliary verb
occupies a more central position in the grammatical structure of English
than do modal adverbs". He concludes: "Although there may be no difference
in terms of naturalness or acceptability between 9 and 10:
9. It's not possible that water is not H20.
10. It's not necessary that water is not H20.
"in English at least, pssibility, rather than necessity, should be taken as
primitive in the analysis of modality. Whether this holds for all languages
is an empirical question that is probably unanswerable on the basis of the
evidence available at present." Lyons then introduces a notation:
11. <> . p
(i.e. "Possibly, it is the case that p")versus
12. . <> p
(i.e. "I say that it is possibly the case that p") -- where <> is the
possibility modal operator. He writes: "The difference between SUBJECTIVE
and OBJECTIVE epistemic modality can now be represented by substituting the
modal operator of possibility for the first and second operator,
respectively." Lyons notes that his system allows for nonmodal utterances like
13. . . p
and doubly modal ones, such as
14. <> <> p
(i.e. "Possibly, it is possibly the case that p". E.g. "Perhaps water may
be XYZ"). "My system allows for a total of 24 notationally distinc and
truth-conditionally non-equivalent modal formulae, in addition to 8
non-modal formulae. Each of these can be realised in English. This number
can be increased if possibility in either (or both) positions is treated as
a SCALE along which a greater or less number of DEGREES are recognised ("it
is probably raining", "it is very probably raining", "it is almost
certainly raining"...)". There are wide options for the utterer to MODULATE
his utterance. Most discussions of mood and modality in linguistics seems
to take for granted that epistemic modality is always subjective". Lyons
then considers "harmonic" versus "nonharmonic" (such as 17) utterances
15. Water may certainly be XYZ.
"In English, subjective modality always has wider scope than objective
modality".
You still think I'm not fancy! ha ha.
====
G Forbes writes in _The Metaphysics of Modality_ (Clarendon):
Index: epistemic possibility. Section: Quasi-psychologism
"The main idea of the psychologistic approach is that the modal status of
truths and falsehoods is ultimately grounded upon human intellectual
abilities." Forbes quotes DGP Wiggins -- the Oxford English philosopher.
Wiggins writes:
"what we have here...is not a reduction or elimination of
necessity or possibility...but the following elucidation
of possibility or necessity _de re_:
He considers
16. This android is human.
17. This water is XYZ.
a. x may be F iff it is possible to
conceive of x that it is F.
b. x must be F iff it is NOT possible to
conceive of x that it is NOT F.
-- Wiggins, Sameness and substance, Oxford, Blackwell, p.106.
Forbes writes: "It seems to me that Wiggins's approach is either circular
or wrong ... Kripke sometimes writes that we can conceive of finding out
that such and such is the case even tho' we in fact know that it is NOT the
case, and can infer from that that it is NECESSARY that it is not". Forbes
explicitly discusses water on p.223. I like water since it reminds me of
the header of this thread... :):
Someone who holds that water is H20 can allow that it is
CONCEIVABLE that water is XYZ. He can have a way of
thinking of the substance water which permits him to
have thoughts about water and which does not at all
involve him thinking that water is H20. In view of the
way the use of the natural-kind word "water" is taught,
by OSTENSION OF SAMPLES, most people's concept of Water
will be like this.
(Forbes here refers to GJM Evans, 1982, pp.14-22). Forbes concludes that
psychologism looks for the time being unpromising, since we need an
explication of "conceive", which is lacking. "In the prevailing absence of
any deailed psychologistic theory, it is very hard to see where such a
characterisation of "conceive" is to come from..."
====
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Daniel Language
--- Rodrigo,
Suppose we say, "I rolled a twelve,
> and that roll could have
> been a thirteen." Wouldn't we in this case be
„« explicitly referring to what
„« just happened, viz., to that roll?
Well, there is a clear distinction between WHAT
happened and THAT it happened. If we were referring to
the fact THAT it happened, such a statement would
clearly be false. If, on the other hand, we were
referring to WHAT just happened, "the fact that you
rolled a 12", then we would be speaking theoretically
about the past and the variable structure of events,
as in, "It is a theoretical possiblility that you
could have rolled a 13, given that you made different
motions at the time" (this can be denied, see below).
Yet, we infer this from our knowledge (the logical
truth) that , "a roll of 13 is a possibility".
> Suppose we say, "Rolling thirteen is a possibility,
> so his roll could have
> been a roll of thirteen." What does "his roll"
> refer to, if not his
> roll? And isn't it his roll that we say "could have
„« been a roll of thirteen"?
Again, it is a theoretical inference, once we go from
"a roll of 13 is possibile" to "SO his roll could have
been a roll of thirteen". Therefore, we can not be
referring to the actuality¡Xthat would be nonsense.
It may be a theoretical possibility as this would be
purely an inference. That is, "you could have rolled a
13" is just a theoretical statement, infered from the
what is logically true, that, "a roll of 13 is
possible". Someone could easily deny the truth of
"you could have rolled a 13" (determinism vs. free
will), but no-body CAN deny the truth of "a roll of 13
is possible".
I think you suppose that we are "representing" what
happened, but that is not so. Language represents our
knowledge and thereby reference is a possible mode of
language.
Daniel
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Larry Tapper
> Again, it is a theoretical inference, once we go from
> "a roll of 13 is possibile" to "SO his roll could have
> been a roll of thirteen". Therefore, we can not be
> purely an inference. That is, "you could have rolled a
> 13" is just a theoretical statement, infered from the
> what is logically true, that, "a roll of 13 is
> possible". Someone could easily deny the truth of
> "you could have rolled a 13" (determinism vs. free
> will), but no-body CAN deny the truth of "a roll of 13
> is possible".
>
Well, I deny it because with a normal pair of cubical dice, a roll of
13 is not possible.
I am wondering whether this argument may be equivalent to the debate
about whether there is such a thing as de re necessity. It looks like
Daniel is coming close to insisting (with Quine) that
(1) Rodrigo could not have rolled a 13.
is a modal statement that should properly be read de dicto. That is,
(1) is not to be read as implying that there is some modal property
attached to the dice or the dice-rolling-event; (1) is not "talk
about things" but rather "talk about talk about things."
What difference this distinction makes depends on who's making it. In
practice, I assume that Rodrigo and Daniel agree that it would be
foolish to bet on 13. So I'd like to ask Daniel what his motivation
is (in this context) for insisting that statements like (1) involve
semantic ascent, or that they properly refer to our state of
knowledge as opposed to the actual event.
Larry
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 10:11 AM 8/22/2001 -0300, you wrote:
>Thanks to Rodrigo for his comments.
>
>He writes: "Epistemic necessity, which I take to be roughly interdefinable
>with conceivability or imaginability, isn't controversial. But it also
>isn't helpful to the essentialist."
>
>It may not be helpful to the essentialist, but hey, I was thinking that it
>may be helpful to the anti-essentialist such as you and I!
Any help is appreciated, naturally! But the anti-essentialist doesn't need
help, or at least I don't, since regular ol' non-epistemic necessity as
interdefined with logical truth alredy does the job of providing de re
necessity with an anti-essentialist semantics.
I should mention here, since I am arguing a related point with Roger, that
even logical truth is vulnerable to Quine's attacks on analyticity. The
reason I use it so freely to interpret the necessity operator is that the
operator is already embedded in the context of a logic, so were a revision
of logical truths called for, it would be all of quantified modal logic
that would see changes, not only those truths making use of the modal operator.
Daniel,
At 08:19 AM 8/29/2001 -0700, you wrote:
>but no-body CAN deny the truth of "a roll of 13
>is possible".
I'm with Larry in denying that it was possible. I don't consider this to
be a philosophical position, hence I don't feel that I need to defend
it. I picked this example precisely because I was hoping you'd fall into
this trap. By too closely associating necessity with logical truth -- even
more closely than *I* do -- you have found yourself saying that the roll of
two conventional dice can possibly fall outside the expected range of two
to twelve!
What you are failing to account for is de re necessity, which is precisely
what I have been trying to make room for. The same thing goes for water
and H2O.
Quine got away with only de dicto necessity by insisting that his interest
was only to regiment the language of science and arguing that science
doesn't need de re necessity. The problem is that some of us, including
myself, are interested in a logic that will be useful outside of physics
and mathematics. Putnam even noticed a need for de re necessity in
accounting for semantics across changes in theory. That I know of, besides
laying out his objections to de re necessity, Quine simply didn't speak to
these issues. I believe his objections were strong, but I also believe
they can be overcome. That's what I've been arguing for since the
beginning of this thread.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
Daniel Language
>
> At 08:19 AM 8/29/2001 -0700, you wrote:
> >but no-body CAN deny the truth of "a roll of 13
> >is possible".
>
> I'm with Larry in denying that it was possible. I
> don't consider this to
> be a philosophical position, hence I don't feel that
> I need to defend
> it. I picked this example precisely because I was
> hoping you'd fall into
> this trap. By too closely associating necessity
> with logical truth -- even
> more closely than *I* do -- you have found yourself
> saying that the roll of
> two conventional dice can possibly fall outside the
> expected range of two
> to twelve!
O Rodrigo! In my efforts to frame the point
explicitly, I paid absolutely no attention to the fact
that a roll of 13 is NOT in *this* system (which,
of-course is not to say, "impossible")! See below for
further explication of this point.
>
> What you are failing to account for is de re
> necessity, which is precisely
> what I have been trying to make room for. The same
> thing goes for water
> and H2O.
