[analytic-borders] Starting Over?
swmaerske
don't we attack this from a different angle? Instead of arguing our
competing proposals as to what moral claims are based on, why don't
we try to imagine what it would take to establish the necessary
basics of moral valuing in the first place. Let's suppose we were
engaged in building an artificial entity, an android of sorts. Let's
assume, further, that we are capable of constructing the capacity for
artificial intelligence (what we would recognize as akin to human
intelligence in certain critical ways) to support this android, i.e.,
it would not merely be an automaton but would be capable of acting
like persons act based on its own "intellectual" operations.
What would be required, given such an entity, to provide it with the
capacity to make moral distinctions as we do? One way, perhaps, would
be to program into it a set of rules to govern its behavior but also
the conviction that it was acting freely, i.e., choosing its courses
of action when it followed those rules. That is certainly one way of
explaining the moral dimension of our own behavior. And it may even
be the true explanation (though as I have often said, this would
wreck the moral game itself for us).
Another possibility could be that we provide our entity with the
building blocks to arrive at moral judgements itself, such as we
think we do (or most of us think we do most of the time). What would
those building blocks have to be? Would they include the entity's
belief in its own personhood, its integrity as a distinct entity, its
belief in its self? Would they also have to include certain
capacities, e.g., self-awareness, the ability to have beliefs at all,
the ability to recognize selfhood in others, etc?
I think this may be a better way to go at this, than to go on and on
arguing our different notions about what moral valuing ultimately
comes down to. If anyone here is game for this approach, I propose
that we adopt it and see where it leads.
SWM
bruce denner
get on a good footing and move ahead. My
sentiments...but how?
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>Instead of arguing our competing proposals as to what
moral claims >are based on
>why don't we try to imagine what it would take to
establish
> the necessary basics of moral valuing in the first
place.
Wouldn't a proposal to establish the basics of moral
valuing follow from what one considered the basis of
moral claims? It seems to me that is what you do with
your example of building an Android.
> What would be required, given such an entity, to
> provide it with the capacity to make moral
distinctions as we do?
Wondering. Why speculate about a Being. Why not just
consider how to raise a moral child?
Is it consistent with your thinking that an answer to
your question is the BEING would have to have a moral
concept?
The concept could be described as freely (electively)
following rules. OK.
> Another possibility could be that we provide our
> entity with the building blocks to arrive at moral
judgments
As you describe these building blocks, integrity,
self-awareness, etc. they don't seem option, not just
a possibility, but essential if the BEING is to make
moral judgments the way we do.
I'll stay with a fictional creature or a child, if you
like. What's the next thing to discuss?
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swmaerske
ass", Bruce! No matter what the proposal, you want to debate it.
Debate is good, of course. It's what we're up to here after all. But
it has to be used sparingly. Somewhere we have to have some common
ground in a discussion. We can't simply argue everything because,
when we do, we end up going nowhere. Maybe this is the source of our
problem: our argumentative attitudes. I see it not just here but
elsewhere, on other sites. Some people just want to say "no," either
by denying what is said or by insisting on rephrasing hat is said in
different words.
I'm a believer in the importance of language but, at the end of the
day, I am more concerned with our understanding for which our
language is a tool. Popperians who get down on Wittgensteinians
object that all they are doing is playing with words. I have noted,
by the way, that Popperians are often guilty of this very fault they
ascribe to others. But Wittgensteinians aren't free of it either and
can certainly fall into that mindset. It is one of the outcomes you
get when all you want to do is reject and replace one formulation
with another.
Now in the case below it seems you want to challenge the premises of
a very simple proposal I made and steer us back to the same debate we
were having. While I would not call this "playing with words" it does
strike me as more of the endless argument!
Anyway, I'm not intending to be offensive here, Bruce, though I'm
probably coming off that way. I just want to be frank and clear as to
where I'm coming from (insofar as I am capable of that). I'll add
some comments below:
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
> Hey, welcome back...really appreciate your effort to
> get on a good footing and move ahead. My
> sentiments...but how?
> --- swmaerske <swmaerske@...> wrote:
>
> >Instead of arguing our competing proposals as to what
> moral claims >are based on
>
> >why don't we try to imagine what it would take to
> establish
> > the necessary basics of moral valuing in the first
> place.
>
> Wouldn't a proposal to establish the basics of moral
> valuing follow from what one considered the basis of
> moral claims? It seems to me that is what you do with
> your example of building an Android.
>
It's a way of taking a breath and perhaps getting a new slant on this.
> > What would be required, given such an entity, to
> > provide it with the capacity to make moral
> distinctions as we do?
>
> Wondering. Why speculate about a Being. Why not just
> consider how to raise a moral child?
>
Because even a human child has certain things about it that we
assume. But a machine would not have those human capacities. We would
have to give it that. Thus we have to think long and hard as to
what's missing, what it is we must give it. Certainly one can adopt a
strategy of watching moral development in children but I would submit
that it is not as radical as imagining moral development literally
from scratch. In this case the point is to shake off as many of our
preconceptions and assumptions as we can and see if we can't figure
out what the basic building blocks we need are.
> Is it consistent with your thinking that an answer to
> your question is the BEING would have to have a moral
> concept?
>
I don't know what this means. I have suggested we imagine trying to
incorporate moral concepts in a mechanical entity that is manlike,
that is all. This seems pretty clear cut. Nothing has been said about
what a manlike being would have to have to be manlike at this stage.
The whole point of the exercise is what manlike being would have to
have to operate morally in the way we think we do.
> The concept could be described as freely (electively)
> following rules. OK.
>
Hmmm, perhaps I'm being unfair to you here. It seems you are merely
thinking aloud. If so, then I regret suggesting above that you are
being argumentative for the sake of arguing. (But I have decided to
leave what I initially said in place, as though we were conversing,
thus on-line communication has a different quality than more
traditional written forms of communication where we check and shape
our words before finalizing them.)
> > Another possibility could be that we provide our
> > entity with the building blocks to arrive at moral
> judgments
>
> As you describe these building blocks, integrity,
> self-awareness, etc. they don't seem option, not just
> a possibility, but essential if the BEING is to make
> moral judgments the way we do.
>
I'm sorry, this is unclear. I am guessing a typo or other keyboard
related lapse . . .
> I'll stay with a fictional creature or a child, if you
> like. What's the next thing to discuss?
>
>
I think we should imagine our mechanical man (or woman, I suppose) in
human form for convenience sake though that would not be essential.
Then we should consider what would need to be put in place in the
context of its "artificial intelligence" that would yield what we
understand is moral valuing capability (either as moral sensibility,
moral reasoning or moral programming).
Let's put the mechanical man in contexts where we would expect human
beings to have to make moral choices but, in doing so, we assume that
it has none of the basic components we have to start with. It has no
moral experience, no moral training to draw on, no metaphysical
beliefs that imply a moral order to which it must conform. What must
we give our android to think morally? What must it know, believe,
feel, think, etc.? Are there any primary things it must have as its
moral building blocks or are there a lot of different possibilities
that might serve?
Is it possible for a mechanical creature such as we've imagined to
have moral judgement, to be able to make moral choices? Or is the
best we can hope for that it act according to a pre-programmed set of
instructions that makes it seem to be operating morally?
What is there in our kind of intelligence that makes moral valuing
possible for us? And is it something we could somehow add to our
machine?
Perhaps we need to put our android in a situation where it (he/she)
must decide on foregoing it own interest in favor of another
entity's? But how will our entity even know when something is in its
own interest? What are the capacities we must give it?
The reason this seems like a fruitful line of inquiry to me is that I
suspect that one of the areas of importance for us is that of
artificial intelligence (both for what it can tell us about our own
minds and for what we can do with it technologically). Philosophy
cannot, I think, get us to artificial intelligence but it can enable
us to think more clearly about what "intelligence" in this sense is,
which can help those engaged in the scientific pursuit of artificial
intelligence. Insofar as it can help clarify what we mean by "mind,"
when referring to our sort of intelligence, it can help clarify the
things minds do. One of those, of course, is to make choices based on
a valuing process, including what we are wont to call moral valuing.
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> You're what a colleague of mine used to call a real
> "pain ....
I'm sorry you see me that way. And this may seem odd,
but I'm trying to be my most empathetic self, asking
myself "What is SWM want?" From my point of view, I
can't be arguing, because I'm not clear what your
position is. But every attempt to clarify, sounds like
a rebuke.
And while I'm struggling to grasp your point of view,
you are sizing me up.
> I'm a believer in the importance of language but, at
> the end of the
> day, I am more concerned with our understanding for
> which our
> language is a tool.
As if I'm not. What gives you that impression?
> Now in the case below it seems you want to challenge
> the premises of a very simple proposal I made
You can see it as a challenge or, as I do, as an
expression of confusion. How can I make a distinction
I don't understand?
> Anyway, I'm not intending to be offensive here,
I don't find you offensive at all. I appreciate your
position. You are trying to say something and it seems
to fall on deaf or critical ears. Well, I share the
same frustration. I'm trying to work with you but I'm
seen as an unhelpful pain in the ass.
Please indulge me. Answer my simple question.
Wouldn't a proposal to establish the basics of
moral valuing follow from what one considered the
basis
of moral claims?
Or, perhaps we should move past the question and
discuss your Android proposal. I wondered why not a
human child and you answered..
> Because even a human child has certain things about
> it that we
> assume. But a machine would not have those human
> capacities. We would
> have to give it that. Thus we have to think long and
> hard as to
> what's missing, what it is we must give it.
In all modesty I can't imagine doing this. Why would I
expect to be able to think up all the capacities that
make one human? I wouldn't know how to begin. I'm
willing to follow you though.
>In this case the point is to shake off
> as many of our preconceptions and assumptions as we
can and >see if we can't figure out what the basic
building blocks we need >are.
Please see me as helpful when I ask how we know when
we have actually figured out a building black and not
have made an assumption or have been working with a
preconception?
If I'm going to do this with you, I have to know how
to do it.
> The whole point of the exercise is what manlike
> being would have to have to operate morally in the
way we >think we do.
Right. So I start with my pre-conception of what it
means to be moral...and then what? You say and I quote
"Let's put the mechanical man in contexts where we
would expect human beings to have to make moral
choices but, in doing so, we assume that it has none
of the basic components we have to start with. It has
no moral experience, no moral training to draw on, no
metaphysical beliefs that imply a moral order to
which it must conform. What must we give our android
to think morally? What must it know, believe, feel,
think, etc.? Are there any primary things it must have
as its moral building blocks or are there a lot of
different possibilities that might serve?
(What would you propose as the building blocks?)
" Is it possible for a mechanical creature such as
we've imagined to have moral judgment, to be able to
make moral choices? Or is the best we can hope for
that it act according to a pre-programmed set of
instructions that makes it seem to be operating
morally?"
(Question confuses me. If we program the Android, then
it is programed and hence not free by definition. This
gets into the whole puzzle of how a person who is
subject to socialization is still free. I think we
should set this aside and go back to the building
blocks)
"What is there in our kind of intelligence that makes
moral valuing
possible for us? And is it something we could somehow
add to our machine?"
(Isn't the answer "Yes" if we agree that we have
supplied the building block and the Android acts
morally?. And, yes, we have to establish criteria for
acting morally. One is foregoing self-interest)
"Perhaps we need to put our android in a situation
where it (he/she) must decide on foregoing it own
interest in favor of another
entity's? But how will our entity even know when
something is in its own interest? What are the
capacities we must give it?"
(Guess we have to give it that capacity and others)
"The reason this seems like a fruitful line of inquiry
to me is that I
suspect that one of the areas of importance for us is
that of
artificial intelligence ..."
(I'm going to pass on the AI question. It's quite
controversial. Let's stick with your notion of
building blocks)
bruce
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swmaerske
>
> > You're what a colleague of mine used to call a real
> > "pain ....
>
> I'm sorry you see me that way. And this may seem odd,
> but I'm trying to be my most empathetic self, asking
> myself "What is SWM want?" From my point of view, I
> can't be arguing, because I'm not clear what your
> position is. But every attempt to clarify, sounds like
> a rebuke.
That sense of "rebuke" is only a fairly recent innovation I think.
>
> And while I'm struggling to grasp your point of view,
> you are sizing me up.
>
We are always sizing one anothe up. It's just our natural huan
inclination to try to "get" where the other is coming from, what he
(or she) actually wants, etc.
> > I'm a believer in the importance of language but, at
> > the end of the
> > day, I am more concerned with our understanding for
> > which our
> > language is a tool.
>
> As if I'm not. What gives you that impression?
>
What I said about my postion contains no commentary on what your
position may or may not be. However, I have begun to see you in a
certain way (rightly or wrongly perhaps), as someone who just likes
to tussle on these boards. I am here only because it is a good place
to explore some ideas and issues that interest me. I do my posting in
between other on-line activity and sometimes haven't a lot of time to
do it right. Thus I tend to want to get to the crux of things rather
than niggle over peripheral matters. Such niggling may arise when we
engage in arguing for its own sake, something I prefer to simply
avoid.
>
> > Now in the case below it seems you want to challenge
> > the premises of a very simple proposal I made
>
> You can see it as a challenge or, as I do, as an
> expression of confusion. How can I make a distinction
> I don't understand?
>
Perhaps it was just my frustration showing. I proposed this new
approach as a means of cutting the knot, of shaking loose the old
categories and terms of our discussion by making a new start. Yet it
seemed to me that by your response, you were pointing us back to the
same questions that had bogged us down before. A big part of this, I
think, is that we are slipping and sliding over multiple meanings to
the words we are using. Then we can get bogged down sorting these out
on the edges of the discussion or we can go in to the heart of it. I
am trying to get to the heart.
> > Anyway, I'm not intending to be offensive here,
>
> I don't find you offensive at all. I appreciate your
> position. You are trying to say something and it seems
> to fall on deaf or critical ears. Well, I share the
> same frustration. I'm trying to work with you but I'm
> seen as an unhelpful pain in the ass.
>
The reason I had put the phrase in quotes is actually lost in this
format. In fact the colleague I was referring to was a native born
Italian and he used to use the phrase with a robust, heavily accented
enunciation. It was THAT aspect of the phrase that I wanted to
somehow convey, hence the quote marks around what is really a very
common phrase. But I grew sloppy and, perhaps, perplexed as to how to
present that aural experience of the phrase which, when simply
written here, with or without quotes, seems quite prosaic and rather
flat. If I could figure a way to repeat that phrase as he used to,
perhaps the reason I had made that reference would seem more
meaningful and pertinent. But writing doesn't give us that capacity.
> Please indulge me. Answer my simple question.
>
> Wouldn't a proposal to establish the basics of
> moral valuing follow from what one considered the
> basis
> of moral claims?
>
I don't know what the basis of moral claims are though I have
speculated here, as you have. However, we have been unable to find
agreement. In order to reach greater clarity and, perhaps, even
agreement, I have suggested that we drop the ongoing line of inquiry
and adopt another, i.e., imagine what it would take to replicate
moral judgement and decision making if we had to do it in a
mechanical man.
> Or, perhaps we should move past the question and
> discuss your Android proposal. I wondered why not a
> human child and you answered..
>
> > Because even a human child has certain things about
> > it that we
> > assume. But a machine would not have those human
> > capacities. We would
> > have to give it that. Thus we have to think long and
> > hard as to
> > what's missing, what it is we must give it.
>
> In all modesty I can't imagine doing this. Why would I
> expect to be able to think up all the capacities that
> make one human? I wouldn't know how to begin. I'm
> willing to follow you though.
>
It's just a proposal, an idea that perhaps this will be a more
fruitful line of inquiry.
> >In this case the point is to shake off
> > as many of our preconceptions and assumptions as we
> can and >see if we can't figure out what the basic
> building blocks we need >are.
>
> Please see me as helpful when I ask how we know when
> we have actually figured out a building black and not
> have made an assumption or have been working with a
> preconception?
>
That is the usefulness of this approach, I think. We want to
construct a model of an intelligent valuing entity. But this question
of yours, how we could know when we got to something, well that is
odd. Since we don't seem to know enough to agree on anything here, we
obviously don't know. We would have to know first in order to know
how we would know. (This is like "getting it" I think.) But by your
throwing up the question of how we would know, before we even
commence, it is like you are shoving monkey wrench in the gearbox
before we start our engines, a pre-emptive action to make sure we
could never achieve agreement.)
> If I'm going to do this with you, I have to know how
> to do it.
>
No you don't. And I don't. We just have to do it. We don't need
theoretical ground rules to inquire. But the rules will show
themselves as we proceed. That is how life works, anyway. Demanding
we spend our time arguing out the rules first is just a way of
avoiding commencing the journey. Just go on, that's all we have to
do.
> > The whole point of the exercise is what manlike
> > being would have to have to operate morally in the
> way we >think we do.
>
> Right. So I start with my pre-conception of what it
> means to be moral...and then what? You say and I quote
>
> "Let's put the mechanical man in contexts where we
> would expect human beings to have to make moral
> choices but, in doing so, we assume that it has none
> of the basic components we have to start with. It has
> no moral experience, no moral training to draw on, no
> metaphysical beliefs that imply a moral order to
> which it must conform. What must we give our android
> to think morally? What must it know, believe, feel,
> think, etc.? Are there any primary things it must have
> as its moral building blocks or are there a lot of
> different possibilities that might serve?
>
> (What would you propose as the building blocks?)
>
Perhaps we should start with determining what the building blocks are
for an intelligence (a conscious intelligence) of the sort we have.
Perhaps we will find the valuistic and moralistic blocks in these.
> " Is it possible for a mechanical creature such as
> we've imagined to have moral judgment, to be able to
> make moral choices? Or is the best we can hope for
> that it act according to a pre-programmed set of
> instructions that makes it seem to be operating
> morally?"
>
> (Question confuses me. If we program the Android, then
> it is programed and hence not free by definition. This
> gets into the whole puzzle of how a person who is
> subject to socialization is still free. I think we
> should set this aside and go back to the building
> blocks)
>
Yes. Let's stipulate that we can probably program such an entity to
behave as though it were making moral value judgements. And perhaps
that is the final answer. But if not, then the question must be: is
there some way that just being an intelligent, self-aware being will
yield up the activity of moral behavior as we understand it?
> "What is there in our kind of intelligence that makes
> moral valuing
> possible for us? And is it something we could somehow
> add to our machine?"
>
> (Isn't the answer "Yes" if we agree that we have
> supplied the building block and the Android acts
> morally?. And, yes, we have to establish criteria for
> acting morally. One is foregoing self-interest)
>
What is the building block? And how does this entity come by self-
interest in order to then forego it? And what would prompt it to do
that?
> "Perhaps we need to put our android in a situation
> where it (he/she) must decide on foregoing its own
> interest in favor of another
> entity's? But how will our entity even know when
> something is in its own interest? What are the
> capacities we must give it?"
>
> (Guess we have to give it that capacity and others)
>
> "The reason this seems like a fruitful line of inquiry
> to me is that I
> suspect that one of the areas of importance for us is
> that of
> artificial intelligence ..."
>
> (I'm going to pass on the AI question. It's quite
> controversial. Let's stick with your notion of
> building blocks)
>
> bruce
>
Fair enough. I just wanted to let you know up front why I think it
pays to take this tack.
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> you were pointing us back to the same questions that
had >bogged us down before.
Because I fail to see what's new. Or rather, I could
at least understand (my understanding) of your
original quest -- resting place where moral arguments
could end based on a "way" of reasoning. That
presented some difficulties but I least (thought) I
got what you wanted to accomplish. Now I'm perplexed.
Why are we talking about Computerized beings rather
than real people in real moral dilemmas? Because the
former we must make assumptions??? Well, the latter is
all assumption.
> I don't know what the basis of moral claims are....
I've expressed puzzlement about that before. By
"basis" I don't mean the results of scientific inquiry
(I do know some of this but that's not our point). I
mean the everyday basis folks give when they make a
moral claim.
Recently, a prize winning children's book has been
banned in some libraries because it contains the word
"scrotum." Librarians argue that this a moral decision
based on the value that a child's sexual innocence
shouldn't be disturbed. Whether I agree, or not, the
basis is crystal clear. It is the same basis given for
censorship of pornography. But, of course, other moral
claims have other bases.
That there is no one universal basis is my
observation. Do we differ in that you are looking for
you. Well, even there we don't differ. Maybe there is.
I can't think of one. But...
>I have suggested that we drop the ongoing
> line of inquiry
OK. Let's do just that. Don't respond to what I wrote
above. It's there for the record. But now I have to
grasp what the new inquiry is. Inventing a mechanical
man, you say. How is that new? Aren't we going to
place in him what we take to be the basis of moral
valuing? I say this not to be critical but to show my
lack of understanding.
You continue...I'm throwing a monkey wrench and
perhaps it is true. I know nothing of computer
programming. But it seems to me if we are going to
write a program that guides moral behavior then the
program will reflect what we take to be moral. And
thus first we must agree on what is moral.
Please show me how I'm mistaken.
>But the rules will show themselves as we proceed.
Yes, in a sense, if we are going to write rules for
anything we start with nothing and proceed. As we go
on we will discuss. OK Let's start to write the rules
for moral behavior and see where it goes.
> Perhaps we should start with determining what the
building >blocks
OK-- start.
bruce
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swmaerske
>
> > you were pointing us back to the same questions that
> had >bogged us down before.
>
> Because I fail to see what's new. Or rather, I could
> at least understand (my understanding) of your
> original quest -- resting place where moral arguments
> could end based on a "way" of reasoning. That
> presented some difficulties but I least (thought) I
> got what you wanted to accomplish. Now I'm perplexed.
>
All right, so maybe you really are "a pain in the ass" (said robustly
with a heavy Italian accent and a sense of personal frustration,
leavened by a bit of self-realization that I am probably more
frustrated about this than I ought to be).
Nothing's "new" except the line of attack, Bruce. The same questions
are inherent in this inquiry, but maybe you and I just don't share a
sense that there are real problems here. Certainly you say you don't.
You believe you know how to use moral terms and that's all there is
to it. You use them as you use them (as you have been taught and as
you have learned through years of being immersed in the culture and
language you find yourself in) and others use them as they use them
and sometimes you and the others can understand one another and,
perhaps, there are times when you don't. It seems that this is enough
for you in the matter. You feel no compulsion, as I manifestly do, to
try to find a reason why you should care about the interests of
others (one of what I take to be the most important -- perhaps the
only important -- moral issues). You care, you tell us, and so you
act from that perspective. Well, I care, too, Bruce. Sometimes. And
sometimes I don't though on occasion I can be convinced to care. What
I'm not sure of is whether there is any reason that compels me (in a
logical sense) or if it's all about how I happen to feel at a given
moment.
> Why are we talking about Computerized beings rather
> than real people in real moral dilemmas? Because the
> former we must make assumptions??? Well, the latter is
> all assumption.
>
It seems to me that you are still committing what I think is a
mistake, demanding that we solve the problem BEFORE we tackle it and
insisting that, if we do tackle it and "solve" it (even to our own
satisaction), then all we will have done is made manifest our pre-
existing assumptions. On this view there can be no solving of the
problem, of course.
Perhaps you just want to take a Wittgensteinian view that the issue
of finding a basis for moral claims is just one more pseudo-problem?
All we have to do, on such a view, is look at how we use our words,
etc., and then we will realize that this "problem" goes away. As you
must know by now I diverge here from such a view though I don't
recall ever reading anything by Wittgenstein where he explicitly
claimed that understanding the basis for our moral claims is one of
those pseudo-problems of philosophy which he inveighed against. But
perhaps he did think this way. Certainly Popper, when he confronted
Wittgenstein at the Moral Sciences Club meeting (documented in
Wittgenstein's Poker) claimed that moral problems were real
philosophical problems.
I don't agree with Popper if by this he meant that finding answers to
moral questions is a philosophical issue. I don't think one has to be
a philosopher to make sound moral judgements (whatever these are) or
that being a philosopher even helps one to do that. But I do think
that understanding the basis for our moral discourse, how and why we
come to the moral judgements we come to, is a philosophical question
and that it is not a pseudo-problem. I think it's a legitimate
question that we can ask and that gaining a better understanding of
how we make the moral judgements we make is at least marginally
helpful in addressing moral issues.
> > I don't know what the basis of moral claims are....
>
> I've expressed puzzlement about that before. By
> "basis" I don't mean the results of scientific inquiry
> (I do know some of this but that's not our point). I
> mean the everyday basis folks give when they make a
> moral claim.
>
Well it's clear to me that there are many who don't think they know
the basis of their moral judgements and/or who don't think they have
a basis. Think only of that psychologist we spoke of, or the thief he
as supposed to be counseling.
> Recently, a prize winning children's book has been
> banned in some libraries because it contains the word
> "scrotum." Librarians argue that this a moral decision
> based on the value that a child's sexual innocence
> shouldn't be disturbed. Whether I agree, or not, the
> basis is crystal clear. It is the same basis given for
> censorship of pornography. But, of course, other moral
> claims have other bases.
>
Yes, this suggests another use of "moral" though I have tried to be
consistent here in noting that I am only interested in the basis of
one particular kind of "moral" claim: the claim that there are times
when we should place the interests of others above our own. This
example you give simply is not relevant to that question, or at least
it does not seem obviously so to me at this juncture.
> That there is no one universal basis is my
> observation. Do we differ in that you are looking for
> you. Well, even there we don't differ. Maybe there is.
> I can't think of one. But...
>
I am not denying that "moral" has a range of uses and that what
generally characterizes all these uses is that they refer to
questions of human behavior about which we have an apparent ability
to choose from an array of options. However, practical or prudential
valuing also falls into this category. What, then, do we mean when we
speak of "moral" per se? Are some instances of moral valuing simply
prudential in their nature? I don't see why we should doubt this. But
prudence as a basis doesn't get us to those moral value judgements
which work against our own self-interest. And these are the instances
that I have said, again and again, that I am concerned with in this
inquiry.
> >I have suggested that we drop the ongoing
> > line of inquiry
>
> OK. Let's do just that. Don't respond to what I wrote
> above.
Now how can I do that, since you've already reiterated these issues?
But clearly, in doing so, you've brought us back to the old line of
inquiry which I have been trying to suggest is just not getting us
anywhere.
> It's there for the record. But now I have to
> grasp what the new inquiry is.
No. Same inquiry. Different approach or strategy.
> Inventing a mechanical
> man, you say. How is that new? Aren't we going to
> place in him what we take to be the basis of moral
> valuing?
Isn't this just your same claim, reiterated again, i.e., that first
we have to solve the problem in order to tackle the problem?
> I say this not to be critical but to show my
> lack of understanding.
>
Yes, perhaps we neither of us understand each other. I don't know how
I can be much clearer. I am concerned with finding reasons all of us
(or, perhaps, most of us) can generally credit in order to make
certain moral decisions, certain moral value judgements. The moral
judgements I am concerned with revolve around issues that find our
self-interest at odds with the self-interest of others and the
question at hand is when and why should we (not "do we") decide to
subordinate our own self-interest in such scenarios?
> You continue...I'm throwing a monkey wrench and
> perhaps it is true. I know nothing of computer
> programming. But it seems to me if we are going to
> write a program that guides moral behavior then the
> program will reflect what we take to be moral. And
> thus first we must agree on what is moral.
>
> Please show me how I'm mistaken.
But that is just my point. It would be easy (theoretically anyway) to
write such a program. But I am asking if there is anything more basic
about conscious beings like ourselves out of which the moral capacity
arises. If all we are are programmed beings then once we realize
this, the moral game collapses. So either we must live in a delusion
and/or give up the conceit that we have moral capacity . . . or there
is a basis for moral judgements that is not simply coded into us.
>
> >But the rules will show themselves as we proceed.
>
> Yes, in a sense, if we are going to write rules for
> anything we start with nothing and proceed. As we go
> on we will discuss. OK Let's start to write the rules
> for moral behavior and see where it goes.
>
I think this is not simply about writing rules but rather exploring
what things there are about us that give rise to moral judgements.
> > Perhaps we should start with determining what the
> building >blocks
>
> OK-- start.
>
> bruce
Actually I thought I had when I suggested that the entity in question
would need certain things including a sense of selfhood and a
recognition that there are other selves. Could we have moral claims
without that?
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Nothing's "new" except the line of attack, Bruce.
> The same questions
> are inherent in this inquiry, but maybe you and I
> just don't share a
> sense that there are real problems here. Certainly
> you say you don't.
> You believe you know how to use moral terms and
> that's all there is
> to it. You use them as you use them (as you have
> been taught and as
> you have learned through years of being immersed in
> the culture and
> language you find yourself in) and others use them
> as they use them
> and sometimes you and the others can understand one
> another and,
> perhaps, there are times when you don't. It seems
> that this is enough
> for you in the matter.
You are on the money up to this point.
>You feel no compulsion...to try to find a reason why
>you should care about the interests of others
If you could sit with me during my day you'd see just
how wrong you are. You go from-- I have no generalized
reason for caring, to I have none at all. Not very
logical.
> It seems to me that you are still committing what I
> think is a
> mistake, demanding that we solve the problem BEFORE
> we tackle it
It seems that way because I'm trying to find out two
things-- 1- What's the problem and 2-- How does the
method work on the problem, for get solve.
If I'm going to program a being to be moral I must
know what moral means. Don't I?
> Perhaps you just want to take a Wittgensteinian view
> that the issue
> of finding a basis for moral claims is just one more
> pseudo-problem?
Let's set LW aside. As for me, I don't know whether
"finding a basis" is a pseudo problem until I'm clear
what it means to find a basis. I don't consider asking
for the moral basis of my action to be a pseudo
question. But I think the search for some generic,
universal basis for all action is problematic.
> I am only interested in the basis of
> one particular kind of "moral" claim: the claim that
> there are times when we should place the interests
of > others above our own.
Let's agree that the above is the only claim we will
discuss. That others may not see it as moral will be
irrelevant to us. Now, what's the problem?
Depending upon the context, I have a specific reason
for subordinating my interests. I've done it countless
numbers of times. What about this puzzles you?
You seems to answer...
"If all we are are programmed beings then once we
realize
this, the moral game collapses. So either we must live
in a delusion and/or give up the conceit that we have
moral capacity . . . or there is a basis for moral
judgments that is not simply coded into us."
The above paragraph throws me for a loop.
1. If we are programmed beings, then once we realize
it, the game collapses. But you want to program a
robot.
2. If we are programmed, then our realizing it is
programmed. So there is no difference between being
programmed or not.
3. Of course we are socialized into making moral
claims. Is socializing the same as programming?
4. Any basis given for taking moral action is in
language and language is learned. So there can no such
thing as a "basis" that isn't the result of
socializing.
5. You very asking for a basis that isn't coded is
also influenced by your socialization.
6. What would be one example of a basis that wasn't
coded?
I'll be gone till this weekend.
bruce
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swmaerske
Yes, but that is not the issue. Here we just seem to be missing each
other in the fog again. I am not saying we don't need to know what we
mean by "moral" to undertake this inquiry. Of course we do and I have
frequently given what I mean by "moral" and you have given what you
mean. But, while I have agreed that we mean a range of things and
that inquiring further ought to help us to further sharpen our
understanding of the meaning, I have said repeatedly that I am
interested in one issue primarily: being moral as caring about the
interests of others. I don't think moral claims about our grooming
habits or our ritual practices or our personal comportment in society
are particularly problematic or interesting. But I do think it is
philosophically interesting to try to understand why we think we
should care about others' interests in certain cases.
I think, in this inquiry, you often slide us into what I take to be
the other moral questions which invariably gets us chasing our tail
here. I want to stay focused on caring about others and ask if there
is a reason or set of reasons that can convince us (or many of us) to
do this when we don't and if these reasons have the power of doing
this (convincing us) on their merits as reasons rather than through
emotivist content, i.e., have logical rather than polemical or
propagandistic power.
> > Perhaps you just want to take a Wittgensteinian view
> > that the issue
> > of finding a basis for moral claims is just one more
> > pseudo-problem?
>
> Let's set LW aside. As for me, I don't know whether
> "finding a basis" is a pseudo problem until I'm clear
> what it means to find a basis. I don't consider asking
> for the moral basis of my action to be a pseudo
> question. But I think the search for some generic,
> universal basis for all action is problematic.
>
I have said that a "universal" basis is not necessary nor have I
decided in advance what the solution must look like. I have
frequently noted here that the solution may be that there is no
general basis (either one universal reason or rule or one group of
related rules). In that case, if there is nothing to be found, then
I've suggested that our moral practices must be seen to be
illusionary (and from this both moral relativism and nihilism
follow). This may just be how things are. Wittgenstein, for all his
moral inclinations, may just have been the result of his genes and
his life experiences and all his agonizing over being a morally
better person may have merely been neurosis and nothing more than
that. Perhaps that is all any of this is about.
> > I am only interested in the basis of
> > one particular kind of "moral" claim: the claim that
> > there are times when we should place the interests
> of > others above our own.
>
> Let's agree that the above is the only claim we will
> discuss. That others may not see it as moral will be
> irrelevant to us. Now, what's the problem?
>
> Depending upon the context, I have a specific reason
> for subordinating my interests. I've done it countless
> numbers of times. What about this puzzles you?
>
> You seems to answer...
>
> "If all we are are programmed beings then once we
> realize
> this, the moral game collapses. So either we must live
> in a delusion and/or give up the conceit that we have
> moral capacity . . . or there is a basis for moral
> judgments that is not simply coded into us."
>
> The above paragraph throws me for a loop.
>
> 1. If we are programmed beings, then once we realize
> it, the game collapses. But you want to program a
> robot.
>
No, I want to see if moral judgements and behavior arise from
something that is inherent in us as conscious, intelligent beings.
> 2. If we are programmed, then our realizing it is
> programmed. So there is no difference between being
> programmed or not.
>
I think that is a cop out. Easy to say but not compelling as an
explanation because I and others, once having considered the
possibilities, have frequently faced moments when the moral choice
appears to come unmoored, when we think we should do something (or
not do something) but cannot say why other than this is what we have
been taught (not programmed in the sense we are using the term here)
by society to think we should do. But if society's teachings lose
their hold on us, what if anything, can we rely on as a reason for
making one choice instead of another?
Or should we just do what we feel whenever we feel it? My wife knew a
priest who used to tell his flock the solution was always to "do
what's in your heart." But this is an odd bit of advice since serial
killers and terrorists also do what's in their hearts.
And here, haven't we returned to the same old terms of our argument
insted of undertaking a different approach as I have called for and
you have agreed to do?
Perhaps we must now look at this term "programmed" and understand
that it, too, has a variety of meanings, i.e., programming a computer
is not like being socially programmed and more like being
brainwashed.
> 3. Of course we are socialized into making moral
> claims. Is socializing the same as programming?
>
Ah, yes, we are on the same track at least on this then! Of course it
is not but it is also possible to say that we are genetically
programmed which, again, is more like the programs of computers than
the social conditioning and training that we often take in at a level
that is somewhat below our immediate, explicit awareness. It is
possible to say that our moral judgements are the result both of
social conditioning and genetic predispositions (either species-
specific or personal, e.g., uniquely related to each individual
organism). But in these latter cases, to suggest moral valuing is
merely a function of them is to gut the moral game since one then no
longer needs reasons that go beyond what we feel or happen to
believe. There is no longer room for argument and analysis. So there
is a sense in which an analogy with the programming of computers is
possible and relevant. But if making moral judgements is nothing more
than this, then the moral game, which requires giving and jutifying
reasons to convince, simply breaks down.