Part of my point has been that the distinction between
de re and de dicto is based on a misunderstanding of
the logic of our language. You think that we need de
re necessity to account for the fact that "13" is NOT
a roll in *this* system. This is not so. Given a
certain thing, we identify what is necessary in its
representation, but we are not also representing it.
In other words, once you posit the conventional
dice-system, we must also identify that it is a
possibility that there are other dice-systems that
would provide for the possibility of there being a
roll of "13" (therefore "13" is possible, and most
importantly, you must see that we can not stop
here...thus you see where we MUST go with this) That
in *this* system there is NOT (note, i didn't use
"impossible") roll of *13* does not implicate, a need
for de re necessity once it is understood that (we are
not representing *this* system in identifing the fact
that *13* is not IN IT, for there are other systems,
in which *13* is not) reference is arbitrary. Since we
are always representing our knowledge, it is entirely
arbitrary that we may be referring to *dice*. There is
no necessity of reference. That, in fact, might have
been the reason why I simply overlooked the fact that
*13* would not be a roll in the conventional system. I
realize that you *want* to use it in reference,
although you must realize that HOW you segment it is
entirely arbitrary, since, what is necessary in its
representation is only determined once we have defined
what it is, in terms, internal to the logic of our
language. In other words, "13" is possible, since
there ARE an infinite variety of possible numbers (and
thus, by inference, an infinite variety of
dice-systems). In this way, we get out, cleanly, I
must say, from any implication of de re necessity
because, as we work to identify what is necessary in
the representation of a *dice-system outcome* or even
a *dice-roll* we CAN NOT stop at an arbitrary place
(that assumes reference) and we find that we MUST
identify it, in terms, of number (and most definitely
further, in terms of what is necessary in the
representation of language).
>
> Quine got away with only de dicto necessity by
> insisting that his interest
> was only to regiment the language of science and
> arguing that science
> doesn't need de re necessity. The problem is that
> some of us, including
> myself, are interested in a logic that will be
> useful outside of physics
> and mathematics.
Yes, I understand you but you CAN NOT base necessity
on an arbitrary reference.
<Putnam even noticed a need for de
> re necessity in
> accounting for semantics across changes in theory.
Can you give an example of this, since I am not too
familiar with this concept.
Daniel
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J L Speranza
"regular ol' non-epistemic necessity as interdefined with logical truth
alredy does the job of providing de re necessity with an anti-essentialist
semantics."
Does it do the job? I always found _any kind_ of semantics
(anti-essentialist, essentialist, modal, non-modal) -- or even
"interpretation" a la Benson Mates, Elementary Logic -- too essentialist to
my taste. One reason, I guess, why I offered my apostasy and converted to
Pragmaticist...
Best,
JL
GC.
====
What, then, would a semantics for
1. Water must be H20.
or
2. Water may be H20.
be? I note first that
3. (1) entails (2).
My hunch:
4. (1) is true (or "1") iff
for all possible worlds, the predicate
"water" is assigned reference to the
set of individuals that feature the
property assigned by "water".
(or something). The reference (inescapable?) to "possible world" -- as
first made by Kripke in his early essay on the issue -- makes (4), to my
taste, (inescapably) "essentialist". To provide a non-essentialist
semantics, on the other hand, would be to do something ala what Wiggins is
attempting in _Sameness and Substance_:
I to hold that "must" (in (1)
be interpreted in terms of "doxastic" modality.
II. to hold that "must" (in (1) be
interpreted in terms of only one
possible world, i.e. the utterer's actual one!
Since Rodrigo is saying that the non-essentialist does this by possibly
interdefining non-epistemic necessity with logical truth, a further problem
arises, it seems to me, and this seems to amount to see (1) as a necessary
logical truth. But that is, as I understand it, precisely the
essentialist's, and I thought, also Rodrigo's, point or objection: there's
nothing tautological or analytic about water _being_ H20.
A further trouble with "essence" of a natural kind word like "water"
(unless proper names like "Socrates" where the idea of rigidity plays an
interesting role) is perhaps that we need to know what individual items we
are talking about. Since "water" is a mass noun, I guess that the presence
of just _one_ molecule, as per the definition, of water constituted with
two atoms of Hydrogen and one of Oxygen (H20) would qualify as "water". But
then perhaps maybe just _one_ molecule may _not_ feature the full range of
behavioural properties, as it were, that we expect from "water".
Perhaps there's something QUALITATIVE (and thus "essential") about some
_large amount_ of molecules of H20 BEING water (How many molecules. Does
this make "water" a "fuzzy predicate". I think so). In any case, given the
state of our (or their, since I do not do science) scientific knowledge, it
would be hard to prove that a given molecule (and only one) of H20 is water
-- as surrounded by, er, "non"-water.
Note that chemists talk of logarithms here (to define, e.g. pH in water) as
involving a great MANY MOLECULES of, er, water.
It seems the essence then (if "water" has one -- I agree with Rodrigo that
it hasn't, since I'm more than ready to call "XYZ" "water" too, if I'm
obliged to do so for some important pragmatic reason) has to do not only
with SORTAL IDENTITY, as Rodrigo calls it ("water" qua "substance" -- as
opposed to Socrates qua individual), but also with the abstract feature of
"COMBINATION".
I.e. water would be the ESSENTIAL "combination" of H2 and O. And a specific
combination at that. Notably, H202 is NOT "water" although we also call it
"water". Oxygenated water. And very useful it is too. But it is of course,
not water. Nor a type of water. Or is it not.
Essentially, "water" is then, not just "H2" and "O". I.e HYDROGEN and
OXYGEN. In this sense, we can say that hydrogen and oxygen have like each,
an "ATOMIC" essences (literally so) - while "water" would have a molecular
essence (again literally). Where this combination specifies not only the
union, but the _type_ of union: two hydrogen, one oxygen).
But what does "combination" mean here. How can "combination" (and a
specific type of combination: one of one element, two of the second), which
is an abstract thing, "combine" as it were, with "hydrogen" and "oxygen".
It seems that, if water has an essence, it is somewhat weaker than the
essence of hydrogen or oxygen -- For, how would you like YOUR essence to be
the combination of your having been born in, say, Italy, and brought up in,
say, Oxford? -- Anyway, we'll keep on thinking about these issues!
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J L Speranza
Towards a nominal essence ... of "water". -- And, mind, the OED seems to be
the best anglophonic way to provide essences...
Water from the OED then, in the ps -- the Putnam relevant _essentialist_
usage, out of 33 distinct usages, is usage 15 below. Note the OED is _not_
a historical dictionary -- i.e. the oldest definition is not the first. It
seems however to me that it should be some such historical ordering of
definitions that satisfies the essentialist about _water_ since, if some
designation rigidity took place, it took place when the sounds "water" were
first used in England to mean (ostensively)...water.
Best,
JL
GC
====
water (from the OED -- ed. by JLS). Cognate with Frisian "water", Dutch
"water", German "wasser", Russ "voda" (cfr "vodka"), Latin Roman, "unda" =
=
wave. Also cognate with English "otter".
USAGE I: The liquid of which seas, lakes, and rivers are composed, and
which falls as rain and issues from springs. When pure, it is transparent,
colourless (except as seen in large quantity, when it has a blue tint),
tasteless, and inodorous.Popular language recognizes kinds of `water' that
have not all these negative properties; but (even apart from any scientific
knowledge) it has usually been more or less clearly understood that these
are really mixtures of water with other substances.
Sub-usage 1.1. Sub-sub-usage 1.1.1. GENERAL. FIRST REGISTERED USAGE
897 Aelfred Gregory's Past. C. 309
Onsend Ladzarus, thaette he gewaete his ytemestan
finger on waettre.
Last registered usage:
1850 Tennyson In Mem. lviii,
As drop by drop the water falls In vaults and catacombs.
SUB-SUBUSAGE 2. 2: With various qualifying words, denoting kinds of
water distinguished by their properties or origin: see ice-water,
rain-water, river-water, salt water, sea-water, snow-water, spring-water,
sweet water; cold water, hot water, warm water; also fresh, hard, soft.
SUB-SUBUSAGE 3. Considered as antagonistic to fire.
FIRST REGISTERED USAGE: 1390 Gower Conf. I. 266
For as the water of a welle
Of fyr abateth the malice, Riht so
Last registered usage:
1879 Encycl. Brit. IX. 235/2
In coping with fires, water is the great agent employed.
SUBUSAGE 3.2. figurative. First registered usage:
1682 Bunyan Greatn. Soul (1691) 3
This kind of Language tends to cast Water
upon weak and beginning Desires.
SUB-SUBUSAGE 4: As supplied for domestic needs, esp. as conveyed by a
channel or conduit from the source, and distributed through pipes to the
houses of a district. Phrases, to cut off, turn on the water.
FIRST REGISTERED USAGE:
1535 Coverdale 2 Kings xx. 20
The pole and water condyte, wherby he conueyed water in to the cite.
Last registered usage
1836 Dickens, Shops & Tenants,
At last the company's man came to cut off the water.
SUB-SUBUSAGE 5: As used for motive power. First registered usage:
1698 Floyer Asthma (1717) To Rdr. p. xxv,
Like a Mill which stands still for want of Water.
SUB-SUBUSAGE 6: In various similative and figurative phrases, many of
which are of biblical origin: see, e.g., Gen. xlix. 4.
to write on or in water [= L. in aqua scribere: to fail to leave abiding
record of (something). (To spend money) like water: profusely, recklessly.
to put water in (a person's) worts: to make things unpleasant for him.
water in one's shoes: something disagreeable. to hold out water, to bear
water: = `to hold water'. where the water sticks [after L. haeret aqua]:
where discussion comes to a standstill. water over the dam or under the
bridge (dyke, mill and varr.): past events which it is unprofitable to
revive or discuss; a way of saying `a long time has passed'.
First registered usage:
971 Blickl. Hom. 237
Manega tintrega hie the onbringath..swa thaette thin blod flewth ofer
eorthan swa swa waeter.
Last registered usage:
1981 Encounter Oct. 7
You don't want to let any of that business bother you... Water under the
bridge. Just accept the fact, file it away.
USAGE 2. SUB-USAGE 1. As a drink, as satisfying thirst, or as necessary
aliment for animals and plants. Also fig. (chiefly in biblical uses)
applied to what satisfies spiritual needs or desires; cf. water of
life.bread and water (also in Shaks. bran and water), the type of extreme
hard fare, as of a prisoner or a penitent.
FIRST REGISTERED USAGE:
950 Lindisf. Gosp. John iv. 13
Eghuelc sethe gedrincath of thaem uaetre thaet
ic sello him ne thyrsteth in aecnisse.
LAST REGISTERED USAGE:
1921 E. L. Masters Mitch Miller xiv. 113
After that they..put him in a dark room and kept him on bread and water for
a day.
SUBUSAGE 2.2.:Contrasted with wine, as inferior in strength or
pleasantness.
FIRST REGISTERED: 1300 Cursor M. 21295
The stile o matheu, water it was, And win the letter o lucas.
1842 Tennyson Locksley Hall 152 Woman is the lesser man, and all thy
passions, match'd with mine, Are as moonlight unto sunlight, and as water
unto wine.
USAGE 2.3: water bewitched (colloq.): used derisively for excessively
diluted liquor; now chiefly, very weak tea. 1678 Ray Prov. (ed. 2) 84 Water
betwitch't, i.e. very thin beer.
1825 Forby Voc. E. Anglia, Water-bewitched, weak tea, coffee, punch, &c.
USAGE 2.4 figurative: 1845 Carlyle Cromwell Introd. ii. I. 25
Another Book of Noble's..is of much more stupid character; nearly
meaningless indeed; mere water bewitched.
USAGE 3: 3.1. As used for dilution of liquors.
1382 Wyclif Isa. i. 22
Thi syluer is turned in to dros; thi wyn is mengd with water.
1837 Dickens Pickw. xxxviii, Mr. Benjamin Allen..produced..a black bottle
half full of brandy. `You don't take water, of course?' said Bob Sawyer.
3.1.1. Figurative 1860 Ld. Acton in Gasquet Acton & Circle (1906) 149, I
am afraid you will think I have poured a good deal of water into your wine
in `Tyrol' and `Syria'.
3.2. In phrasal combinations denoting liquors diluted with water, as
brandy-and-water, gin-and-water, rum-and-water, whisky-and-water,
wine-and-water: see the first words; also milk-and-water. Hence jocularly
in nonce-combinations.
1812 H. C. Robinson Jrnl. 13 May in E. J. Morley Blake, Coleridge,
Wordsworth, Lamb, Etc. (1922) 50
Barfield called Wilson `Wordsworth & Water'
1899 Daily News 13 Mar. 7/1 He once heard a University sermon described as
of the Bible and water order.
3.3. (Stock Exchange.) Fictitious capital created by the `watering' or
`diluting' of the stock of a trading company. See water v. 7 e.
1883 Nation (N.Y.) 8 Nov. 384/2 The Committee does not produce any evidence
to show that it is the dread of `water' which is now keeping the foreign
investor out of Wall Street.
1894 Daily News 12 July 5/5 The stock of the Company has been watered three
times over, and the Company has not only been able to pay the regular
dividends on the water and all, but [etc.].
USAGE 4. 4.1. As used for washing, steeping, boiling, etc.
1000 Ags. Gosp. Matt. xxvii. 24
The geseah pilatus thaet hyt naht ne fremode..tha genam he waeter & thwoh
hys handa.
1828 Scott F.M. Perth, Chron. Canongate Ser. ii. Introd., These are the
stains;..neither water nor any thing else will ever remove them from that
spot.
4.2. Each of the quantities of water used successively in a gradual
process of washing.
1225 Ancr. R. 324 Wule a weob beon, et one cherre, mid one watere wel
ibleched..?
1875 F. J. Bird Dyer's Hand-bk. 33 Wash in two waters and dry.
4.3.in references to baptism.
1000 Ags. Gosp. Matt. iii. 11
Ic eow fullige on waetere to daedbote.
1597 Hooker Eccl. Pol. v. lx. §1
Why are we taught that with water God doth purifie and clense his Church?
USAGE 5: Water of a mineral spring or a collection of mineral springs
used medicinally for bathing or for drinking, or both. Often plural (cf. L.
aquae) preceded by the or the name of a place. to go to the waters (?
obs.): to visit a `watering-place' for remedial treatment.
1542 Act 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 8
Divers honest persones..whome God hathe endued with the knowledge of the
nature kinde and operacion of certeyne herbes rotes and waters.
1879 St. George's Hosp. Rep. IX. 579 She was ordered simply a wine-glass of
Orezza water after breakfast every morning.
USAGE 6. 6.1. Water regarded as collected in seas, lakes, ponds, etc.,
or as flowing in rivers or streams.Often with definite article, as denoting
a particular portion of water referred to. Also, the aqueous part of the
earth's surface as a region inhabited by its own characteristic forms of
life, in contradistinction to the land and the air.
1100 Gerefa in Anglia IX. 259
Ge on wuda, ge on waetere, ge on felda, ge on falde.
1867 Ansted Phys. Geog. 125 Owing to the position of the land, we have the
water divided into two unequal parts, the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic
canal.
6.2: The plural is often used instead of the sing. esp. with reference
to flowing water or to water moving in waves.For the pl. cf. F. eaux, L.
aquae.
1000 Ags. Gosp. Matt. xiv. 28
Dryhten, gyf þu hyt eart, hat me cuman to the ofer thas waeteru.
1891 Farrar Darkn. & Dawn xiii, They..had been baptised in the waters of
their native river.
6.3: In figurative context. deep waters (after Ps. lxix. 2, 14), grave
distresses and anxieties; also, difficult or dangerous affairs; now usu. in
phr. in deep water(s).
1535 Coverdale Ps. lxviii [lxix]. 2,
I am come in to depe waters.
1950 D. Lessing Grass is Singing viii. 157 He stubbornly went his own way,
feeling as if she had encouraged him to swim in deep waters beyond his
strength, and then left him to his own devices.
6.4: The maritime tract belonging to a particular nation; the seas and
oceans in a particular quarter of the globe.
1659 in Rec. Convent. Burghs Scot. (1878) III. 487
Who..went aboard of tuo Dutch wessellis lying near Inchkeyth, being within
our watteris.
1920 Round Table Dec. 89 The Alliance..freed us from the necessity of
keeping more than a skeleton force in eastern waters in order to defend the
Dominions and India.
6.5: In Hunting, Steeplechasing, etc. Streams or ditches which a horse
is required to leap.
1860 Ld. W. Lennox Pict. Sporting Life I. 328
You will find him [a horse] a splendid fencer, I never saw the like of him
at timber or water; no gate or brook will stop him.
6.6. To make a hole in the water: to commit suicide by drowning.
1853 Dickens Bleak Ho. xlvi,
Why I don't go and make a hole in the water I don't know.
==========================
=
6.7. Pictorial representations of tracts of water.
(this is funny. Adam Kilgariff has an essay entitled "I don't believe in
word senses", where he criticises this usage and others (e.g. "horse",
representation of a horse!).
==========================
==
1747 Francis tr. Horace, Art P. 34 note, It is chiefly in this View, that
Ruisdale's Waters, and Claude Lorrain's Skies are so admirable.
USAGE 7: In phrases relating to navigation.
7.1. by water: by ship or boat on the sea or a lake or river or canal.
7.2. on or upon (the) water (ME. †a wætere): on the sea, in naval
employments or enterprises. Also, to be on the water, to be in course of
transport by sea.
7.3. In London the above phrases are often used with reference to the
Thames. Similarly to go on the water.
1600 Essex Reb. Exam. (MS.) in Shaks. Cent. Praise (1879) 35
They went all together to the Globe over the water wher the L. Chamberlens
men vse to play.
USAGE 8 to take the water.
8.1. To enter the sea, a lake or river, and begin to swim. To embark, take
ship; to take a boat on the Thames. `To abandon one's position' (Thornton).
8.2. Of a ship: To be launched.
1859 Bartlett Dict. Amer. (ed. 2) 470 To Take Water. To run away, make off.
A Western expression, doubtless borrowed from sportsmen. 1891 C. Roberts
Adrift Amer. 200 The fellow, who was really a coward, though nearly twice
as big as myself, took water at once.
USAGE 9. 9.1 Quantity or depth of water, as sufficient or insufficient
for navigation. to draw (so much) water.
9.2. With prefixed adj., a particular state of the tide: see high water,
low water. full water = full tide.
USAGE 10. to take (in) water = to have a flaw or weak place.
USAGE 11: As an enveloping or covering medium. In various phrases.
11.1. under water: below the surface of water; (of land) flooded,
submerged. Hence fig. unsuccessful in life.
11.2. above water: above the surface of the water. Also fig., esp. in to
keep one's head above water, to avoid ruin by a continued struggle.
11.3 to lay in water, to lay a-water : to make of no effect or value; to
dissipate.