> 4. Any basis given for taking moral action is in
> language and language is learned. So there can no such
> thing as a "basis" that isn't the result of
> socializing.
>
We give reasons in language all the time for a great many things.
Sometimes we believe that the giving of reasons is about making a
logically compelling case. Sometimes we think it is just to explain.
Sometimes we think it is to express. Sometimes reasons are not serve
a logical function. The point I am making is that if you take that
away from moral reasons, you strip them of their role in the moral
game and the game loses its power over us.
> 5. You very asking for a basis that isn't coded is
> also influenced by your socialization.
>
No. I am asking for the logical component of the moral reason, what
lies beneath it and is it logical force or merely polemical?
> 6. What would be one example of a basis that wasn't
> coded?
>
> I'll be gone till this weekend.
>
> bruce
>
I don't know that it pays to go on with this, Bruce. We are back were
we were, arguing the same points, disputing the same questions,
chewing the same fat. I thought that a proposal to undertake a
different strategy would break us out of our rut but I was obviously
wrong. You continue to point us back to the same things, reflecting,
I think, your basic misunderstanding of what I am saying or, perhaps,
the difficulty of teasing out the different strands here. Perhaps it
is my fault. Perhaps I am just unable to make this as clear as I need
it to be. Perhaps I am unclear on it myself at this stage.
But whatever the source of our problem, I am proposing we drop it
now. I am not up for going round and round on the same stuff at this
time. I have too many other things to deal with elsewhere and this
can be time consuming as I'm sure you know. I do not have the feeling
that we are making any real progress here, certainly not the sort to
warrant continued effort on this thread.
So for now I propose we drop the matter and let others step in with
their issues. Perhaps one or both of us will be moved to take up the
cudgel again in future threads.
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>I am not saying we don't
> need to know what we
> mean by "moral" to undertake this inquiry. Of course
> we do and I have
> frequently given what I mean by "moral" and you have
> given what you
> mean. But, while I have agreed that we mean a range
> of things and
> that inquiring further ought to help us to further
> sharpen our
> understanding of the meaning,
Sounds reasonable. Sharpen understanding. Read all
sorts of texts that sharpen my understanding of
complex notions. If I open a text on "morality", I'd
expect to read different moral systems, or why folks
profess to act moral actually don't, or the causes and
conditions for becoming a moral person, or specific
moral arguments for certain acts, etc....Ok and your
interest.
>I am interested in one issue primarily: being moral
as
>caring about the interests of others.
For the sake of our discussion let's call that a moral
problem. What understanding of this do you want to
sharpen?
> philosophically interesting to try to understand why
> we think we should care about others' interests in
certain
> cases.
I can't quite seen the "philosophical interest." I
care about others because I value them. Where is the
philosophy here?
My reason is that it works for me. I cherish my wife
and children, and they me. I'd die for my country.
Risk my life rescuing a person. I'm a Red Cross
volunteer.
I don't know what "emotivist content" means. My
reasons are rational. I'm sure that they wouldn't
convince all the people all the time. Reasons aren't
like that. Reasons aren't causes.
> If there is no
> general basis (either one universal reason or rule
> or one group of
> related rules). In that case, if there is nothing to
> be found, then
> I've suggested that our moral practices must be seen
> to be
> illusionary (and from this both moral relativism and
> nihilism
That is a philosophical muddle that you've created.
Should we focus on this, step by step? How does one
get from "no universal reason" to no justification for
a practice? What in the wordily is an illusionary
practice?
> No, I want to see if moral judgments and behavior
> arise from
> something that is inherent in us as conscious,
> intelligent beings.
They must. There is no intelligible alternative. All
judgments arise from us as conscious being, including
this statement. Another philosophical muddle -- again
in your question
> But if society's teachings lose their hold on us,
what if >anything, can we rely on as a reason for
making one choice >instead of another?
Some of society's teachings can lose their hold, but
it is "nonsense" to say all teachings lose their hold.
Unless you hold to a private language.
>Or should we just do what we feel whenever we feel
it?
In some situations. But, again, "what we feel" is part
and parcel of who we are and how we become an "I". You
have an odd notion of socialization. Do you propose
that we have a private self untouched by the voice of
others?
>My wife knew a priest who used to tell his flock the
solution was >always to "do what's in your heart." But
this is an odd bit of >advice since serial killers and
terrorists also do what's in their >hearts.
Any staetment, out of context, can be ridiculed.
>And here, haven't we returned to the same old terms
of our >argument instead of undertaking a different
approach as I have >called for and you have agreed to
do?
Because there is no "new" in your new. You are still
stuck in the muddle of proposing that if we don't have
some basic reason for acting then we have no
persuasive reason at all. You think that practices are
illusory if they can't be justified to the bone.
Right from the start I pointed out that I can sort
tables from chairs but I have no basic reason for
doing so. You replied that morality was more
important. Indeed. But the wish for a basic reason is
the same.
>to suggest moral valuing is merely a function of them
Whatever the "them" is, I never said that moral
valuing is merely a function of them because we aren't
doing a functional analysis. you keep on confusing a
question of the causes and conditions for moral
valuing with a justifications. My moral valuing is a
function of my upbringing. That I value marital
fidelity is my choice. My choice is not an illusion
because I was taught its value. I think it an illusion
to posit a behavior that is absent any social
influence.
If a person would speak or act outside of any social
influence, you wouldn't be able to make any sense out
of it. It would fall outside our language and
practices.
>I am asking for the logical component of the moral
reason, what
> lies beneath it and is it logical force or merely
polemical?
Whenever I hear a metaphor I ask whether it helps me
understanding what is under discussion. I don't find
the "lie beneath" metaphor helpful because it creates
a mystery where there is none. My moral reason for
fidelity is that I love my wife. There is nothing
above or below it. I can state my reason coolly and
logically, or I can be polemical. But my reason is the
same.
I guess this is a stopping point. One possibility is
that I've followed a word of what you have written.
The other is that you've lead me, and yourself, into a
thicket of philosophical muddles.
In any event, I hold no grudge. I rather enjoyed our
discussion. Perhaps Rob has an insight.
bruce
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swmaerske
>
> >I am not saying we don't
> > need to know what we
> > mean by "moral" to undertake this inquiry. Of course
> > we do and I have
> > frequently given what I mean by "moral" and you have
> > given what you
> > mean. But, while I have agreed that we mean a range
> > of things and
> > that inquiring further ought to help us to further
> > sharpen our
> > understanding of the meaning,
>
> Sounds reasonable. Sharpen understanding. Read all
> sorts of texts that sharpen my understanding of
> complex notions. If I open a text on "morality", I'd
> expect to read different moral systems, or why folks
> profess to act moral actually don't, or the causes and
> conditions for becoming a moral person, or specific
> moral arguments for certain acts, etc....Ok and your
> interest.
>
I know I shouldn't be taking up this cudgel again. We are really too
far apart, despite some superficial similarities. We are not talking
in the same terms as comes out quite clearly in your comments below.
But I feel like I should at least offer some response here (though I
know it is an invitation to more endless circumlocutions).
> >I am interested in one issue primarily: being moral
> as
> >caring about the interests of others.
>
> For the sake of our discussion let's call that a moral
> problem. What understanding of this do you want to
> sharpen?
>
Why should I choose to care about the interests of others when I
don't feel like doing so?
> > philosophically interesting to try to understand why
> > we think we should care about others' interests in
> certain
> > cases.
>
> I can't quite seen the "philosophical interest." I
> care about others because I value them. Where is the
> philosophy here?
>
I also care about others in many cases without any more reason for
doing so than that I do. So what? That is not what moral questions
like this come down to. They involve asking when and if we should
care, should make ourselves care, etc. Think, again, of the
psychologist counseling the criminal and trying to figure out what
reason he could give him not to commit crimes that went beyond "you
may get caught and end up being punished." It is the Gyges Ring
problem. Is there a reason not to do certain things that are in your
own interest that goes beyond your immediate self-interest?
> My reason is that it works for me. I cherish my wife
> and children, and they me. I'd die for my country.
> Risk my life rescuing a person. I'm a Red Cross
> volunteer.
>
Very nice. Still this doesn't address my question. Presumably you are
what you are and do what you do because you want to, you like doing
such things. The moral question in this is whether there are any
reasons to do any of these things if you don't happen to want to or
like to.
> I don't know what "emotivist content" means. My
> reasons are rational. I'm sure that they wouldn't
> convince all the people all the time. Reasons aren't
> like that. Reasons aren't causes.
>
We have covered this aspect many times. I don't see what's gained by
addressing it again. I am not suggesting I am looking for "causes" so
why even bring this up?
> > If there is no
> > general basis (either one universal reason or rule
> > or one group of
> > related rules). In that case, if there is nothing to
> > be found, then
> > I've suggested that our moral practices must be seen
> > to be
> > illusionary (and from this both moral relativism and
> > nihilism
>
> That is a philosophical muddle that you've created.
> Should we focus on this, step by step? How does one
> get from "no universal reason" to no justification for
> a practice? What in the wordily is an illusionary
> practice?
>
Well it may be a muddle as you say. Admittedly I find myself confused
by the lack of an apparent answer. Still, merely being in a state of
confusion doesn't mean there is no real cause for confusion. Not all
confusions are the result of linguistic misusage which, once sorted
out, cease to trouble us. Besides, I haven't spoken here
about "universal reason" so why do you?
By "illusionary" I simply meant (and have said this many times as
well, though apparently to no avail) that we think we are acting in
accord with reasons we adduce for ourselves but, in fact, are merely
rationalizing what we do, i.e., the reasons we give ourselves or
others are ultimately irrelevant to our actions.
> > No, I want to see if moral judgments and behavior
> > arise from
> > something that is inherent in us as conscious,
> > intelligent beings.
>
> They must. There is no intelligible alternative. All
> judgments arise from us as conscious being, including
> this statement.
This just shows that we are not "hearing" each other or, at least,
you are not "hearing" me. By "arise from something that is inherent
in us as conscious, intelligent beings" I am asking if there is a way
we can derive our moral reasons from other sorts of things which lie
at the base of what it means to be conscious creatures, i.e., is
there something about the kinds of entities we are that implies a
moral dimension or is it just a contingent fact that we happen to
have a moral dimension, i.e., could a conscious being exist, in the
way in which we have consciousness, that did not share our moral
capacities?
You, on the other hand, take this to be a question of whether our
moral capacities are part and parcel of our natures as conscious
beings. But that isn't what I am asking. Of course they are, as you
rightly note. But just because we know that moral capacities are
among the things humans, as a species, have, it does not follow that
moral capacities are inherent in conscious minds. That was the reason
I proposed engaging in a thought experiment: building an intellectual
model of a mind (an artificial one) to see at what point and in what
way the moral capacities would be built in.
But it really does seem that for everything I say there is at least
one other way that it can be interpreted and that you are dead set on
interpreting it in that way. I have regretfully come to the
conclusion that philosophical inquiry on lists like these is not a
profitable enterprise. Too much time is wasted in arguing qua
quibbling to get anywhere. There is just too much room for linguistic
misinterpretations and legerdemain. Perhaps that is a problem for
philosophy in all arenas. I do recall a lot of blathering going on
between philosophers in an academic setting. Maybe philosophy, in the
end, really must be a personal affair?
> Another philosophical muddle -- again
> in your question
>
Sorry but I don't see how this is merely a muddle: When confronted
with a situation in which I must put my personal interests aside in
favor of the interests of another, when and why should I do so?
You can argue that the question is too abstract to be meaningful in
this context, but the same issue arises when we look at concrete
instances as well. And I have given you many such instances over the
course of our seemingly endless discussions.
> > But if society's teachings lose their hold on us,
> what if >anything, can we rely on as a reason for
> making one choice >instead of another?
>
> Some of society's teachings can lose their hold, but
> it is "nonsense" to say all teachings lose their hold.
> Unless you hold to a private language.
>
I don't see the relevance of importing the private language argument
here. In fact, I think it's really gratuitous, unless you can now
demonstrate its relevance. Otherwise it can be nothing more than a
convenient tool for obfuscating the issue at hand.
> >Or should we just do what we feel whenever we feel
> it?
>
> In some situations. But, again, "what we feel" is part
> and parcel of who we are and how we become an "I". You
> have an odd notion of socialization. Do you propose
> that we have a private self untouched by the voice of
> others?
>
Why do you think this is relevant? Have I said anything along these
lines? While I do think it is quite undeniable that we have private
mental lives (which means private experiences which are inaccessible
to other minds) I make no such claim vis a vis language and agree
with the Wittgensteinian view that language is, by its nature, a
social construct and that all its terms and functionalities are only
operable and applicable in a public context. When we use language in
our minds it is as though we are talking to ourselves and the words
at our disposal have, as their primary application, the world that is
publicly accessible. Thus, when applied to some of our private
experiences, our words prove incapable of fully performing the jobs
we would normally expect of them.
> >My wife knew a priest who used to tell his flock the
> solution was >always to "do what's in your heart." But
> this is an odd bit of >advice since serial killers and
> terrorists also do what's in their >hearts.
>
> Any staetment, out of context, can be ridiculed.
>
That's probably true. But I wasn't ridiculing. I was asking if there
were one or more statements which could serve as reasons to make
moral choices. My point was that this statement did not do the job
despite the priest's conviction otherwise.
> >And here, haven't we returned to the same old terms
> of our >argument instead of undertaking a different
> approach as I have >called for and you have agreed to
> do?
>
> Because there is no "new" in your new. You are still
> stuck in the muddle of proposing that if we don't have
> some basic reason for acting then we have no
> persuasive reason at all. You think that practices are
> illusory if they can't be justified to the bone.
>
No. I think that sometimes we are faced with choices which are
difficult to make and that, among those, are questions of when to set
aside our own interests for the interests of others. I am asking
whether there is any general reason or set of reasons which we can
fall back on to provide us a justification for making such choices.
We can look at specific concrete instances and, indeed, we have done
that here in the past. That is certainly a good way to go but, in the
end, the question is a general one. We are taught that we should be
good to others and not bad, that we should do certain things and not
other things in pursuit of this teaching. But what does this teaching
amount to? And why should we pay any attention to it?
When a serial killer commits a crime, is there a reason he shouldn't
have done it other than he might get caught?
When 19 hijackers grab a number of jet planes and fly them into
public buildings killing those on board and those in the buildings,
is there a reason they shouldn't have done it? Or is everything
relative and if they thought they had good reason to do it, then who
are we to condemn them?
When that psychologist agonized over whether he should cheat on his
girl friend or not, was there a reason he shouldn't aside from the
fact that he might get caught?
When Gyges got hold of an invisibility ring that would prevent anyone
from knowing what he did, was there a reason he shouldn't go out and
do just whatever he wanted, even though he could be highly competent
that no one would ever be able to nail him?
These are the kinds of questions I am asking. It is no answer to say
that many of us feel we shouldn't do such things so we don't because
the question is not whether any of us or many of us feel a particular
way. It is whether any of us should feel a particular way. This is
not a question of fact but of value. And the fact that we do feel a
particular way is no reason that anyone else should.
> Right from the start I pointed out that I can sort
> tables from chairs but I have no basic reason for
> doing so. You replied that morality was more
> important. Indeed. But the wish for a basic reason is
> the same.
I did not reply that "morality was more important." I said it was a
different question. No one is arguing here that we don't have moral
categories or know how to use them. I am asking, rather, what does it
mean to use them and what underlies them?
>
> >to suggest moral valuing is merely a function of them
>
>
> Whatever the "them" is, I never said that moral
> valuing is merely a function of them because we aren't
> doing a functional analysis. you keep on confusing a
> question of the causes and conditions for moral
> valuing with a justifications.
No, I am not confusing "causes" with "justifications" but if you
think I am then at least cite specific statements of mine so we can
get to the bottom of this. If you show that I have done this I will
apologize and move on. However, I am fairly confident that you cannot
show this because I can recall no instance in which I have made such
a claim or spoken in a manner there that would imply it.
> My moral valuing is a
> function of my upbringing. That I value marital
> fidelity is my choice. My choice is not an illusion
> because I was taught its value. I think it an illusion
> to posit a behavior that is absent any social
> influence.
>
Fair enough. But I think it is to fall into moral relativism to
believe that all moral judgements can be no more than what we have
been taught via our upbringing. As I have long said, it may be the
case that moral relativism is true (I have not demonstrated to my own
satisfaction that it is not). But, if so, then moral valuing
collapses as soon as we recognize this relativism in our daily
choices and we are left with moral nihilism, a belief that anything
goes. This ultimately deprives us of any ability to insist on one
course of action over another. It is poison to the moral game.
> If a person would speak or act outside of any social
> influence, you wouldn't be able to make any sense out
> of it. It would fall outside our language and
> practices.
>
But I am not making a claim that this is the case. Perhaps you can
show how what I am saying leads to such a conclusion by you?
> >I am asking for the logical component of the moral
> reason, what
> > lies beneath it and is it logical force or merely
> polemical?
>
> Whenever I hear a metaphor I ask whether it helps me
> understanding what is under discussion.
> I don't find
> the "lie beneath" metaphor helpful because it creates
> a mystery where there is none. My moral reason for
> fidelity is that I love my wife. There is nothing
> above or below it. I can state my reason coolly and
> logically, or I can be polemical. But my reason is the
> same.
One can love more than one person. If she never finds out about your
infidelity, how have you harmed her? More, can she not be brought to
accept the premise that you can love her and love another as well?
Monogamy is not a given. There are many societies in which having
more than one wife or husband is perfectly acceptable. In some
societies it is also acceptable to have extramarital relations.
But, of course, you are operating in this society. So presumably
other social rules aren't relevant to you and to her. However, even
in this society we have so-called swingers, practitioners of open
marriages. Thus you could still love your wife and have sexual
relations with another who is not your wife. Theoretically you could
bring your wife around to accepting this. What if you tried and she
still refused? Why then would you not cheat on her?
Perhaps because you feared the damage to your relationship if you
were caught? But suppose you had a very high probability of never
being caught? Would you cheat on her then? Would your cheating on her
mean you have ceased to love her?
But isn't the real problem in this that you don't want to cause harm
to her, that you don't want to give her pain and that knowledge of
the pain she would receive if she learned of your infidelity, even if
the odds were great that she would never find out, would stop you
from such an action? Is that a form of empathy for her then? And so
the question comes down to whether empathy is something we should
cultivate in ourselves and recommend to others? But why should we?
What is gained by making ourselves more empathetic? And is the
question of whether to be more or less empathetic a moral question
too, or is it a question of a different order?
>
> I guess this is a stopping point. One possibility is
> that I've followed a word of what you have written.
> The other is that you've lead me, and yourself, into a
> thicket of philosophical muddles.
>
> In any event, I hold no grudge. I rather enjoyed our
> discussion. Perhaps Rob has an insight.
>
> bruce
>
Yes, well it seems we each have a problem letting go. I started
reading this assuming you meant to continue and then figured I would
as well. But here you indicate a willingness to stop. And I am fine
with that, too. Some of what you said, above, I thought was just
plain wrong as an interpretation of, or response to, what I had said.
And so I felt obligated to respond. But this really does not look
like it is a promising discussion on balance. We have exhausted and
repeated ourselves. I still think you read me wrong and, no doubt,
you think I am just stuck in an unwittgensteinian muddle. Well,
perhaps. We often don't know the muddles we are in when we are in
them.
SWM
>
>
______________________________________________________________________
bruce denner
then saved it. Instead, I'll ask one question.
What makes an act moral?
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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swmaerske
> then saved it. Instead, I'll ask one question.
>
> What makes an act moral?
>
> bruce
>
By "moral" do you mean what makes it a moral matter, i.e., what makes
it fit the category of "moral," or do you mean what makes it morally
good or right?
From past experience, I assume you are referring to the second
whereas you know that I generally (though not exclusively) use the
term to apply to the first.
If your question is what do we call "moral" in relation to the second
(i.e., what is morally good?), I would say that we call lots of
different kinds of acts morally good or right and that we do so
largely when we think such acts are required of us by some rule or
set of rules which we invoke without regard to our individual
preferences (sometimes in contradiction to those preferences) and
that following the specified rules is taken by us to characterize
moral rightness.
Such acts may involve a whole panoply of things, e.g., whether we
smoke or drink, whether we have pre-marital or extra-marital or
promiscuous sex, whether we lie, cheat, or steal, whether we choose
to reduce our consumption, whether we dress modestly, etc.
I think we can differ on the appropriateness of following any of the
particular rules. Thus, one person's morally good choice might not
accord with another's and yet both may feel they have acted in a
morally good way even while following different rules.
However, the question of whether it's pertinent to follow such a rule
or not at all, in taking action, would determine whether a particular
action under consideration is seen to fall into the moral category.
(For instance, choosing what flavor ice cream I may wish to eat seems
to have no moral dimension at all.)
So the question of 'what is moral?' leads us to ask both what actions
are properly considered to be of moral concern and what are not, and
also what actions are morally good or not?
In proceeding with our discussion it is essential that we constantly
keep this distinction in mind in order to avoid slipping and sliding
between usages. There is enough slippery ground already before us in
this inquiry to keep us from finding our feet much of the time.
SWM
bruce denner
then again we also agree. Now I'm trying to sort this
out. Also we both feel misunderstood. But exactly
where and why? So I'm taking baby steps. Ask simple
questions. Assume nothing. Then move on.
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce
> > What makes an act moral?
> By "moral" do you mean what makes it a moral matter,
> i.e., what makes
> it fit the category of "moral," or do you mean what
> makes it morally
> good or right?
Good distinction. First things first. What makes it a
moral matter?
But your answer seems to be the same for both.
>such acts are required of us by some rule or set of
rules which >we invoke without regard to our
individual preferences >(sometimes in contradiction
to those preferences) and that >following the
specified rules is taken by us to characterize
> moral rightness.
and I agree. Let me check this out. How we decide that
a person is following the rule both in the sense of 1-
he is engaged morally and 2- his behavior was moral
rather than immoral.
Thanks for working with me.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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Have a HUGE year through Yahoo! Small Business.
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swmaerske
> then again we also agree. Now I'm trying to sort this
> out. Also we both feel misunderstood. But exactly
> where and why? So I'm taking baby steps. Ask simple
> questions. Assume nothing. Then move on.
>
> > --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce
>
> > > What makes an act moral?
>
> > By "moral" do you mean what makes it a moral matter,
> > i.e., what makes
> > it fit the category of "moral," or do you mean what
> > makes it morally
> > good or right?
>
> Good distinction. First things first. What makes it a
> moral matter?
> But your answer seems to be the same for both.
>
Yes that struck me as I was writing it. Clearly this is hard to tease
out. Still I think it can be teased out. See below.
> >such acts are required of us by some rule or set of
> rules which >we invoke without regard to our
> individual preferences >(sometimes in contradiction
> to those preferences) and that >following the
> specified rules is taken by us to characterize
> > moral rightness.
>
> and I agree. Let me check this out. How we decide that
> a person is following the rule both in the sense of 1-
> he is engaged morally and 2- his behavior was moral
> rather than immoral.
>
> Thanks for working with me.
>
> bruce
>
An action is categorizable as moral in sense #1 when it is decided
based on reference to some rule or set of rules extrinsic to the
interests of the person who is acting (the agent). Thus to choose
chocolate over vanilla ice cream is not, in itself, a moral decision
but to choose to obey a law or not, to refrain from doing violence or
from stealing or from having unsanctioned sex, etc., because of some
rule or rules, when the opposites of these choices are preferred by
the agent, would be recognizable as making moral choices (since they
involve subordinating personal interest to an extrinsic standard).*
An action is categorizable as moral in sense #2 when it accords with
a particular rule or set of rules we acknowledge as the appropriate
extrinsic standard(s) in the case at hand. Thus, making the morally
approved choice vis a vis the relevant standard would be the basis on
which we call the resultant act moral (morally good) or immoral
(morally bad). In this sense, asserting that an act is moral involves
a pre-established acceptance of the standard it accords with as being
THE moral standard (or at least an acceptably moral one).
Thus sometimes we use "moral" as a generic category and sometimes as
a descriptor for evaluating particular types of actions.
Discussing moral questions necessarily requires that we keep these
distinctions in mind and, more, that we find a way to understand how
they relate to one another.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* I would further note that even an innocuous decision to choose a
particular flavor of ice cream can be considered in a moral way, of
course. For instance, in Orthodox Judaism and in Islam, there are
dietary rules whose observance, regardless of a believer's
preferences, is considered a moral matter, i.e., the laws of kashruth
and halal respectively. This only shows that the line between the
moral and non-moral categories of action is not drawn based on the
intrinsic nature of the actions themselves but on context. Thus, just
about any action we imagine can be viewed either as a moral or non-
moral question. For instance, deciding to kill someone can be
considered a moral choice (in the evaluative sense of "moral") as
much as deciding not to kill someone might be. This raises the
question of when and where it is appropriate to apply moral
standards, as well as which moral standards should be applied.
SWM
swmaerske
showing how hard it is to keep these things clear. See my footnote
comment below:
-- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "swmaerske" <swmaerske@...>
wrote:
>
> --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@>
I should not have made the following statement in the context of this
footnote: "For instance, deciding to kill someone can be considered a
moral choice (in the evaluative sense of 'moral') as much as deciding
not to kill someone might be." Clearly it conflates the two uses of
moral, precisely what I was seeking to avoid in my response to you.
Although I noted I was referring to the "evaluative sense of moral,"
the comment actually had no place in the discussion of the
fungibility of actions when considering whether to designate them
questions of moral decision-making or not.
In fact, I can think of no situation when deciding whether to kill
another person or not is held to be a strictly non-moral question.
Perhaps, though, this adds a little light to our discussion since,
given that inflexibility, maybe it is telling us something about the
core of moral questions. Since deciding whether to kill another
person or not ALWAYS involves a conflict of interests between the
agent and another, then maybe the relevant rule here is that moral
questions are always those questions in which an agent is called upon
to consider subordinating his or her interest(s) to that of another?
Thus, eating a particular flavor of ice cream, when it has zero
impact on another, would have no moral dimension. But as soon as it
is seen to have such an impact (my choosing chocolate may deprive
another or may violate a rule which I am enjoined to follow as part
of a larger group obligation), then the moral dimension kicks in.
If this is the standard, then the salient difference between moral
and non-moral (as opposed to moral and immoral) would be the question
of self-interest vs. the interests of others. Of course, I have been
suggesting this, off and on, for quite a while in our discussion but
this is the first time it has hit me so directly, i.e., that the
issue before us is to clearly identify the rules which differentiate
self-interest from other-interest and determining how those rules
actually manifest in the moral game and why they are important and
compelling (if, in fact, they are compelling).
SWM
ggos...@aol.com
blro...@yahoo.com writes:
> No, I want to see if moral judgments and behavior
> arise from
> something that is inherent in us as conscious,
> intelligent beings.
Bruce replied:
They must. There is no intelligible alternative.
Okay. Language, including moral discussion, grows from something
nonlinguistic. "It is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game." And
the way I act is grounded in natural selection. And then heavily influenced by
culture.
There are many books attempting to spell out in detail how natural selection
produces certain kinds of behavior, but I haven't found these detailed
explanations compelling. The general idea--natural selection makes us moral,
conscious, linguistic in one way or another--is, as you say, intelligible.
Best,
Gary
<BR><BR><BR>**************************************<BR> AOL now offers free
email to everyone. Find out more about what's free from AOL at
http://www.aol.com.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> An action is categorizable as moral in sense #1 when
> it is decided
> based on reference to some rule or set of rules
> extrinsic to the
> interests of the person who is acting (the agent).
Tough to word this without creating a tension. Someone
could argue that moral rules are intrinsically good
for us. But I'd rather move on and agree that the
above is good enough for our purpose.
> An action is categorizable as moral in sense #2 when
> it accords with
> a particular rule or set of rules we acknowledge as
> the appropriate
> extrinsic standard(s) in the case at hand.
Skip this question for now!!!
Question A: Yes-- this was where we where last night.
Let's move on and ask how we know that the behavior is
in accord. I'd like to move on to this. But obviously
you are interested in distinguishing 1 from 2.
I wrote the above and then read your second Post. It
is quite complex and am not sure I follow it. Probably
it would take more time than I'm giving it. Here is
the critical part where you try to distinguish between
acts that are (and are not) of moral significance, on
the one hand, and an act that is moral vs. immoral, on
the other hand.
>If this is the standard, then the salient difference
between moral
>and non-moral (as opposed to moral and immoral) would
be the >question of self-interest vs. the interests of
others...the issue
>before us is to clearly identify the rules which
differentiate
> self-interest from other-interest and determining
how those >rules actually manifest in the moral game
and why they are >important and compelling (if, in
fact, they are compelling).
OK--Let's set aside question A. I don't follow the
above. I do easily see the difference between asking
moral vs. non-moral and moral vs. immoral, but I don't
follow your account nor do I see the part of
self-interest. Could you spell it out step by step?
bruce
swmaerske
Acting in our self-interest is a matter of following a simple
rule, 'do what's best for me.' That rule seems to be intrinsic to our
make up, a natural part of what we are. Animals act to sustain
themselves, protect themselves and, by extension among more advanced
animals, to do the same for their progeny or their group mates.
But as human beings we also act, at times, in disregard of these
rather natural imperatives. Sometimes we make choices according to
rules that are extrinsic to us, i.e., seen to be sourced from outside
ourselves. That is, we follow rules that take no account of our self-
interest (or at least take very little account of it). We obey laws,
abide by taboos, follow what we describe as moral precepts.
Deciding whether to obey the law or abide by the taboo, insofar as it
is not something we are being overtly compelled to do, is, itself, a
moral question, i.e., we do so out of choice, whether or not it
accords with our own self-interest. (Obviously when we are compelled
to do it and have the choice not to but succumb to some form of
compulsion, we are doing so in regard to our own self-interest, i.e.,
seeking to avoid the pain, etc., of non-compliance.)
So my point is that at least one distinguishing factor between the
moral and non-moral categories is that the first (the moral) involves
acceptance of outside rules, which have no relation to the principle
of self-interest, whereas the second (the non-moral) involves acting
in accord with a certain principle that is intrinsic to us, a part of
us.
Thus, at some point in the evolutionary process, animals like
ourselves reach a stage where we recognize other controlling factors
on our actions besides our immediate preferences (though without
simply eliminating those preferences, i.e., those preferences remain
a part of the map by which we navigate in order to choose our
actions).
At some point we see our preferences as part of a larger schema of
imperatives and recognize that our preferences do not exhaust our
reasons for acting nor are they always the reason which we consider
most compelling.
Thus, the moral/non-moral dichotomy seems to be characterized by the
question of whether the rules we are following when we select our
actions fundamentally boil down to a principle of preference or some
principle refecting certain standards which take little or no account
of our preferences.
The moral/immoral dichotomy seems to be characterized, on the other
hand, by our selecting a set of extrinsic standards to follow, i.e.,
it already assumes the first dichotomy and involves operating within
one end of the spectrum which that dichotomy establishes.
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Acting in our self-interest is a matter of following
> a simple
> rule, 'do what's best for me.'
OK -- but "do what's best for me" may involve or ecen
be exclusively self-sacrifice. No?
> But as human beings we also act, at times, in
> disregard of these
> rather natural imperatives. Sometimes we make
> choices according to
> rules that are extrinsic to us, i.e., seen to be
> sourced from outside
> ourselves. That is, we follow rules that take no
> account of our self-
> interest (or at least take very little account of
> it). We obey laws,
> abide by taboos, follow what we describe as moral
> precepts.
Coul you mention some "natural imperatives" that have
rules extrinsic to us.
>
> Deciding whether to obey the law or abide by the
> taboo, insofar as it
> is not something we are being overtly compelled to
> do, is, itself, a
> moral question, i.e., we do so out of choice,
> whether or not it
> accords with our own self-interest.
I need an example. The laws I know compel me to act.
But I can refuse and face the consequences.
>
> So my point is that at least one distinguishing
> factor between the
> moral and non-moral categories is that the first
> (the moral) involves
> acceptance of outside rules, which have no relation
> to the principle
> of self-interest, whereas the second (the non-moral)
> involves acting
> in accord with a certain principle that is intrinsic
> to us, a part of
> us.
An example please. I can't imagine a social rule that
has "no relation to the principle of self-interest."
> At some point we see our preferences as part of a
> larger schema of
> imperatives and recognize that our preferences do
> not exhaust our
> reasons for acting nor are they always the reason
> which we consider
> most compelling.
Are you saying that we have preferences that have no
origin in social factors? What preferences do you have
in mind?
>
> Thus, the moral/non-moral dichotomy seems to be
> characterized by the
> question of whether the rules we are following when
> we select our
> actions fundamentally boil down to a principle of
> preference or some
> principle reflecting certain standards which take
> little or no account
> of our preferences.
I don't know what a standard is that doesn't take in
account our preferences. Need an example.
> The moral/immoral dichotomy seems to be
> characterized, on the other
> hand, by our selecting a set of extrinsic standards
> to follow, i.e.,
> it already assumes the first dichotomy and involves
> operating within
> one end of the spectrum which that dichotomy
> establishes.
That I follows. Once I get what what a "extrinsic
standard" is then I'll know what you mean by moral.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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swmaerske
>
> > Acting in our self-interest is a matter of following
> > a simple
> > rule, 'do what's best for me.'
>
> OK -- but "do what's best for me" may involve or ecen
> be exclusively self-sacrifice. No?
"ecen"?
No. There may be strong personal imperatives to act in a self-
sacrificing way in certain cases (a mother or father dying to save
her or his child, for instance). Here we may want to say there is
some sort of intrinsic drive (part of our make up) to cast aside self-
interest. In that case the question is whether it is THIS drive that
accounts for our moral claims about the importance of disregarding
our own interests or if something else is at work.
Actually I would tend to think the answer is "something else" since,
while we may praise the self-sacrificing parent, we do not condemn
them for not giving up their own lives for their child though we may
pity them for their pain, etc.
>
> > But as human beings we also act, at times, in
> > disregard of these
> > rather natural imperatives. Sometimes we make
> > choices according to
> > rules that are extrinsic to us, i.e., seen to be
> > sourced from outside
> > ourselves. That is, we follow rules that take no
> > account of our self-
> > interest (or at least take very little account of
> > it). We obey laws,
> > abide by taboos, follow what we describe as moral
> > precepts.
>
> Coul you mention some "natural imperatives" that have
> rules extrinsic to us.
> >
I can't think of any nor was I suggesting that any exist though, of
course, they may. Can you come up with any?
> > Deciding whether to obey the law or abide by the
> > taboo, insofar as it
> > is not something we are being overtly compelled to
> > do, is, itself, a
> > moral question, i.e., we do so out of choice,
> > whether or not it
> > accords with our own self-interest.
>
> I need an example. The laws I know compel me to act.
> But I can refuse and face the consequences.
>
Quite right. And often we do simply choose to break a law for either
acceptable (civil disobedience in defense of a larger issue) or
unacceptable (personal gain) reasons. The point here is that the
notion of obeying laws represents a moral position too, i.e., that
one should obey just laws regardless of whether one is being forced
to or not. So it is fair to ask where does this moral
imperative, 'obey just laws,' derive from and why should we grant it
any power to compel us on a rational level?
>
> > So my point is that at least one distinguishing
> > factor between the
> > moral and non-moral categories is that the first
> > (the moral) involves
> > acceptance of outside rules, which have no relation
> > to the principle
> > of self-interest, whereas the second (the non-moral)
> > involves acting
> > in accord with a certain principle that is intrinsic
> > to us, a part of
> > us.
>
> An example please. I can't imagine a social rule that
> has "no relation to the principle of self-interest."
>
Don't pick up your fork with your left hand.
Wear a black tie to certain kinds of affairs.
Eat only with your right hand (or your left).
Don't look your interlocutor in the eye.
Look your interlocutor in the eye.
Don't bow lower (or higher) than the person bowing in greeting to you.
Wear a tie/don't wear a tie in certain settings.
Don't have sex with an unmarried person.
Don't marry more than one person.
Don't go naked on the beach.
Now you can argue that all of these items have dimensions that
involve self-interest, i.e., a failure to follow the social rule can
result in ostracism, personal rejection, embarrassment and, in some
cases, arrest and punishment by the authorities so we will choose our
actions to avoid such penalties. I am not going to dispute the fact
that society enforces its rules in many ways and, if you want to be
accepted in society/by society then you must follow such rules at
least some of the time.
But my point is that the nature of the self-interest involved here is
strictly related to the extent you want acceptance in that society,
making conformance a practical question.
Such rules are also often accorded moral status by practitioners or
enforcers, of course.
When I speak about self-interest here, I am referring to the
circumstance when the person has before him the choice of concerning
himself with what will benefit him or what will benefit someone else.
Going naked on the beach (or anywhere), to select the last item on
the above list, in a society where this is frowned on, harms no one
though it may give offense. Typically we consider such things moral
questions in some contexts, but not moral questions in others.
Whether or not to do this is not, itself, a question of my interest
vs. others' interests although it becomes that in particular
contexts. On the other hand, the question of whether to pay attention
to my interests vs. others' interests in contexts where this question
arises, has a dimension that takes it beyond the question of "why
shouldn't I just do whatever I want?"
When the question is 'why shouldn't I do what I want if that's what I
prefer to do?' the answer will be different depending on context.
When it's a matter of which ice cream I choose, for instance, there
doesn't seem to be any question that this is a non-moral issue
(unless dietary laws are invoked, of course, demonstrating that
nearly anything humans do can be conceived as having a moral
dimension). But on the question of going naked, other things kick in.
Here we have taboos and social mores to take account of (note the
similarity to the word "moral").
As I said elsewhere, we use "moral" for a broad variety of action
types. You asked me what characterized the use of "moral". My answer
was that the term typically refers to actions which we take based on
rules that are extrinsic to us, i.e., that are not part of our basic
human drives or our personal preferences. Below you ask what
is "extrinsic". I think this should be clear. It means those things
that are outside of us, that originate from outside of ourselves.
Thus, in this case, I'm speaking about rules or standards that guide
actions which are not part of the basic inclination we have to take
care of our own interests.
But I am not going to suggest here that this description covers only
one kind of action but not others. Rather my point is that just about
every possible human action we can think of can be taken based on at
least one of two principles:
1) A principle of preference (either personal or instinctive)
2) A principle of acting according to a standard that is independent
of personal preference.
The question, now, of course, is to get clearer on what these two
principles mean for us and to determine if they can be further
analyzed in some useful fashion to shed light on the question of what
is moral and what isn't (in both sense of our term).
> > At some point we see our preferences as part of a
> > larger schema of
> > imperatives and recognize that our preferences do
> > not exhaust our
> > reasons for acting nor are they always the reason
> > which we consider
> > most compelling.
>
> Are you saying that we have preferences that have no
> origin in social factors? What preferences do you have
> in mind?
> >
We have lots of preferences. These depend on who we are and our
personal circumstances. My point is that sometimes our preferences
are all we need to take account of in making a decision and sometimes
our preferences are not the decision-making factor.
I am not referring to preferences as lists of this or that group of
things we happen to like as you seem to want to use the term. Rather,
I am using the term to refer to a general reason we give for taking
action in many cases. Thus, the issue is not how many kinds of ice
cream I happen to like but, rather, whether what I like is relevant
in making certain decisions I make.
> > Thus, the moral/non-moral dichotomy seems to be
> > characterized by the
> > question of whether the rules we are following when
> > we select our
> > actions fundamentally boil down to a principle of
> > preference or some
> > principle reflecting certain standards which take
> > little or no account
> > of our preferences.
>
> I don't know what a standard is that doesn't take in
> account our preferences. Need an example.
>
Don't kill.
Don't commit adultery.
Don't eat milk and meat together.
All of these are from the Ten Commandments which you once cited here
though the last is from a variant form of that list found only once
in the Bible and the first is probably a mistranslation since it
should probably actually read "Don't murder", i.e., don't commit
unsanctioned killing.
Why do they not take account of our preferences (as I put it)?
Because we may want to kill, or commit adultery or have an ice cream
cone with that hamburger but the point is that if we are following
these standards (and we can certainly follow different standards),
then our preferences aren't pertinent, i.e., we must disregard those
preferences to stay consistent with the standard.
Moral claims, I have suggested, represent those claims that regard
acting in accordance with such a standard as more important than
acting with regard to one's own personal wishes.
> > The moral/immoral dichotomy seems to be
> > characterized, on the other
> > hand, by our selecting a set of extrinsic standards
> > to follow, i.e.,
> > it already assumes the first dichotomy and involves
> > operating within
> > one end of the spectrum which that dichotomy
> > establishes.
>
> That I follows. Once I get what what a "extrinsic
> standard" is then I'll know what you mean by moral.
>
> bruce
Perhaps the foregoing has made it clear? (Or not!) Let's stay focused
on these questions at this point before moving on since I doubt we
can get anywhere if we leave these unclarities unresolved.
SWM
>
>
>
______________________________________________________________________
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Acting in our self-interest is a matter of following
a simple rule, 'do what's best for me.'
Bruce
OK -- but "do what's best for me" may involve
self-sacrifice.
SWM, You say "No" but I don't read what follows as
defending a "No." I see it as a causal truth. Examples
are legion. Then you write...
> Actually I would tend to think the answer is
"something else"
but I can't follow your logic. Maybe it will become
clearer later.
Bruce asked: Could you mention some "natural
imperatives" that
have rules extrinsic to us because I want to find out
what you mean by "natural imperatives." Hence, I can't
come up with any.
SWN wrote:The point here is that the notion of obeying
laws represents a moral position that one should obey
just laws regardless of whether one is being forced
Agreed
SWM wrote:So it is fair to ask where does this moral
imperative, 'obey just laws,' derive from
Bruce: From those societies that developed laws,
Ancient to modern. That seems obvious. Perhaps you
asking something else.
SWM:and why should we grant it any power to compel us
on a rational level?
Bruce: Because it serves our interest. I don't see
laws as external to me. I am part of the "we" that
developed it.
I can't imagine a social rule that has "no relation to
the principle of
self-interest." I quote..
> Don't pick up your fork with your left hand etc.
> Now you can argue that all of these items have
> involve self-interest, i.e., a failure to follow the
social rule can
> result in ostracism...etc
RIGHT. But the punishment argument perpetuates the
notion of the uncivilized savage, the natural man,
splitting self from society. This is a distortion. If
we are to be intelligible to one another, while
eating, making love, or killing one another, we must
do it in ways that WE understand. The sense of self
differentiates out from the social matrix. Then we can
wear a upside down cross or eat peas with a knife. But
in doing so we make a social statement
> When I speak about self-interest here, I am
> referring to the
> circumstance when the person has before him the
> choice of concerning
> himself with what will benefit him or what will
> benefit someone else.
Let's see if you can intelligibly split these.
> Going naked on the beach (or anywhere), to select
> the last item on
> the above list, in a society where this is frowned
> on, harms no one
> though it may give offense.
For some there is quite a harm. If an under aged child
claims that an adult male made here feel uncomfortable
by his looks, that man can face criminal charges.
Of course, I'm not disputing that one can behave in a
way that is irrelevant to society but the decision to
act morally. when and if it is made, is,
simultaneously an expression of self and society.
>> When the question is 'why shouldn't I do what I
want if that's what I prefer to do?' the answer will
be different depending on context.
you betcha -- but as you write at the end we may be
losing our focus.
The initial question: What makes an act moral? And the
answers.....
SWM: As I said elsewhere, we use "moral" for a broad
variety of action
types. You asked me what characterized the use of
"moral". My answer
was that the term typically refers to actions which we
take based on
rules that are extrinsic to us, i.e., that are not
part of our basic
human drives or our personal preferences.
Bruce: That answer makes sense to someone who holds
that we are autonomous self-defining beings that then
can choose (or refuse) to obey social rules rather
than our own. But it makes no sense to someone who
holds that our personal preferences emerges in a
social context and has no independent existence from
some aspect of society. There is no such thing as a
personal rule.
I can break any social code. But if I act in a way
that doesn't reflect anything ever taught, then no one
could make sense out of it, including myself. Mont
Python's ministry of funny walks is absurd but still
intelligible. The ministers walk like clowns. If I
claimed to be walking while standing on my head, I
wouldn't be expressing a personal walking preference
because you wouldn't see it as walking.
Deviance is also social. But this not to deny what we
take to be immoral is often a refusal to take into
account societal needs. However, the person labeled
immoral will argue that in fact he has. Yes, an act is
often defended as moral in so far as it takes society
into account. But since the self is embedded in
society, the moral act can also be seen as benefiting
the individual. But I'm drifting.
The question: What makes an moral? Answer. When we
place a society above ourselves. But not by wearing a
black rather than a yellow tie. So, a moral act is one
in which we privilege society when a moral issue is at
stake. I don't see how my circular definition advances
our understanding.
SWM:Below you ask what is "extrinsic". I think this
should be clear. It means those things that are
outside of us, that originate from outside of
ourselves. Thus, in this case, I'm speaking about
rules or standards that guide actions which are not
part of the basic inclination we have to take care of
our own interests.
Bruce: Apart from reflexes, everything, including the
expression of instinctual dries is socialized. His
monogamy is just as personal and social, as my
open-marriage.
SWM:But I am not going to suggest here that this
description covers only
one kind of action but not others. Rather my point is
that just about
every possible human action we can think of can be
taken based on at
least one of two principles:
1) A principle of preference (either personal or
instinctive)
2) A principle of acting according to a standard that
is independent
of personal preference.
Bruce: When put *that* way I can -- sort of -- go
along with it. It makes sense to ask whether Bruce
turned off the sexual favor because he respects
fidelity or whether he was too anxious. But if I it is
the latter, then my behavior wasn't morally informed.
If it was the former, it was because I prefer a
society of fidelity. My preference is at one with
society. Sure, it may not be. I could argue that
fidelity is a bourgeoisie concept. But then again, my
argument is intelligible because it reflects a
principle shared by a certain community.
Still, one might ask... and quite appropriately so
SWM: The question, now, of course, is to get clearer
on what these two
principles mean for us and to determine if they can be
further
analyzed in some useful fashion to shed light on the
question of what
is moral and what isn't (in both sense of our term).
even if we can't agree how distinct the principles,
how tied up the self is with the social, we can still
ask "what is moral?"
SWM:My point is that sometimes our preferences are all
we need to take account of in making a decision and
sometimes our preferences are not the decision-making
factor.
Bruce: My preference may be to have that fling. But I
also prefer to see myself as loyal. So my preferences
are always at work. Still, what makes either act moral
-- in both senses? Let's try to get at that.
SWM: Thus, the issue is not how many kinds of ice
cream I happen to like but, rather, whether what I
like is relevant in making certain decisions I make.
Bruce: The context and the reason must be recognizably
moral. But how do we recognize this as moral?
I don't know what a standard is that doesn't take in
account our preferences. Need an example.
SWM: Don't kill. Don't commit adultery.
Bruce: Definitely my preference, depending on context,
of course.
SWM:Don't eat milk and meat together.
Bruce: My religious friends claim that to be their
preference. I don't see it as a moral issue.
SWM:.. if we are following these standards (and we can
certainly follow different standards), then our
preferences aren't pertinent, i.e., we must disregard
those preferences to stay consistent with the
standard.
Bruce: Put differently. We set aside one preference, a
role in the hay, for another preference, a virtuous
marriage.
SWM:Moral claims, I have suggested, represent those
claims that regard acting in accordance with such a
standard as more important than acting with regard to
one's own personal wishes.
Bruce: I agree that someone might say "I would have
preferred a role in the hay" but I must restrain
myself. The standard of virtue is privilege over the
standard of self-satisfaction. Both are standards.
I feel that we have clarified where we stand on the
matter of self vs. society. I see no need now to go
over it. I agree that a person can be self-absorbed or
socially conscious, that he can go for the immediate
gusto or think about the consequences of others....OK?
Take either person. What are our criteria for saying
that he acted morally?
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
Don't get soaked. Take a quick peek at the forecast
with the Yahoo! Search weather shortcut.
http://tools.search.yahoo.com/shortcuts/#loc_weather
swmaerske
Yes, something else, i.e., the reason to obey the law, not the fact
that we have such reasons.
> SWM:and why should we grant it any power to compel us
> on a rational level?
>
> Bruce: Because it serves our interest. I don't see
> laws as external to me. I am part of the "we" that
> developed it.
>
But what about when it doesn't? Here again we are back to speaking
different languages. We need a real instance here to crystallize this
I think.
> I can't imagine a social rule that has "no relation to
> the principle of
> self-interest." I quote..
>
> > Don't pick up your fork with your left hand etc.
> > Now you can argue that all of these items have
> > involve self-interest, i.e., a failure to follow the
> social rule can
> > result in ostracism...etc
>
> RIGHT. But the punishment argument perpetuates the
> notion of the uncivilized savage, the natural man,
> splitting self from society. This is a distortion. If
> we are to be intelligible to one another, while
> eating, making love, or killing one another, we must
> do it in ways that WE understand. The sense of self
> differentiates out from the social matrix. Then we can
> wear a upside down cross or eat peas with a knife. But
> in doing so we make a social statement
>
So? My point is that we have lots of different rules we follow but
not all are "on the same page" so to speak.
> > When I speak about self-interest here, I am
> > referring to the
> > circumstance when the person has before him the
> > choice of concerning
> > himself with what will benefit him or what will
> > benefit someone else.
>
> Let's see if you can intelligibly split these.
>
> > Going naked on the beach (or anywhere), to select
> > the last item on
> > the above list, in a society where this is frowned
> > on, harms no one
> > though it may give offense.
>
> For some there is quite a harm. If an under aged child
> claims that an adult male made here feel uncomfortable
> by his looks, that man can face criminal charges.
>
Depends on the society. In a nudist society or a society on a south
sea island, this would be absurd. The notions of harm will be
different, of course. But what is the aspect of this that is
important morally? There are two: the first has to do with observing
the moral conventions as it were, the mores of proper society,
whatever that is in a given society. The second has to do with doing
no harm to another and now the question arises, why should we do no
harm? Why not cause harm? Why is it wrong to harm another? Is THIS
simply a matter of yet another social convention? If so, it fails as
a reason (see my nearby post about the Holocaust experience). But if
it is something more, what underlies it?
> Of course, I'm not disputing that one can behave in a
> way that is irrelevant to society but the decision to
> act morally. when and if it is made, is,
> simultaneously an expression of self and society.
>
But an expression of what aspect of these? Is it no different than
following the accepted dietary rules or table manners or dress codes?
> >> When the question is 'why shouldn't I do what I
> want if that's what I prefer to do?' the answer will
> be different depending on context.
>
> you betcha -- but as you write at the end we may be
> losing our focus.
> The initial question: What makes an act moral? And the
> answers.....
>
> SWM: As I said elsewhere, we use "moral" for a broad
> variety of action
> types. You asked me what characterized the use of
> "moral". My answer
> was that the term typically refers to actions which we
> take based on
> rules that are extrinsic to us, i.e., that are not
> part of our basic
> human drives or our personal preferences.
>
> Bruce: That answer makes sense to someone who holds
> that we are autonomous self-defining beings that then
> can choose (or refuse) to obey social rules rather
> than our own. But it makes no sense to someone who
> holds that our personal preferences emerges in a
> social context and has no independent existence from
> some aspect of society. There is no such thing as a
> personal rule.
>
This is to make a claim of moral relativism (which may or may not be
right). Is it simply a matter of social convention whether, if you
are a German under Nazi orders, you kill some Jews?
> I can break any social code. But if I act in a way
> that doesn't reflect anything ever taught, then no one
> could make sense out of it, including myself. Mont
> Python's ministry of funny walks is absurd but still
> intelligible. The ministers walk like clowns. If I
> claimed to be walking while standing on my head, I
> wouldn't be expressing a personal walking preference
> because you wouldn't see it as walking.
>
Sorry but I just don't see the relevance to the moral question here.
> Deviance is also social. But this not to deny what we
> take to be immoral is often a refusal to take into
> account societal needs. However, the person labeled
> immoral will argue that in fact he has. Yes, an act is
> often defended as moral in so far as it takes society
> into account. But since the self is embedded in
> society, the moral act can also be seen as benefiting
> the individual. But I'm drifting.
>
Yes.
> The question: What makes an moral? Answer. When we
> place a society above ourselves. But not by wearing a
> black rather than a yellow tie. So, a moral act is one
> in which we privilege society when a moral issue is at
> stake. I don't see how my circular definition advances
> our understanding.
>
Are you advancing this as a definition? Here you are following my
suggestion that adherence to rules premised on concerns extrinsic to
ourselves is what characterizes the moral and distinguishes it from
the non-moral (not the immoral, since one man's set of such rules may
deny another's).
> SWM:Below you ask what is "extrinsic". I think this
> should be clear. It means those things that are
> outside of us, that originate from outside of
> ourselves. Thus, in this case, I'm speaking about
> rules or standards that guide actions which are not
> part of the basic inclination we have to take care of
> our own interests.
>
> Bruce: Apart from reflexes, everything, including the
> expression of instinctual dries is socialized. His
> monogamy is just as personal and social, as my
> open-marriage.
>
The distinction between moral and non-moral is NOT the same as the
distinction between moral and immoral.
> SWM:But I am not going to suggest here that this
> description covers only
> one kind of action but not others. Rather my point is
> that just about
> every possible human action we can think of can be
> taken based on at
> least one of two principles:
>
> 1) A principle of preference (either personal or
> instinctive)
>
> 2) A principle of acting according to a standard that
> is independent
> of personal preference.
>
> Bruce: When put *that* way I can -- sort of -- go
> along with it. It makes sense to ask whether Bruce
> turned off the sexual favor because he respects
> fidelity or whether he was too anxious. But if I it is
> the latter, then my behavior wasn't morally informed.
Yes. The first is a decision taken for moral reasons as it were. The
second is a decision taken for non-moral reasons, i.e., personal or
self interest.
> If it was the former, it was because I prefer a
> society of fidelity. My preference is at one with
> society. Sure, it may not be. I could argue that
> fidelity is a bourgeoisie concept. But then again, my
> argument is intelligible because it reflects a
> principle shared by a certain community.
>
Yes. So now we are part way there I think. We can agree that the
distinction between moral and non-moral comes down to whether or not
one is making one's decisions based on self-interest or reliance on a
standard that sets self-interest aside. This is why seemingly moral
actions that are taken for personal gain are less well regarded from
a moral perspective or even discounted entirely as morally
praiseworthy.
The further question however is what are the arguments for any
particular moral system or set of reasons and are there arguments
that convincingly demonstrate that one set of reasons is better (in
some fashion) than another? That is, we must have a way to decide
between competing moral imperatives (imperatives driven by extrinsic
standards of action).
> Still, one might ask... and quite appropriately so
>
> SWM: The question, now, of course, is to get clearer
> on what these two
> principles mean for us and to determine if they can be
> further
> analyzed in some useful fashion to shed light on the
> question of what
> is moral and what isn't (in both sense of our term).
>
> even if we can't agree how distinct the principles,
> how tied up the self is with the social, we can still
> ask "what is moral?"
>
> SWM:My point is that sometimes our preferences are all
> we need to take account of in making a decision and
> sometimes our preferences are not the decision-making
> factor.
>
> Bruce: My preference may be to have that fling. But I
> also prefer to see myself as loyal. So my preferences
> are always at work. Still, what makes either act moral
> -- in both senses? Let's try to get at that.
>
Well why should we prefer one set of reasons to another if that's how
you want to put it? Do I prefer to act in a non-self interested
manner out of some form of self-interest? And if I do that, how do I
distinguish the different forms of being self-interested?
> SWM: Thus, the issue is not how many kinds of ice
> cream I happen to like but, rather, whether what I
> like is relevant in making certain decisions I make.
>
> Bruce: The context and the reason must be recognizably
> moral. But how do we recognize this as moral?
>
Good question? We must see it, I think, as properly falling under a
set of extrinsic standards, a set of standards we adhere to for some
reason. What is the reason? How do we pick one standard or set of
standards from others?
> I don't know what a standard is that doesn't take in
> account our preferences. Need an example.
>
Don't kill when you're so pissed off at someone you want to kill them!
Don't eat that bacon, lettuce and tomato sandwich when you love bacon.
Simple stuff really.
> SWM: Don't kill. Don't commit adultery.
>
> Bruce: Definitely my preference, depending on context,
> of course.
>
Right, sometimes killing and committing adultery could be the right
things to do. The actual wording of the Ten Commandments even
recognizes this with the don't kill mandate since it really
translates as don't do murder (which essentially is to say don't kill
unless it is sanctioned killing).
> SWM:Don't eat milk and meat together.
>
> Bruce: My religious friends claim that to be their
> preference. I don't see it as a moral issue.
>
Neither do I. But some do. Cheese burgers have much to recommend them.
> SWM:.. if we are following these standards (and we can
> certainly follow different standards), then our
> preferences aren't pertinent, i.e., we must disregard
> those preferences to stay consistent with the
> standard.
>
> Bruce: Put differently. We set aside one preference, a
> role in the hay, for another preference, a virtuous
> marriage.
>
You could say that. The question is, if they are both merely
preferences as you want to put it, then when the issue is whether we
should commit a murder or not, then putting the question of the law
aside (and, possibly, that of personal relationships and sense of
affinity with the person to be murdered), there's no stronger reason
not to do it than to do it. And that's the rub I've been talking
about.
> SWM:Moral claims, I have suggested, represent those
> claims that regard acting in accordance with such a
> standard as more important than acting with regard to
> one's own personal wishes.
>
> Bruce: I agree that someone might say "I would have
> preferred a role in the hay" but I must restrain
> myself. The standard of virtue is privilege over the
> standard of self-satisfaction. Both are standards.
>
Yes, because one can also follow a set of extrinsic standards which
exhort us to do what we feel, do what's in our hearts, etc. But there
is still the extrinsic standards vs. the internal drives, desires,
preferences, etc.
> I feel that we have clarified where we stand on the
> matter of self vs. society. I see no need now to go
> over it. I agree that a person can be self-absorbed or
> socially conscious, that he can go for the immediate
> gusto or think about the consequences of others....OK?
>
Yes, though I think the disagreements that still exist between us
betoken a still existing problem: a failure to agree just what are
preferences and what are standards.
> Take either person. What are our criteria for saying
> that he acted morally?
>
> bruce
>
If we mean morally good, then it will depend on which set of
standards we adhere to. If what is meant is that he chose his course
of action within the moral dimension as opposed to the practical,
then this takes us back to determining where the non-moral leaves off
and the moral takes up.
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > SWM:and why should we grant it any power to compel
> us
> > on a rational level?
> >
> > Bruce: Because it serves our interest. I don't see
> > laws as external to me. I am part of the "we" that
> > developed it.
> >
>
> But what about when it doesn't? Here again we are
> back to speaking
> different languages. We need a real instance here to
> crystallize this
The law that sets the age for sexual consent is
arbitrary. But the act of abuse is immoral. It limits
me; I wouldn't want it any other way. In fact, I've
help write it. So it isn't external.
I cut to the chase.
>Why is it wrong to harm another?
Because the concept "harming another" includes the
notion of "wrong." It's like asking "why is it fun to
have a good time?"
>Is THIS simply a matter of yet another social
convention? If
>so, it fails as a reason.
You are confusing two questions. "Is it moral?" "Do I
have a strong reason to comply?"
All concepts are social. Morality is a concept.
Hence....
But the moral concept is a generality. It doesn't
"fail" as a reason because the concept isn't a person.
A person has a reason for applying the concept.
>Is it simply a matter of social convention whether,
if you are a >German under Nazi orders, you kill some
Jews?
Of course it was a social convention to kill Jews and
the Nazis could consider themselves moral. But it is
only because they consider themselves moral that I
could call them immoral.
A world of people who never disagreed on what is moral
wouldn't have our concept of morality. Can you see
this?
>distinction between moral and non-moral comes down to
>whether or not one is making one's decisions based on
self->interest or reliance on a standard that sets
self-interest aside.
Not true. Folks can set self-interest aside and still
not be moral. folks can rely on a standard and still
not be morel.
>Well why should we prefer one set of reasons to
another
No answering that in the abstract except in platitudes
like it is more compelling.
(I don't know what a standard is that doesn't take in
account our preferences. Need an example.)
> Don't kill when you're so pissed off at someone you
want to kill >them!
I agree with that standard and prefer that everyone
would act that way including me.
< But there is still the extrinsic standards vs. the
internal drives, >desires, preferences, etc.
You are comparing apples and oranges. Standards are
rules, drives, desires, preferences are psychological
states. The former is what it is, the latter are
ambivalent.
I'll break off here for tonight. See that you've
trying something new. I'll give it a fair read. But I
feel that there basic confusions here I can't seem to
clarify.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
Don't pick lemons.
See all the new 2007 cars at Yahoo! Autos.
http://autos.yahoo.com/new_cars.html
bruce denner
Apparently we agree on the meaning of "morality".
Evidence? We agree what situation definitely calls for
a moral response, what is
problematic, and what definitely doesn't call for a
moral response (MEANING #1)
Also, apparently we agree on MEANING #2. Our
descriptions of a moral or a immoral response is
reasonably close -- as I've read them.
BUT when comes to asking the question "What makes an
act moral?", our approach is radically different.
As I read you, SWM, your tack is to describe the
properties, building blocks, of MEANINGS 1 and 2.
You've suggested principles, self vs. other interest,
empathy, external demand, etc.
I've tried to show you that each and every property is
true of some
Meanings 1 & 2, some of the time, but no where close
to all of them all of the time. I've also tried to
show you how problematic the distinction is between
self vs. other etc.
My response to our generic question: What makes an act
moral, loving, opportunistic, etc. can all be answered
in the same way. Morality, love, opportunism, etc.,
are concepts. We come to use these concepts the way we
learn, apply, and teach them.
Ask me "What makes an act moral?" and I'll give
examples, discuss their similarities and differences,
why I think X doesn't call for a moral response but Y
does. I'll then go on and say why A is moral and Z is
an immoral response in a specific situation, on what
grounds some agree and some disagree.
In brief, "What makes an act moral?" is our readiness
to describe as such.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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swmaerske
>
> > > SWM:and why should we grant it any power to compel
> > us
> > > on a rational level?
> > >
> > > Bruce: Because it serves our interest. I don't see
> > > laws as external to me. I am part of the "we" that
> > > developed it.
> > >
> >
> > But what about when it doesn't? Here again we are
> > back to speaking
> > different languages. We need a real instance here to
> > crystallize this
>
> The law that sets the age for sexual consent is
> arbitrary. But the act of abuse is immoral. It limits
> me; I wouldn't want it any other way. In fact, I've
> help write it. So it isn't external.
>
> I cut to the chase.
>
By "abuse" you mean harming another of course. What else
could "abuse" mean but that? Thus, the issue is removed from mere
ritualistic type actions or actions with only implications for the
individual him or herself. 'Don't abuse another' is addressing how we
relate with another, thus it involves the issue of the others
feelings, concerns, needs, etc., i.e., interests. So this brings us
back to the distinction between our own and others' interests and the
notion that there must be some reason to disregard our own interests
and pay attention instead to the interests of another in some cases.
> >Why is it wrong to harm another?
>
> Because the concept "harming another" includes the
> notion of "wrong." It's like asking "why is it fun to
> have a good time?"
>
No, it does not include that concept. A person can very easily argue
that it is not wrong to kill a murderer (i.e., to harm that person).
A serial killer can believe that it is not wrong to commit serial
murder for a variety of reasons including a conviction that the only
thing that counts is his or her pleasure. (Remember we are not
talking about what is legally wrong but what is morally wrong.) A
soldier can believe it is not wrong to kill certain people in the
course of doing his business. The two concepts are most assuredly NOT
linked as you want to suggest.
> >Is THIS simply a matter of yet another social
> convention? If
> >so, it fails as a reason.
>
> You are confusing two questions. "Is it moral?" "Do I
> have a strong reason to comply?"
>
> All concepts are social. Morality is a concept.
> Hence....
> But the moral concept is a generality. It doesn't
> "fail" as a reason because the concept isn't a person.
> A person has a reason for applying the concept.
>
But all concepts are not equally the case. We can have wrong concepts
as well as right ones. Believing that a concept's existence
demonstrates its truth, efficacy or whatever is just wrong.
I also think your distinction above as to the two questions is
mistaken. While they are certainly different questions they import
the earlier confusion we have worked so hard to rid ourselves of:
moral as category vs. moral as standard.
That persons have reasons as you suggest is true. But not any reason
will do nor does this work if the only power of a reason is found in
its psychological influence over the person considering it. That
reduces this to a question of polemics or propaganda which, as I
think I've shown, cannot undergird moral reasoning for moral
reasoning to work as what it purports to be.
> >Is it simply a matter of social convention whether,
> if you are a >German under Nazi orders, you kill some
> Jews?
>
> Of course it was a social convention to kill Jews and
> the Nazis could consider themselves moral. But it is
> only because they consider themselves moral that I
> could call them immoral.
>
That is incorrect. If they did what they did while acknowledging that
it was wrong you would still call them immoral. Your distinction
doesn't hold up here.
> A world of people who never disagreed on what is moral
> wouldn't have our concept of morality. Can you see
> this?
>
Sure. So what? It has no bearing on what I've been saying. (I see we
are sliding backwards again into the same kind of debate we had
agreed to climb out of. Perhaps there is just no hope for this sort
of discussion. You are where you are and I am where I am on these
matters. It may be that one of us is more right than another but this
sort of discussion doesn't seemed geared to making who is more right
any clearer, only to giving us both a platform to restate our
positions. Ah well, it seemed promising . . .)
> >distinction between moral and non-moral comes down to
> >whether or not one is making one's decisions based on
> self->interest or reliance on a standard that sets
> self-interest aside.
>
> Not true. Folks can set self-interest aside and still
> not be moral. folks can rely on a standard and still
> not be morel.
>
First not all standards are moral standards and we can agree on that.
I never suggested otherwise. Some standards may have to do do with
aesthetics and some may have to do with meeting other criteria, e.g.,
passing tests, etc. I only suggested that in seeking to identify the
characteristics of "moral" we must note that following an extrinsic
standard for personal action was one critical characteristic. There
may be others, for instance the type of standard we are thinking of.
Or the point of the standard, e.g., what aspect of human behavior is
addressed. (For instance, it might be the case that a moral standard
concerns itself, uniquely or especially, with the dichotomy between
self and other interests as we've been exploring here.)
Second, by saying that "folks can rely on a standard and still not be
moral" you also also seem to be saying that not every standard which
we call moral will satisfy everyone's opinion of what is moral and
this, it seems to me, would be to again import the confusion of moral
as category vs. moral as standard. That confusion is something we
must rid ourselves of if we are to talk effectively here.
> >Well why should we prefer one set of reasons to
> another
>
> No answering that in the abstract except in platitudes
> like it is more compelling.
>
> (I don't know what a standard is that doesn't take in
> account our preferences. Need an example.)
>
I don't know what you mean by "take in account our preferences".
Certainly our preferences are part of all considerations in every
action and we are talking about valuing and evaluating our actions.
Still insofar as we're talking about standards here, we are talking
about standards which address the role of our preferences. That sort
of "taking in account" is irrelevant to the point I have made above.
Nor is it platitidinous to talk about what is more or less
compelling. That is a red herring in this discussion.
> > Don't kill when you're so pissed off at someone you
> want to kill >them!
>
> I agree with that standard and prefer that everyone
> would act that way including me.
>
Nice that you agree but it is irrelevant to the point.
> < But there is still the extrinsic standards vs. the
> internal drives, >desires, preferences, etc.
>
> You are comparing apples and oranges. Standards are
> rules, drives, desires, preferences are psychological
> states. The former is what it is, the latter are
> ambivalent.
>
And it is how our psychological states are to be maintained, altered
or developed that we are interested in when we are speaking of the
moral. Standards provide us a set of parameters by which to deal with
our psychological states and hence our acts. Recall that the view I
have proposed involves the supposition that we are not merely passive
participants in our states but actively (consciously, intentionally)
alter them.
> I'll break off here for tonight. See that you've
> trying something new. I'll give it a fair read. But I
> feel that there basic confusions here I can't seem to
> clarify.
>
> bruce
>
I agree. At least one of us is confused at a very deep level. Of
course I think it is you, not me. But who's to tell? It's often the
case that we don't know we're confused when we are and still less are
we likely to see it when others point it out to us.
SWM
swmaerske
I think this misses the whole point. I have said time and again that
what I'm interested in is seeing if there is some basis for choosing
some acts as right or others wrong in the moral sphere, i.e., when it
is a matter of how our acts affect others. I think that what we have
gone through here and on the nearby related post has simply shown how
far apart we are. It is simply false to say that the answer to the
question I've raised lies in the concepts we use themselves. The
answer is not there and we see that demonstrated every day. It's true
that we don't find ourselves in moral quandaries all the time and
that most times we simply know how to behave. But there are certain
cases, the Nazi case being one in point, here this whole thing is
called into question. Certainly in the Nazis' world they were not
acting wrongly. They followed orders. They acted to cleanse their
nation of pollution by a dangerous and alien people. That most of us
today can see the wrongness of that doesn't change the fact that if
you were inside their world, within their world view, there was
reason to think they were acting rightly, i.e., they were acting for
the "greater good" of their people and nation.
I read one Holocaust memoir in which the fleeing Jewish woman falls
in with a Polish girl and her farm family. The father of the girl
takes the whole family at one point into the barn to watch him
slaughter a lamb for their dinner. He lifts the baby sheep from its
mother places it across a chair, holds it down, then slits its throat
so that it can bleed to death as it bleats its life away. The Jewish
woman (a city girl) is horrified. But it gets worse. The farmer then
lowers himself below the dying sheep and drinks the blood pouring
from its opened throat. Grinning he finally gets up and wipes some of
the blood away from his mouth, suggesting the other family members
partake. "It's the best part," he says. The Jewish woman, there in
disquise of course, faints from the sight.