11.4. (to swim) between two waters [= F. (nager) entre deux eaux]: midway
between the surface and the bottom; fig. keeping an impartial or a
temporizing attitude between two parties.
USAGE 12: a body of water on the surface of the earth.
12.1. A body or collection of standing or flowing water, irrespective of
size; a sea, lake, river, etc.
1898 Edin. Rev. Jan. 192 Hundreds of the swallow family may sometimes be
seen together, hawking for flies over the London waters on a fine April
morning.
USAGE 12.2. A sheet of water, a lake, pool. Cf. the proper names
Derwentwater, Wastwater, Ullswater, Hawes Water, etc. in n.w. England.
1896 Housman Shropshire Lad xli, And like a skylit water stood The
bluebells in the azured wood.
USAGE 12.3. A stream, river. In early use often the water of (prefixed
to the name of a river). Now chiefly north.; often in the names of small
rivers, as Water of Esk, Water of Leith, Allan Water, Moffat Water.
1865 Geikie Scen. & Geol. i. 18 Streams, intermediate in size between
brooks and rivers, are known in as `waters'.
12.4 The banks of a river; the inhabitants of the district bordering on
a river. (Eng. Dial. Dict.)
USAGE 13. Sing. A flood.
1853 Dickens Bleak Ho. ii, The waters are out in Lincolnshire... The
adjacent low-lying ground, for half a mile in breadth, is a stagnant river.
USAGE 14 Astr. The portion of the constellation Aquarius which is
figured as a stream of water. [= L. Aqua].
==========================
=========
THE PHILOSOPHICALLY RELEVANT USAGE, according to Harvard Prof. of Science,
Hilary Putnam et al,
CATEGORY II
USAGE 15
The substance of which the liquid "water"
is one form among several. Now known to be a
chemical compound of two volumes of
hydrogen and one of oxygen
(formula H2O).
In ancient speculation regarded as one of the four, and in pre-scientific
chemistry as one of the five elements (essences) of which all bodies are
composed (the fifth essence being the philosopher's stone).
FIRST REGISTERED USAGE:
971 Blickl. Hom. 35
Ure lichoma waes gesceapen of feower gesceaftum, of eorthan, & of fyre, &
of waetere, & of lyfte.
1390 Gower Conf. III. 92 Above therthe kepth his bounde The water, which is
the secounde Of elementz. 1500-20 Dunbar Poems x. 13 Fyre, erd, air, and
watter cleir. 1549 Compl. Scot. v. 33 This material varld that is maid of
the four elementis, of the eird, the vattir, the ayr, ande the fyir. 1669
W. Simpson Hydrol. Chymica 258 The like happens in all Vegetables, for
Water is the material Principle of Vegetables. 1704 J. Harris Lex. Techn.
I, Water, which the Chymists call Phlegm, is the 4th of the 5 Chimical
Principles, and one of the Passive ones. 1732 A. Stewart in Phil. Trans.
XXXVII. 330, I think the word (Spirits) was an unhappy Choice [to designate
the nervous fluid]..And the simple Qualities of a pure and perfectly
defecated elementary Water, will better suit all that our Senses can
discover of it. 1812 Playfair Nat. Philos. (1819) I. 235 On the different
quantities of heat united to the substance which we call water, depends its
existence in the state of a solid, a liquid, or an elastic fluid.
LAST REGISTERED USAGE:
1881 Sir W. Armstrong in Nature 8 Sept. 450/2
Water, being oxidised hydrogen, must be placed in the same category as the
earths.
=========================
CATEGORY III: A liquid resembling (and usually containing) water.
USAGE 16: 16.1. An aqueous decoction, infusion, or tincture, used
medicinally or as a cosmetic or a perfume. 1871 Garrod Mat. Med. (ed. 3) 4
The waters of pharmacy consist of water holding in solution very small
quantities of oils or other volatile principles.
16.2. With defining word, applied to liquid preparations of various
kinds.For illustration of the diversity of application, see cologne-water,
lavender water, orange-flower-water, rose-water; barley-water,
†chicken-water; baryta-water, gum-water, lime-water; lithia-water, potass
water, soda-water.
16.3. A distilled alcoholic liquor, = strong water, hot water. Also
burning water (= med.L. aqua ardens, F. eau ardente), alcohol.
16.4. Contextually for strong water 1 = aquafortis. Also corrosive
water, any strong acid.
USAGE 17: 17.1. Used to denote various watery liquids found in the human
or animal body, either normally or in disease. To run on a water, to
discharge a watery liquid.
17.2. ater on the brain, in the head: hydrocephalus; cf. G. wasser im
hirn, im kopf (haben). water on the knee: an excessive accumulation of
fluid in the knee joint.
17.3. The fluid contained in the amniotic cavity (liquor amnii); now
usually plural. The effusion of this fluid from the womb, which precedes
the exclusion of the foetus, is popularly denoted by the expression `the
waters have broken'.
17.4. Tears. (So often in the Bible)
1840 Dickens Old C. Shop vi, A dexterous rap on the nose with the key,
which brought the water into his eyes.
17.5 Saliva; flow of saliva provoked by appetite. to set (a person's)
teeth on water = `to make his mouth water'.
1870. W. S. Gilbert `Bab' Ballads, Etiquette 26 For the thought of Peter's
oysters brought the water to his mouth.
17.6 all on a water: covered with sweat.
17.7. The liquid of oysters.
USAGE 18 = Urine. To hold (one's) water: to retain urine.
1897 Allbutt's Syst. Med. IV. 281
The quantity of water voided by a healthy adult in 24 hours is from 40 to
50 ounces.
18.2. In references (at one time very common) to the inspection of a
patient's urine as a means of diagnosis.
18.3. In fig. phrases, to attend, watch (a person's) waters [= G. eine=
m
das wasser besehen], to scrutinize his conduct rigorously.
1709 Mrs. Manley Secr. Mem. 151 Her Brother..was gone abroad..when this
Rogue..courted her, or else he had never got his Will of her; he would have
watch'd his Waters for him to some purpose.
USAGE 19: Applied to vegetable juices.
1842 Anne Pratt Pict. Catech. Bot. v. 79 [In the pitcher plant] the liquid
is a clear water, very pleasant and refreshing to the palate.
CATEGORY IV: Appearances resembling water.
USAGE 20. 20.1 The transparency and lustre characteristic of a diamond
or a pearl. The three highest grades of quality in diamonds were formerly
known as the first, second, and third water; the phrase of the first water
survives in popular use as a designation of the finest quality, often
applied to jewels generally.[The equivalent use is found in all the mod.
Rom. and Teut. langs.; it may have come from Arabic, where this sense of
ma¯', water, is a particular application of the sense `lustre, splendour'
(e.g. of a sword).]
20.2 fig. of the first (occas. purest, rarest, finest) etc. water:
originally (with implied comparison to a jewel), of the highest excellence
or purity; now only following a personal designation (often of reproach)
with the sense `out-and-out', `thorough-paced'.
USAGE 21: 1721 Bailey, Water (among Dyers), a certain Lustre imitating
Waves, set on Silks, Mohairs, &c.
USAGE 22 a = water-colour. b pl. Water-colour paintings. colloq.
USAGE 23: The lap of one shingle in roofing.
USAGE 24: Simple attributive uses. Designating vessels in which water is
held or kept, as water-bail, -bowl, -bucket, -cruet, -fetles, -flask,
-gourd, -jar, -jug, -sack, -say, -scoop, -skeet, -skin, -stean, tank, -tin,
-trough, -tub, -tun, -vat, -vessel. See also water-bottle, -glass, etc.
24.2. Pertaining to the storage or distribution of water in considerable
quantities; as water-ditch, -lock, -place, -room, -stank, -station, -well;
water-meter, †-purveyance, -service, -storage, -supply.
24.3. Used for the carriage or transport of water, as water barge, boat,
ship, tender, truck; water animal, mule.
24.4. Designating a channel in which water runs, or any contrivance for
facilitating or regulating its flow, as water-channel, -cock, -conduct,
-conduit, -cut, -cutting; -dam, -gutter, -main, -port, -sewer, -squirt,
-tap, -trunk, -wising. See also watercourse, -furrow, etc.
24.5. Designating a machine which is worked or driven by water, a part
of a machine in which water is heated, a contrivance for drawing or
circulating water, and the like; as water-back, -barrel, -bellows, -blast,
-box, -chamber, -corn-mill, -drum, -feed, -gin, -grist-mill, -motion,
-motor, -trap, -trompe, -turbine, -whim.
24.6. Designating implements or contrivances used in or on the water, as
water-cord, -dress, -staff, -stang.
24.7. Designating (a) a water-tight contrivance, as water-joint, -packer;
(b) a body of water which makes a vessel air-tight or gas-tight, as
water-lute, -luting, -seal.
24.8. Deignating substances which harden under water and so become
impervious to it, as water-cement, -lime, -mortar. Cf. hydraulic a. 3.
24.9. Pertaining to water as a beverage, or as a (teetotal) article of
diet, as water-day, -diet, -doctrine -drink, -time; relating to the use of
water in medical treatment, as water-dressing, -patient, strapping; also
water-cure.
24.10. Pertaining to water as a physiographical feature or factor, as
water-action, -brim, -depths, -drainage, -edge, -flow, -ground, -land,
-point, -rim, -scene, -shore, -strand, -view.In many of these combinations
the first element is equivalent to the genitive water's, and in early and
dial. examples the sense may often be `pertaining to the specified "water"'=
.