Where do you draw the line and is there a line to be drawn? Should we
treat animals in this way but not people? What is the difference
making factor and what is the reason it is wrong to treat someone in
this way? The farmer and his family were innured to such sights and
actions but not the Jewish city girl. Was it just a matter of
aesthetic revulsion? Would she get used to it if she lived for a few
years with the farm family? Is that why they were okay with it?
Should we allow ourselves to become used to such things?
There is a moral dimension here that your answers don't begin to
address.
I think we may have once more reached rock bottom. I don't see much
hope that we can progress since you are simply wedded to your views
on this as I may be to mine. Unless one of us is prepared to see the
other's point, what is the use of continuing?
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>'Don't abuse another' is
> addressing how we
> relate with another, thus it involves the issue of
> the others
> feelings, concerns, needs, etc., i.e., interests. So
> this brings us
> back to the distinction between our own and others'
> interests and the
> notion that there must be some reason to disregard
> our own interests
> and pay attention instead to the interests of
> another in some cases.
Who would doubt that there are reasons to disregard
our interests and pay attention to others at time?
What does this fact imply to you?
> > >Why is it wrong to harm another?
> > Because the concept "harming another" includes the
> > notion of "wrong.
> No, it does not include that concept. A person can
> very easily argue
> that it is not wrong to kill a murderer (i.e., to
> harm that person).
The "i.e.," doesn't follow. Argue that it is OK to
kill, is to make it legitimate and hence make the
"harm" irrelevant. We don't speak "harming" people we
execute in electric chairs.
> A serial killer can believe that it is not wrong to
> commit serial
> murder for a variety of reasons including a
> conviction that the only
> thing that counts is his or her pleasure.
Which is another way of denying that "harm" is
relevant.
REMEMBER THE QUESTION: WHY IS IT WRONG TO HARM?
ANSWER: BECAUSE HARM IS WRONG.
That's my point. It holds independent of serial
killer's talk.
> But all concepts are not equally the case. We can
> have wrong concepts
> as well as right ones.
That's confusing. A concept is wrong if it is
misapplied but the concept itself can't be wrong. The
concept of morality can't be wrong or right. But it
may have no obvious application. We can also misapply
a concept. We may think that a couple is fighting when
they claim to be making love. But I've lost the
relevance of these remarks.
> That persons have reasons as you suggest is true.
> But not any reason
> will do nor does this work if the only power of a
> reason is found in
> its psychological influence over the person
> considering it.
Also very confusing. Of course, one man's good reason
is another man's foolishness. But reasons can only be
appealing if they have a psychological impact which
includes appeal to logic. However, if me reasons is a
gun to your head, then it isn't a reason.
> reduces this to a question of polemics or propaganda
> which, as I think I've shown, cannot undergird moral
reasoning
> for moral reasoning to work as what it purports to
be.
You have "shown" nothing of the kind. You keep on
"saying" it. But "polemics","propaganda" are just bad
words attributed to arguments one dislikes. One man's
polemic is another man's reasoned persuasion.
Bruce: A world of people who never disagreed on what
is
moral wouldn't have our concept of morality.
> Sure. So what? It has no bearing on what I've been
> saying.
I'm under the impression that you see yourself as
finding a "resting place" for moral arguments that
would end disagreement. After this "resting place",
disagreement would cease. Yes, that does seem silly to
me. Can't be what are saying. Then what are you
saying? A temporary resting place?
Again, you seem to think concepts have "building
blocks", identifiable properties". And you will use
these to build a resting place. No? Well, you write...
>I only suggested that in seeking to identify the
> characteristics of "moral" we must note that
> following an extrinsic
When in fact all standards are "extrinsic" or social,
moral, etc. but to be brought into play someone has to
prefer one.
Think of it this way: In a diner you find a menu. It
lists the extrinsic, the standards. But you don't eat
until to select one.
The extrinsic demands the intrinsic if the game is to
on.
>(For instance, it might be the case that a moral
standard
>concerns itself, uniquely or especially, with the
dichotomy >between self and other interests as we've
been exploring here.)
No-- because the dichotomy doesn't hold water. I steal
your money. Only interested in myself? No, I spend it
on my friends. I murder my wife? Just concerned with
my welfare? No, she was no damn good to anybody!
OK-- While I see the distinction between caring for
the self vs. the other, I see every real life example
as a blend. But my resistance your distinction isn't
the issue. The issue is your answer to the question of
what makes an act moral?
Your answer appears a moral act concerns itself with
external standards. But not all standards, just moral
ones. This answer is circular.
You answer is to certain building blocks identify a
moral response either in sense #1 or #2. But you have
not identified one essential block. "Caring for
others" may or may not moral, though of social value.
But even more puzzling is where you want to go with
this. If are not trying to improve upon our moral
reasoning, as you've said you have not, then I can't
make sense out of why you are trying to find
compelling reasons or building blocks.
'
swmaerske
for a third response. I'll start below:
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
>
> --- swmaerske <swmaerske@...> wrote:
>
> >'Don't abuse another' is
> > addressing how we
> > relate with another, thus it involves the issue of
> > the others
> > feelings, concerns, needs, etc., i.e., interests. So
> > this brings us
> > back to the distinction between our own and others'
> > interests and the
> > notion that there must be some reason to disregard
> > our own interests
> > and pay attention instead to the interests of
> > another in some cases.
>
> Who would doubt that there are reasons to disregard
> our interests and pay attention to others at time?
> What does this fact imply to you?
>
If we mean put others' interests above our own in some decision
calculus, I think there are many who would doubt it. Of course there
is always the fact that sometimes putting one of our interests aside
for another's interest may serve some other interest of ours which, I
think, is the sort of thing you often fall back on. A father
sacrifices himself for his child . . . he is casting aside his own
interest to survive and thinking only of the child, yes, but is this
because he is thinking about the survival value of his genes since
the child has more of a future ahead of him, all things being equal,
or is this because he has simply stopped thinking of himself in a
very important sense?
Aren't there some situations where no amount of rational legerdemain
explains why we act for others rather than ourselves?
> > > >Why is it wrong to harm another?
> > > Because the concept "harming another" includes the
> > > notion of "wrong.
>
> > No, it does not include that concept. A person can
> > very easily argue
> > that it is not wrong to kill a murderer (i.e., to
> > harm that person).
>
> The "i.e.," doesn't follow. Argue that it is OK to
> kill, is to make it legitimate and hence make the
> "harm" irrelevant. We don't speak "harming" people we
> execute in electric chairs.
>
Oh that is very mushy, Bruce. Of course executing the criminal harms
him. That is the point of executing him, after all. We are not
inviting him to a game of tiddily winks! We may not want to think
about the pain (physical or psychological) of a legitimately
condemned criminal but we know and he knows that we are engaged in
causing him harm. The idea is that he has it coming, that he has
earned the harm and is being justly recompensed. Thus, as we use the
term "harm" it does not automatically included the notion of "wrong."
You are just flat out wrong on this.
> > A serial killer can believe that it is not wrong to
> > commit serial
> > murder for a variety of reasons including a
> > conviction that the only
> > thing that counts is his or her pleasure.
>
> Which is another way of denying that "harm" is
> relevant.
> REMEMBER THE QUESTION: WHY IS IT WRONG TO HARM?
> ANSWER: BECAUSE HARM IS WRONG.
Wrong answer since harm is not always wrong.
> That's my point. It holds independent of serial
> killer's talk.
>
Nope it doesn't. Many serial killers think it's perfectly all right
to cause harm to others.
> > But all concepts are not equally the case. We can
> > have wrong concepts
> > as well as right ones.
>
> That's confusing. A concept is wrong if it is
> misapplied but the concept itself can't be wrong. The
> concept of morality can't be wrong or right. But it
> may have no obvious application. We can also misapply
> a concept. We may think that a couple is fighting when
> they claim to be making love. But I've lost the
> relevance of these remarks.
Me too. I don't even recall why I said the above if, indeed, it was I
who said it!
>
> > That persons have reasons as you suggest is true.
> > But not any reason
> > will do nor does this work if the only power of a
> > reason is found in
> > its psychological influence over the person
> > considering it.
>
> Also very confusing. Of course, one man's good reason
> is another man's foolishness. But reasons can only be
> appealing if they have a psychological impact which
> includes appeal to logic. However, if me reasons is a
> gun to your head, then it isn't a reason.
>
A gun to one's head can certainly be a reason: to comply with an
otherwise unacceptable demand, for instance. One can and usually will
make decisions by weighing the risks and rewards in such cases. One
may even consider the logic of taking this or that action in terms of
likely consequences.
But, while psychological factors obtain (the person is frightened,
emboldened, reckless) there is a dimension to such a decision making
process that is logical as well. But is what is logical also
psychological as you want to suggest? It's certainly a psychological
fact when a person comes to believe certain things, disbelieve other
things. More, one can be prompted to believe or disbelieve by various
polemical or propagandistic ploys. But one can also come to believe
or disbelieve something based on a reasoned judgment, i.e., one uses
one's head, one thinks logically. That is, one examines the
implications of this or that circumstance on this or that course of
action.
The distinction I have made here is between instances when one's mind
is influenced by non-rational factors and when one's mind is
influenced by rational factors. It may certainly be true that we have
few instances when one or the other alone is involved. But, even if
the two sorts of factors intermix to varying degrees, still we can
recognize that we are looking at two distinct and separate
categories.
> > reduces this to a question of polemics or propaganda
> > which, as I think I've shown, cannot undergird moral
> reasoning
> > for moral reasoning to work as what it purports to
> be.
>
> You have "shown" nothing of the kind. You keep on
> "saying" it. But "polemics","propaganda" are just bad
> words attributed to arguments one dislikes. One man's
> polemic is another man's reasoned persuasion.
>
If I have no reason to act other than how I am conditioned or
subliminally influenced, then moral valuing is a charade. If it is a
charade, then as soon as I realize that, the claims of morality have
no more power over me. If they have no power over me then the moral
game collapses for me. If I continue to play at moral valuing, then I
am pretending. If I let others play at it or encourage them to do so,
then I am fooling them. Either way, the claims of morality lose their
potency. I have made this point numerous times. I suppose you can
deny my conclusion and that is the nature of argument of this sort.
We each know what we "see" for ourselves and we establish what
we "see" in this way in a public environment only if others can be
brought to acknowledge "seeing" the same thing. If they can't, either
because they really don't "see" it or simply wish to deny "seeing"
it, we are at an impasse. Of course, one doesn't take a poll as to
what is the case. We each "see" what we "see". So, in the end
majority rule is not the standard (though in at least one important
sense it is, of course, i.e., we must share a great deal most of the
time in order to function as we do).
> Bruce: A world of people who never disagreed on what
> is
> moral wouldn't have our concept of morality.
>
I am not arguing about disagreement. I am noting that there must be a
way to come to a reason based conclusion or moral valuing collapses.
> > Sure. So what? It has no bearing on what I've been
> > saying.
>
> I'm under the impression that you see yourself as
> finding a "resting place" for moral arguments that
> would end disagreement. After this "resting place",
> disagreement would cease.
No, I never said disagreement would cease, only that some of us could
come to a common ground and in that case have no cause to disagree. I
am hardly suggesting that moral valuing can or must be put on a non-
controversial basis in every particular. Remember I have argued for a
form of moral valuing that relies on certain emotional resonances
which we cultivate in ourselves. It stands to reason that these
resonances may differ to varying degrees between individuals and that
they will yield different choices in different circumstances.
From the first you have accused me of seeking a rationalist approach
to ethics and I have denied this a gazillion times and explained what
I have in mind instead. Yet it seems you still imagine you are
arguing with a 17th century rationalist!
> Yes, that does seem silly to
> me. Can't be what are saying. Then what are you
> saying? A temporary resting place?
>
See above.
> Again, you seem to think concepts have "building
> blocks", identifiable properties". And you will use
> these to build a resting place. No? Well, you write...
>
> >I only suggested that in seeking to identify the
> > characteristics of "moral" we must note that
> > following an extrinsic
>
> When in fact all standards are "extrinsic" or social,
> moral, etc. but to be brought into play someone has to
> prefer one.
The standard of acting strictly in accord with one's own preferences
is what I have in mind by a non-extrinsic standard. But you have hit
on an important point. I think it can be argued that in the end all
standards are extrinsic as you say which may be why we can critique
the decision to act solely on one's own preferences. In the end,
extrinsic standards are a characteristic of how we think and act,
unlike other kinds of animals we are aware of and so there is a moral
dimension to every action we take, even the least relevant such as
choosing chocolate ice cream over vanilla. In the end every human
action seems to be subject on some level to moral valuing.
> Think of it this way: In a diner you find a menu. It
> lists the extrinsic, the standards. But you don't eat
> until to select one.
> The extrinsic demands the intrinsic if the game is to
> on.
>
Agreed. We cannot ditch either. But in the end, if we are talking
about what is "moral" then we mean those choices which involve
attention to standards that are extrinsic, outside ourselves in some
fashion.
> >(For instance, it might be the case that a moral
> standard
> >concerns itself, uniquely or especially, with the
> dichotomy >between self and other interests as we've
> been exploring here.)
>
> No-- because the dichotomy doesn't hold water. I steal
> your money. Only interested in myself? No, I spend it
> on my friends. I murder my wife? Just concerned with
> my welfare? No, she was no damn good to anybody!
>
Then the question is who is hurt and can we justify inflicting that
hurt. And, of course, why should we care about hurting others at all?
After all, we don't feel their hurt. Unless we are sufficiently
empathetic of course!
> OK-- While I see the distinction between caring for
> the self vs. the other, I see every real life example
> as a blend. But my resistance your distinction isn't
> the issue. The issue is your answer to the question of
> what makes an act moral?
>
> Your answer appears a moral act concerns itself with
> external standards. But not all standards, just moral
> ones. This answer is circular.
>
I do agree that there are different kinds of extrinsic standards. But
we began this line of inquiry by trying to find out what we mean
by "moral." I proposed that one characteristic would be that it
involved adherence to standards outside ourselves. But I did not say
that this was the only characteristic to be found. More, we have to
come back to our different uses of "moral." We need to identify the
characteristics that prompt us to call something moral in the first
sense (as a category term) as well as what would prompt us to call it
that in the second sense (i.e., morally good).
I would say for an act or judgement to be seen as categorically a
moral question, there would need to be not only adherence to an
external standard but also relevance to the needs and wants of other
human beings. For instance, choosing a particular flavor ice cream,
all other things being equal, is not a moral matter. It's strictly
practical, strictly a matter of my personal preference. But suppose
there is only one scoop of the flavor I want and two of us who want
it. Then deciding who gets it is a different level of concern and
here, I submit, moral issues would kick in.
Now as to what makes my action or decision in this or any case
morally good or not will be something else. It will be whether it
adheres to a standard that I believe is itself good and therefore to
be followed. But this is not, itself, a moral question, i.e., what I
believe is a good standard will have to be determined on a wholly
different level. As you may recall, I have suggested in the past that
we can think of things in a category most commonly thought of
as "spiritual" which is why religion seems to play such a remarkably
ubiquitous role in moral valuing throughout human history. But, as I
have also said, I have not unpacked this to my own satisfaction yet.
In essense I am suggesting that we choose certain ways of orienting
ourselves to the world around us on a non-moral basis that is
commonly called spiritual. And that choice then informs and governs
our moral judgements because of the standards it implies for us.
> You answer is to certain building blocks identify a
> moral response either in sense #1 or #2. But you have
> not identified one essential block. "Caring for
> others" may or may not moral, though of social value.
>
Not building blocks but characteristics.
> But even more puzzling is where you want to go with
> this. If are not trying to improve upon our moral
> reasoning, as you've said you have not, then I can't
> make sense out of why you are trying to find
> compelling reasons or building blocks.
> '
> bruce
>
>
I am fascinated by the question of why we should ever care about
others. I know that I do at times and at times I don't. But sometimes
when I do is because I think I should. Then I want to know the source
of that particular belief of mine and whether it is adequately
founded.
Now one could say this is just my own neurosis. And yet I look around
at the world and see these same questions being asked again and again
by a wide range of people. I see moral questions everywhere but no
ready answers, only platitudes and beliefs based on nothing that
seems compelling. If, in the end, it's just about what we feel, then
we should drop the pretense. And yet to do that would be damaging to
society and thus to all of us. But I don't see a strong reason to
worry about damaging society as long as I can get away with whatever
I want while others are still playing the game (the Gyges ring
question).
So the reason I'm interested in this is that I want to know why I
should do some things and not other things when those things have no
intrinsically compelling reason for me to do them.
SWM
bruce denner
questions;
1. How do we best achieve our moral goals?
2. How do we best clarify moral discourse.?
Question 1 may best be answered by avoiding moral
discourse because, as you say, so much is
platitudinous hand waving, emotional, propagandist
appeal.
Question 2 requires that we get straight what sort of
question is "What makes an act moral?" Is one asking
for a definition, how we use the word, or an objective
description of characteristics, and causes/conditions?
If neither, then I'm lost.
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> what I'm interested in is seeing if there is some
> basis for choosing
> some acts as right or others wrong in the moral
> sphere,
I'm perfectly aware of that. What I'm trying to show
you that this question "is there some basis for
choosing acts" stirs up all lot of conceptual dust, if
you will, such that I no longer can see the question,
much less the possibility of the answer.
Just for beginners. The obvious answer is "YES." When
I give answers, you challenge them. So if you are
really asking "is there some basis that is will win
overwhelming acceptance, the answer is "No." Then you
accuse me of Moral Relativism. But I'm not putting
forth a doctrine. I'm just describing what happens.
Then I ask, "Are you trying to improve upon this,
revise our moral game?" and you answer "NO." Then
I'm mystified.
>It is simply false to say that the
> answer to the
> question I've raised lies in the concepts we use
If it is false, then I don't get your question. You
want to know whether our moral choices have a basis.
It is in the very nature of our choices that they have
a basis -- sometimes the same, sometimes different.
(Q) "Bruce, what is the basis for choosing fidelity."
(A) "The basis is that I value fidelity." Yes the
answer is in the question. Are you asking a different
question?
>The answer is not there and we see that demonstrated
> every day...there are certain
> cases, the Nazi case being one in point,
A case of what? For the sake of discussion, let's say
that the Nazis found their behavior moral, obviously
we don't -- but at least we agree that it is a moral
issue (meaning #1). But, both Nazis and us give a
basis for their acts. That's what you asked for and
that's what you get. Again, what do you really want? A
way of showing that the Nazis were immoral that they
have to agree with. If that's it, then let's discuss
whether such a request can be provided by our moral
game.
Earlier you wrote that our Moral game is like Chess.
But it isn't. There are no rules for moral checkmate.
Do you think that this is accidental, or because this
is very difficult material or, perhaps, because to ask
for a checkmate violates the game?
> Where do you draw the line and is there a line to be
> drawn? There is a moral dimension here that your
answers
> don't begin to address.
Correct. I haven't tried to speak my revulsion with
genocide, nor are any of comments here relevant to
such concerns. I've on;y been addressing what I see as
conceptual confusion. This is a minor point compared
with genocide.
On that matter, I think it pointless to go on about
its morality. What is going on in Darfur and other
places needs to be stopped. It will not be stopped by
arguments about its moral purpose.
If you are not ready to stop Genocide until you are
sure it is immoral, then I have great difficulty in
understanding how your mind works.
> Aren't there some situations where no amount of
> rational legerdemain
> explains why we act for others rather than
> ourselves?
You write "explain". I was thinking "justification."
Two different concepts. No explanation is ever
complete because new facts or theories may emerge. But
justification ends when ones "spade is turned." So,
"Yes", countless numbers of folks have justified
"acting for others rather than themselves" in terms
that leave me unimpressed.
Again -- my issue with "acting for the other rather
than the self" is that it falls in both the moral and
non-moral, as well as the moral and immoral.
Moral valuing is not like birdwatching. There specific
characteristics define the bird. Need I say that
"morality" is a family resemblance work?
> Thus, as we use the
> term "harm" it does not automatically included the
> notion of "wrong."
I love these ordinary language exchanges.You mean to
harm someone may be a good thing.
The Dentist's drill hurts. It harms me. But he fills
my cavity. You can rest assure that the Dentist would
deny harming me, his malpractice attorney insists upon
it.
Dictionary definition: 1- Injury 2- Wrong, evil.
Of course, you can deny #2. But be sure that you say
that each and every time you use "harm."
But all this us beside the point. The point being,
your question, "why is harming someone wrong." How
about "because most of us say it is wrong!" What's
wrong with that answer? Well, not every one agrees.
But is this sort of question that gets universal
agreement?
>The distinction I have made here is between instances
when one's >mind is influenced by non-rational factors
and when one's mind is
>influenced by rational factors. It may certainly be
true that we have
>few instances when one or the other alone is
involved. But, even if
>the two sorts of factors intermix to varying degrees,
still we can
>recognize that we are looking at two distinct and
separate
>categories.
That's helpful. Yes, we can theoretically posit a
distinction. Does it exist in the world. You say
"look." Where? How? And isn't this an empirical
question. The question isn't whether you can conceive
of a distinction. It is whether the distinction has an
application in our world.
I don't know. How do we find out?
>If I have no reason to act other than how I am
conditioned or
>subliminally influenced, then moral valuing is a
charade.
Yes, I love the ordinary language game. Note you write
"If I have no other reason"...so I wait to hear a
reason. But you don't give a reason. You give causes.
All my reasons have causes but the causes don't
diminish the validity of my reasons. Moral valuing is
a charade if I'm bullshitting or pretending. But that
is decided on criteria other than whether I've been
socialized. I can't be human with socialization.
Yes, along the way it occurs to one that every thought
and deed had a parent of sorts. And the parents...all
the way back to the big bang when it was all
predetermined. That can freeze me, dead in my tracks.
But then I still have to decide to take or bypass the
offer to cheat on my wife.
>I am not arguing about disagreement. I am noting that
there must be >a way to come to a reason based
conclusion or moral valuing >collapses.
Right. Whether I cheat or not will be a reasoned based
conclusion. My therapist may have other ideas about
causes...but she isn't making the decision. Nor is she
prepared to justify it. That I cheated because the
siren looked like my mother may "explain" why, but
doesn't speak to my justification.
>No, I never said disagreement would cease, only that
some of us >could come to a common ground and in that
case have no cause to >disagree.
How is that different from saying that sometimes folks
agree? Not in dispute. The issue is whether you can
point to anything that is common to the common ground
beyond they say they found it.
>Remember I have argued for a form of moral valuing
that relies on >certain emotional resonances
What do you mean you "argue" for it? Isn't this
something we already do? Again, is the title of your
work "A new approach to moral valuing"? If so, where
is the new?
> But in the end, if we are talking about what is
"moral" then we mean >those choices which involve
attention to standards that are extrinsic, >outside
ourselves in some fashion.
Finally, we agree on something. Let's see if it holds.
>Then the question is who is hurt and can we justify
inflicting that
>hurt.
One can justify anything. You are not asking that. You
want a reason that convinces most of the people most
of the time. Well, most people would agree that
arbitrarily hurting another for ones own pleasure,
without masochistic consent, is wrong. You want to
know why? Because we say so! Try to improve on that.
> we began this line of inquiry by trying to find out
what we mean
> by "moral."
And you tell me that my account of our conceptual life
is irrelevant. I went to great pains to explain how I
take that question as a request to look it up in the
dictionary. That's where you find the meaning of
words. But you are not asking what "moral means...you
are asking...
>I proposed that one characteristic
You want to give an objective description of a moral
act. As I said in the beginning, last year, this is
not a matter of speculation. One needs to observe
people claiming to act moral and see whether, using
statistical techniques, we can abstract out
properties. This research is feasible. But you deny
any interest in it. I recall you writing we must think
very. very hard. But very, very hard thinking doesn't
get us to the way things are.
See the difference. "What do we mean by 'moral'?
doesn't require data collection. We ask a native
speaker. As native speakers neither of us know the
properties of moral acts (sense #1 or #2) Your
hypotheses may pan out. But they are not even
hypotheses until you have a method for testing them.
More importantly, all research on the properties of
morality doesn't give us justification for calling
behavior X moral in either sense 1 or 2. Notice, to do
the research we ask the subjects to behave morally so
we Can observe them. What is justifiably moral has
been settled before the research begins. I don't know
how to make this any clearer.
>I would say for an act or judgment to be seen as
categorically a
>moral question, there would need to be not only
adherence to an
>external standard but also relevance to the needs and
wants of other
>human beings.
That is true because that is exactly what we mean by
the word "moral." No one can dispute. But armed with
that definition..oh, I see you agree.
>Now as to what makes my action or decision in this or
any case
>morally good or not will be something else. It will
be whether it
>adheres to a standard that I believe is itself good
and therefore to
>be followed.
Right. Again by definition.
>But this is not, itself, a moral question, i.e., what
I
>believe is a good standard will have to be determined
on a wholly
>different level.
Throws me for a loop. Whether I consider my behavior
moral isn't a moral question????
>In essence I am suggesting that we choose certain
ways of orienting
>ourselves to the world around us on a non-moral basis
that is
>commonly called spiritual.
Now I'm really confused. Yes, we can always ask
different questions about our behavior. Is it moral,
spiritually in tune, psychologically appropriate...but
don't tell me that my moral choice isn't moral. Not
unless you are gas lighting me.
SWM writes:I am fascinated by the question of why we
should ever care about others. I know that I do at
times and at times I don't. But sometimes when I do is
because I think I should. Then I want to know the
source of that particular belief of mine and whether
it is adequately
founded.
Bruce: I respect that in you.
SWM writes: Now one could say this is just my own
neurosis. And yet I look around at the world and see
these same questions being asked again and again by a
wide range of people. I see moral questions everywhere
but no ready answers, only platitudes and beliefs
based on nothing that seems compelling. If, in the
end, it's just about what we feel, then we should drop
the pretense. And yet to do that would be damaging to
society and thus to all of us. But I don't see a
strong reason to worry about damaging society as long
as I can get away with whatever I want while others
are still playing the game (the Gyges ring
question).
Bruce: That's well put. You are giving my reasons for
not playing the moral game. But I don't need to talk
morality, play the game, to be moral. Do you see that?
Nor do I need a complicated justification for not
hurting others.
SWM asks:So the reason I'm interested in this is that
I want to know why I should do some things and not
other things when those things have no intrinsically
compelling reason for me to do them.
Bruce: This question makes my head spin. If none of
the "things" have a compelling interest then there is
no "should." If you have no reason for doing
something, why should I be able to come up with one?
But you are really talking about damaging society
while getting away with it. If that's your question,
you frighten me. Why? Because if you have to ask it,
you are missing a conscience, the very thing that must
be in place for you to appreciate the answer.
All this is very frustrating; and yet very
illuminating, at least to me.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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swmaerske
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
> SWM: Seems that we go back and forth between two
> questions;
>
> 1. How do we best achieve our moral goals?
> 2. How do we best clarify moral discourse.?
>
> Question 1 may best be answered by avoiding moral
> discourse because, as you say, so much is
> platitudinous hand waving, emotional, propagandist
> appeal.
>
Depends what we take to be "moral discourse." If you are thinking of
moralizing or blathering about "the moral" then you may be right. But
if, as I have been suggesting, we think of any questions involving
making the right choices, then I would suggest one cannot avoid this.
But this simply brings us back to the same old, same old. I had
thought we were making some progress by trying a different tack or
two but it seems to me that we are just stuck on different
wavelengths. You hear "moral" and immediately think of moralizing. I
hear the term and think of the process by which we navigate our way
through our lives. We are just talking about different stuff I think.
> Question 2 requires that we get straight what sort of
> question is "What makes an act moral?" Is one asking
> for a definition, how we use the word, or an objective
> description of characteristics, and causes/conditions?
> If neither, then I'm lost.
>
Perhaps we are both "lost." I think here we are slipping and sliding
between the two main uses of "moral." As I have often said, I prefer
to ask what makes an act morally good or morally right? When you
phrase it as simply 'what makes an act moral' I hear the question as
when does a choice between actions involve moral criteria and when
does it not?
Of course the ultimate aim is to see if there are any moral criteria
we can reliably invoke in such situations or if all such criteria are
simply illusory?
> --- swmaerske <swmaerske@...> wrote:
>
> > what I'm interested in is seeing if there is some
> > basis for choosing
> > some acts as right or others wrong in the moral
> > sphere,
>
> I'm perfectly aware of that. What I'm trying to show
> you that this question "is there some basis for
> choosing acts" stirs up all lot of conceptual dust, if
> you will, such that I no longer can see the question,
> much less the possibility of the answer.
>
The fact that dust is stirred up doesn't mean we should not stir it.
The more I try to brush the dust aside by suggesting we limit our
discussion or keep an eye on the usages of moral, the more, it seems
to me, you push us back toward mixing our usages and looking at a
bigger, less manageable picture. In fact, I think we'd do better to
move more incrementally here, sticking with questions like what do we
mean by "moral" in its different usages for starters. But we seem
unable to hold to this.
Of course there is the obvious question that arises all the time: why
should I put my own interests aside for another and should I ever do
such a thing? And then there are derivative questions such as why
should I follow this or that rule reflecting some external standard
or other (no need to cite a specific one here) when I'd prefer to
simply serve my own purposes? As long as these questions can be
answered this is not just a philosophical question. That psychologist
and the thief he was counseling weren't speaking philosophically. The
question really revolved around what the thief might or might not do,
going forward.
> Just for beginners. The obvious answer is "YES." When
> I give answers, you challenge them.
I was under the impression you were challenging the answers I gave as
well. Is that off limits here?
> So if you are
> really asking "is there some basis that is will win
> overwhelming acceptance, the answer is "No."
I'm not convinced that is the answer, though apparently it is yours.
My view is that there is a remarkable commonality from culture to
culture and place to place with regard to how humans comport
themselves with their fellows. While moral codes and mores vary,
there are some things that don't really seem to vary all that much,
e.g., the tendency to follow certain articulated external standards
or rules, the belief in the value of self-sacrifice, the belief that
killing one's fellows (at least in some circumstances) is wrong, the
belief that stealing is wrong (even if some societies have a dual
standard, encouraging and rewarding stealing while still recognizing
it as a punishable offense). If one looks at religions one also sees
a tendency to believe in the ability to shape ourselves via religious
tenets and practices. There may not be 100% universality here, but
there does seem to be a great deal of commonality. And that
commonality raises interesting questions about whether or not it is
possible to build a picture of what is morally good that can win
broad acceptance based on the quality of the argument alone.
> Then you
> accuse me of Moral Relativism. But I'm not putting
> forth a doctrine.
You don't have to explicitly subscribe to moral relativism to be a
moral relativist. On the other hand, may people talk as though they
are but when you get right down to it, they don't act that way, i.e.,
there are some threshholds they won't cross however much they may pay
lip service to the claim that there is no way to show that one set of
moral value claims is better or more reasonable than another.
> I'm just describing what happens.
So am I.
> Then I ask, "Are you trying to improve upon this,
> revise our moral game?" and you answer "NO." Then
> I'm mystified.
>
I am not trying to create a better moral game. I am trying to
understand why moral valuing often seems to work for us, in this
case, of course, for me, when I hold no obvious belief in anything
that can support a claim that one set of value standards is
intrinsically superior to another.
> >It is simply false to say that the
> > answer to the
> > question I've raised lies in the concepts we use
>
> If it is false, then I don't get your question. You
> want to know whether our moral choices have a basis.
> It is in the very nature of our choices that they have
> a basis -- sometimes the same, sometimes different.
>
> (Q) "Bruce, what is the basis for choosing fidelity."
> (A) "The basis is that I value fidelity." Yes the
> answer is in the question. Are you asking a different
> question?
>
Why do you value fidelity? Some people obviously don't and some do.
Now it is certainly true that our society as a whole places a value
on fidelity and there may be a number of good sociological reasons
and/or there may be reasons that are just a matter of the course
history took in the place and among the people we find ourselves.
Nevertheless, in valuing fidelity, we may sometimes also come to
disvalue it. We have a choice. And when we have such a choice, we
must decide according to reasons. Now it may be that our reasons are
illusions, that we act in a programmed way or on instinct or some
such most of the time and only rationalize our reasons before, during
or after we act. If this is the case, of course, then moral valuing
as a game we play ceases to work. And yet our experience (or at least
mine) seems to suggest that the game works most of the time, even if
we don't know quite why.
> >The answer is not there and we see that demonstrated
> > every day...there are certain
> > cases, the Nazi case being one in point,
>
> A case of what? For the sake of discussion, let's say
> that the Nazis found their behavior moral, obviously
> we don't -- but at least we agree that it is a moral
> issue (meaning #1). But, both Nazis and us give a
> basis for their acts. That's what you asked for and
> that's what you get. Again, what do you really want? A
> way of showing that the Nazis were immoral that they
> have to agree with. If that's it, then let's discuss
> whether such a request can be provided by our moral
> game.
Yes, I think that is exactly what we need if moral valuing is to
work. We must be able to convince others and ourselves of certain
choices in lieu of others for, if we cannot, then there is no real
moral valuing to be had at all.
>
> Earlier you wrote that our Moral game is like Chess.
> But it isn't. There are no rules for moral checkmate.
> Do you think that this is accidental, or because this
> is very difficult material or, perhaps, because to ask
> for a checkmate violates the game?
>
I would never suggest that the moral game is a closed game in the way
that chess is. While chess has a vast number of possible board
combinations and moves, I don't think one can so easily delimit the
game of moral valuing.
> > Where do you draw the line and is there a line to be
> > drawn? There is a moral dimension here that your
> answers
> > don't begin to address.
>
> Correct. I haven't tried to speak my revulsion with
> genocide, nor are any of comments here relevant to
> such concerns. I've on;y been addressing what I see as
> conceptual confusion. This is a minor point compared
> with genocide.
And that is a moral judgement. Perhaps some other will say, no,
genocide is minor compared with the significance of getting clear on
a particular problem that interests me. By making the claim you make
about genocide you have already decided the issue. But it does not
tell us why it is wrong to commit genocide. Only that you believe
it's wrong. Presumably we can all agree to that on this list. Yet
some human beings in history have not agreed to it. Were they wrong?
Why should they agree to it? And if they were not and there is no
reason for them to agree to it, then how can we say it's wrong in any
way that goes beyond our personal likes and dislikes? But such
personal inclinations can form no basis for moral claims. And here we
are back, I think, where we started. (I don't see that we are making
any progress at all.)
>
> On that matter, I think it pointless to go on about
> its morality. What is going on in Darfur and other
> places needs to be stopped. It will not be stopped by
> arguments about its moral purpose.
>
Why does it need to be stopped? Because we think it is wrong. But
apparently there are some human beings, those committing the
genocide, that don't agree that they are acting wrongly. If they did
agree, presumably they would stop what they are doing. Can we ever
get them to agree? If we can't is the only solution to make war on
them and, if need be, kill them to stop their actions?
The point of moral discourse is to get us to the right choices
without the use of force or chicanery. Obviously it doesn't always
work but if this possibility didn't exist we would live in a
frightening world indeed.
> If you are not ready to stop Genocide until you are
> sure it is immoral, then I have great difficulty in
> understanding how your mind works.
>
The question is whether we can stop it by offering moral guidance,
showing someone who is doing it that they shouldn't do it and getting
them to see things our way. Obviously, again, this is not always
possible. But at some level, in some places it happens. In parts of
the United States in the early nineteenth century many communities
came to the conclusion that slavery was wrong. There are a lot of
factors that led to this including a change in economic dynamics and,
also, the growing realization that the people who were slaves were
also human and that slavery was simply inconsistent with the
articulated principles of human freedom that formed the cornerstone
of our national myth and primary institutions. Eventually there was
an upheaval. As Lincoln portrayed it, the Civil War was also a great
moral struggle. Now, more than a hundred years later, the notion of
slavery is anathema to nearly everyone in this country and, no doubt,
in much of the world. There has been a sea change in our views and
understandings. This did not proceed by simple arguments and moral
debate but, in fact, the moral aspect played a significant part in
the change that our society underwent. People made arguments against
slavery based on its cruelty and inconsistency with other things
people believed in. The arguments had an effect. Arguments can only
have an effect when they have a certain logical power in the game of
giving reasons. Granted this game does not get played in isolation.
But I think it's quite clear that it does get played.
> > Aren't there some situations where no amount of
> > rational legerdemain
> > explains why we act for others rather than
> > ourselves?
>
> You write "explain". I was thinking "justification."
> Two different concepts.
Sometimes quite fungible though.
> No explanation is ever
> complete because new facts or theories may emerge.
If the explanation has to do with clarification rather than
hypothesizing and theorizing, then I think we can come to a point
where the matter is simply settled.
> But
> justification ends when ones "spade is turned." So,
> "Yes", countless numbers of folks have justified
> "acting for others rather than themselves" in terms
> that leave me unimpressed.
>
Still acting for others instead of ourselves is a part of what we do
and what we often think is the right thing to do. Why? Is there some
reason that underlies the articulated reasons, some reason implied in
how we argue about this matter?
> Again -- my issue with "acting for the other rather
> than the self" is that it falls in both the moral and
> non-moral, as well as the moral and immoral.
>
Clarify this please.
> Moral valuing is not like birdwatching. There specific
> characteristics define the bird. Need I say that
> "morality" is a family resemblance work?
>
What are the resemblances you think at work? Until now you have asked
me to present my ideas about what constitutes the moral as a
category. Now I think it is only fair you have a go at it.
Remember the issue before us is not what constitutes morally good. We
already know that that is defined by any number of different
standards and systems of standards depending on where the individual
is culturally situated. Some believe in the Ten Commandments, others
the Middle Way, others the Golden Rule, other's the Eightfold Path,
others the revelations of the Prophet. This is not a question of
family resemblances.
That question, which requires this sort of explication, is what is
the thing about moral claims that differentiates them from the non-
moral?
> > Thus, as we use the
> > term "harm" it does not automatically included the
> > notion of "wrong."
>
> I love these ordinary language exchanges.You mean to
> harm someone may be a good thing.
> The Dentist's drill hurts. It harms me. But he fills
> my cavity. You can rest assure that the Dentist would
> deny harming me, his malpractice attorney insists upon
> it.
>
> Dictionary definition: 1- Injury 2- Wrong, evil.
>
> Of course, you can deny #2. But be sure that you say
> that each and every time you use "harm."
>
The point is that notions of what is morally wrong or bad, what is
evil, are not contained in the term "harm" every time we use it. True
sometimes harm is used in relation to these. But if it is not always
used thus, then they are not intrinsic to the word harm.
> But all this us beside the point. The point being,
> your question, "why is harming someone wrong." How
> about "because most of us say it is wrong!" What's
> wrong with that answer? Well, not every one agrees.
> But is this sort of question that gets universal
> agreement?
So in a Nazi society where the majority agree that it is okay to kill
off one part of the population, then it is morally acceptable? Is
moral judgment just a matter of taking a poll or a vote?
>
> >The distinction I have made here is between instances
> when one's >mind is influenced by non-rational factors
> and when one's mind is
> >influenced by rational factors. It may certainly be
> true that we have
> >few instances when one or the other alone is
> involved. But, even if
> >the two sorts of factors intermix to varying degrees,
> still we can
> >recognize that we are looking at two distinct and
> separate
> >categories.
>
> That's helpful. Yes, we can theoretically posit a
> distinction. Does it exist in the world. You say
> "look." Where? How? And isn't this an empirical
> question. The question isn't whether you can conceive
> of a distinction. It is whether the distinction has an
> application in our world.
>
Look at my example of how the idea of slavery gradually fell into
disapprobation.
> I don't know. How do we find out?
>
> >If I have no reason to act other than how I am
> conditioned or
> >subliminally influenced, then moral valuing is a
> charade.
>
> Yes, I love the ordinary language game. Note you write
> "If I have no other reason"...so I wait to hear a
> reason. But you don't give a reason. You give causes.
What are you talking about? I have been offering a number of possible
reasons, e.g., the notion that we act in a certain way because we
should be empathetic. I don't know if this is a good formulation of
an underlying reason for the kinds of moral issues I am concerned
with, but it is in the end a reason and not a cause. It does,
however, imply a connection with religious teaching and activity and
I'm not sure that is necessarily the wrong place to look.
> All my reasons have causes but the causes don't
> diminish the validity of my reasons.
We either act on a cause or we act for a reason. If the cause is what
matters, then the reasons are surface phenomena and, thus, chimerical
in nature. If, on the other hand, the reason matters, then what kind
of reason would do the job?
> Moral valuing is
> a charade if I'm bullshitting or pretending. But that
> is decided on criteria other than whether I've been
> socialized. I can't be human with socialization.
>
The question is whether moral valuing is ever anything more than
bullshitting or pretending, isn't it? (Including, of course,
bullshitting or pretending to ourselves.)
> Yes, along the way it occurs to one that every thought
> and deed had a parent of sorts. And the parents...all
> the way back to the big bang when it was all
> predetermined. That can freeze me, dead in my tracks.
> But then I still have to decide to take or bypass the
> offer to cheat on my wife.
>
Yes, you are still in a world of reasons, not causes. As a
psychologist you look at the causes behind what people do. But in
your own life you act on reasons. Presumably you hold to a view that
all your reasons have some underlying causes which, perhaps, you
simply cannot discern for yourself (so maybe you go to your own
analyst periodically to get down to the causative nitty gritty). But
most of the time in your daily life you are acting and thinking and
weighing things without regard to causes but, rather, with regard to
justifications (and facts about the world, of course). The question
then is does this dichotomy between the psychologist and the man
really exist and, if it does, which is the important factor in our
daily behavior?
> >I am not arguing about disagreement. I am noting that
> there must be >a way to come to a reason based
> conclusion or moral valuing >collapses.
>
> Right. Whether I cheat or not will be a reasoned based
> conclusion. My therapist may have other ideas about
> causes...but she isn't making the decision. Nor is she
> prepared to justify it. That I cheated because the
> siren looked like my mother may "explain" why, but
> doesn't speak to my justification.
>
If you could have chosen otherwise, then the compulsion related to
your mother is only partly relevant, i.e., you could have resisted.
Failure to resist or the decision to resist are the relevant issues
here. If, on the other hand, you were totally a creature of your
drives, then you cannot be blamed. Of course if that is true for all
of us, then none of us can be blamed. In that case there is no real
moral dimension to our actions. Without a moral dimension, of course,
anything pretty much goes when you really think about it.
> >No, I never said disagreement would cease, only that
> some of us >could come to a common ground and in that
> case have no cause to >disagree.
>
> How is that different from saying that sometimes folks
> agree? Not in dispute. The issue is whether you can
> point to anything that is common to the common ground
> beyond they say they found it.
>
Yes, that is the issue isn't it? That is what I've been driving at.
> >Remember I have argued for a form of moral valuing
> that relies on >certain emotional resonances
>
> What do you mean you "argue" for it? Isn't this
> something we already do? Again, is the title of your
> work "A new approach to moral valuing"? If so, where
> is the new?
The question is what underlies our moral decision making and how does
that relate to the reasons we give others and ourselves? What is the
nature of this moral game we play?
>
> > But in the end, if we are talking about what is
> "moral" then we mean >those choices which involve
> attention to standards that are extrinsic, >outside
> ourselves in some fashion.
>
> Finally, we agree on something. Let's see if it holds.
>
> >Then the question is who is hurt and can we justify
> inflicting that
> >hurt.
>
> One can justify anything. You are not asking that.
No I'm not. Thank you for noticing.
> You
> want a reason that convinces most of the people most
> of the time. Well, most people would agree that
> arbitrarily hurting another for ones own pleasure,
> without masochistic consent, is wrong. You want to
> know why? Because we say so! Try to improve on that.
>
And the Nazis say killing off the Jews is okay. Saying something is
just not enough from a moral perspective.
> > we began this line of inquiry by trying to find out
> what we mean
> > by "moral."
>
> And you tell me that my account of our conceptual life
> is irrelevant. I went to great pains to explain how I
> take that question as a request to look it up in the
> dictionary. That's where you find the meaning of
> words.
Dictionaries document many common meanings in language but they don't
get at the shadowy edges of usage or at the implication of uses for
certain larger questions. Going to a dictionary strikes me as rather
sterile. Better to rely on our own expertise as language users to
follow where the spoor leads.
> But you are not asking what "moral means...you
> are asking...
>
> >I proposed that one characteristic
>
> You want to give an objective description of a moral
> act. As I said in the beginning, last year, this is
> not a matter of speculation. One needs to observe
> people claiming to act moral and see whether, using
> statistical techniques, we can abstract out
> properties. This research is feasible. But you deny
> any interest in it. I recall you writing we must think
> very. very hard. But very, very hard thinking doesn't
> get us to the way things are.
>
I said then and say now that I am not all that interested in doing
original research of how different people and different societies
practice moral valuing. I'm interested in the work done but, in the
end, I am interested in the concepts, not what particular people or
peoples think of the concepts or how they employ them. I know how I
employ these concepts within my own cultural milieu and how certain
difficulties arise when my usages come up against other cultural
usages. This is of interest to me. But I will leave researching and
documenting human practices to sociologists, anthropologists,
psychologists and other relevant scientists. Looking into the idea of
moral valuing is a different activity.
> See the difference. "What do we mean by 'moral'?
> doesn't require data collection. We ask a native
> speaker. As native speakers neither of us know the
> properties of moral acts (sense #1 or #2) Your
> hypotheses may pan out. But they are not even
> hypotheses until you have a method for testing them.
>
I'm only interested in a philosophical inquiry here not a scientific
one. I don't think scientific research answers this question though
it may provide useful information in broadening our grasp of the
concepts in question.
> More importantly, all research on the properties of
> morality doesn't give us justification for calling
> behavior X moral in either sense 1 or 2.
I don't see how we can talk about "properties of morality."
Properties seems to me to relate to physical phenomena whereas moral
judgements are conceptual in their nature. Thus, "characteristics" is
a more appropriate term.
> Notice, to do
> the research we ask the subjects to behave morally so
> we Can observe them.
It's a different project.
> What is justifiably moral has
> been settled before the research begins. I don't know
> how to make this any clearer.
>
That's why it's a different project.
> >I would say for an act or judgment to be seen as
> categorically a
> >moral question, there would need to be not only
> adherence to an
> >external standard but also relevance to the needs and
> wants of other
> >human beings.
>
> That is true because that is exactly what we mean by
> the word "moral." No one can dispute. But armed with
> that definition..oh, I see you agree.
>
I am not saying that is the only characteristic we have in mind
by "moral" . . . just that it is one characteristic.
> >Now as to what makes my action or decision in this or
> any case
> >morally good or not will be something else. It will
> be whether it
> >adheres to a standard that I believe is itself good
> and therefore to
> >be followed.
>
> Right. Again by definition.
>
That's all we're doing here, looking at the concepts (what you here
call definitions) trying to clear them up a bit. The issue here is to
clarify what we mean by "moral" when we use the term.
> >But this is not, itself, a moral question, i.e., what
> I
> >believe is a good standard will have to be determined
> on a wholly
> >different level.
>
> Throws me for a loop. Whether I consider my behavior
> moral isn't a moral question????
>
What is moral as a category is a conceptual question. What is moral
as in morally good is a question that relates to the moral standards
we accept. Different questions and different kinds of answers.
> >In essence I am suggesting that we choose certain
> ways of orienting
> >ourselves to the world around us on a non-moral basis
> that is
> >commonly called spiritual.
>
> Now I'm really confused. Yes, we can always ask
> different questions about our behavior. Is it moral,
> spiritually in tune, psychologically appropriate...but
> don't tell me that my moral choice isn't moral. Not
> unless you are gas lighting me.
>
If the point is to see how we come to accept a moral claim based on a
reason, then the reason must reflect a different level of the game
than the moral. In essense I'm saying that the moral game may simply
rest on another.
No because I think you are hung up on the usage of "moral" as morally
good. For you, whenever I mention the word "moral" you
hear "moralizing" and that's not what I'm saying.
> SWM asks:So the reason I'm interested in this is that
> I want to know why I should do some things and not
> other things when those things have no intrinsically
> compelling reason for me to do them.
>
> Bruce: This question makes my head spin. If none of
> the "things" have a compelling interest then there is
> no "should." If you have no reason for doing
> something, why should I be able to come up with one?
> But you are really talking about damaging society
> while getting away with it. If that's your question,
> you frighten me. Why? Because if you have to ask it,
> you are missing a conscience, the very thing that must
> be in place for you to appreciate the answer.
>
And what is a conscience? Is it just certain internal strictures we
happen to have in ourselves to holdg our thinking in place? Or is it
the result of thought about what is morally right and what isn't?
> All this is very frustrating; and yet very
> illuminating, at least to me.
>
> bruce
>
Well we shall see. It is getting long again. This one took me two
hours to read and respond to when I had only planned to devote a half
hour at most to it. I can't put in this much time for awhile going
forward. We really have to try to keep these threads tighter and more
focused.
SWM
bruce denner
in order to follow your advice, I believe, go step by
step.
Step 1: Answer the question: “What makes a response
moral?”
Answer: It expresses what we take the concept moral to
mean, i.e., an expression of a moral value both in
sense #1 – A situation asking for a moral response;
and #2 – What is (or is not) a moral act in that
situation.
In both instances, what I mean by “value”, are the
uses listed in the dictionary.
You’ve agreed. I believe. But, at best, you find the
above preliminary, limited. Fine. So, ask the next
question!
I’ll add that I expect the next question to be one
that we can discuss here and not one that asks the
review of the research, i.e., the causes and
conditions for a moral response. I expect your
question to move us to some clarification. Addresses
something that is unclear about answer. If so, tell me
what needs to be clarified, and I’ll give it a try.
swmaerske
Yahoo has been having problems on other lists so perhaps there's
something wrong here, too? I just don't feel like reinventing the
last wheel I posted here. Call me crazy . . . of lazy. -- SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> I responded to this but for some reason it's not
> showing up. I know
> Yahoo has been having problems on other lists so
> perhaps there's
> something wrong here, too? I just don't feel like
> reinventing the
> last wheel I posted here. Call me crazy . . . of
> lazy. -- SWM
I'm a bit lost. I assumed upon reading the above that
you had copied your missing Post. But I don't find it
here. Now it is possible that I accidentally deleted
it. I get 70plus posting plus spam. So-- if it is
lost, can you do it again.
Also, the last Post by emirsky was signed by SWM--
strange...are their doppelgangers among us?
swmaerske
>
> > I responded to this but for some reason it's not
> > showing up. I know
> > Yahoo has been having problems on other lists so
> > perhaps there's
> > something wrong here, too? I just don't feel like
> > reinventing the
> > last wheel I posted here. Call me crazy . . . of
> > lazy. -- SWM
>
> I'm a bit lost. I assumed upon reading the above that
> you had copied your missing Post. But I don't find it
> here. Now it is possible that I accidentally deleted
> it. I get 70plus posting plus spam. So-- if it is
> lost, can you do it again.
>
> Also, the last Post by emirsky was signed by SWM--
> strange...are their doppelgangers among us?
>
> bruce
>
>
Ah, I hadn't noticed that. I must have been responding from my wife's
computer which she has permanently logged into her Yahoo account
(unless I change it) since that is her account name. Didn't pay
attention.
I did think my response to your post appeared here but later, when I
happened to look for it again (after discovering problems on another
Yahoo list), I couldn't find it, so figured it had been somehow
knocked off. If you recall seeing it then I guess it really was
there, however briefly.
I don't know if I'm up to trying to reconstruct. Let's simply proceed
from here.
SWM
>
>
______________________________________________________________________
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> I don't know if I'm up to trying to reconstruct.
> Let's simply proceed
> from here.
Which left me thinking: "OK, he is going to go on" But
you haven't. Right? You will, I hope. Though this
weekend is shot full of off-line commitments.
Also, I actually heard a different voice in that
different name, your wife, it seems. Perhaps, just my
imagination.
In any event: Here is where I am. I backed us up to
the most introductory. The definition of morality.
From Webster's Unabridged.
1. rightness or wrongness as of an action.
2. the character of being in accord with the
principles or standards of right conduct.
3. principles of right and wrong in conduct, ethics.
4. moral instruction or lesson.
5. a morality play.
I'm not playing the fool. I well know that much, much
more can be said about morality. But what more can we
say here that doesn't involve reading other texts,
gathering data, etc? Well, philosophy can be said.
Philosophy, I believe we agree, is in the business of
clarification.
One doesn't need data to clarify. What one needs is a
statement that is unclear,ambiguous, seemingly
contradictory, puzzling.
What about the above uses are any of these?
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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swmaerske
>
> > I don't know if I'm up to trying to reconstruct.
> > Let's simply proceed
> > from here.
>
> Which left me thinking: "OK, he is going to go on" But
> you haven't. Right? You will, I hope. Though this
> weekend is shot full of off-line commitments.
>
> Also, I actually heard a different voice in that
> different name, your wife, it seems. Perhaps, just my
> imagination.
>
Well it was still me writing, just using a different account without
realizing it. Unless my wife's spirit somehow infected me for the
moment!
I will try to continue but am in the midst of a big project for the
next few weeks so that may oblige me to take a break. These
discussions of ours can get very intense and require my full
attention which I am not currently able to afford them. Being
distracted may lead me to make errors in clarity or focus which will
undermine our efforts to get clear here.
> In any event: Here is where I am. I backed us up to
> the most introductory. The definition of morality.
> From Webster's Unabridged.
>
> 1. rightness or wrongness as of an action.
> 2. the character of being in accord with the
> principles or standards of right conduct.
> 3. principles of right and wrong in conduct, ethics.
> 4. moral instruction or lesson.
> 5. a morality play.
>
> I'm not playing the fool. I well know that much, much
> more can be said about morality. But what more can we
> say here that doesn't involve reading other texts,
> gathering data, etc? Well, philosophy can be said.
>
> Philosophy, I believe we agree, is in the business of
> clarification.
> One doesn't need data to clarify. What one needs is a
> statement that is unclear,ambiguous, seemingly
> contradictory, puzzling.
>
> What about the above uses are any of these?
>
> bruce
>
I think the above set of definitions misses one very critical
one: "moral" as a category descriptor, i.e., that referring to a
choice as a moral one means that we recognize a special (moral)
dimension in making it. It is what we mean by that moral dimension
that interests me primarily and philosophically, though I am
interested, secondarily, in what actions I, as a person with the
ability to choose, should choose when I am engaged in the moral
dimension.
No doubt the reason you got the definition you did is that you looked
up "morality" rather than "moral" though I suppose it is possible to
find a dictionary that does not note the 'moral as category' usage
that I am talking about.
SWM
>
>
>
______________________________________________________________________
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> I will try to continue but am in the midst of a big
> project for the
> next few weeks so that may oblige me to take a
> break. These
> discussions of ours can get very intense and require
> my full
> attention which I am not currently able to afford
> them. Being
> distracted may lead me to make errors in clarity or
> focus which will
> undermine our efforts to get clear here.
Take your time. No deadlines here.
> I think the above set of definitions misses one very
> critical
> one: "moral" as a category descriptor, i.e., that
> referring to a
> choice as a moral one means that we recognize a
> special (moral)
> dimension in making it.
>
> No doubt the reason you got the definition you did
> is that you looked
> up "morality" rather than "moral"
Let's look. As a noun: 1. practical lesson inculcated
in a story, 2.a maxim, 3. good or right in conduct,
virtuous, 3. principles and practice in regard to
right, right, wrong and duty. There more, but #3 seems
closest to your use; and clearly suggests a dimension.
>It is what we mean by that moral dimension
>that interests me primarily and philosophically,
I know I've asked you again and again, but I remain
unclear what about this dimension, implied above,
interests you.
Again, I assume that we share what "Moral" means, we
know how to use the word, in the main, and sometimes
be surprised by a new use. Nor are we asking for the
causes and conditions under which a person calls a
situation, a moral dilemma.
What are we asking?
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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swmaerske
Still very short of time and likely to be until the end of April.
Nevertheless this is a good question (if asked before). What are we
asking?
What I am asking is: Why should anyone act in the interests of others
in some situations rather than in their own interests?
Put another way: What underlies a claim that it's good to put others
interests/needs/benefits above one's own in certain situations?
As a corollary to either form of this question: What are the
situations that are relevant to such considerations?
Another corollary question: What are the conditions or reasons that
underlie a claim that acting in others' interests is sometimes the
right thing to do and are these reasons (or the reasons based on the
conditions) convincing in some rational way? (By "some rational way,"
I am aksing how it is that we consider different reasons for acting
and select one or more of them in lieu of others and then act on them
or try to act on them.)
I know you keep asking the same question as though I am not making
this clear and, perhaps, I am not making it clear to you. Or perhaps
it just doesn't resonate with you because you are not attuned to
these questions as I apparently am.
Indeed, most of us proceed through life with our beliefs as they are,
not questioning them or seeing the need to question them. That is no
less true for those with an interest in philosophy than it is for
those with no such interest. Even philosophers have areas of interest
and, presumably, areas of disinterest.
Gary nearby has pointed out that much of what we mean by "moral"
refers to a sensibility, a feeling or set of feelings we have about
some things, and that it is often enough merely to invoke these
feelings in order to take a moral stand. He seems to think that this
is enough to explain the moral dimension of his life and, perhaps, so
do you.
Over this past weekend my son was by for a visit and got in an
argument with my son-in-law about physician assisted suicide. My son
announced that he is morally opposed to it but, when pressed, could
give no better reason than that he felt that life was sacred and you
should not take it, even if it is your own. My son-in-law is a bit
more libertarian on this question (a position I tend to share) and
demanded to know if my son would want his moral sense converted to
law. Of course that IS the question vis a vis assisted suicide, isn't
it? It's not do we like the idea of it or not but do we think that
society should enforce (or try to enforce) a prohibition against it.
My son agreed that he would not like the state intervening but stood
firm on his feeling that it is morally repugnant.
So this debate resolved itself when all agreed that on the issue of
external enforcement of a prohibition, we were all on the same page
(though conceivably we might not have been).
I think many moral debates take this form, arguing over conflicting
feelings AND over the role of others in individual moral choices.
But we never got to a level in that discussion where the question of
opposition to assisted suicide could be morally evaluated. My son
simply refused to go there. He announced that he just felt that way
and that was the end of it. As long as we did not oppose his holding
his particular personal feelings about this and he did not insist on
making his personal feelings a general standard through the agency of
social enforcement, we were all on the same page.
I think this is what Gary is getting at when he says it all boils
down to how we feel about things.
But this doesn't help us much with the question of the Nazi who kills
the Jews or the farmer who laps the blood from the throat of the
dying lamb he has just slaughtered. Perhaps, though, the farmer's
actions by themselves are simply aesthetically unappealing? But can
we say as much for the Nazi killing Jews? Or the terrorist blowing up
thousands of people in a suicide attack? And would we want to say
that, i.e., that it's just a matter of our personal sensibilities?
Is there an argument against killing others (or even against
something more minor, such as stealing) that stands on something more
than my son's feeling of disapprobation for an individual's decision
to take his or her own life?
Because if there isn't, how can we condemn those humans among us
whose behavior is genuinely monstrous? Certainly we can oppose them.
But at the end of the day, isn't it just a matter of whatever they or
anyone else can get away with? Isn't it then nothing more than a form
of might makes right? The winner writes the history?
But if that is true, then there really isn't any moral game to be
played except insofar as it is some sort of elaborate social charade.
But if it is that, then those who adopt a view of moral nihilism are
correct.
Anyway, that is the issue that interests me and why I ask the
questions, above, that I ask.
Why you keep asking me what the question is, on the other hand,
strikes me as odd since I am always answering it. Indeed, it seems
that I do so in nearly every post.
SWM
P.S. Yes, the third definition roughly approximates what I have in
mind when I inquire about the term "moral." Only secondarily am I
interested in any particular moral standard or set of standards,
e.g., whether they can or cannot be shown to be the right ones. When
I suggest that the issue of standards boils down to an argument for
empathy, I am claiming that moral standards, both specifically and
generally, are best explained as a function of certain attitudes and
stances we adopt and that 1) adopting such standards can and does
influence or affect the actual feelings we have and 2) that an
argument that is itself not strictly a moral one can be advanced in
favor of adopting such attitudes or stances. I am not denying the
role of feelings in moral judgements but, rather, suggesting a way in
which feelings can be seen to play a role without exhausting the
description of what constitutes moral valuing.
bruce denner
me id I respond immediately upon reading.
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> What I am asking is: Why should anyone act in the
> interests of others
> in some situations rather than in their own
> interests?
A good question. I would imagine that there are lots
and lots of possible answers. Where do you want to go
with this? Ask people?
> Put another way: What underlies a claim that it's
> good to put others
> interests/needs/benefits above one's own in certain
> situations?
Yes, the same question. We are we going to ask and
what are we going to do with the many answers?
You go on to propose different versions of the
question. Fine. But my question remains the same.
> I am asking how it is that we consider different
> reasons for acting
> and select one or more of them in lieu of others and
> then act on them
> or try to act on them.)
What do you mean by "how it is we consider?" The fact
is that we do. You want to know the steps people take
in considering? It gets back to asking folks.
Note: I don't find your question unclear. It is
perfectly clear. But I don't know how you want to
answer it.
Note: A answer to your question would be of great
value. But, for me, it is not a matter of what I
think, an opinion. I want to know the facts. And the
facts are hard to come by.
Note: I find the comment that moral refers to a
sensibility, a feeling, obviously true but doesn't
tell me much. Then again, I'm not clear about what
more we want to know. If we want to know people's
reasons for acting, we have to ask them. And then we
have the problem of data reduction, i.e., we get all
kinds of answers in different words and have to figure
if they are all saying the same thing or something
different. This is a daunting task,
Morality of physician assisted suicide was quite
interesting.
> I think many moral debates take this form, arguing
> over conflicting
> feelings AND over the role of others in individual
> moral choices.
Right!
> But we never got to a level in that discussion where
> the question of
> opposition to assisted suicide could be morally
> evaluated.
because, and this is critical...
>My son simply refused to go there.
which is his choice. But there is an enormous
literature that critically evaluates the moral
dimension of this question. Perhaps he simply didn't
want to debate. I don't know what to conclude in
general because one person is reluctant.
>is there an argument against killing others ...that
stands on >something more than my son's feeling of
disapprobation for an >individual's decision to take
his or her own life?
Come on, you know there are books and books...so I'm
puzzled by your question. You mean people disagree. We
don't have a united front. But that doesn't mean there
is no game but that there is no sense of checkmate in
this game. The problem with analogies.
Note: Bruce asks the same question, namely, "What is
SWM's question?" because of these reasons:
1- Bruce believes that SWM already knows the answer.
People make moral decisions based on reasons sometimes
fueled by passion. So why is SWM asking it?
2- Bruce doesn't understand what SWM is planning to do
with all the many reasons he may collect.
3- Bruce suspects that SWM has the notion that some
where there is a very compelling reason that will
persuade most of the people most of the time. But SWM
denies this.
4. Every now and then SWM mentions empathy as a
possible basis for that most compelling answer. But
SWM has alread agreed that Empathy is neither
necessary or sufficient. So Bruce remains puzzled
about SWM's project.
bruce
Footnote: What interests me how, in what way, we can
go beyond what we know, what we take to be,
ordinarily, the case.
____________________________________________________________________________________
swmaerske
> me id I respond immediately upon reading.
>
> > What I am asking is: Why should anyone act in the
> > interests of others
> > in some situations rather than in their own
> > interests?
>
> A good question. I would imagine that there are lots
> and lots of possible answers. Where do you want to go
> with this? Ask people?
>
Sometimes. And ask ourselves.
Yes, when we are playing THAT game. But asking about reasons for the
moral claims people adduce when answering the question you are
proposing is a different question. In that case we must also look at
the lines of reasoning bihnd their answers, what the reasons they
adduce point to, in order to get our answer. So it is not the same
question as you pose though it looks superficially the same.
> And then we
> have the problem of data reduction, i.e., we get all
> kinds of answers in different words and have to figure
> if they are all saying the same thing or something
> different. This is a daunting task,
>
There is the work of social science and the work of philosophical
inquiry. They are different games. I take it that you want to say the
second is not a real game but an illusory one and that you rely, in
this claim, to some extent on Wittgenstein's assertions that he had
put an end to philosophy. (Of course I take that claim to mean
something a bit different, i.e., that he had put an end to
traditional philosophy, not to philosophy per se. This is to say that
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, the process of seeking
clarity about our ideas, is still philosophy when you come right down
to it).
No books I know of have resolved the matter to my satisfaction. This
may simply mean it is an unresolvable matter or that no one has
really gotten at this with sufficient clarity.
> Note: Bruce asks the same question, namely, "What is
> SWM's question?" because of these reasons:
>
> 1- Bruce believes that SWM already knows the answer.
> People make moral decisions based on reasons sometimes
> fueled by passion. So why is SWM asking it?
>
SWM wants to know if there is any argument beyond what any of us
happen to feel at any given moment for the moral claims we happen to
make? SWM is not satisfied with an answer that it's all about our
feelings because that provides no basis for rational claims beyond
those that are merely descriptive. And moral claims, as is quite
clear, are prescriptive, not descriptive (though they often contain
descriptive elements).
> 2- Bruce doesn't understand what SWM is planning to do
> with all the many reasons he may collect.
>
SWM is planning to use the conclusions he comes to in order to
determine if there is some basis for making rationally convincing
moral arguments.
Of course, this doesn't mean we simply cease playing the moral game
without such information. The game goes on. But what we make of it
and how seriously we play it may well be affected by the results of
this inquiry. Certainly SWM's own involvement with the moral game is
likely to be affected (though, indeed, he may well be the only one
affected by this inquiry).
> 3- Bruce suspects that SWM has the notion that some
> where there is a very compelling reason that will
> persuade most of the people most of the time. But SWM
> denies this.
>
No, SWM has never denied this. Rather, he has denied that he is
looking for an absolutely irrefutable moral proof or justification.
On the other hand he has often said he is looking for a basis for
making moral claims that will satisfy most serious and sincere
players most of the time.
> 4. Every now and then SWM mentions empathy as a
> possible basis for that most compelling answer. But
> SWM has alread agreed that Empathy is neither
> necessary or sufficient. So Bruce remains puzzled
> about SWM's project.
>
> bruce
SWM has noted that he is not convinced that empathy IS the
fundamental basis of the relevant moral claims, but he is also not
convinced that it isn't. Empathy remains for SWM an interesting
prospect in this inquiry and, so far, SWM has noted nothing better
(though this is not to say there is nothing better to be noted).
>
> Footnote: What interests me how, in what way, we can
> go beyond what we know, what we take to be,
> ordinarily, the case.
>
>
SWM does not get this footnote which Bruce has appended here. SWM
thinks that "what we take to be, ordinarily, the case" is not
necessarily all that "we know." Sometimes, as SWM sees it, there are
things we don't know simply because we haven't yet looked closely
enough. When applied to our actual behavior and language usage, this
means that new knowledge may arise just from our paying attention to
things we formerly took for granted. Not all knowledge is of the sort
we get via scientific inquiry (i.e., new explanatory theories, and
their associated claims, that have predictive powers about happenings
in the observable world). Some aspects of our knowledge are merely
the statements we make reflecting our seeing things in new and more
penetrating ways.
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> There is the work of social science and the work of
> philosophical
> inquiry. They are different games.
I remain unclear what you mean by the philosophical
inquiry into the Moral. I know what it means to ask
people for their reasons. That is a fact finding
question. Which is the best answer is also a fact if
what we mean by "best" is the most convincing to the
most people.
If you mean by "best", the one that most follows a
moral code, then best is arrived by argument. But an
argument is simply an argument, why call it
philosophy.
No-- I don't believe in the end of philosophy. But I
do believe that it is very difficult to state a
philosophical problem.
> No books I know of have resolved the matter to my
> satisfaction. This
> may simply mean it is an unresolvable matter or that
> no one has
> really gotten at this with sufficient clarity.
No books have resolved what? I assume, what is moral
in both of our two senses. Let's take stealing. Why is
it a moral issue(#1) and what should I not steal (#2)
Neither have been resolved. OK
What's the first step in clarification? What needs to
be clarified? What is confused or muddled?
>SWM is not satisfied with an answer that it's
> all about our
> feelings
Bruce agrees those are unsatisfactory.
> SWM wants to know if there is any argument beyond
> what any of us
> happen to feel at any given moment for the moral
> claims we happen to
> make?
Bruce can't understand why SWM asks since we both know
that arguments are legion. But no arguments are
definitive.
THEN AGAIN: I've said this time and time again. In
applying any concept at all, there is room for
disagreement. It is in the very nature of our concepts
that we disagree in their application. There is
probably more agreement that genocide is a moral
nightmare then whether whether the art work that hangs
around my home is art.
>SWM is planning to use the conclusions he comes to in
order to
>determine if there is some basis for making
rationally >convincing moral arguments.
What kind of basis are you looking fro?
> 3- Bruce suspects that SWM has the notion that some
> where there is a very compelling reason that will
> persuade most of the people most of the time. But
SWM
> denies this.
>
No, SWM has never denied this. Rather, he has denied
that he is
looking for an absolutely irrefutable moral proof or
justification.
On the other hand he has often said he is looking for
a basis for
making moral claims that will satisfy most serious and
sincere
players most of the time.
Bruce: That's what it comes down to? Serious and
sincere. We are having trouble deciding whether the
holocaust was immoral but we are going to be more
successful in determine sincerity?
We keep on looking for a closure that simply isn't
there.
> 4. Every now and then SWM mentions empathy as a
> possible basis for that most compelling answer. But
> SWM has alread agreed that Empathy is neither
> necessary or sufficient. So Bruce remains puzzled
> about SWM's project.
SWM has noted that he is not convinced that empathy IS
the
fundamental basis of the relevant moral claims, but he
is also not
convinced that it isn't.
(Which is to say that SWM holds to some sort of
essentialism. That concepts have a core meaning
identified by some word? Right? )
> Footnote: What interests me how, in what way, we can
> go beyond what we know, what we take to be,
> ordinarily, the case.
SWM thinks that "what we take to be, ordinarily, the
case" is not
necessarily all that "we know."
(Bruce agrees. No one can deny that truth)
SWM:Not all knowledge is of the sort we get via
scientific inquiry
(Yes we can learn new things by just keeping our eyes
and ears open. Then again that's exactly what
scientists do, just more carefully)
SWM:Some aspects of our knowledge are merely the
statements we make reflecting our seeing things in new
and more
penetrating ways.