Consisting of, holding or containing, formed or caused by, water; as
water-blowball, †water-breath, -breeze, -brook, -chasm, -cloud, -column,
-draught, -drip, -fence, -flow, -foam, -fount, -gush, -leak, -mist,
-passage, -plash, -race, -ring, -ripple, -run, -slide, -song, -sphere,
-spray, -spread, †-sprinkle, -stripe, -surface, -swirl, -talk, -vein,
-wash, -wear, -world.
Also Situated or built on or beside water, as water-beacon, -brae,
-bridge, -castle, -door, -doorway, -frontage, -stable, -stairs, -steps,
-tack. Also water-front.
Performed, conducted, taking place, on or in the water; as water-ballet,
-excursion, -fight, -life, -motion, -music, -pageant, -song, -sonnet,
-sports, etc.
1888 L. A. Smith Music of Waters 83 The verses and tune of this
water-song..follow.
Pertaining to transit or transport by water, as water-communication,
-highway, -route, -traction.
Living or occupied on the water; faring by water; as water-guide,
-people, -police. Also, found on the water, as water-brother, -stray,
-wayfarer.
Designating fabulous beings that live in, or have rule over, water; as
water-deity, -demon, -devil, -elf, -fairy, -fay, -fiend, -ghost, -goblin,
-god, -kelpie, -king, -nixie, -shape, -spirit, -sprite, -wraith. Also
water-horse, -nymph.
Occas. used to designate freshwater, as opposed to saltwater, objects;
as water-fish, -land, -sand.
USAGE 25: Objective: a with vbl. sbs. and pres. pples., as
water-blowing, -commanding, -divining, -dowsing, -drawing, -fetching,
-flinging, -holding, -loving, -raising, -receiving, -retaining, -selling,
-yielding; also with sbs. and adjs., as water-retention, -retentive.
With agent-nouns, as water-drawer, -fearer, -haunter, -lover, -tender,
†-searcher, -seller, -supplier.
In names of machines, implements, or natural agencies, as †water-chafe=
r,
-conductor, -feeder, -forcer, -heater, -holder, -regulator.
USAGE 26: Instrumental: a with pa. pples., as water-beaten, -bollen,
-cooled, -cut, -eaten, -filled, -girt, -gyved, -hidden, -inwoven, -loaden,
-locked, -marrowed, -mingled, -mixed, -pillared, -rolled, -rounded,
-saturated, -sealed, -shafted, -smoothed, -sodden, -sorted, sprinkled,
-tempered, -walled, -wattled, -whipped, -wound; also with adjs., as
water-dispersible, -poor, -rich. Also water-bound, -logged, -soaked,
-washed, -worn, etc.
With pres. pples., as †water-flowing, -rippling, -standing; with vbl.
sbs., as water-dripping, -planing, -rolling, -seasoning, -spinning,
-steeping, -wasting.
USAGE 27: Locative, with agent-nouns and vbl. sbs., as water-diver,
farer, -skirmisher; water-building, -dwelling, -faring, -hunting. Also
water-dwelling, -haunting, -growing, -living, -standing ppl. adjs.;
water-gifted adj.
USAGE 28: Similative, as water-grey, -green, -white adjs. (and sbs.);
water-chilly, -clear, -cold, -dark, -eager, -flowing, -precious, weak, adjs=
.
USAGE 29: Special comb.: e.g.
water-boy, (a) a boy employed at the riverside; the constellation Aquarius.
USAGE 30. In combination denoting water-living animals.
USAGE 31. In combinations denoting vegetable growths that live in water.
USAGE 32: Med. Designating specific ailments, eruptions, etc., as
†water-bladder, -blister, -farcin, -garget, -murrain, -pang; water-blebs,
pemphigus; water-brash, pyrosis; water-canker, a form of stomatitis;
water-pox, chicken-pox; water-stroke (see quots.); †water-wheal, a watery
blister.
USAGE 33: Prefixed to certain designations of measures of capacity, to
denote the larger measures used for goods sold on board ship (see
water-measure), as water bushel, firlot, peck; also water met =
water-measure. A related use seems to exist in water-fother (quot. 1300),
but the sense is obscure.
====
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Daniel Language
> <danlang7@y...> wrote:
> > Again, it is a theoretical inference, once we go
> from
> > "a roll of 13 is possibile" to "SO his roll could
> have
> > been a roll of thirteen". Therefore, we can not be
> > referring to the actualityĄ that would be
> nonsense.
> > It may be a theoretical possibility as this would
> be
> > purely an inference. That is, "you could have
> rolled a
> > 13" is just a theoretical statement, infered from
> the
> > what is logically true, that, "a roll of 13 is
> > possible". Someone could easily deny the truth of
> > "you could have rolled a 13" (determinism vs. free
> > will), but no-body CAN deny the truth of "a roll
> of 13
> > is possible".
> >
>
> Well, I deny it because with a normal pair of
> cubical dice, a roll of
> 13 is not possible.
Yes, I only now realized that "13" is NOT a roll in
the conventional dice-system (but, I think my apparent
carelessness on that point was for good reason) But,
as I pointed out to Rodrigo, this is not to say that
"a roll of 13" is impossible. Once we posit
dice-systems then we MUST consider that there are
other possible systems in which "13" is. Of-course,
"13" is ALWAYS possible, whether or not it is
identified to be represented within any given system.
That you may WANT to refer to *this* system is
entirely arbitrary. There is no necessity that we do
so. It is a subtle mistake, but a mistake nonetheless,
to base *the possibility of a roll of "13"* on an
arbitrary reference to "this" system, because, in that
case, we are equally as entitled to identify the fact
that there are other possible systems in which "13" is
a roll. Because, in this case, it is meaningless to
say, "13 is a POSSIBLE roll", for we need only say,
"13 IS a roll in this system" (we would IN THIS CASE,
which you prompted by an inadvertant negation, be
referring to dice-roll systems). Therefore I assume
that you appreciate the direction that this is going.
We will not stop until we reach numbers and then, as I
was saying to Rodrigo, definitely on to the
possibility of knowledge, and thus a definiton in
terms, internal, to the logic of our language.
>
> I am wondering whether this argument may be
> equivalent to the debate
> about whether there is such a thing as de re
> necessity. It looks like
> Daniel is coming close to insisting (with Quine)
> that
>
> (1) Rodrigo could not have rolled a 13.
No. I wouldn't go that far. I would only say, "13 is
not in this system", but then this CAN NOT be a
reference TO this system.
>
> is a modal statement that should properly be read de
> dicto. That is,
> (1) is not to be read as implying that there is some
> modal property
> attached to the dice or the dice-rolling-event; (1)
> is not "talk
> about things" but rather "talk about talk about
> things."
Well, not quite. I would say, that the statement:
1. Rodrigo could not have rolled a 13.
is infered from:
A. 13 is not in the X system.
B. Rodrigo is using the X system.
Thus, ultimately, it says nothing.
>
> What difference this distinction makes depends on
> who's making it. In
> practice, I assume that Rodrigo and Daniel agree
> that it would be
> foolish to bet on 13. So I'd like to ask Daniel what
> his motivation
> is (in this context) for insisting that statements
> like (1) involve
> semantic ascent, or that they properly refer to our
> state of
> knowledge as opposed to the actual event.
Well, I wouldn't say that (1) refers to "our state of
knowledge", since I think it says nothing. Though I
should bring up one point;
A. 13 is not in the X system.
*A* can not be referring to the X system, because it
is negating OF the system. It is also clear that,
regardless of this non-reference, we are still able to
identify THAT WHAT IS NOT REPRESENTED BY the system.
Thus, to make the further claim of (1) is to say
nothing, and more importantly that it is possible to
identify the non-representation of "13" by some
arbitary system (parts of a car, or whatever,
SEGMENTED as we like) shows clearly that, this
possibility is THE representation of "13" IN_ANY_CASE.
Therefore, what is necessary in its representation is
possibility (though we do not need further
stipulation, we can say, "the possibility of its
representation AND non-representation"--which we see
immediately is only to say, "the possibility of 13").
Thus, in this way, we get back to the possibility of
knowledge...
Daniel
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Rodrigo Vanegas
Thank you for finally taking me to task! I don't know what's wrong with
me, but for some reason I find it difficult to motivate myself to spell
things out unless I can do so in the context of a discussion. So, I needed
you to ask, but now that you have, I have written some of what's been on my
mind for about a month.
At 12:26 PM 8/24/2001 -0300, you wrote:
>"regular ol' non-epistemic necessity as interdefined with logical truth
>alredy does the job of providing de re necessity with an anti-essentialist
>semantics."
>
>Does it do the job? I always found _any kind_ of semantics
>(anti-essentialist, essentialist, modal, non-modal) -- or even
>"interpretation" a la Benson Mates, Elementary Logic -- too essentialist to
>my taste.
Well, let's roll up our sleeves and see, shall we? I don't know if my kind
of semantics is like anything you've come across already, except of course
on Analytic a month ago. If others have been too essentialist to your
taste, then maybe I can cook up something you can swallow.
The long version of my idea is scattered over various of my postings
between #625 and #809. Don't bother to review, though. Let me just begin
my exposition as if from the beginning and I can answer your questions as
we go.
>What, then, would a semantics for
>
>1. Water must be H20.
>
>or
>
>2. Water may be H20.
>
>be?
Oh, I don't think I'm ready to take on the OED. Instead of (1) and (2), I
want to study "[]water=H2O" and "<>water=H2O". If you will allow for the
usual interdefinitions of "<>" and "[]", then I will limit myself to
"[]water=H2O".
>I note first that
>
>3. (1) entails (2).