(That's also what scientists do. Bruce sees no
substantive distinction here.)
As I see it. You are displeased with the lack of moral
certainty. You want to do better. So you think that
perhaps philosophy will help. But , in what way, you
never make clear.
You say that you are not interested in changing the
moral game and yet you fault out game for being
indecisive. In fact, you reject it on this basis.
You recognize that the reason that folks disagree
morally is that they disagree in the application of
the concept. That's disturbing. So you suggest
bypassing this by looking for some essential element
that would, at least for the serious and sincere,
prompt agreement. But you know our conceptual life
doesn't allow for this. So you modify your position.
Just better, more convincing arguments.
So pick a moral dilemma. Read the argument pro and
con, and come up with a moral convincing one. There is
no philosophical puzzle to unravel here.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
Bored stiff? Loosen up...
Download and play hundreds of games for free on Yahoo! Games.
http://games.yahoo.com/games/front
swmaerske
>
> > There is the work of social science and the work of
> > philosophical
> > inquiry. They are different games.
>
> I remain unclear what you mean by the philosophical
> inquiry into the Moral. I know what it means to ask
> people for their reasons. That is a fact finding
> question. Which is the best answer is also a fact if
> what we mean by "best" is the most convincing to the
> most people.
>
> If you mean by "best", the one that most follows a
> moral code, then best is arrived by argument. But an
> argument is simply an argument, why call it
> philosophy.
>
Because THAT is not what I am asking. The question is what
distinguishes a moral reason from a non-moral one and is there any
way of determining which moral answers are better than others that
would be convincing to players of the moral game?
> No-- I don't believe in the end of philosophy. But I
> do believe that it is very difficult to state a
> philosophical problem.
>
Then that says something about philosophy or your conception of it,
no?
> > No books I know of have resolved the matter to my
> > satisfaction. This
> > may simply mean it is an unresolvable matter or that
> > no one has
> > really gotten at this with sufficient clarity.
>
> No books have resolved what? I assume, what is moral
> in both of our two senses. Let's take stealing. Why is
> it a moral issue(#1) and what should I not steal (#2)
> Neither have been resolved. OK
>
> What's the first step in clarification? What needs to
> be clarified? What is confused or muddled?
>
What underlies a claim that stealing is wrong and is whatever it is
that underlies it convincing on a rational level?
> >SWM is not satisfied with an answer that it's
> > all about our
> > feelings
> Bruce agrees those are unsatisfactory.
>
> > SWM wants to know if there is any argument beyond
> > what any of us
> > happen to feel at any given moment for the moral
> > claims we happen to
> > make?
>
> Bruce can't understand why SWM asks since we both know
> that arguments are legion. But no arguments are
> definitive.
>
What is "definitive" will depend on context. There are definitive
arguments in particular contexts. The moral game is at least one
context (though perhaps an amalgam of many related contexts). It is
at least theoretically possible to achieve a satisfactory end to
argument in particular contexts, i.e., to adduce a definitive reason
or set of reasons.
> THEN AGAIN: I've said this time and time again. In
> applying any concept at all, there is room for
> disagreement. It is in the very nature of our concepts
> that we disagree in their application. There is
> probably more agreement that genocide is a moral
> nightmare then whether whether the art work that hangs
> around my home is art.
>
And that "more agreement" suggests the basis for resolving the
question of whether or not genocide is wrong.
> >SWM is planning to use the conclusions he comes to in
> order to
> >determine if there is some basis for making
> rationally >convincing moral arguments.
>
> What kind of basis are you looking fro?
>
Whatever sustains the moral claims if anything does. If not, then
such claims are illusory and we might as well toss out the whole
game. More specifically, I am looking at how we argue for the
feelings we favor or disfavor and how these affect our actual
decisions to act, hence my interest in the role played by empathy.
> > 3- Bruce suspects that SWM has the notion that some
> > where there is a very compelling reason that will
> > persuade most of the people most of the time. But
> SWM
> > denies this.
> >
>
> No, SWM has never denied this. Rather, he has denied
> that he is
> looking for an absolutely irrefutable moral proof or
> justification.
> On the other hand he has often said he is looking for
> a basis for
> making moral claims that will satisfy most serious and
> sincere
> players most of the time.
>
> Bruce: That's what it comes down to? Serious and
> sincere. We are having trouble deciding whether the
> holocaust was immoral but we are going to be more
> successful in determine sincerity?
>
We know we don't like the holocaust. But is that dislike enough to
convince others they should not perpetrate holocausts or prevent us
from doing so under conditions akin to what the Germans experienced
in the Nazi era/
> We keep on looking for a closure that simply isn't
> there.
>
Yes, I think you and I are too far apart in our conceptions of moral
valuing as an enterprise. And perhaps, as well, in our conception of
what philosophy ought to be expected to be able to do in this kind of
inquiry.
> > 4. Every now and then SWM mentions empathy as a
> > possible basis for that most compelling answer. But
> > SWM has alread agreed that Empathy is neither
> > necessary or sufficient. So Bruce remains puzzled
> > about SWM's project.
>
> SWM has noted that he is not convinced that empathy IS
> the
> fundamental basis of the relevant moral claims, but he
> is also not
> convinced that it isn't.
>
> (Which is to say that SWM holds to some sort of
> essentialism. That concepts have a core meaning
> identified by some word? Right? )
>
I don't think there is anything essentialist here at all. If I were
suggesting that all uses of "moral" boil down to one thing, say to
empathy, you might have a case. But I am looking at particular uses
and trying to find what they reflect. Essentialism assumes that there
is a core idea or meaning at the heart of every word and that once
one gets at it one has the one meaning that explains and sustains all
uses. It is the opposite of a notion that words have a myriad of uses
and that these often overlap and interlock.
The way to see this clearly is to note above that I said "relevant
moral claims" not "moral claims" as in "all moral claims."
> > Footnote: What interests me how, in what way, we can
> > go beyond what we know, what we take to be,
> > ordinarily, the case.
>
> SWM thinks that "what we take to be, ordinarily, the
> case" is not
> necessarily all that "we know."
> (Bruce agrees. No one can deny that truth)
>
> SWM:Not all knowledge is of the sort we get via
> scientific inquiry
>
> (Yes we can learn new things by just keeping our eyes
> and ears open. Then again that's exactly what
> scientists do, just more carefully)
>
Actually more than "just more carefully." They also engage in
systematic and highly focused data gathering for the purpose of
comparing what they find to various testable hypotheses. Philosophers
don't do that.
> SWM:Some aspects of our knowledge are merely the
> statements we make reflecting our seeing things in new
> and more
> penetrating ways.
>
> (That's also what scientists do. Bruce sees no
> substantive distinction here.)
>
Scientists, like everyone else, need clarity and will seek it, of
course. But the focus of their inquiry is not to attain clarity but
to add to a body of knowledge about selected observables.
Philosophers need information, like everyone else, but do not seek it
out directly but, rather, take it from what others have gathered
(including scientists). What philosophers are after, though, is
getting clear on the things we know. That is the focus of THEIR
inquiry.
> As I see it. You are displeased with the lack of moral
> certainty. You want to do better. So you think that
> perhaps philosophy will help. But , in what way, you
> never make clear.
>
Well at least it isn't clear to you. I have indicated that collecting
data on what others do morally or understand as moral matters is not
what I am interested in doing though the data collected by others is
of interest to me. You seem to think that if I am not willing to join
the data gatherers (scientists) then there is nothing I can expect to
accomplish. I think that examining what we do morally based on my own
practices, those I see around me and those I have learned about is a
different and equally valid inquiry since it aims at a different
thing than what the scientists aim at. You seem to feel that there is
nothing here but work for science. In this we could not be further
apart.
> You say that you are not interested in changing the
> moral game and yet you fault out game for being
> indecisive. In fact, you reject it on this basis.
>
I never said I reject it. Indeed I play it all the time. I just want
to know if I am playing a game worth playing or if I am simply
deluding myself.
> You recognize that the reason that folks disagree
> morally is that they disagree in the application of
> the concept. That's disturbing. So you suggest
> bypassing this by looking for some essential element
> that would, at least for the serious and sincere,
> prompt agreement. But you know our conceptual life
> doesn't allow for this. So you modify your position.
> Just better, more convincing arguments.
>
I think your analysis of what I am doing here is simply mistaken.
> So pick a moral dilemma. Read the argument pro and
> con, and come up with a moral convincing one. There is
> no philosophical puzzle to unravel here.
>
> bruce
There is if there is no really convincing argument. The point is that
different arguments may work on different levels but the moral game
requires one that works in certain cases across levels, or at least
on enough levels to give the game the sense of reality it needs to
operate as it purports to operate. If genocide is wrong we have to
know why in order to tell others not to do it.
Anyway, as before, I don't think you and I are any closer to
understanding one another. You remain convinced that there is no
there there, i.e., there is nothing worth looking at philosophically
in this. That is a legitimate position though I think it's a mistaken
one. But you are welcome to continue to hold to it. As for me, I
remain confused by the moral game that we play, and so, unsure of it.
Therefore I want to clarify and gain more confidence in this game, or
simply recognize its lack of status as a serious game and move on.
I think we've hit that old brick wall again. If no one else has
anything to weigh in with on this question, I doubt you and I can
achieve much more by going on this way.
SWM
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> The question
> is what
> distinguishes a moral reason from a non-moral one
Right. I get that. But I keep asking:
1- How, the method, ask lots of people and then what
do we do with the answers? Just ask yourself? You
suggest that latter. But if I ask myself, my answer is
what I've read and heard. But you want to "clarify"
that, I think. How?
2- Is your questions any different (formally) from
asking the difference between a vegetable and
non-vegetable? If not, we can just look it up in
Wikipedia. If it differs, how?
> and is there any
> way of determining which moral answers are better
> than others that
> would be convincing to players of the moral game?
The only way is to ask people. Then you get lots of
answers and you are back to the problems of #1.
> What underlies a claim that stealing is wrong...
I don't know what "underlies" means here. Is it really
the case that no one has ever told you why stealing is
wrong? Or is it that you haven't been convinced? And
you are tempted to steal because of this? I don't mean
to pry. I need to know where you are coming from.
>There
> are definitive
> arguments in particular contexts.
Right! So, why aren't you pleased? Stealing happens in
a particular context. So, if I steal medicine to cure
my dying child, some will day it isn't immoral. Isn't
that reasonable? Later on you talk about reasons
across levels. There are plenty of those too. But if
the criteria is "what convinces SWM?", then I don't
know how to play.
We're back to another problem. It is in the very
nature of our concepts that folks aren't seen as
applying them in the same way. Moral concepts are very
much so.
> > What kind of basis are you looking for?
> Whatever sustains the moral claims if anything does.
Reasons sustain. Why do you doubt? Because you aren't
happy with our ordinary reasons.
> If not, then
> such claims are illusory
Yes, that follows. Demand that we have more than
ordinary reasons, don't find them, and then claim the
reasons are illusory. But what is actually illusory
are your (transcendental?) reasons.
> We know we don't like the holocaust.
"Dislike" the holocaust. Come on. If all you can
muster is a "dislike" then we don't share the same
understanding of "holocaust."
The above point is critical. I see you as creating a
philosophical issue -- "What is morality?"-- by acting
as if you haven't been socialized as me, as if there
is something you don't know. It is only by some weird
suspension of what one already knows, that one can ask
if genocide is conceivably moral.
> I don't think there is anything essentialist here at
all.
Let's see if you hold to this position
> But I am looking at particular uses and trying to
find what they > reflect.
Hmm... typically that means reflect some one thing.
Surely not everything. That wouldn't add anything.
> Essentialism assumes that there is a core idea or
meaning
So you are not looking for a core, you are looking for
what?
> The way to see this clearly is to note above that I
said "relevant
> moral claims" not "moral claims" as in "all moral
claims."
I took it to mean ALL relevant moral claims. There is
something about them you want to identify. Isn't that
a core?
If your project isn't to find out what ESSENTIALLY
makes a claim moral (vs. immoral) and what reasons
ESSENTIALLY convinced most (serious, sincere folks)
that stealing is immoral --then what in the world is
it?
A list of reasons? But all them would either be
essential or not depending upon the context, as you
say. But we already know the reasons...so what is it
that you hope to add if it isn't some ESSENTIAL reason
or argument.
> Philosophers don't do that.
Yes, they don't ask empirical questions like "what are
the reasons people give for making moral claims?" or
"what arguments do people find the most convincing."
You insist you are doing philosophy while continuing
to ask empirical questions.
> philosophers ... getting clear on the things we
know.
OK - We know the definition of moral. How do we get
clearer about it? We know the reasons people give
saying stealing is immoral. How do we make it clearer.
We know people disagree whether abortion is moral or
not. What does philosophy have to add?
> You seem to think that if I am not willing to join
> the data gatherers (scientists) then there is
nothing I can expect > to accomplish.
If you are interested in the questions you profess to
be interested in, as set out in the beginning of the
Post, then out of intellectual honesty you ought to
become familiar with the data. Yes.
If you are interested in clarifying something, then
you ought first to say what is confused.
> I think that examining what we do morally based on
my own
> practices, those I see around me and those I have
learned about > is a different and equally valid
inquiry since it aims at a >different thing than what
the scientists aim at.
I really at a loss to make sense out of your position.
Scientists study what people say and do, determine the
facts, and explain them with theories. Now, some great
observers, Freud, Piaget, did as you say but many of
their ideas were found to be false.
Of course, if you never put your ideas to an objective
test, involving neutral observers, then you can go on
believing anything you want. Yes, that is different
from science.,
Bruce wrote
> You recognize that the reason that folks disagree
> morally is that they disagree in the application of
> the concept. That's disturbing. So you suggest
> bypassing this by looking for some essential
element
> that would, at least for the serious and sincere,
> prompt agreement. But you know our conceptual life
> doesn't allow for this. So you modify your
position.
> Just better, more convincing arguments.
SWM writes: I think your analysis of what I am doing
here is simply mistaken.
I'm sure of that. I am at a loss to state your project
in a way that makes sense to me.
Bruce wrote:
> So pick a moral dilemma. Read the argument pro and
> con, and come up with a moral convincing one. There
is
> no philosophical puzzle to unravel here.
> There is if there is no really convincing argument.
You're telling me that each and every time people
disagree on the application of a concept (moral, etc.)
that's a philo problem??? Boy, do we have problems.
SWM writes: The point is that different arguments may
work on different levels but the moral game requires
one that works in certain cases across levels, or at
least on enough levels to give the game the sense of
reality it needs to operate as it purports to operate.
Bruce responds: What are you saying? You are inventing
notions of "levels" in order to avoid the accusation
of essentialism, you allow for difference, different
levels, but then "across", so as to reduce difference
in order to get back to some big idea that cuts
across.
> As for me, I remain confused by the moral game that
we play,
What are you confused about? That you are not
convinced that stealing is immoral, for the most part,
and genocide is unquestionably immoral, is not, in
itself, confusion. Let's call it radical open
mindedness.
However, as I read you, you seem quite confused about
our conceptual life (what we ordinarily take to be the
case, not any theoretical account) and what philosophy
can do about it.
You insist that you want to clarify but then tell me
that my moral game is illusory unless I have some
concept in place -- a concept, as I see it, that is
not an ordinary one.
We may be stuck for now.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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waveletter
the greatest phenomena of mankind in general if he had been able to
feel love; but since this was not the case there was something
defective in his nature. In fact, even in Kant's relation to people in
his immediate surroundings, in all the sympathy and all the selfless
devotion of which he was capable, a certain limit set by reason was
never crossed, and this rational control, where one thinks himself
justified in expecting and demanding a direct expression of emotion,
can easily arouse the illusion of an impersonal coolness in reflection
on human things and relationships. Actually, all emotions of the
'softhearted kind,' as he himself called them, were alien to Kant's
disposition and nature. But all the more richly and delicately
developed in him was the emotion which he himself regarded as the
fundamental ethical emotion, and in which he thought he recognized the
motive force for all concrete ethical behavior. His relationship to
individuals was guided and ruled by universal respect for the freedom
of the moral person and his right of self-determination. And this
respect was no abstract demand, but it acted on him as an immediately
living motive, determining every particluar utterance.
Ernst Cassirer, "Kant's Life and Thought," trans. J. Haden, New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1981.
Thanks!
--Ron
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
>
swmaerske
>
> > The question
> > is what
> > distinguishes a moral reason from a non-moral one
>
> Right. I get that. But I keep asking:
>
> 1- How, the method, ask lots of people and then what
> do we do with the answers? Just ask yourself? You
> suggest that latter. But if I ask myself, my answer is
> what I've read and heard. But you want to "clarify"
> that, I think. How?
>
We think lots of things that are often confused or wrong. Am
currently reading Dennett's Consciousness Explained. Don't know why I
put it off so long. It's really exceedingly sharp. Anyway, he points
out repeatedly how we so often think wrongly about things (just as
Wittgenstein noted). Sometimes it is quite natural to see things
wrongly. One of the jobs of philosophy is to get it right if one can.
That's all.
> 2- Is your questions any different (formally) from
> asking the difference between a vegetable and
> non-vegetable? If not, we can just look it up in
> Wikipedia. If it differs, how?
>
I've already told you and don't much feel like going over the same
ground for what feels like the nth time. If you don't see it, fine.
Let's leave it at that.
> > and is there any
> > way of determining which moral answers are better
> > than others that
> > would be convincing to players of the moral game?
>
> The only way is to ask people. Then you get lots of
> answers and you are back to the problems of #1.
>
> > What underlies a claim that stealing is wrong...
>
> I don't know what "underlies" means here.
Think about it.
> Is it really
> the case that no one has ever told you why stealing is
> wrong?
That's irrelevant to my question as you should know from everything
I've said before. Why you persist in chewing on the same bone just
seems odd to me. No progress can be made if one or both sides are not
hearing the other. I think I am hearing you and that you are not
hearing me. Perhaps you feel the same way. Whatever the answer, we
have gone about as far as you and I can go on this. After this post I
am really going to try to back away from this discussion because not
every discussion is of equal value. Discussing for discussing's sake
waste's both our times.
> Or is it that you haven't been convinced? And
> you are tempted to steal because of this? I don't mean
> to pry. I need to know where you are coming from.
>
All of my philosophizing is personal and always have been. I have
been tempted to do things that I haven't done as, I suppose, many of
us have. When I have chosen not to, I have had to give myself a
reason since it seemed to me that I could have decided otherwise.
Sometimes I have given myself what I took at the time to be good
reasons but later concluded were not. Sometimes I have not been
satisfied with reasons I accepted anyway. More, I tend to be the sort
of person who puts himself in others' shoes. So when I think about
the Nazis, for instance, and what they did, I wonder what made it
wrong aside from the fact that I would have been on the receiving end
(being Jewish) and so would not have liked that fact. But, in truth,
had I been a non-Jewish German in that era, how would I have acted?
Would I have had the strength character to care about others who
weren't quite like me? Would I have been swayed by the Nazi narrative
and mythos? Can I blame the Nazis for what they did? Is it any
different than following the rule in nature of might makes right? If
there is no objective moral standard, doesn't anything go? Anyway, I
have always done philosophy on a very personal level, looking at
myself and how I see and understand things. This issue is no
different.
> >There
> > are definitive
> > arguments in particular contexts.
>
> Right! So, why aren't you pleased? Stealing happens in
> a particular context. So, if I steal medicine to cure
> my dying child, some will day it isn't immoral. Isn't
> that reasonable? Later on you talk about reasons
> across levels. There are plenty of those too. But if
> the criteria is "what convinces SWM?", then I don't
> know how to play.
>
Think of particular contexts: the Nazis killing Jews or other peoples
in Europe. Or Islamic terrorists attacking the twin towers on
September 11th. Are there any standards or is everything relative?
> We're back to another problem. It is in the very
> nature of our concepts that folks aren't seen as
> applying them in the same way. Moral concepts are very
> much so.
>
"Very much so" what?
> > > What kind of basis are you looking for?
>
> > Whatever sustains the moral claims if anything does.
>
> Reasons sustain. Why do you doubt? Because you aren't
> happy with our ordinary reasons.
>
This is getting ridiculous, Bruce. Answering "reasons sustain" is
just nonsense in this context. I have been arguing that moral valuing
is about giving reasons and I have been asking how we know which
reasons work and which don't in the moral contexts. Now I say I am
looking for "what sustains moral claims" and you answer "reasons."
Obviously I am asking for kinds of reasons, the sorts of things that
work. A general answer of "reasons" simply reroutes the discussion to
a different place. This kind of linguistic sleight of hand where you
answer my question with a different order answer is the kind of thing
that keeps us mired in confusion. I said I am tired of this and now I
really am. Either let's stay on the same level of discussion here or
give this up.
> > If not, then
> > such claims are illusory
>
> Yes, that follows. Demand that we have more than
> ordinary reasons, don't find them, and then claim the
> reasons are illusory. But what is actually illusory
> are your (transcendental?) reasons.
>
> > We know we don't like the holocaust.
>
> "Dislike" the holocaust. Come on. If all you can
> muster is a "dislike" then we don't share the same
> understanding of "holocaust."
>
What is moral disapprobation but dislike (albeit of a particularly
extreme sort)? My question is whether there is anything wrong with
the holocaust besides the fact that we disapprove of it or, if you
like, even recoil at it?
> The above point is critical. I see you as creating a
> philosophical issue -- "What is morality?"-- by acting
> as if you haven't been socialized as me, as if there
> is something you don't know. It is only by some weird
> suspension of what one already knows, that one can ask
> if genocide is conceivably moral.
>
I think you and I are in entirely different places on this issue. You
are convinced there is nothing to uncover here. I am not. One of us
may be wrong (or we both may be). No matter. If we cannot talk on the
same level here, if your move in response to everything I say is
going to be to switch levels of discourse, then this is a waste of
time and I am tired of pursuing it.
> > I don't think there is anything essentialist here at
> all.
>
> Let's see if you hold to this position
>
> > But I am looking at particular uses and trying to
> find what they > reflect.
>
> Hmm... typically that means reflect some one thing.
> Surely not everything. That wouldn't add anything.
>
> > Essentialism assumes that there is a core idea or
> meaning
>
> So you are not looking for a core, you are looking for
> what?
>
I am looking for what particular things mean in particular contexts.
Perhaps we should talk a bit about this notion of "essentialism"? It
is a favorite epithet that people toss about but I wonder sometimes
if they have really thought it through. After all, we do have the
word "essence" in our language and we do have uses for that word. So
in fact there are things we call essences. Just because we
acknowledge that there can be essences and things that are essential
is not simply to fall into the sin of "essentialism". What sort of
thing is "essentialism"? Isn't it applying the term "essence" to
places where it actually doesn't have an application?
Isn't "essentialism" really things like the philosophical mistake of
thinking that there is, as Plato thought, a core idea behind every
word which captures its full meaning and which every use of the word
must partake of and be traced back to? Isn't Wittgenstein's critique
of this idea to note that words have many uses and that family
resemblances in those uses are what defines them and that, in fact,
there is no core basic meaning that every variant of a particular
word partakes of?
But perhaps you will say what you take "essentialism" to be? (This
has to be better than our going round and round in circles about
moral reasoning with me saying I am interested in determining which
reasons make sense in moral terms, which support which moral claims
and you telling me that the answer is "reasons.")
> > The way to see this clearly is to note above that I
> said "relevant
> > moral claims" not "moral claims" as in "all moral
> claims."
>
> I took it to mean ALL relevant moral claims. There is
> something about them you want to identify. Isn't that
> a core?
>
I have said here before that I think "moral" has many different uses
and that the things we call moral are quite diverse. And I have noted
that I am interested in a particular aspect of all this: what makes
us believe that sometimes it is right to put others' interests before
our own. I have been very clear that not all moral statements and
judgments involve this issue. So why would you think I meant "ALL"
anything? I have repeatedly indicated here specific moral problems
and contexts and asked about them. Nowhere have I said "all moral
claims". However your reformulation of "ALL relevant moral claims"
may or may not be meaningful here since as long as "relevant" is
included, I cannot have meant all moral terms. But "all" in this case
is relative to the term relevant. You can, of course, narrow your
scope and say well aren't you being essentialist with regard to "all
relevant moral claims" but on my view that is just playing with
words. If essentialism is the idea that there are core meanings that
exist apart from or behind every word, then there is nothing
essentialist in asking if there are characteristics in common among a
particular class of usages and what those characteristics might be.
> If your project isn't to find out what ESSENTIALLY
> makes a claim moral (vs. immoral) and what reasons
> ESSENTIALLY convinced most (serious, sincere folks)
> that stealing is immoral --then what in the world is
> it?
>
See above.
> A list of reasons? But all them would either be
> essential or not depending upon the context, as you
> say.
Here I think you are hung up on the notion of "essentialism" thinking
any usage of the terms essence or essential are indicative of this
sin. I think that is just a mistake.
>But we already know the reasons...so what is it
> that you hope to add if it isn't some ESSENTIAL reason
> or argument.
>
And what is wrong with saying some things are essential in some
cases? Remember, the word "essential" is a perfectly legitimate term
in our language and using it is not to fall into the sin
of "essentialism."
> > Philosophers don't do that.
>
> Yes, they don't ask empirical questions like "what are
> the reasons people give for making moral claims?" or
> "what arguments do people find the most convincing."
>
I didn't say that. I said philosophers do not gather data and compare
it to hypothetical predictions to hone some theory about the way
things are in some aspect of the observable world.
> You insist you are doing philosophy while continuing
> to ask empirical questions.
>
What do you think is an empirical question?
> > philosophers ... getting clear on the things we
> know.
>
> OK - We know the definition of moral. How do we get
> clearer about it?
We know what people mean when they use the term and we know what some
people count as moral. But we don't know (or I don't know and, so
far, you have not given evidence that you know) what makes one moral
claim better than another.
> We know the reasons people give
> saying stealing is immoral. How do we make it clearer.
> We know people disagree whether abortion is moral or
> not. What does philosophy have to add?
>
It is not philosophy's job to come to moral conclusions but it can be
its job to tell us how we do that and whether our conclusions are
soundly based or not. (By "how we do that" by the way I DO NOT MEAN
the actual practices of different groups of people. I mean, of
course, how the moral game works when we are playing it.)
> > You seem to think that if I am not willing to join
> > the data gatherers (scientists) then there is
> nothing I can expect > to accomplish.
>
> If you are interested in the questions you profess to
> be interested in, as set out in the beginning of the
> Post, then out of intellectual honesty you ought to
> become familiar with the data. Yes.
>
I am not denying the value of being familiar with the data. As I'm
reading Dennett I am more and more impressed with the broad range of
literature he has incorporated to work his way through the problem of
what consciousness and how it can best be modeled. But he is not
engaged in collecting that data. He is studying the reports, the
conclusions, the speculations of others, from many different fields
(cognitive pscyhology, neurobiology, philosophy, cognitive computer
science, etc.) in order to build the picture he thinks best explains
the phenomenon he is out to explain. The interesting thing is that he
is fully cognizant of the scientific findings in the field but is
not, himself, engaged in the research which yields those findings.
You confuse the scientific project with the philosophical one.
> If you are interested in clarifying something, then
> you ought first to say what is confused.
>
Oh give me a break, Bruce. Where have you been? You may not agree
with some of the things I've claimed about what is confused but you
certainly cannot say I have not been identifying things that I take
to be confused.
> > I think that examining what we do morally based on
> my own
> > practices, those I see around me and those I have
> learned about > is a different and equally valid
> inquiry since it aims at a >different thing than what
> the scientists aim at.
>
> I really at a loss to make sense out of your position.
> Scientists study what people say and do, determine the
> facts, and explain them with theories. Now, some great
> observers, Freud, Piaget, did as you say but many of
> their ideas were found to be false.
>
That's true. So? One of the criticisms leveled against them is that
they weren't acting scientifically. And I agree with such criticisms.
Take Dennett now. What he is doing is not intended to result in
anything more than a clearer picture of what consciousness is. If he
is right, his work will add immeasurably to the work of scientists
engaged, say, in trying to build artificial minds. If he is wrong, as
Searle who is doing the same thing seems to me to be quite wrong,
then someone else will need to come up with a better picture. But,
again, scientists work with the world, collecting data, testing, and
hypothesizing. Philosophers are interested in sharpening the picture.
It is a different project though it is not without value to
science.
> Of course, if you never put your ideas to an objective
> test, involving neutral observers, then you can go on
> believing anything you want. Yes, that is different
> from science.,
>
Wittgenstein didn't test his ideas. He looked at things and tried to
get clear on them. Some of us have come away with greater clarity
after following Wittgenstein's circumlocutions. I am finding the same
with Dennett vis a vis the idea of consciousness (though I did not
find it with Seare). That is the value of philosophizing.
> Bruce wrote
> > You recognize that the reason that folks disagree
> > morally is that they disagree in the application of
> > the concept. That's disturbing. So you suggest
> > bypassing this by looking for some essential
> element
> > that would, at least for the serious and sincere,
> > prompt agreement. But you know our conceptual life
> > doesn't allow for this. So you modify your
> position.
> > Just better, more convincing arguments.
>
> SWM writes: I think your analysis of what I am doing
> here is simply mistaken.
>
> I'm sure of that. I am at a loss to state your project
> in a way that makes sense to me.
> Bruce wrote:
>
> > So pick a moral dilemma. Read the argument pro and
> > con, and come up with a moral convincing one. There
> is
> > no philosophical puzzle to unravel here.
>
> > There is if there is no really convincing argument.
>
> You're telling me that each and every time people
> disagree on the application of a concept (moral, etc.)
> that's a philo problem??? Boy, do we have problems.
>
I don't recall telling you anything about "each and every time". In
fact I very specifically said that there is a large class of moral
claims and judgments we make which are not obviously problematic. I
think you just don't listen or, in this case, pay attention to what
others have written.
> SWM writes: The point is that different arguments may
> work on different levels but the moral game requires
> one that works in certain cases across levels, or at
> least on enough levels to give the game the sense of
> reality it needs to operate as it purports to operate.
>
>
> Bruce responds: What are you saying? You are inventing
> notions of "levels" in order to avoid the accusation
> of essentialism, you allow for difference, different
> levels, but then "across", so as to reduce difference
> in order to get back to some big idea that cuts
> across.
I don't think you have a good handle on the philosophical error
of "essentialism." As I've already said, noting that there is such an
error does not mean that there are no legitimate uses for the
terms "essence" or "essential." This invocation of "essentialism" as
all purpose philosophical sin is simply a shortcut to avoid having to
think about certain questions.
>
> > As for me, I remain confused by the moral game that
> we play,
>
> What are you confused about? That you are not
> convinced that stealing is immoral, for the most part,
> and genocide is unquestionably immoral, is not, in
> itself, confusion. Let's call it radical open
> mindedness.
>
> However, as I read you, you seem quite confused about
> our conceptual life (what we ordinarily take to be the
> case, not any theoretical account) and what philosophy
> can do about it.
>
> You insist that you want to clarify but then tell me
> that my moral game is illusory unless I have some
> concept in place -- a concept, as I see it, that is
> not an ordinary one.
>
I can't speak for you and your game. I can only speak for mine and,
perhaps, for people who see the problem I see. Many people are fully
ensconced in their own games and do not see problems. Perhaps that is
just where you are.
> We may be stuck for now.
>
> bruce
Yes, and I no longer have patience for this circling round the same
ground. I propose we shift to talk about Dennett and Searle and their
respective ideas of consciousness if you've an interest. Reading
Dennett for the first time has pushed me in that direction. I already
know why I think Searle's ideas about this are superficially
compelling but deep down a bit of a mess. Dennett offers a far better
picture. If you want to continue, I suggest we change the subject.
SWM
swmaerske
always found Kant painfully opaque (though not nearly so as Hegel or
Heidegger). I could use a bit more clarity on Kant's thinking. -- SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "waveletter" <wavelets@...>
wrote:
> wrote:
Ron Allen
That's a very Denneresque response. Even though you guys have tangled for several weeks over what the basis for morality consists of, I think you've actually grown more alike.
Hmm...let me read my post. There's one particluar spelling error.
Well, to begin with, it's not opaque Kant, but rather clear Cassirer's biography on Kant. It's only part of the paragraph, about half, actually. The excerpt is like a mountain, and it's peak is the phrase "fundamental ethical emotion", which I thought might catch your eye, since you've been debating this with Bruce for weeks. Going back down the north slope of the mountain, it seems like Kant was kind of a cold dude, not very often given to warm fuzzies. Look at Frau Schiller's remark. The old Königsberger seems to have no softhearted feelings whatsoever; he probably doesn't empathize with anyone much at all. But, going forward down the south face of the mountain, it appears nevertheless that he's a very, very moral person.
Kant's morality, according to Cassirer, was based on respect for another person's freedom and right of self-determination, not sharing feelings, not empathy. Well, I'm not very adept at philosophical ethics, so I don't know if this is right or wrong. It's an interesting theory, though. It means that the empathetic person, while decidedly friendly, is not necessarily ethical.
Opacity of German philosophers. Hmm...I find Kant fairly easy to read and kind of convincing at times. Cassirer's biography is good, in any case. Hegel and Heidegger are tough for me too. You might like Howard Kainz's translations of chunks from the "Phenomenology of Spirit", if you wanted to try your hand at Hegelianism one more time. One Heidegger work that I like is "Early Greek Thinking". It's a little hard to find, though. I don't really agree with Heidegger's take on Anaximander, but it's an interesting little book.
Thanks!
--Ron
______________
> > Need Mail bonding?
> > Go to the Yahoo! Mail Q&A for great tips from Yahoo! Answers
users.
> > http://answers.yahoo.com/dir/?link=list&sid=396546091
> >
>
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
swmaerske
wrote:
>
> Hi SWM:
>
> That's a very Denneresque response. Even though you guys have
tangled for several weeks over what the basis for morality consists
of, I think you've actually grown more alike.
I'm not sure how. It seems to me that we just go round and round on
the merry-go-round. I keep hearing the same questions and challenges,
no matter how many times I answer them. Of course maybe my answers
are inadequate. In that case, the discussion should take us into THAT
issue. But instead it's as if we are not talking to one another. I
say X. Bruce says Y. I reply not-Y because Z and Bruce replies Y.
Somewhere our discourse just seems to be misfiring.
>
> Hmm...let me read my post. There's one particluar spelling error.
>
> Well, to begin with, it's not opaque Kant, but rather clear
Cassirer's biography on Kant.
Still Kant is opaque to me. I never found his moral argument
convincing though some, I know, do. Perhaps I am just missing
something in it. I was hoping you could explicate it a bit more (as
you start to do below).
> It's only part of the paragraph, about half, actually. The excerpt
is like a mountain, and it's peak is the phrase "fundamental ethical
emotion", which I thought might catch your eye, since you've been
debating this with Bruce for weeks. Going back down the north slope
of the mountain, it seems like Kant was kind of a cold dude, not very
often given to warm fuzzies. Look at Frau Schiller's remark. The old
Königsberger seems to have no softhearted feelings whatsoever; he
probably doesn't empathize with anyone much at all. But, going
forward down the south face of the mountain, it appears nevertheless
that he's a very, very moral person.
>
> Kant's morality, according to Cassirer, was based on respect for
another person's freedom and right of self-determination, not sharing
feelings, not empathy.
I guess I just don't see that there is a rationally compelling
argument for respecting others' freedom. We all condemn slavery today
(or most of us to, anyway) but there was a time when human beings
generally didn't. Were they ignorant back then and we wiser today?
What is it that we have learned, that we now know, that was not known
or understood then?
In fact I think the general abhorrence of slavery today is more
likely traceable to our modern recognition of the humanity of the
enslaved and that that is a form of empathy, i.e., of our seeing
ourselves in the others. If we actually look at what happened as
society was moving away from acceptance of slavery, there was a
generaly upheaval over the human suffering entailed. This was the
case made by the abolitionists and this case resonated more and more
in different quarters of society. There was also the recognition that
slavery was inconsistent with principles on which, say, our country
was founded but that recognition itself hinged on a grasping of the
essential humanness of those who had been enslaved. And isn't that,
too, an example of empathy? That is, those who were free came round
to seeing themselves in the slaves' place.
> Well, I'm not very adept at philosophical ethics, so I don't know
if this is right or wrong. It's an interesting theory, though. It
means that the empathetic person, while decidedly friendly, is not
> necessarily ethical.
I think we can agree that one can be empathetic and still in the
wrong on any given ethical question. Indeed one can be empathetic
toward a criminal and still prepared to condemn him or her for other
moral reasons. I don't want to suggest that empathy constitutes the
total motivation of justification for moral claims. But I think that
empathy must be seen to lie at the heart of a large class of them or,
at least, the claim that one should be empathetic must underlie this
class of claims.
But isn't this claim itself to make a moral argument? I'm not sure
but am inclined to think that, if it is, it's on a different order.
Or it is at least something that may be shown to derive from other,
largely non-moral reasons. Here, however, my thinking founders a bit.
I see the conviction that empathy is a good thing (remember I
recognize many kinds of value claims, not only moral ones) as
stemming from the religious dimension of our lives. Is this a
different order claim? And is this why morality as such always seems
to associate itself with religion and religious imperatives? (Not
being a religious person myself, I'm not quite sure.)
>
> Opacity of German philosophers. Hmm...I find Kant fairly easy to
> read and kind of convincing at times.
I have always thought there was a significant affinity between Kant
and Wittgenstein (or at least I have thought this since I became
adequately exposed to both).
> Cassirer's biography is good, in any case. Hegel and Heidegger are
tough for me too. You might like Howard Kainz's translations of
chunks from the "Phenomenology of Spirit", if you wanted to try your
hand at Hegelianism one more time. One Heidegger work that I like
is "Early Greek Thinking". It's a little hard to find, though. I
don't really agree with Heidegger's take on Anaximander, but it's an
interesting little book.
>
> Thanks!
> --Ron
>
Every time I pick up either Hegel or Heiddegger I find my brain
seizing up. On the other hand I do not have that experience with
Wittgenstein who is arguably as obscure at times. Perhaps we just
resonate differently with different thinkers.
SWM
> swmaerske <swmaerske@...> wrote:
> Can you elaborate this a bit? I am interested in hearing
more. I have
> always found Kant painfully opaque (though not nearly so as Hegel
or
> Heidegger). I could use a bit more clarity on Kant's thinking. --
SWM
>
> --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "waveletter" <wavelets@>
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> We think lots of things that are often confused or
> wrong.
What is it about morality that is confused. I can't
recall that you have mentioned one confusion. Though
I'm aware you believe that you have.
>
> > 2- Is your questions any different (formally) from
> > asking the difference between a vegetable and
> > non-vegetable? If not, we can just look it up in
> > Wikipedia. If it differs, how?
> I've already told you and don't much feel like going
> over the same
> ground for what feels like the nth time. If you
> don't see it, fine.
OK -- but the possibility remains that you don't see
clearly what it means to ask and answer what a concept
means. If you think that there is some mystery about
the meaning of "morality", well, it is possible that
you are drifting into philosophical essentialism --
not "essential" as it is ordinarily used. But in some
property that only a deep thinker can see.
> > Is it really
> > the case that no one has ever told you why
> stealing is
> > wrong?
> That's irrelevant to my question
Is it? You ask for a reason for not stealing. Sure,
you know all of them. so it is silly to ask. But it is
also silly, confused, to think that there is some
other reason out there hiding from us.
The best reason for holding a reason is another
reason.
> Think of particular contexts:Are there any standards
> or is everything relative?
You very question creates confusion. Sure, there are
standards and they are relative. Some apply here and
others there. Some this way, others that way. What in
the world is an absolute application?
> This is getting ridiculous, Bruce. Answering
> "reasons sustain" is
> just nonsense in this context.
The original question asked for reasons for making a
moral claim. And now "reasons are nonsense." What is
it you are really looking for? Not garden variety
reasons but something "out there" that will set us
straight.
SWM:"Obviously I am asking for kinds of reasons, the
sorts of things that work. A general answer of
"reasons" simply reroutes the discussion to a
different place."
(Bruce:That doesn't follow. You ask for reasons. I
give them. But you are not satisfied because ordinary
reasons aren't good enough for you. You want a
super-reason. Notice what you write...
SWM:"My question is whether there is anything wrong
with the holocaust besides the fact that we disapprove
of it or, if you like, even recoil at it?"
Bruce: What more do you want? What would satisfy you?
You look down on ordinary reasons.
SWM:"I am interested in determining which reasons make
sense in moral terms, which support which moral claims
and you telling me that the answer is "reasons."
Bruce:You know darn well that there is no such thing
as "which reasons" but a myriad of them.
SWM:"I am interested in a particular aspect of all
this: what makes us believe that sometimes it is right
to put others' interests before our own."
The particular aspect is that aspect that convinces
the reader. Yes I've gone in a circle because your
question puts us in a circle. Why am I convinced?
Because you convinced me! What about what I said did I
find convincing? Your argument, the words you used.
You are spinning me in circles and then accusing me of
creating them.
SWM:"then there is nothing essentialist in asking if
there are characteristics in common among a particular
class of usages and what those characteristics might
be."
Bruce:I suggest you consult a rhetoric book. They list
and discuss why arguments are compelling. Then you can
find them in moral argument texts. No mystery here at
all.
SWM:"We know what people mean when they use the term
and we know what some people count as moral. But we
don't know (or I don't know and, so far, you have not
given evidence that you know) what makes one moral
claim better than another."
Bruce:Oh yes we do. We both do. What makes a moral
claim "better" is one we find more convincing. What
makes a claim more convincing is a myriad of things
including...
a-- compelling logic
b-- emotional appeals
c-- congenial values
and so on. We know all this. But we are frightened. We
know that we can't prove that genocide is wrong, etc.
We want to find some yet hidden factor with which we
can bash the evil doers. I afraid there is none. In
fact...
It would be too hard to act if decency had to be
invented. A quote worth pondering.
The way to create a decent world is not to find the
hidden meaning of any word.
SWM:"I mean, of course, how the moral game works when
we are playing it."
Bruce:You asked what is an empirical question: THAT is
an empirical question. There is a vast literature. I
see no point in speculating.
OK-- we beat this to death. Let's turn to Dennett.
SWM:"Take Dennett now. What he is doing is not
intended to result in anything more than a clearer
picture of what consciousness is."
Bruce:The same problem arises. Native speakers have
the concept of "consciousness." What about our concept
is confused.
SWM:"If he is right, his work will add immeasurably to
the work of scientists"
Bruce:Scientists don't have he normal concept of
consciousness?
SWM:"Philosophers are interested in sharpening the
picture."
Bruce:What in the world does that metaphor mean?
Please state the problem. What is dull about our
picture of consciousness?
SWM:"Wittgenstein didn't test his ideas. He looked at
things and tried to get clear on them."
Bruce:He didn't look at things. He studied
philosophical claims and showed how they were
confused. His data was the claim. He didn't study
consciousness. He studied what philosophers said about
it. If it was confused, there was no need to collect
data because the philosophical claim was nonsense to
begin with.
So-- let's drop "moral" and see what Dennet has to
teach us about a word I use every day.
bruce
__________________________________________________
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swmaerske
can see it's just more of the same (contra Ron's suggestion that we
have been drawing closer in our views . . . no progress in our
discussion here at all. It's back and back and back again. I don't
even see a point in going through it more specifically as we've been
all through these same points before . . . many times. So I am
skipping this one. If you want to talk about Dennett, Searle and
consciousness I'm game. At least it will be a change of pace and
maybe we shall find common ground enough there to actually benefit
one another in the discussion. But on this question, we are just not
talking in the same terms. -- SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
>
waveletter
I know that you don't know how. But, that's OK, it's not important at the moment, and I'll
explain later; you may have to remind me to do so at some opportune time. Thanks in
advance!
What I'd like to talk about is ethics, others, freedom, and the self. (Yes, I am a very
narrowly constructed individual, I confess.) Well now then, you have been arguing with
Bruce about others and ethics, and I threw in some crap from Kant about freedom, so it
must be time for some quip about the opposite of others--self, that would be--and I
submit: (quoting intellectuals as usual)
"Q. You say that freedom must be practiced ethically...
M.F. Yes, for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie]
practice of freedom?
Q. In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already ethical in itself.
M.F. Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that
freedom takes when it is informed by reflection.
Q. Ethics is what is achieved in the search for or the care of the self?
M.F. In the Greco-Roman world, the care of the self was the mode in which individual
freedom--or civic liberty, up to a point--was reflected [se réfléchie] as an ethics. If you
take a whole series of texts going from the first Platonic dialogues up to the major texts of
late Stoicism--Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and so on--you will see that the theme of the
care of the self thoroughly permeated moral reflection. It is interesting to see that, in our
societies on the other hand, at a time that is very difficult to pinpoint, the care of the self
became somewhat suspect. Starting at a certain point, being concerned with oneself was
readily denounced as a form of self-love, a form of selfishness or self-interest in
contradiction with the interest to be shown in others or the self-sacrifice required."
Foucault, "Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth," ed. P. Rabinow, vol. I, New York: New Press,
1997. May he rest in peace.
I am surprised that in his repartee with you, Bruce did not already cite this passage. At a
certain point, I am obliged to intervene. No? Yes.
Um, as a Wittgensteinian, is it correct to translate 'réfléchie' as 'conscious'? This is
something I ponder. Maybe Foucault was reaching deeper than his interlocutor's--
indeed--than his translator's intellectual grasp?
At your service,
--Ron
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "swmaerske" <swmaerske@...> wrote:
>
> --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Ron Allen <wavelets@>
swmaerske
rooted in our understanding of, and commitment to, human freedom? And
that moral claims are essentially a way of otherwise expressing and
recognizing this fundamental value of human freedom? Is that a fair
way of stating this view? -- SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "waveletter" <wavelets@...>
wrote:
Ron Allen
No, I'm really not staking out a position.
Rather, I'm finding different accounts of what might be the foundation of ethical behavior and observing that they are quite different. Your suggestion that morality rests on empathy is denied by Kant, who holds that such soft-hearted emotions have nothing to do with ethics. Kant contends that moral goodness rests on respect for another person's freedom and self-determination. Now, Foucault is interesting in this regard. He seems to agree with Kant that it's not sympathy, but freedom and respect that underlie righteousness. But then he goes on to say that it's respect for oneself, not others. These are all very opposed theories, and yet it doesn't appear that you, Kant, or Foucault have been immoral men.
I guess that GE Moore would mark all three of the above rationalizations of ethical behavior as examples of the "naturalistic fallacy" at work.
Thanks!
--Ron
swmaerske
wrote:
>
> Hi SWM:
>
> No, I'm really not staking out a position.
>
> Rather, I'm finding different accounts of what might be the
foundation of ethical behavior and observing that they are quite
different. Your suggestion that morality rests on empathy is denied
by Kant, who holds that such soft-hearted emotions have nothing to do
with ethics. Kant contends that moral goodness rests on respect for
another person's freedom and self-determination. Now, Foucault is
interesting in this regard. He seems to agree with Kant that it's not
sympathy, but freedom and respect that underlie righteousness. But
then he goes on to say that it's respect for oneself, not others.
These are all very opposed theories, and yet it doesn't appear that
you, Kant, or Foucault have been immoral men.
>
> I guess that GE Moore would mark all three of the above
rationalizations of ethical behavior as examples of the "naturalistic
fallacy" at work.
>
> Thanks!
> --Ron
Moore later admitted that he had got it wrong and that there was no
naturalistic fallacy per se. Moreover, there has been a movement in
relatively recent years to rethink the notion of a naturalistic
morality though I have never seen a comprehensive naturalistic theory
that seems to me to work.
I note, above, that you point out that Kant rejected the notion of
empathy but later you use the term "sympathy." Of course sympathy and
empathy are not the same. Did Kant explicitly reject empathy or did
you mean sympathy? I know he did explicitly reject sympathy as a
basis for moral claims.
My problem with Kant has always been that his analysis is too
abstruse to work for us in the real world. That is, no one, it seems
to me, makes moral judgements the way Kant suggests must be done to
be genuinely moral. Again I come back to the sea change in Americans'
opinions about slavery that began to take hold in the early part of
the 19th century. While a lot of facts were at work, certainly one of
the most significant was the growth in a way of thinking that
recognized the fundamental humanity of the slaves in relation to the
non-slaves. With that recognition, sympathy did arise with the
victims of slavery but it was that recognition and its consequence,
the seeing of ourselves in the other (empathy), that, I think drove
the increasing sympathy for the slaves and prompted our society to
change as much as it did (with a little help from the Civil War and
the impediment of ongoing racism thereafter).
I don't think a Kantian argument would have resonated broadly with
society or that such an argument ever really does. And, if it
doesn't, then how can it play a role in our moral judgements?
SWM
>
> swmaerske <swmaerske@...> wrote:
> So you are arguing that moral value, what we deem morally
good, is
> rooted in our understanding of, and commitment to, human freedom?
And
> that moral claims are essentially a way of otherwise expressing and
> recognizing this fundamental value of human freedom? Is that a fair
> way of stating this view? -- SWM
>
> --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "waveletter" <wavelets@>
Ron Allen
My questions and comments inserted below.
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Ron Allen
Hmm...OK, where did he do that? You provide no
reference, but that's OK; I didn't refer to "Principia
Ethica" or David Hume for the "ought-is" distinction.
Here's what the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
says:
"Moore expressed the realist side of his
non-naturalism by saying that fundamental moral
judgements ascribe the property of goodness to states
of affairs. Like others of his time, he seems to have
taken this realism for granted; he certainly did not
defend it extensively against anti-realist
alternatives. In this he was doubtless influenced by
the grammar of moral judgements, which have a standard
subject-predicate form. But it may also be relevant
that, at least early on, the only subjectivist view he
seems to have been aware of was the naturalist one
according to which to say “x is good” is to report the
psychological fact that one approves of x. In his 1912
book Ethics he showed that this view does not allow
for moral disagreements, since my report that I
approve of x and your report that you disapprove of it
can both be true (Ethics 58-61). Late in life he
encountered the non-cognitivist emotivism of C.L.
Stevenson, which says that moral judgements express
rather than report feelings and therefore can
conflict. He initially conceded that this anti-realist
view had as good a claim as his own to be true (“A
Reply to My Critics” 544-45), but shortly after
reverted to his earlier non-naturalism, saying he
could not imagine what had induced him to consider
abandoning it (Ewing, “G.E. Moore” 251)."
So Moore repudiated the charge of "naturalistic
fallacy" only momentarily, and promptly adopted it
once more. Is this what you are referring to?
If so, then why aren't you more forthright about
Moore's settled opinion on the matter. You present it
as if Moore changed his mind and never came back. OK,
I can live with that; it only means that I have to put
forward the Humean position by myself.
Moreover, there has
> been a movement in
> relatively recent years to rethink the notion of a
> naturalistic
> morality though I have never seen a comprehensive
> naturalistic theory
> that seems to me to work.
Yes, Moore's anti-naturalism has found some traction
in recent years. Is that good or bad for your
hypothesis of empathy as the foundation of morality?
>
> I note, above, that you point out that Kant rejected
> the notion of
> empathy but later you use the term "sympathy." Of
> course sympathy and
> empathy are not the same.
Hmm...good point. I thought for a moment that I was
ignorant of the meaning of these words. An awful
position to be in, I suppose.
I looked up empathy in the dictionary. This is what
you have been stipulating to be the basis for moral
behavior. Here it is:
1. The attribution of feelings aroused by an object in
nature or art to the object itself, as when one speaks
of a painting full of love.
[Wow, is this what you mean?!]
2. Understanding so intimate that the feelings,
thoughts, and motives of one are readily comprehended
by another.
[Wow, is this what you mean?!]
These two definitions of 'empathy' are in the
"American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language."
I will tell you that this was a very interesting
discovery to me. I had no idea that 'empathy' meant
these things. I thought that it meant feeling for
another persons emotions. So 'sympathy' was pretty
close, maybe even a more precise word for what you
were trying to elucidate.
OK, my dictionary tells me to go look for synonyms of
'empathy' under 'pity'. You aren't saying that
morality is based on 'pity' are you?
But when I go look under 'pity', the dictionary says
that its synonyms are 'pity', 'compassion',
'commiseration', 'sympathy', 'condolence', 'empathy'.
Well.
Did Kant explicitly reject
> empathy or did
> you mean sympathy? I know he did explicitly reject
> sympathy as a
> basis for moral claims.
You may know Kant better than I. He seems to have have
rejected both sympathy and empathy--if they are
distinct--as "soft-hearted" emotions. Well, this is
what I read and posted from Cassirer's biography.
My scholarship stinks, yes.
>
> My problem with Kant has always been that his
> analysis is too
> abstruse to work for us in the real world.
Whoa, dude, what are you saying here? Kant's supreme
moral principle is not too much different from the
Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do
unto you." (Matthew, 7:12) This works for a lot of
people.
That is,
> no one, it seems
> to me, makes moral judgements the way Kant suggests
> must be done to
> be genuinely moral. Again I come back to the sea
> change in Americans'
> opinions about slavery that began to take hold in
> the early part of
> the 19th century.
Slavery was repugnant from the beginnings of the
Colonies' liberation from England. A compromised was
reached at the end of the 18th century between
northern small capitalists and southern large
landowners (and slave holders). What became clear in
50 years was that democracy was threatened by the
semi-feudal, chattel slavery system in place in the
South. It had to be overthrown and the conflict arose,
became critical, and resulted in civil war. This was
all a continuation of the revolutionary process that
had begun decades before, but had had been directed
against England. For about a century, we were the most
revolutionary people in the world.
While a lot of facts were at work,
> certainly one of
> the most significant was the growth in a way of
> thinking that
> recognized the fundamental humanity of the slaves in
> relation to the
> non-slaves.
Yes, I kind of agree, except to say that this
recognition was generally in place up north all along.
With that recognition, sympathy did
> arise with the
> victims of slavery but it was that recognition and
> its consequence,
> the seeing of ourselves in the other (empathy),
Here, you seem to be using 'empathy' in the
dictionary's sense of 'sympathy', but I think I
understand what you mean. And you have rightly, in my
opinion, put your finger on a genuine reflection of
moral outrage and historical import during this period
of American history. Good point.
> that, I think drove
> the increasing sympathy for the slaves and prompted
> our society to
> change as much as it did (with a little help from
> the Civil War and
> the impediment of ongoing racism thereafter).
I'm just not so certain that it was entirely moral in
nature. There were fundamentally counterposed economic
systems in place in the North and the South. The North
based on manufacturing, and having the philosophical
impetus toward individual freedom, and the South
having the plantations and the need for chattel
slavery as a renewable source of the fruits of human
labor.
The cotton mills were in England, not Massachusetts.
Who sold to the mills? Yeah, there's a problem here.
>
> I don't think a Kantian argument would have
> resonated broadly with
> society or that such an argument ever really does.
But they were Christians, by and large [Matthew 7:12,
Kant].
> And, if it
> doesn't, then how can it play a role in our moral
> judgements?
>
> SWM
>
Thanks for your detailed reply. Just to review...could
you say where it is you think Moore abandoned his
rejection of the "naturalistic fallacy" in ethical
reasoning? I must confess that I thought that this was
kind of solid. Moore wavered at one point, but bounced
back to his original position. I could be wrong; I'd
like to be updated. Also, what's the meaning of
'empathy'? What's the meaning of 'sympathy'? The
dictionary seems to support me, not you. Uh, maybe I
should be more keen on ethical philosophy?!
Thanks again SWM,
--Ron
=== message truncated ===
swmaerske
>
>
> > --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Ron Allen
> > <wavelets@>
This may have been the reference I had in mind. I had actually read a
paper by him about this wherein he acknowledged erring in this regard
but I don't recall where I saw it. Thus it is not a case of my not
acknowledging a subsequent recantation of his recantation but of my
being unaware of it, if it occurred. For the record I was greatly
influenced by his Principia Ethica early on though I thought his
reliance on "intuition" as a solution rather untidy and unsatisfying.
In more recent years I have come to see his view as exceedingly naive
and much less sophisticated than Wittgenstein's points about language
use and how that affects our moral claims.
> Moreover, there has
> > been a movement in
> > relatively recent years to rethink the notion of a
> > naturalistic
> > morality though I have never seen a comprehensive
> > naturalistic theory
> > that seems to me to work.
>
> Yes, Moore's anti-naturalism has found some traction
> in recent years. Is that good or bad for your
> hypothesis of empathy as the foundation of morality?
>
Don't know. In a sense you're right if my claim is simply that moral
claims equal claims in favor of being empathetic for I would thus be
reducing moral to expressions of empathy. But that is not what I have
in mind (though it may be what I am trying to say is not more
intelligible than that view). The proposal I have been kicking around
is that claims for a certain class of moral valuations (NOT ALL MORAL
CLAIMS) are really grounded in an argument for adopting a certain
stance in the world, a certain way of seeing and interrelating with
the world and its consituents. Thus I am thinking along the lines of
trying to root arguments for certain moral behaviors in an argument
in favor of being empathetic, i.e., of seeing the world in a certain
way. Such an argument would have to be of a different order than the
moral or it would simply be circular. That is, you can't say be moral
because it's the moral thing to be. That will convince no one and
convincing, in the moral game, is important.
Where I have looked for a solution is at the religious project which,
metaphysics aside, seems to hinge on adopting certain stances in just
this sort of way. It's my view that one's feelings (including
feelings of empathy) arise in the context of the stances we take,
i.e., that as much as our feelings may drive our actions, so too, our
actions may engender our feelings. Thus, following a policy of
kindness toward others might engender feelings of kindness within us.
Therefore the moral argument to act in certain ways which reflect
kindness say, will not be simply an expression of feeling kindness or
be premised in a claim of feeling kindness but, rather, be an
argument to feel kindness.
> >
> > I note, above, that you point out that Kant rejected
> > the notion of
> > empathy but later you use the term "sympathy." Of
> > course sympathy and
> > empathy are not the same.
>
> Hmm...good point. I thought for a moment that I was
> ignorant of the meaning of these words. An awful
> position to be in, I suppose.
>
> I looked up empathy in the dictionary. This is what
> you have been stipulating to be the basis for moral
> behavior. Here it is:
>
> 1. The attribution of feelings aroused by an object in
> nature or art to the object itself, as when one speaks
> of a painting full of love.
>
> [Wow, is this what you mean?!]
>
Nope. Don't even know quite what that means.
> 2. Understanding so intimate that the feelings,
> thoughts, and motives of one are readily comprehended
> by another.
>
> [Wow, is this what you mean?!]
>
Closer but this shows why dictionary definitions are not always
adequate. As I see it, empathy is seeing ourselves in the other and
thus feeling, if only through imagination, what the other feels.
(Obviously no one can have another's pain but, seeing another in
pain, we can imagine ourselves in the same predicament and be
troubled by that realization.)
> These two definitions of 'empathy' are in the
> "American Heritage Dictionary of the English
> Language."
>
> I will tell you that this was a very interesting
> discovery to me. I had no idea that 'empathy' meant
> these things. I thought that it meant feeling for
> another persons emotions. So 'sympathy' was pretty
> close, maybe even a more precise word for what you
> were trying to elucidate.
>
> OK, my dictionary tells me to go look for synonyms of
> 'empathy' under 'pity'. You aren't saying that
> morality is based on 'pity' are you?
>
No, but certainly pity is related to empathy since feeling as one
with someone in pain or trouble we may be moved to pity them.
> But when I go look under 'pity', the dictionary says
> that its synonyms are 'pity', 'compassion',
> 'commiseration', 'sympathy', 'condolence', 'empathy'.
>
One thing that studying Wittgenstein taught me (though I think I knew
it before but did not articulate it) is that there are no such things
as perfect synonyms in language. Every word has nuances which add or
subtract meaning. Groups of words that are recognized as synonymous
are generally so recognized across a range of contexts and are not
synonymous in every case. For instance, despite being called synonyms
above, the words you adduce are not simply replaceable one with
another across every case in which they may find a use. Try it.
> Well.
>
> Did Kant explicitly reject
> > empathy or did
> > you mean sympathy? I know he did explicitly reject
> > sympathy as a
> > basis for moral claims.
>
> You may know Kant better than I. He seems to have have
> rejected both sympathy and empathy--if they are
> distinct--as "soft-hearted" emotions. Well, this is
> what I read and posted from Cassirer's biography.
>
> My scholarship stinks, yes.
>
I have read a bit of Kant but would never hold myself out as an
expert. I defer to others here on that score.
> >
> > My problem with Kant has always been that his
> > analysis is too
> > abstruse to work for us in the real world.
>
> Whoa, dude, what are you saying here? Kant's supreme
> moral principle is not too much different from the
> Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do
> unto you." (Matthew, 7:12) This works for a lot of
> people.
>
Indeed, but the way he gets to it does not. And that's the point I'm
making. Why should we abide by, say, the "Golden Rule"? Kant gives us
a lengthy discourse on why based on willing what we do to be
universalized, etc. But does that really make any sense? Can't we act
without expecting or willing what we do to be universalized?
>
>
>
> That is,
> > no one, it seems
> > to me, makes moral judgements the way Kant suggests
> > must be done to
> > be genuinely moral. Again I come back to the sea
> > change in Americans'
> > opinions about slavery that began to take hold in
> > the early part of
> > the 19th century.
>
> Slavery was repugnant from the beginnings of the
> Colonies' liberation from England.
Not to everyone. Nor was it repugnant to mankind for the majority of
its history. But eventually repugnance did take hold broadly, here
and elsewhere though it is probably still not universal. Of course
majority opinion is not and cannot be our guide to moral value.
Still, it's interesting that we have, as a species, generally become
convinced that slavery (and some other practices and institutions)
are wrong.
> A compromised was
> reached at the end of the 18th century between
> northern small capitalists and southern large
> landowners (and slave holders). What became clear in
> 50 years was that democracy was threatened by the
> semi-feudal, chattel slavery system in place in the
> South.
I don't think that's a fair statement of the causes of the Civil War.
> It had to be overthrown and the conflict arose,
> became critical, and resulted in civil war. This was
> all a continuation of the revolutionary process that
> had begun decades before, but had had been directed
> against England. For about a century, we were the most
> revolutionary people in the world.
>
I don't know about a "revolutionary process". What does that mean?
Why is it a good description of our experience in this country? Even
our American Revolution has, as has often been noted, a less than
revolutionary aspect to it. Indeed, it is often characterized more as
a civil war between factions than as a revolution.
>
> While a lot of facts were at work,
> > certainly one of
> > the most significant was the growth in a way of
> > thinking that
> > recognized the fundamental humanity of the slaves in
> > relation to the
> > non-slaves.
>
> Yes, I kind of agree, except to say that this
> recognition was generally in place up north all along.
>
And yet the New York State legislature is currently debating passing
legislation to apologize for its history in sanctioning slavery! What
have they to apologize for if, as you say, slavery was repugnant in
New York, the quintessential northern state, "all along."
Yes, I think this is true. Humans rarely act for single motives.
There are generally many reasons and many motivations. Nevertheless,
I think a review of the literature at the time will show that slavery
and its moral repugnance was a driving force throughout. It's what
all the other factors seemed to coalesce around and what kept people
pushing and pushing, whatever the other interests of particular
groups and individuals in the coalition were.
> The cotton mills were in England, not Massachusetts.
> Who sold to the mills? Yeah, there's a problem here.
>
> >
> > I don't think a Kantian argument would have
> > resonated broadly with
> > society or that such an argument ever really does.
>
> But they were Christians, by and large [Matthew 7:12,
> Kant].
>
So were the slaveholders.
> > And, if it
> > doesn't, then how can it play a role in our moral
> > judgements?
> >
> > SWM
> >
>
> Thanks for your detailed reply. Just to review...could
> you say where it is you think Moore abandoned his
> rejection of the "naturalistic fallacy" in ethical
> reasoning? I must confess that I thought that this was
> kind of solid. Moore wavered at one point, but bounced
> back to his original position. I could be wrong; I'd
> like to be updated.
For the moment I'm accepting your position on this as it's not all
that significant to what I'm arguing. However, if I have occasion to
find the article I'd read where he recanted, I'll flag it for you
here and we can decide if it's the same as the one you referenced
which, you note, he subsequently re-recanted.
His recantation certainly surprised me as much as my pointing it out
seemed to have surprised you since I was strongly influenced by the
core insight of Principia Ethica, that of the naturalistic fallacy.
Nevertheless, I'm reminded that Wittgenstein didn't think much of
Moore as a philosopher (and that always troubled me because I rather
liked Moore for Principia).
> Also, what's the meaning of
> 'empathy'? What's the meaning of 'sympathy'? The
> dictionary seems to support me, not you. Uh, maybe I
> should be more keen on ethical philosophy?!
>
I think it's pretty clear that sympathy and empathy, while related,
are not the same and even the dictionary seems to suggest that.
Here's what I found on dictionary.com:
1. the intellectual identification with or vicarious experiencing of
the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another.
2. the imaginative ascribing to an object, as a natural object or
work of art, feelings or attitudes present in oneself: By means of
empathy, a great painting becomes a mirror of the self.
I think the first pretty much covers what I have in mind.
Here's some more from that same site:
American Heritage Dictionary - Cite This Source em·pa·thy
(ěm'pə-thē) Pronunciation Key
n.
Identification with and understanding of another's situation,
feelings, and motives. See Synonyms at pity.
The attribution of one's own feelings to an object.
[en-2 + -pathy (translation of German Einfühlung).]
(Download Now or Buy the Book) The American Heritage® Dictionary of
the English Language, Fourth Edition
Copyright © 2006 by Houghton Mifflin Company.
Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.
Online Etymology Dictionary - Cite This Source
empathy
1903, translation of Ger. Einfühlung (from ein "in" +
Fühlung "feeling"), coined 1858 by Ger. philosopher Rudolf Lotze
(1817-81) from Gk. empatheia "passion," from en- "in" +
pathos "feeling" (see pathos). A term from a theory of art
appreciation. Empathize (v.) was coined 1924; empathic (adj.) is from
1909.
Online Etymology Dictionary, © 2001 Douglas Harper
WordNet - Cite This Source empathy
noun
understanding and entering into another's feelings
WordNet® 3.0, © 2006 by Princeton University.
American Heritage New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition -
Cite This Source
empathy [(em-puh-thee)]
Identifying oneself completely with an object or person, sometimes
even to the point of responding physically, as when, watching a
baseball player swing at a pitch, one feels one's own muscles flex.
That's it for now. More if you want to continue on this track. Thanks.
SWM
bruce denner
--- waveletter <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
>If you
> take a whole series of texts going from the first
> Platonic dialogues up to the major texts of
> late Stoicism--Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and so
> on--you will see that the theme of the
> care of the self thoroughly permeated moral
> reflection.
Yes -- it come up earlier on. Rob also has pointed
this out with Blake, if I recall correctly.
Thanks for reminding us.
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> Rather, I'm finding different accounts of what
> might be the foundation of ethical behavior and
> observing that they are quite different. Your
> suggestion that morality rests on empathy is denied
> by Kant, who holds that such soft-hearted emotions
> have nothing to do with ethics. Kant contends that
> moral goodness rests on respect for another person's
> freedom and self-determination. Now, Foucault is
> interesting in this regard. He seems to agree with
> Kant that it's not sympathy, but freedom and respect
> that underlie righteousness. But then he goes on to
> say that it's respect for oneself, not others. These
> are all very opposed theories, and yet it doesn't
> appear that you, Kant, or Foucault have been immoral
> men.
What does that suggest about the relationship between
theory and action in this domain?
> I guess that GE Moore would mark all three of the
> above rationalizations of ethical behavior as
> examples of the "naturalistic fallacy" at work.
Could you explain the workings of the fallacy in this
context?
Thanks---Bruce
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>If you want to talk about
> Dennett, Searle and
> consciousness I'm game.
Me too! But let's set it aside for the time being and
work with Ron. He certainly has some very interesting
things to say and, in contrast to my history with Ron,
we seem to be more in tune this time.
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> Here's what the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
> says:
>
> "Moore expressed the realist side of his
> non-naturalism by saying that fundamental moral
> judgments ascribe the property of goodness to
> states
> of affairs.
Why is that non-naturalism?
>But it may also be relevant
> that, at least early on, the only subjectivist view
> he
> seems to have been aware of was the naturalist one
> according to which to say “x is good” is to report
> the
> psychological fact that one approves of x.
Isn't a psychological fact, an experince", a state of
affairs? I'm confused.
> So Moore repudiated the charge of "naturalistic
> fallacy" only momentarily, and promptly adopted it
> once more.
What fallacy?
> I looked up empathy in the dictionary. This is what
> you have been stipulating to be the basis for moral
> behavior. Here it is:
>
> 1. The attribution of feelings aroused by an object
> in
> nature or art to the object itself, as when one
> speaks
> of a painting full of love.
> 2. Understanding so intimate that the feelings,
> thoughts, and motives of one are readily
> comprehended
> by another.
> These two definitions of 'empathy' are in the
> "American Heritage Dictionary of the English
> Language."
>
> I will tell you that this was a very interesting
> discovery to me. I had no idea that 'empathy' meant
> these things. I thought that it meant feeling for
> another persons emotions. So 'sympathy' was pretty
> close, maybe even a more precise word for what you
> were trying to elucidate.
I agree. SWM seems to be talking about "caring for
others", not just what they are feeling, but where
their best interest lies.
BTW- For therapists, empathy means the ability to put
into words what the other is feeling, not in the sense
of parroting back, but in choosing words that move the
feeling the direction that the other finds right.
This is a skill and can be performed without sympathy
or care.
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> So you are arguing that moral value, what we deem
> morally good, is
> rooted in our understanding of, and commitment to,
> human freedom? And
> that moral claims are essentially a way of otherwise
> expressing and
> recognizing this fundamental value of human freedom?
> Is that a fair
> way of stating this view? -- SWM
Well put SWM. But are you correct? I'm looking forward
to reading Ron's answer.
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>Again I come back to the sea
> change in Americans'
> opinions about slavery that began to take hold in
> the early part of
> the 19th century. While a lot of facts were at work,
> certainly one of
> the most significant was the growth in a way of
> thinking that
> recognized the fundamental humanity of the slaves in
> relation to the
> non-slaves. With that recognition, sympathy did
> arise with the
> victims of slavery but it was that recognition and
> its consequence,
> the seeing of ourselves in the other (empathy),
> that, I think drove
> the increasing sympathy for the slaves and prompted
> our society to
> change as much as it did (with a little help from
> the Civil War and
> the impediment of ongoing racism thereafter).