>
>My hunch:
>
>4. (1) is true (or "1") iff
> for all possible worlds, the predicate
> "water" is assigned reference to the
> set of individuals that feature the
> property assigned by "water".
>
>(or something). The reference (inescapable?) to "possible world" -- as
>first made by Kripke in his early essay on the issue -- makes (4), to my
>taste, (inescapably) "essentialist".
Kripke's semantics is essentialist, but the essentialism doesn't enter hand
in hand with talk of possible worlds. It's only when he turns to
conditions of transworld identity that the quizzical looks
begin. Personally, I prefer to keep my world-count at one, and I think I
can get away with it.
>To provide a non-essentialist
>semantics, on the other hand, would be to do something ala what Wiggins is
>attempting in _Sameness and Substance_:
>
>I to hold that "must" (in (1)
> be interpreted in terms of "doxastic" modality.
>
>II. to hold that "must" (in (1) be
> interpreted in terms of only one
> possible world, i.e. the utterer's actual one!
That's right. I would say that (II) accurately describes my position's
non-essentialism.
>Since Rodrigo is saying that the non-essentialist does this by possibly
>interdefining non-epistemic necessity with logical truth, a further problem
>arises, it seems to me, and this seems to amount to see (1) as a necessary
>logical truth. But that is, as I understand it, precisely the
>essentialist's, and I thought, also Rodrigo's, point or objection: there's
>nothing tautological or analytic about water _being_ H20.
I don't think there's anything analytic or tautological about it. Let's
recall what I take to be the logical form of "[]water=H2O". This formula
is already partially formal, but something more needs to be done with the
nouns "water" and "H2O". (Actually, "H2O" is more of a noun phrase, and I
will speak to this below in reply to your discussion of
"combination".) The basic idea is that nouns like these, i.e. nouns that
refer to kinds, refer rigidly. So, we get,
5. (Ex)(Ey)(x=water and y=H2O and []x=y).
Since we know from chemistry that
6. (Ex)(x=water and x=H2O)
and from elementary quantified modal logic that
7. (x)([]x=x)
it follows that
8. (Ex)(x=water and x=H2O and []x=x)
or more indirectly, but equivalently, that
9. (Ex)(Ey)(x=water and y=H2O and []x=y).
QED.
If we take "H2O" to be a kind term, just as "water" is, then that it is
necessary that water is H2O is just the combination of a truth of chemistry
and a truth of quantified modality theory. As it happens, "H2O" isn't just
a kind term -- more on this below -- but for now notice that if we were
speaking of gold and Au, the problem would end here.
>A further trouble with "essence" of a natural kind word like "water"
>(unless proper names like "Socrates" where the idea of rigidity plays an
>interesting role) is perhaps that we need to know what individual items we
>are talking about. Since "water" is a mass noun, I guess that the presence
>of just _one_ molecule, as per the definition, of water constituted with
>two atoms of Hydrogen and one of Oxygen (H20) would qualify as "water". But
>then perhaps maybe just _one_ molecule may _not_ feature the full range of
>behavioural properties, as it were, that we expect from "water".
I would prefer to say that "water" refers to all bodies of water as one
large non-contiguous mass, without individuation. In addition to water,
there are bodies of water, such as the Charles River and this glass of
water. There are also molecules of water. And single molecules of water
behave exactly as you would expect single molecules of water to behave,
unless you are like me and you don't happen to have *any* expectations
about such things.
>It seems the essence then (if "water" has one -- I agree with Rodrigo that
>it hasn't, since I'm more than ready to call "XYZ" "water" too, if I'm
>obliged to do so for some important pragmatic reason)
If Searle put a gun to my head, I would too. Let's not mix pragmatics and
semantics until we have to.
>has to do not only
>with SORTAL IDENTITY, as Rodrigo calls it ("water" qua "substance" -- as
>opposed to Socrates qua individual), but also with the abstract feature of
>"COMBINATION".
>
>I.e. water would be the ESSENTIAL "combination" of H2 and O. And a specific
>combination at that. Notably, H202 is NOT "water" although we also call it
>"water". Oxygenated water. And very useful it is too. But it is of course,
>not water. Nor a type of water. Or is it not.
Oxygenated water is H2O with more than the usual O2 in
solution. Oxygenated water is just another variety of impure water. Not
that even the chemist would care for truly pure water. About eight
miligrams per liter of dissolved O2 is expected even in the most perfectly
distilled water, for example. Why? Equilibrium with the surrounding
atmosphere.
H2O2 is hydrogen peroxide. Also colorless and similar to water in other
ways. That extra O, however, is no small matter! H2O2 is usually produced
and used in solution, and in its highest concentrations, it is used as
*rocket* *propellant*!
>Essentially, "water" is then, not just "H2" and "O". I.e HYDROGEN and
>OXYGEN. In this sense, we can say that hydrogen and oxygen have like each,
>an "ATOMIC" essences (literally so) - while "water" would have a molecular
>essence (again literally). Where this combination specifies not only the
>union, but the _type_ of union: two hydrogen, one oxygen).
>
>But what does "combination" mean here. How can "combination" (and a
>specific type of combination: one of one element, two of the second), which
>is an abstract thing, "combine" as it were, with "hydrogen" and "oxygen".
>It seems that, if water has an essence, it is somewhat weaker than the
>essence of hydrogen or oxygen -- For, how would you like YOUR essence to be
>the combination of your having been born in, say, Italy, and brought up in,
>say, Oxford? -- Anyway, we'll keep on thinking about these issues!
I would rather *like* that essence. An early childhood of the heart and an
adolescence of the mind! How sublime! And to end up in Buenos Aires, the
melting pot of WWII escapees and Spanish colonialism with a temperate
climate. I could hardly have designed a better combination!
"H2O" is a chemist's shorthand for "molecule consisting of two hydrogen
atoms and one oxygen atom". Adapting this to predicate calculus, I would
replace the name "H2O" with a definite description whose matrix is a single
dyadic predicate "(the w)(comp(<<hydrogen,2>,<oxygen,1>>,x))", where
"comp(x,y)" means something like "x is the molecular composition of y". So,
we get,
10. (Ex)(x=water and x=(the w)(comp(<<hydrogen,2>,<oxygen,1>>,w)))
as the truth of chemistry, and
11. (Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(x=water and y=hydrogen and z=oxygen and
[]x=(the w)(comp(<<y,2>,<z,1>>,w)))
as the necessary identity combined with the truth of chemistry.
It is hardly a logical truth that everything is a kind composed of 2 of one
kind of thing and 1 of another kind of thing, which is why I don't say that
it's a necessity that water is H2O, purely as matter of logic. Instead, I
say that it is a *natural* necessity. So, let me give the truth conditions
for natural necessity: 'Fa' is naturally necessarily true iff 'if N then
Fa' is necessarily true, where 'N' is the truth about nature. So, 'it is
naturally necessary that water is H2O' comes out something like this
12. (Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(x=water and y=hydrogen and z=oxygen and
[]if N then x=(the w)(comp(<<y,2>,<z,1>>,w)))
Since among the truths of nature are the truths of chemistry, and among the
truths of chemistry is the truth (10) that water is H2O, then (12) is just
true. Replacing 'N' with the relevant truth of chemistry we get,
13. (Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(x=water and y=hydrogen and z=oxygen and
[]if water=(the w)(comp(<<hydrogen,2>,<oxygen,1>>,w)
then x=(the w)(comp(<<y,2>,<z,1>>,w)))
There does exist water, hydrogen, and oxygen, and the sentence in the scope
of the '[]' operator is just a logical truth. It is a de re logical truth
because its rigidly referring terms must first be moved out to the
extensional scope.
There's a lot of detail here, I know. But, again, notice that if we were
talking about gold and Au, we could have avoided all this business of
combinations. (If only Putnam had used only "gold/Au" from the beginning!)
At 05:14 PM 9/1/2001 -0300, you also wrote:
>An appendix (an exercise in boring linguistic botanising, a la H.P.Grice).
>Towards a nominal essence ... of "water". -- And, mind, the OED seems to be
>the best anglophonic way to provide essences...
Unless, with Quine and Putnam, you happen not to acknowledge any clear
distinction between meaning facts and empirical facts. Why do Oxford when
you can do Nevada?
http://www.state.nv.us/cnr/ndwp/dict-1/waterwds.htm
And you were impressed by the Eskimos.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
Rodrigo Vanegas
At 09:09 AM 8/31/2001 -0700, you wrote:
> > It looks like
> > Daniel is coming close to insisting (with Quine)
> > that
> >
> > (1) Rodrigo could not have rolled a 13.
> >
> > is a modal statement that should properly be read de
> > dicto. That is,
> > (1) is not to be read as implying that there is some
> > modal property
> > attached to the dice or the dice-rolling-event; (1)
> > is not "talk
> > about things" but rather "talk about talk about
> > things."
>
>Well, not quite. I would say, that the statement:
>
>1. Rodrigo could not have rolled a 13.
>
>is infered from:
>
>A. 13 is not in the X system.
>B. Rodrigo is using the X system.
>
>Thus, ultimately, it says nothing.
I have two basic problems with the route you've taken. First, I don't know
what systems you're talking about. Even when you tell me what they are, I
expect that I will skeptical about their role and/or existence. Second, it
simply is beyond philosophical challenge that (1) does say *something*. If
you don't think it says *something*, then that right there is a reason to
doubt your entire philosophy.
At 06:58 AM 8/31/2001 -0700, you wrote:
> > The problem is that
> > some of us, including
> > myself, are interested in a logic that will be
> > useful outside of physics
> > and mathematics.
>
>Yes, I understand you but you CAN NOT base necessity
>on an arbitrary reference.
Do I?
><Putnam even noticed a need for de
> > re necessity in
> > accounting for semantics across changes in theory.
>
>Can you give an example of this, since I am not too
>familiar with this concept.
Sure. Here's some Putnam,
Bohr assumed in 1911 that there are (at every time) numbers
p and q such that the (one dimensional) position of a particle
is q and the (one dimensional) momentum is p; if this was part
of the meaning of 'particle' for Bohr, and in addition, 'part
of the meaning' means 'necessary condition for membership in
the extension of the term', then electrons are *not* particles
in Bohr's sense, and, indeed, there are *no* particles 'in
Bohr's sense'. (And no 'electrons' in Bohr's sense of
'electron', etc.) None of the terms in Bohr's 1911 theory
referred! It follows on this account that we cannot say that
present electron theory is a better theory of the same
particles that Bohr was referring to.
(_Philosophical Papers: Volume 2_, 197)
Without de re reference in the "necessary and sufficient conditions" for
being an electron, it's hard to see how our theory of electrons improved on
Bohr's theory.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
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J L Speranza
Rodrigo:
"regular ol' non-epistemic necessity as interdefined with logical truth
already does the job of providing de re necessity with an anti-essentialist
semantics."
JLS: "Does it do the job? I always found _any kind_ of semantics
(anti-essentialist, essentialist, modal, non-modal) -- or even
"interpretation" a la Benson Mates, Elementary Logic -- too essentialist to
my taste."
RV:
"I don't know if my kind of semantics is like anything you've come across
already, except of course
on Analytic a month ago. If others have been too essentialist to your
taste, then maybe I can cook up something you can swallow."
JL: "What, then, would a semantics for "Water must be H20" be?
RV: "Instead of "water must be H20" I want to study "Nec (Water = H2O)".
JLS: "The reference to "possible world" -- as first made by Kripke in his
early essay on the issue -- makes the semantics for "Nec" [in terms of _all
possible worlds_] (inescapably) "essentialist" to my taste.
RV: "Kripke's semantics is essentialist, but the essentialism doesn't enter
hand in hand with talk of possible worlds. It's only when he turns to
conditions of "trans-world identity" that the quizzical looks begin."
I think. Yes, now that I think of it G Forbes probably says something like
that. "Essence" is like a theoretical construct within standard semantics
of modal logic.
RV: "Personally, I prefer to keep my world-count at one, and I think I can
get away with it."
JLS: "To provide a non-essentialist semantics would be [...] to hold that
"Necc" be interpreted in terms of only one possible world, i.e. the
utterer's actual one!"
RV: "That's right. I would say that [that] accurately describes my
position's non-essentialism.
JLS: "Since Rodrigo is saying that the non-essentialist does this by
possibly interdefining non-epistemic necessity with logical truth, a
further problem arises, it seems to me, and this seems to amount to see
"Nec (Water 0 H20)" as a necessary logical truth. But that is, as I
understand it, precisely the essentialist's, and I thought, also Rodrigo's,
point or objection: there's nothing tautological or analytic about water
_being_ H20."
RV: "I don't think there's anything analytic or tautological "Nec (Water =
H20)". Let's recall what I take to be the logical form of "Necc (water =
H2O)". This formula is already partially formal, but something more needs
to be done with the nouns "water" and "H2O". Actually, "H2O" is more of a
noun phrase, and I will speak to this below in reply to your discussion of
"combination". The basic idea is that nouns like these, i.e. nouns that
refer to kinds, refer _rigidly_. So, we get,
(Ex)(Ey)(x = water & y = H2O & Nec (x = y)).
Since we know from chemistry that
(Ex)(x = water & x = H2O)
and from elementary quantified modal logic that
(x)(Nec (x = x)
it follows that
(Ex)( x = water & x = H2O & Nec(x = x))
or more indirectly, but equivalently, that
(Ex)(Ey)(x = water & y = H2O & Nec(x = y)). (QED).
RV: "If we take "H2O" to be a kind term, just as "water" is, then that it
is necessary that water is H2O is just the combination of a truth of
chemistry and a truth of quantified modality theory. As it happens, "H2O"
isn't just a kind term but for now notice that if we were speaking of gold
and Au, the problem would end here.
It's interesting that that's precisely Locke's example in Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. "Gold". Indeed, it is a pity that Putnam could not do
with "Gold"
====
INTERLUDE ON LOCKE ON GOLD:
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/locke/ctb3c11.htm#1
"A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called
"gold", but the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word "gold2
only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls
the same colour in a peacock's tail "gold". Another that has better
observed, adds to shining yellow great weight: and then the sound "gold",
when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very
weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility: and then the
word "gold" signifies to him a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very
heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word
"gold", when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied
it to: but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor
can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not."
There are like 353 more occurrences of the word "gold" in the treatise.
Let's see if the word "water" occurs. Oh it does. And Locke has a most odd
theory about "water". He thinks what falls from the sky as "rain" is _not_
water! nor the thing eskimos may the igloos with... In a way he is right,
if "essence" applies to species, I guess. The first occurrence as follows:
(Book 6, chapter 13):
"Let's consider the "essence" of the "species", as conceived by us, proved
from "water" as essentially different from "ice". If I should ask anyone
whether "ice" and "water" are two _different species_ of things, I doubt
not but I should be answered in the affirmative. And it cannot be denied
but he who says they are two different species is right. But if an
Englishman bred in Jamaica, who has never seen "ice", comes to England in
the winter to find the "water" he puts in the basin at night is in a great
part frozen in the morning, and, not knowing any peculiar name it had,
should call it "hardened water"; I ask whether this would be a new species
to him, as different from "water"? And I think it would be answered here,
It would _not_ be to him a new species, no more than "congealed jelly",
when it is cold, is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and warm;
or than liquid "gold" in the furnace is a distinct species from "hard gold"
in the hands of a workman.
If this be so, it's plain that our distinct species are nothing but
distinct complex ideas, with distinct names annexed to them. It is true
every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon depend
those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the ranking of
things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under several words)
is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them: which, though
sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we may be able to
discourse of them when we have them not present before us; yet if we
suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions, and that things
existing are distinguished by nature into species, by real essences,
according as we distinguish them into species by names, we shall be liable
to great mistakes."
JLS: "A further trouble with "essence" of a natural kind word like "water"
(unlike a proper names like "Socrates" where the idea of rigidity plays an
interesting role) is perhaps that we need to know what individual items we
are talking about. Since "water" is a mass noun, I guess that the presence
of just _one_ molecule, as per the definition, of water constituted with
two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen would qualify as "water". But then
perhaps maybe just _one_ molecule may _not_ feature the full range of
behavioural properties, as it were, that we expect from "water".
RV: "I would prefer to say that "water" refers to all bodies of water as
one large non-contiguous mass, without individuation."
Oh, I see. You'd say "water" is like a quasi-individual. As when BJ
Harrison said that he would not call "gold" Arthur, because he (gold) is a
quasi-particular (Intro to Phil of Lang, Macmillan).
RV: "In addition to water, there are *bodies* of water (= H20) such as the
Charles River and this glass of
water. There are also molecules of water. And single molecules of water
behave exactly as you would expect single molecules of water to behave,
unless you are like me and you don't happen to have *any* expectations
about such things."
But you do. You drink water. If water is drinkable, then molecules of water
are drinkable. Hence a single molecule of water is drinkable. "Drinkable"
is a pretty obvious nice property to me. You MUST have some expectation
about ONE molecule of water, i.e. that it is DRINKABLE. Interesting, one of
my favourite Irish dramatists's surnames is DRINKWATER. So I guess he knew.
JLS: "It seems the essence then (if "water" has one -- I agree with Rodrigo
that it hasn't, since I'm more than ready to call "XYZ" "water" too, if I'm
obliged to do so for some important pragmatic reason)"
RV: "If Searle put a gun to my head, I would too. Let's not mix pragmatics
and
semantics until we have to."
Oh, I was thinking more of Kripke. He's a better shooter.
JLS: "..has to do not only with SORTAL IDENTITY, as Rodrigo calls it
("water" qua "substance" -- as opposed to Socrates qua individual), but
also with the abstract feature of "COMBINATION". I.e. water would be the
ESSENTIAL "combination" of H2 and O. And a specific combination at that.
Notably, H202 is NOT "water" although we also call it "water" (oxygenated
water -- and very useful it is too. But it is of course, not water. Nor a
type of water. Or is it not).
Vanegas educates me in chemistry here:
RV: "Oxygenated water is H2O with more than the usual O2 in solution.
Oxygenated water is just another variety of impure water. Not that even the
chemist would care for truly pure water. About 8 mm/lit. of dissolved O2 is
expected even in the most perfectly distilled water, for example. Why?
Equilibrium with the surrounding
atmosphere. "H2O2", on the other hand, is hydrogen peroxide."
WHOA? That requires a full search in the OED!
"hydrogen peroxide = a colourless, viscous, somewhat unstable liquid, H2O2,
which can act as an oxidizing and a reducing agent, is usu. prepared as an
aqueous solution, and is used esp. as an oxidizing and bleaching agent, in
the manufacture of peroxides and organic compounds, as a weak antiseptic,
and (in concentrated form) as a rocket propellant.
1951 A. Grollman Pharmacol. & Therapeutics xxv. 514
Hydrogen peroxide solution differs from most other
disinfectants in the short duration of the action,
which passes off as soon as all the oxygen is liberated.
1962 J. Glenn in Into Orbit 192 The hydrogen peroxide
jets began to turn the capsule round to orbital attitude.
Oh, I feel satisfied now!
RV: "Also colorless and similar to water in other ways. That extra O,
however, is no small matter! H2O2 is usually produced and used in solution,
and in its highest concentrations, it is used as
*rocket* *propellant*!"
So I see, as J. Glenn in Into Orbit has the honour of being quoted in the
OED above!
JLS: "Essentially, "water" is then, not just "H2" and "O", i.e hydrogen and
oxygen. In this sense, we can say that hydrogen and oxygen have like each,
an "ATOMIC" essences (literally so -- hydrogen and essence being what
chemists call "elements") - while "water" would have a molecular essence
(again literally). Where this combination specifies not only the union, but
the _type_ of union: two hydrogen, one oxygen). But what does "combination"
mean here. How can "combination" (and a specific type of combination: one
of one element, two of the second), which is an abstract thing, "combine"
as it were, with "hydrogen" and "oxygen". It seems that, if water has an
essence, it is somewhat weaker than the essence of hydrogen or oxygen --
For, how would you like YOUR essence to be the combination of your having
been born in, say, Italy, and brought up in, say, Oxford? -- Anyway, we'll
keep on thinking about these issues!
RV: "I would rather *like* that essence. An early childhood of the heart
and an adolescence of the mind! How sublime! And to end up in Buenos Aires,
the melting pot of WWII escapees and Spanish colonialism with a temperate
climate. I could hardly have designed a better combination!"
Right.
RV: ""H2O" is a chemist's shorthand for "molecule consisting of two
hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom". Adapting this to predicate calculus,
I would replace the name "H2O" with a *definite description* whose matrix
is a single dyadic predicate
(i.w)(comp(<<H,2>,<O,1>>,x))",
where "comb(x,y)" means something like "x is the molecular composition of
y". So, we get,
[and "i" is the iota operator read in English as _the_).
(Ex)(x = water & x = (i.w)(comp(<<hydrogen,2>,<oxygen,1>>,w)))
as the truth of chemistry, and
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(x = water & y = H and z = O &
Nec (x = (i.w)(comp(<<y,2>,<z,1>>,w)))
"as the necessary identity combined with the truth of chemistry. It is
hardly a logical truth that everything is a kind composed of 2 of one kind
of thing and 1 of another kind of thing, which is why I don't say that
it's a necessity that water is H2O, purely as matter of logic."
"Instead, I say that it is a *natural* necessity."
This reminds me of a book by Romano Harre about philosophy of science,
about NECESSITY and kinds. My prof had me to read it for a course in
metaphysics. My first and last course on the issue. The co-author was
MADDEN. I only read the intro. though. My prof was into Aristotelian
theories of scientific explanation.
"So, let me give the truth conditions for natural necessity:"
'The F is G' is naturally necessarily true
iff Nec(N -> the F is G).
-- where 'N' is the truth about nature. So, 'it is naturally necessary that
water is H2O' comes out something like this
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(x = water & y = H and z = O &
Nec(N -> x =(i.w)(comp(<<y,2>,<z,1>>,w)))
"Since among the truths of nature are the truths of chemistry, and among
the truths of chemistry is the truth that water is H2O, the formula above
is just true. Replacing 'N' with the relevant truth of chemistry we get as
per below".
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(x = water & y = H and z = O &
Nec(water = (i.w)(comp(<<H,2>,<O,1>>,w)
-> x=(i.w)(comp(<<y,2>,<z,1>>,w)))
"There does exist water, hydrogen, and oxygen, and the sentence [with]in
the scope of the 'Nec' operator is just a logical truth. It is a _de re_
logical truth because its rigidly referring terms must first be moved out
to the extensional scope. ... [Note again] if we were talking about "gold""
-- as Locke was! --
"we could have avoided all this business of combinations."
"If only Putnam had used only "gold/Au" from the beginning!"
I think he does mention "gold", but for some reason changes to "water"!
That's the sad irony!
"It is not that philosophers had never considered such examples. Locke, for
example, uses this word "gold" as an example, and is not troubled by the
idea that its meaning is a necessary and sufficient condition!"
(The Meaning of Meaning, in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, p.271).
"mind, the OED seems to be the best anglophonic way to provide essences..."
I see you don't think you're "ready to take on the OED", yet you comment
the above, "Unless, with Quine and Putnam, you happen not to acknowledge
any clear distinction between meaning facts and empirical facts. Why do
Oxford when you can do Nevada?
http://www.state.nv.us/cnr/ndwp/dict-1/waterwds.htm And you were impressed
by the Eskimos."
Couldn't read the link, but yes, I guess I was impressed by the eskimos.
==
Daniel Language
>Well, not quite. I would say, that the statement:
>
>1. Rodrigo could not have rolled a 13.
>
>is infered from:
>
>A. 13 is not in the X system.
>B. Rodrigo is using the X system.
>
>Thus, ultimately, it says nothing.
Rodrigo wrote:
I have two basic problems with the route you've taken.
First, I don't know
what systems you're talking about. Even when you tell
me what they are, I
expect that I will skeptical about their role and/or
existence.
------------------
In other words, you don't think that other dice, other
than the conventional
dice, are possible? I am saying, quite clearly, that
"13" is not represented in the conventional dice.
However, it is plainly obvious that we could make
other dice in which "13" would be a roll. Do you doubt
this?
-------------------
Rodrigo:
Second, it simply is beyond philosophical challenge
that (1) does say *something*. If you don't think it
says *something*, then that right there is a reason to
doubt your entire philosophy.
--------------------
This is a bit pedantic. Clearly the claim isn't that
(1) is not a sentence. Saying (1) is like saying, "You
can't swim to the moon." Its a pointless sentence, but
this is really a very minor point.
--------------------
Rodrigo:
---------------------
I think I've missed your point here. If Bohr has
assumed that "there are p and q (at every time)" as a
necessary and sufficient condition for membership in
the extension of the term "particle", then he is
trying to define "particle" in the context of its use
in physics. We now know about the uncertainty
principle, therefore, what Bohr had assumed is found
to be an incorrect condition for the definition of
"particle" in physics. Now, its clear that "particle"
and "electron" are theoretical items, part of the
picture-language that physicists use, now and then,
for reasons of interpretation. It is further clear
that the defintions that they really utilize are
mathematical equations. You have yet to make your case
about the "reference" of these definitions.
We alter the meaning of particle and electron as we
discover new facts in experimentation. You will have
to be more explicit on your claim about "de re
reference IN (?) the necessary and sufficient
conditions".
To go back to the original point; you still haven't
touched upon the matter of what is supposed to have
been meant by "natural possibility". The fact of the
matter is that there isn't any natural reference to
the use of "possibility". This point really does close
the case, unless you can provide some evidence for
something in the natural world that could be the
reference of "possibility".
Daniel
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Rodrigo Vanegas
At 09:59 AM 9/6/2001 -0700, you wrote:
>I am saying, quite clearly, that
>"13" is not represented in the conventional dice.
>However, it is plainly obvious that we could make
>other dice in which "13" would be a roll. Do you doubt
>this?
No, I'm not doubting that we could make "other dice" in which "13 would be
a roll", but I also do not believe that the dice in question could roll
thirteen. What "other dice", as you put it, could do, is another question
entirely, since it is a question about *other* dice, not *these* dice.
>> >1. Rodrigo could not have rolled a 13.
>>
>>Second, it simply is beyond philosophical challenge
>>that (1) does say *something*. If you don't think it
>>says *something*, then that right there is a reason to
>>doubt your entire philosophy.
>
>This is a bit pedantic. Clearly the claim isn't that
>(1) is not a sentence. Saying (1) is like saying, "You
>can't swim to the moon." Its a pointless sentence, but
>this is really a very minor point.
Well, I guess I think that whether saying something is pointless or not,
rather depends on one's intended point. In the context of the board game I
described, the point was to inform the other players of the nature of the
dice, hence of the game.
Similarly, if a very ignorant, even primitive, man, got it into his head
that he would swim into the ocean so that at moonset, he could reach the
moon, just past the horizon, I would not consider it pointless to inform
him that he can't swim to the moon. The point would be to save him great
effort and an inevitable disappointment.
>>Without de re reference in the "necessary and
>>sufficient conditions" for
>>being an electron, it's hard to see how our theory of
>>electrons improved on
>>Bohr's theory.
>
>I think I've missed your point here. If Bohr has
>assumed that "there are p and q (at every time)" as a
>necessary and sufficient condition for membership in
>the extension of the term "particle", then he is
>trying to define "particle" in the context of its use
>in physics. We now know about the uncertainty
>principle, therefore, what Bohr had assumed is found
>to be an incorrect condition for the definition of
>"particle" in physics.
The point is that if Bohr defined "particle" as he did, and we do as we do,
then there is no obvious sense in which his theory of "particles" was wrong
about what he called "particles", since there aren't any such things as he
defined them. And there is no obvious sense in which our theory of
particles is better than his theory of "particles" because there is no
obvious sense in which they are theories about the same things at all!
>To go back to the original point; you still haven't
>touched upon the matter of what is supposed to have
>been meant by "natural possibility". The fact of the
>matter is that there isn't any natural reference to
>the use of "possibility". This point really does close
>the case, unless you can provide some evidence for
>something in the natural world that could be the
>reference of "possibility".
It's a good question. I will return to it in another post.
Rodrigo <Van...@yahoo.com>
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