How does your account of increasing empathy jive with
Iraq or the recent Court decision to limit a
physician's decision on abortion?
Not saying it is isn't consistent. But what does one
have to claim to make it consistent?
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>The proposal I have
> been kicking around
> is that claims for a certain class of moral
> valuations (NOT ALL MORAL
> CLAIMS) are really grounded in an argument for
> adopting a certain
> stance in the world, a certain way of seeing and
> interrelating with
> the world and its constituents.
Makes perfect sense to me. My grandson recently return
from Sunday school where he had a lesson in
compassion. They gave him examples like not breaking
other kid's stuff. I told him that a moral person has
compassion.
Of course, he could have asked, "Why should I have
compassion" and then we are off to the races.
SWM, you are not at peace with this. I'm wondering
where Ron stands?
>Thus I am thinking
> along the lines of
> trying to root arguments for certain moral behaviors
> in an argument
> in favor of being empathetic, i.e., of seeing the
> world in a certain
> way. Such an argument would have to be of a
> different order than the
> moral or it would simply be circular. That is, you
> can't say be moral
> because it's the moral thing to be. That will
> convince no one and
> convincing, in the moral game, is important.
Well, not " no one." Convinces me. I'm persuaded that
a moral stance is well expressed (though not the only
way) by empathy, especailly when one takes the pains
to encounter the other.
Aren't all reasoned arguments, in the end, circular in
this sense, or, as you suggest with religion, adopt a
unquestioned foundation?
Ron Allen
I was just quoting Foucault here.
--Ron
Thanks for reminding us.
bruce
Ron Allen
Exactly.
>
> > I guess that GE Moore would mark all three of the
> > above rationalizations of ethical behavior as
> > examples of the "naturalistic fallacy" at work.
>
> Could you explain the workings of the fallacy in
> this
> context?
>
> Thanks---Bruce
Moore suggested that ethics--which involves goodness,
an undefinable characteristic--cannot be explained by
identifying it with natural properties that are
definable. That is, ethical theories that connect
moral or ethical behavior with mutual respect, or
empathy, self-respect, or evolutionary traits, or
anything like these commit the "naturalistic fallacy".
It's an anti-reductive argument, reminiscent of Hume's
barrier between "is" and "ought".
I'm not sure that Moore's unassailable here, by any
means. But it seems like a point that you'd have to
keep in mind and deal with if you were going to try to
objectivize morality.
Thanks!
--Ron
Ron Allen
--- bruce denner <blro...@yahoo.com> wrote:
[snip]
That's what I took the argument to be.
>
> BTW- For therapists, empathy means the ability to
> put
> into words what the other is feeling, not in the
> sense
> of parroting back, but in choosing words that move
> the
> feeling the direction that the other finds right.
>
> This is a skill and can be performed without
> sympathy
> or care.
>
> bruce
That's interesting--the technical use of empathy in
the practice of clinical psychology. This actually
accords more with my dictionary definition (1) above.
But it also seems to be very much the definition we
wouldn't want to invoke when grounding morality on
empathy. You could argue that the most immoral person
is capable of expressing with cruel precision exactly
what the victims of his crimes feel as they frighten,
suffer, and die. So, this heinous individual happens
to be empathetic--in the technical sense. Hmm...as I
turn this over and about, I can almost see strengths
in Kant and Foucault's analysis.
Thanks!
--Ron
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> Moore suggested that ethics--which involves
> goodness,
> an undefinable characteristic--cannot be explained
> by
> identifying it with natural properties that are
> definable. That is, ethical theories that connect
> moral or ethical behavior with mutual respect, or
> empathy, self-respect, or evolutionary traits, or
> anything like these commit the "naturalistic
> fallacy".
Thanks -- I Wikipedia'd it and found that answer. I
call his notion that of a "simple" and find your
description consistent.
> It's an anti-reductive argument, reminiscent of
> Hume's
> barrier between "is" and "ought".
Isn't "connecting", as you mention above, where there
are connections, different from radically
differentiating, as in "is vs. ought?" That is to ask;
Isn't it helpful in understanding a concept to examine
how it is similar and different from related ones?
> I'm not sure that Moore's unassailable here, by any
> means. But it seems like a point that you'd have to
> keep in mind and deal with if you were going to try
> to objectivize morality.
Right! Psychologists have had some success in
objectiving empathy for therapy purposes by
restricting its meaning (for us) to measurable
behaviors but that should not be taken to mean that we
have gotten to the bottom of what "empathy" really
means.
It's this business of determining the basis of
"morality" that both Moore and I find questionable.
I'm in good company.
bruce
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> That's interesting--the technical use of empathy in
> the practice of clinical psychology. This actually
> accords more with my dictionary definition (1)
> above.
> But it also seems to be very much the definition we
> wouldn't want to invoke when grounding morality on
> empathy. You could argue that the most immoral
> person
> is capable of expressing with cruel precision
> exactly
> what the victims of his crimes feel as they
> frighten,
> suffer, and die. So, this heinous individual happens
> to be empathetic--in the technical sense. Hmm...as I
> turn this over and about, I can almost see strengths
> in Kant and Foucault's analysis.
Yes -- indeed-- Let's talk more about the strengths.
bruce
Ron Allen
Maybe I will decay and collapse into an opinion at
some point.
--- bruce denner <blro...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> --- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
>
> > Moore suggested that ethics--which involves
> > goodness,
> > an undefinable characteristic--cannot be explained
> > by
> > identifying it with natural properties that are
> > definable. That is, ethical theories that connect
> > moral or ethical behavior with mutual respect, or
> > empathy, self-respect, or evolutionary traits, or
> > anything like these commit the "naturalistic
> > fallacy".
>
> Thanks -- I Wikipedia'd it and found that answer. I
> call his notion that of a "simple" and find your
> description consistent.
Well, OK, you can call it anything you want. Moore
certainly seemed to call it that. So we have "simple"
and we have "complicated", and the two are distinct,
and that's all there is to it. Is your metaphysical
jag the right way to go?
I intended my "description consistent" to be in
fidelity with Moore's argument, nothing else. So, I'm
not siding with Moore here.
>
> > It's an anti-reductive argument, reminiscent of
> > Hume's
> > barrier between "is" and "ought".
>
> Isn't "connecting", as you mention above, where
> there
> are connections, different from radically
> differentiating, as in "is vs. ought?"
Uh, yes, that's right. Connecting means finding a
similarity, and radically differentiating means
finding a non-similarity, a difference.
That is to
> ask;
> Isn't it helpful in understanding a concept to
> examine
> how it is similar and different from related ones?
Sure. That's what I was doing. That's something that
you and SWM have not been doing for several weeks. I
just started casting some alternative accounts of
moral behavior into the list. They are all related,
because they purport to explain morality, and they are
all different for the reasons that I've pointed out.
Well, this was helpful to me. However persuasive I
found SWM's postulation of empathy and however
convinced I was of your deconstruction of that same
foundation, I still found it heartening to go back,
dig up, dust off and examine some of the archaeology
of philosophical ethics. I'm not done.
>
> > I'm not sure that Moore's unassailable here, by
> any
> > means. But it seems like a point that you'd have
> to
> > keep in mind and deal with if you were going to
> try
> > to objectivize morality.
>
> Right! Psychologists have had some success in
> objectiving empathy for therapy purposes by
> restricting its meaning (for us) to measurable
> behaviors but that should not be taken to mean that
> we
> have gotten to the bottom of what "empathy" really
> means.
This is very interesting and worth holding on to. I
like it. So, you are saying that psychologists can
actually develop an objective sense of what
constitutes therapeutic empathy, without having
pinpointed the exact definition of 'empathy'? But
empathy is a rather ephemeral thing, no? I mean, SWM
had me groping for the dictionary, and all I came up
with was the "American Heritage" (eesh, I cringe, it
sounds like a red state "think" tank) volume...but
that alone provoked some controversy. You can't take
dictionary definitions as they stand, as Stu
admonished me. Quite correctly. Oh, I could have
retrieved our Oxford English from the back room, but
the room's full of junk, rats and roaches can't
squeeze their way in there any more, and I don't know
where the magnifying glass has gone. Maybe the dog ate
it. So, where am I? Oh, yeah. Here I am: If empathetic
psychological therapy has been objectivized, why can't
we objectivize "The cat is on the mat"? I must hold
you to this, Bruce.
>
> It's this business of determining the basis of
> "morality" that both Moore and I find questionable.
> I'm in good company.
>
> bruce
I like Moore's argument. I wish you guys had used it,
or something else (Kant, or Sedgwick, or Brentano, or
Foucault), as a point of departure. It would have made
a better read on the list. But, I do have concerns
about Moore--and right here in "Principia Ethica" in
particular--even though I respect him immensely.
Thanks!
--Ron
swmaerske
>
> Maybe I will decay and collapse into an opinion at
> some point.
>
I also like Moore's argument though I think, despite a certain
illumination he provides, his solution ultimately fails. I was for a
very long time a proponent of the Moorean approach on ethics so you
should not construe me as an opponent of that here. But I have
always recognized the fundamental weakness in his account which is
his reduction of it all to some indescribable intuition. I think that
is not only a cop-out, it actually fails to give a satisfactory
account of how we actually use moral terms.
My own solution to his proposal that "X is good" is to characterize X
by a claim about a non-natural intuited property, is to suggest that,
instead of thinking of "good" as a term that is roughly equivalent
to "yellow" (his choice in the Principia actually) we should think
of "good" as more akin to a term like "here". We can say that "X is
here" without imagining that "here" denotes a non-natural intuited
property. Indeed, "here" is a relational term which will designate
different locations depending on various "landmarks" including the
agent, the pointing finger (or whatever) wielded by the agent, and
the other things around wherever "here" is.
There is no great mystery here however difficult it is to explain the
usage. Still we know what we mean when we use the term.
On this view, "good" may be thought of as denoting a condition
like "here", a condition rather than a quality or property, a
condition which is a function of certain other factors in the world,
which is to say a set of relations determined by these other factors.
I think Moore erred in his analogy for "good" and so was led to the
wrong conclusion about the nature of whatever it is "good" is
supposed to denote.
My own answer for explaining "good" is to suggest that the
statement "X is good" is roughly translatable as "there is something
about X that is also a reason to choose X" which is to say
that "good" is a selecting term, a term whose function is to
designate choices in a shifting environment of many possible
relations between agent and object.
Anyway, enough for now. I've been a little busy and so haven't had
time to do much responding here but when you talk about Moore it kind
of flushes me out. I was much moved by Moore's insights into value
discourse in my college years and they informed a lot of my thinking
at one time.
SWM
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
"Here I am: If empathetic psychological therapy has
been objectivized, why can't we objectivize "The cat
is on the mat"? "
Your right. If we do one, we must be do the other, and
we do. We don't, if you don't think of "objectivize"
they way we do.
bruce
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>I was for a
> very long time a proponent of the Moorean approach
> on ethics so you
> should not construe me as an opponent of that here.
> But I have
> always recognized the fundamental weakness in his
> account which is
> his reduction of it all to some indescribable
> intuition. I think that
> is not only a cop-out, it actually fails to give a
> satisfactory
> account of how we actually use moral terms.
I beg to differ. Well, you are correct, Moore doesn't
give an account of how we actually use moral terms
because he doesn't see this to be a philosophical
question -- not one open to contemplation but an
empirical one.
However, his "indescribable intuition" exactly
captures how we do use concepts. I immediately
recognize a flower as botanical and flour as culinary.
Same for "moral."
>
> My own solution to his proposal that "X is good" is
> to characterize X
> by a claim about a non-natural intuited property, is
> to suggest that,
> instead of thinking of "good" as a term that is
> roughly equivalent
> to "yellow" (his choice in the Principia actually)
> we should think
> of "good" as more akin to a term like "here". We can
> say that "X is
> here" without imagining that "here" denotes a
> non-natural intuited
> property. Indeed, "here" is a relational term which
> will designate
> different locations depending on various "landmarks"
I don't see what difference your distinction makes in
this context. I quite agree that moral is a contrast
concept and one of degree. But my use of "yellow" is
no different from my use of "moral.,"
bruce denner
>I was for a
> very long time a proponent of the Moorean approach
> on ethics so you
> should not construe me as an opponent of that here.
> But I have
> always recognized the fundamental weakness in his
> account which is
> his reduction of it all to some indescribable
> intuition. I think that
> is not only a cop-out, it actually fails to give a
> satisfactory
> account of how we actually use moral terms.
I beg to differ. Well, you are correct, Moore doesn't
give an account of how we actually use moral terms
because he doesn't see this to be a philosophical
question -- not one open to contemplation but an
empirical one.
However, his "indescribable intuition" exactly
captures how we do use concepts. I immediately
recognize a flower as botanical and flour as culinary.
Same for "moral."
>
> My own solution to his proposal that "X is good" is
> to characterize X
> by a claim about a non-natural intuited property, is
> to suggest that,
> instead of thinking of "good" as a term that is
> roughly equivalent
> to "yellow" (his choice in the Principia actually)
> we should think
> of "good" as more akin to a term like "here". We can
> say that "X is
> here" without imagining that "here" denotes a
> non-natural intuited
> property. Indeed, "here" is a relational term which
> will designate
> different locations depending on various "landmarks"
I don't see what difference your distinction makes in
this context. I quite agree that moral is a contrast
concept and one of degree. But my use of "yellow" is
no different from my use of "moral" from one is asking
this question--
Why do I say X is botanical, yellow, moral, etc.? --
with appropriate elaboration as required. But no
matter how much more I say, it all comes back to "I
use this concept this way."
swmaerske
a "quality" that had about it the same sort of objective
characteristic as colors. That is simply wrong since it cannot be
sustained by analysis of our usages. Indeed, a close analysis reveals
that our value words operate differently than color words. He was not
saying, as you suggest, that we simply know how to use our words, he
was saying that we use them based on a moral intuition which was not
susceptible to further explanation or analysis. At the end of the
day, this adds nothing to our understanding of how value claims, and
especially moral value claims, work. His work in Principia adds
nothing further to an understanding of moral usage or to how we know
some things are morally better than others, which is the point of a
philosophical inquiry into this sort of thing. But I fear I am
wasting my time responding to you on this since we are too far apart
in our understandings for fruitful dialogue on this. -- SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
> SWM: 172 messages but I choose you first.
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> I think you simply miss Moore's point. His
> intuitionism posited
> a "quality" that had about it the same sort of
> objective
> characteristic as colors. That is simply wrong since
> it cannot be
> sustained by analysis of our usages.
And your argument that leads to this conclusion?
> analysis reveals
> that our value words operate differently than color
> words.
What analysis? Different in what way? detect yellow. I
detect evil. Where do you want to locate the
difference?
> was saying that we use them based on a moral
> intuition which was not
> susceptible to further explanation or analysis.
That seems obviously false. There is no stopping
analysis of anything. The question is the point of the
analysis. Why is that "moral" ("yellow") is answered
the same -- because I've taught to use the words that
way. But much, much more can be said about color and
morality. But what philosophical question does this
"much more" address.
Is there one basis for making the claim that we all
can agree on. No!. Not color. Not what is moral.
> Principia adds
> nothing further to an understanding of moral usage
> or to how we know
> some things are morally better than others, which is
> the point of a
> philosophical inquiry into this sort of thing.
Yes we differ. The point of the philosophical claim
that I see is that there is no such thing thing as a
"basis" and further understanding simply elaborates
what we already know.
The evidence is in front of you. For 1000's of years
folks have using color words and moral terms without
identifying a basis. What does that tell you about our
conceptual life?
bruce denner
developed a new and profound sense of sympathy, or to
use a more exact 20C term,"empathy", for the autonomy
and well-being of other human beings. We too easily
forget how contemptible or nonexistent other people
often were in the eyes of many throughout much of
history, not just foreign "others" but even members of
their own society"
Gorden Wood's review of INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A
HISTORY
BY LYNN HUNT.
What strikes me: "Empathy", if defined as accurately
identifying the pain of others is the wrong word.
"Sympathy" is closer. And a sympathy informed by
caring. Not just feeling bad.
But I don't find this distinction as helpful as the
point of a shift in attitude of inclusiveness -- no
longer seeing difference as "other."
I can well imagine that slave holders could be
empathetic and perhaps sympathetic, but they must have
seen the slaves as "other" even if they could identify
the slave's pain and feel badly at times.
Is this a shift in moral sensibilities? It not be seen
so. Rather it is an inclusion of others within ones
moral moral imagination.
swmaerske
>
> > I think you simply miss Moore's point. His
> > intuitionism posited
> > a "quality" that had about it the same sort of
> > objective
> > characteristic as colors. That is simply wrong since
> > it cannot be
> > sustained by analysis of our usages.
>
> And your argument that leads to this conclusion?
The word "good" does not function like a color word but it does
function like a condition word, i.e., see my point about "here" and
its similarity to "good".
>
> > analysis reveals
> > that our value words operate differently than color
> > words.
>
> What analysis? Different in what way? detect yellow. I
> detect evil. Where do you want to locate the
> difference?
>
Yellow has an objectively observable criterion that we recognize as
yellow. "Evil" has no such objectively observable criterion since we
can always dispute a claim that X is evil.
> > was saying that we use them based on a moral
> > intuition which was not
> > susceptible to further explanation or analysis.
>
> That seems obviously false. There is no stopping
> analysis of anything. The question is the point of the
> analysis. Why is that "moral" ("yellow") is answered
> the same -- because I've taught to use the words that
> way.
"Yellow" relates to something we can see and agree on. "Evil"
or "good" do not. They are always subject to further debate. While we
may conclude that there are some observable aspects of the world that
are properly designated by these latter terms, we do not, as Moore
rightly noted, believe that they are just what those terms are. Moore
thought that this meant we intuit the goodness or badness, i.e., we
know it when we see it. But that solution is both obviously wrong
(when you consider the range of debate about such things that is
possible) and, further, unhelpful in explicating the usage. It
doesn't make it any easier to use the terms in question. It just
leads us to stop bothering about it, until we hit the first moral
difficulty again.
> But much, much more can be said about color and
> morality. But what philosophical question does this
> "much more" address.
>
'What do we mean by morally good?' And here we go again, eh? I swore
I wasn't going back into this with you because it is fruitless. We
are just on different wavelengths in this matter. If you want to talk
a bit about the comparison of Moore's solution with other possible
solutions, I will. But I will not get sucked back into another tail
chasing exercise where we are constantly chewing the same bones with
no progress possible at all.
> Is there one basis for making the claim that we all
> can agree on. No!. Not color. Not what is moral.
>
Yes, for color. We don't have any problem recognizing colors and
using the words correctly except where the colors shade into one
another or where we have individuals who are color blind. Whether we
each have the same yellow in mind is a different and, on my view,
somewhat fruitless question. See Dennett on qualia. He offers some
interesting thinking on this notion.
> > Principia adds
> > nothing further to an understanding of moral usage
> > or to how we know
> > some things are morally better than others, which is
> > the point of a
> > philosophical inquiry into this sort of thing.
>
> Yes we differ. The point of the philosophical claim
> that I see is that there is no such thing thing as a
> "basis" and further understanding simply elaborates
> what we already know.
>
And since this is your bottom line, it is clear we cannot talk
philosophically on this since you are committed to finding a way to
demonstrate that this can't be done and all our discussions on this
come back to this angle of yours. I, on the other hand, think it can
be.
> The evidence is in front of you. For 1000's of years
> folks have using color words and moral terms without
> identifying a basis. What does that tell you about our
> conceptual life?
>
> bruce
>
And moral usages have changed in a way that color terms seem not to
have changed. What does that tell you?
SWM
swmaerske
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
> "The short answer is that 18th-century individuals
> developed a new and profound sense of sympathy, or to
> use a more exact 20C term,"empathy", for the autonomy
> and well-being of other human beings. We too easily
> forget how contemptible or nonexistent other people
> often were in the eyes of many throughout much of
> history, not just foreign "others" but even members of
> their own society"
>
> Gorden Wood's review of INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A
> HISTORY
> BY LYNN HUNT.
>
> What strikes me: "Empathy", if defined as accurately
> identifying the pain of others is the wrong word.
> "Sympathy" is closer. And a sympathy informed by
> caring. Not just feeling bad.
Empathy prompts sympathy.
>
> But I don't find this distinction as helpful as the
> point of a shift in attitude of inclusiveness -- no
> longer seeing difference as "other."
>
Empathy is that attitude, i.e., it is the recognition of ourselves in
others thus enabling us to identify with them psychologically and to
sympathize with their plights.
> I can well imagine that slave holders could be
> empathetic and perhaps sympathetic, but they must have
> seen the slaves as "other" even if they could identify
> the slave's pain and feel badly at times.
>
A slave holder who is consistently empathetic would have a great
conflict to deal with in him or herself. Such a conflict might be
resolved by individual manumission or by taking extra care in the
treatment of one's slaves. But it also might result in a re-
evaluation of the whole institution of slavery. My point is that over
time in the 19th century this recognition, which was an empathetic
way of seeing slaves, led to a cultural ferment ofer this matter and,
ultimately, a growing movement for abolition. As more and more people
bought into this view, slavery became more and more unsavoury in
large segments of society. Ultimately there was a tipping point and,
of course, the Civil War.
> Is this a shift in moral sensibilities? It not be seen
> so. Rather it is an inclusion of others within ones
> moral moral imagination.
>
> bruce
And that is the change in moral sensibilities. Indeed, early Judeo-
Christianity were perfectly fine with slavey as an institution even
while laying the groundwork for the empathy that ultimately took hold
in Western societies over the centuries. This same sense of empathy
operates vis a vis other moral claims as well. For instance, an
injunction not to commit murder can be seen as grounded in an
argument not to cause harm. The only reason not to harm others is
because we recognize that harm to others is essentially like harm to
ourselves. The same goes for injunctions against theft.
I am leery about getting into this again, as you can imagine. If we
can move forward from here I'll stay with it. Otherwise, if we end up
chasing our tails again by rehashing things we know we don't and
simply can't agree on or by shifting levels of discussion such that
we can never resolve anything, I'll back off again.
If Ron Allen wants to join us in this, I would welcome it since I
think that just us two going at it isn't likely to prove productive.
But we'll see.
SWM
Ron Allen
you exsert so many typos that it's hard to ascertain
whether you mean "Your right" or "You're right", but I
guess it doesn't matter. Or does it?
Thanks!
--Ron
--- bruce denner <blro...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Ron Allen
I think that it's correct that the concept of the
individual arose during the Enlightenment, and that it
represents a turning point and a foundation for later
moral behavior.
Can we really throw away the historical factor?
--- bruce denner <blro...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> "The short answer is that 18th-century individuals
> developed a new and profound sense of sympathy, or
> to
> use a more exact 20C term,"empathy", for the
> autonomy
> and well-being of other human beings.
'Empathy' seems detached and scientific. Does moral
behavior proceed from this? My thought is growing
towards this: No, it does not proceed from
objectivized empathy; maybe straightforward 'sympathy'
is closer to the mark.
We too easily
> forget how contemptible or nonexistent other people
> often were in the eyes of many throughout much of
> history, not just foreign "others" but even members
> of
> their own society"
With the self-observation, I concur. But, I think that
we've become more homogeneous in modern times, so
we've become more inclined to say the others are like
me. But I can't agree that we've become more 'moral'.
We are more alike in our behaviors, so that something
that might be deemed immoral, such as cutting off the
hand of a thief, is just less common. We could get
into specifics about this. For example, what is a
country like the U.S. doing with a chief law
enforcement officer that advocates torture? with a
judicial branch that denies the right of habeus
corpus? that mocks international law on human rights
as "quaint"? Well, it does suggest that we have not
improved on where we were at in 1958, even though we
are not as threatened as we were in 1812.
>
> Gorden Wood's review of INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A
> HISTORY
> BY LYNN HUNT.
>
> What strikes me: "Empathy", if defined as accurately
> identifying the pain of others is the wrong word.
> "Sympathy" is closer. And a sympathy informed by
> caring. Not just feeling bad.
Well, I think I'm the one that injected 'sympathy'
into this dicussion, for better or for worse. I was
unwittingly trying to use a different term for
'empathy', just to break up the discursive pattern,
and it may not have been cosmetic.
But, now I think that 'sympathetic' is more like what
SWM "wants" to say. Not that I disagree tout court
with SWM's postulation of some kind of empathy as the
groundwork for some kind of morality, but, given the
technical meaning that it carries under Bruce's
guidance, well, no, what we want to point to is
*sympathy* not *empathy*.
>
> But I don't find this distinction as helpful as the
> point of a shift in attitude of inclusiveness -- no
> longer seeing difference as "other."
Maybe this is just vague. It could be a good point, or
it could be a bad point, or it could be an incoherent
point.
Uh, ahem, we are discussing morality here, and I think
you want to say something along the lines of
"...attitude of inclusiveness--no longer seeing
difference as 'other', but as seeing difference as
'similar'.
>
> I can well imagine that slave holders could be
> empathetic and perhaps sympathetic, but they must
> have
> seen the slaves as "other" even if they could
> identify
> the slave's pain and feel badly at times.
I am so very deeply concerned about the anguish and
indirection of the slaveholders.
>
> Is this a shift in moral sensibilities? It not be
> seen
> so. Rather it is an inclusion of others within ones
> moral moral imagination.
>
> bruce
Imagine Malcolm X's distinction between the house
slave and the field slave, then take the side of the
undomesticated, and you'll probably be closer to an
Enlightenment viewpoint on individual rights. This is
the philosophical position that was worked out in the
early 1860's in the United States. Actually, as I
think you and I would agree, we're working out
something akin to that right now, only it doesn't
involve slaves and slaveholders so much as it involves
people and corporations. Morality is such a dicey
thing.
Thanks!
--Ron
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> Uh, thanks Bruce.
Sorry Ron -- no good on the fly. I do vlue your
question. Can we objectivize the Cat on the Mat (or in
the Hat, for my grandaughter)?
My answer is "YES". Bu "objectivize I mean entering
into a process of increasing observer agreement. With
regard to Empathy, I work with a training manual,
Takes weeks, months, depending upon the conversation
under study.
I'm not much of a statistician. But we have a
statistical procedure for determining the likelihood
that agreement is by "chance", as we agree to define
chance.
I imagine the same procedure would serve any set of
observations.
Now, I realize that this orientation sets aside
philosophical skepticism...but I'm not the
philosophical expert...nor should I assume that you
are a skeptic.
What say you to this?
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> Hi Bruce & SWM:
>
> I think that it's correct that the concept of the
> individual arose during the Enlightenment, and that
> it
> represents a turning point and a foundation for
> later
> moral behavior.
>
> Can we really throw away the historical factor?
Surely not! But what I want to get clearer about is
this. Should we say that our concept of morality has
changed or that it is been applied more widely?
bruce
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Empathy prompts sympathy.
> Empathy is that attitude, i.e., it is the
> recognition of ourselves in
> others thus enabling us to identify with them
> psychologically and to
> sympathize with their plights.
Clearly, what you claim must be the case under certain
conditions. But which? How often? Surely there is
Empathy without sympathy. In our paper today there is
an article about a physician who is perfecting the
"death cocktail" for execution. While he doesn't
sympathize with the sentenced to death, he knows what
inflicts pain and doesn't want to be accused of doing
so.
Also, one can empathize and yet not identify. In my
work with sexual predators I find myself in that
position.
> A slave holder who is consistently empathetic would
> have a great
> conflict to deal with in him or herself.
Depending upon whether the Owner saw slavery as
legitimate. The example of the executioner, above.
> point is that over
> time in the 19th century this recognition, which was
> an empathetic
> way of seeing slaves, led to a cultural ferment over
> this matter and,
> ultimately, a growing movement for abolition.
You may be dead right. I'm not an historian. But I see
other possible explanations other than psychological
shifts, economic, political...
> And that is the change in moral sensibilities.
> Indeed, early Judeo-
> Christianity were perfectly fine with slavery as an
> institution even
> while laying the groundwork for the empathy that
> ultimately took hold
> in Western societies over the centuries.
I'm inclined to agree. I feel that the schooling I,
and the African-American children had in the South
during the 1950's suggested a world in which
segregation, as practiced, was no longer viable.
But I've found that my intuition on matters of such
complexity can be way off. I'm not comfortable drawing
conclusion based on reason when it comes to how the
world works.
And, as I wrote to Ron, I'm not clear whether our
moral sensibilities changed or we changed who we apply
them to.
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> The word "good" does not function like a color word
> but it does
> function like a condition word, i.e., see my point
> about "here" and
> its similarity to "good".
I read but not with much understanding. A bit of a
struggle for me. But what about "moral" is that
different from a "color." I see you answered my
question later on. Good.
> "Yellow" relates to something we can see and agree
> on. "Evil"
> or "good" do not.
Are you certain? Obviously "yellow" is a property of a
material thing, while "evil" is an abstraction
attributed to something happenign int he world. But
there are some very ambiguous instances of "yellow",
i.e., low observer agreement, and some very agreed
upon perception of "evil."
> They are always subject to further
> debate.
Again, the application of all concepts are subject to
debate. Though color words usually are less contested
than moral terms. But there is no theoretical
difference in the application of the concept.
> may conclude that there are some observable aspects
> of the world that
> are properly designated by these latter terms, we do
> not, as Moore
> rightly noted, believe that they are just what those
> terms are. Moore
> thought that this meant we intuit the goodness or
> badness, i.e., we
> know it when we see it. But that solution is both
> obviously wrong
> (when you consider the range of debate about such
> things that is
> possible) and, further, unhelpful in explicating the
> usage. It
> doesn't make it any easier to use the terms in
> question. It just
> leads us to stop bothering about it, until we hit
> the first moral
> difficulty again.
I disagree that it is unhelpful to explicate usage. It
is exactly what we have to do if we are ever to come
to an understanding. Anyway, what is the alternative
if we disagree whether X is moral?
> 'What do we mean by morally good?'
You are absolutely correct that we hear this question
differently. I know my answer. Open the dictionary.
Ask people who use the word. I knwo that this is not
sufficient for you. But I still couldn't say to a
third person, outside our discussion, what SWM wants
to do. Find the basis? How do I do that without asking
people how they use the word?
>We don't have any problem
> recognizing colors and
> using the words correctly except where the colors
> shade into one
> another or where we have individuals who are color
> blind.
Nor do millions upon0n millions of people have any
problem identifying evil. Well, they can't justify
their claim. Well, how do you go about justifying your
claim that my car is yellow?
> > Yes we differ. The point of the philosophical
> >claim
> > that I see is that there is no such thing thing as
>> a
> > "basis" and further understanding simply
> elaborates
> > what we already know.
> And since this is your bottom line, it is clear we
> cannot talk
> philosophically on this since you are committed to
> finding a way to
> demonstrate that this can't be done and all our
> discussions on this
> come back to this angle of yours. I, on the other
> hand, think it can
> be.
Have you read the discussion on ethics/wittgenstein on
sister list?
> And moral usages have changed in a way that color
> terms seem not to
> have changed. What does that tell you?
Perhaps you know this for a fact. I don't. I'm not a
linguist. My guess is that both have changed depending
upon the culture in question.
But even if color terms are more stable than moral
terms, it doesn't follow that the logic of their
application, how we learn them, apply them, agree and
disagree, is any different.
OK-- let's grant there is a difference. "Moral" is
applied differently. Thus far you have identified one
factor, i.e., less agreement, nothing definitive, OK
-- now what?
bruce
Ron Allen
No flyng on th gd. I vlue yur rspons tu. OK, we can
objectivize CataMat.
You cut out most of my post, including the substantive
part, in your reply, the purpose being to make it seem
like I'm a simpleton. You are right, to cut out the
other pieces of my post. Because: I am a simpleton,
indeed. But, I still want to enquire.
When your patients come to you, do you ignore their
remarks, selectively, in order to make your replies
seem all the more valid?
Thanks,
--Ron
--- bruce denner <blro...@yahoo.com> wrote:
swmaerske
>
> > Empathy prompts sympathy.
> > Empathy is that attitude, i.e., it is the
> > recognition of ourselves in
> > others thus enabling us to identify with them
> > psychologically and to
> > sympathize with their plights.
>
> Clearly, what you claim must be the case under certain
> conditions. But which? How often? Surely there is
> Empathy without sympathy.
Yes, they are not the same as I have previously pointed out.
> In our paper today there is
> an article about a physician who is perfecting the
> "death cocktail" for execution. While he doesn't
> sympathize with the sentenced to death, he knows what
> inflicts pain and doesn't want to be accused of doing
> so.
>
> Also, one can empathize and yet not identify. In my
> work with sexual predators I find myself in that
> position.
>
> > A slave holder who is consistently empathetic would
> > have a great
> > conflict to deal with in him or herself.
>
> Depending upon whether the Owner saw slavery as
> legitimate. The example of the executioner, above.
>
Yes, so? I have not suggested anywhere that empathy and sympathy are
one and the same or that a decision in favor of empathy is exactly
equivalent with every moral claim. I have also noted that it was the
growth of empathy that brought about a sea change in certain beliefs
and practices with regard to the institution of slavery. But nowhere
have I said that empathy is exactly the same as opposition to
slavery. I think you simply misread me on this.
> > point is that over
> > time in the 19th century this recognition, which was
> > an empathetic
> > way of seeing slaves, led to a cultural ferment over
> > this matter and,
> > ultimately, a growing movement for abolition.
>
> You may be dead right. I'm not an historian. But I see
> other possible explanations other than psychological
> shifts, economic, political...
>
Yes there are other "possible" explanations, some with more
credibility than others. Some people have claimed that slavery as a
practice was really only incidental to the Civil War, for instance,
and that sympathy for slaves was only incidental to the movement in
opposition to slavery as an institution. It has been argued, for
instance, that it was all about competing economic interests and that
the North, which had developed a non-slave-holding society, simply
wanted to economically dominate the slave-holding South. Some have
found this a compelling claim though my sense is that feelings
against slavery were largely independent of economic interests
(though perhaps not entirely uninfluenced by them) and that you
cannot divorce those strong sentiments from the complex of main
causes of the Civil War and the ultimate end of slavery.
As with many things, this is a complex question but my point is
simply this: that at one time our society countenanced and even
approved of slavery and then it didn't. A moral sea change came about
and one of the reasons I would suggest it occurred was the fact that,
as a society, we grew to see those who were slaves as more like
ourselves. Once that change in perspective had occurred, it followed
that slavery would seem to us untenable, particularly given the
founding principles of this country which our predecessors were
steeped in and tended to see as undergirding the society itself. Thus
the growing empathy among individuals in our society for those other
individuals who were enslaved led directly to the social upheavals
that demolished the institution of slavery and established in us an
abhorrence of slavery.
> > And that is the change in moral sensibilities.
> > Indeed, early Judeo-
> > Christianity were perfectly fine with slavery as an
> > institution even
> > while laying the groundwork for the empathy that
> > ultimately took hold
> > in Western societies over the centuries.
>
> I'm inclined to agree. I feel that the schooling I,
> and the African-American children had in the South
> during the 1950's suggested a world in which
> segregation, as practiced, was no longer viable.
>
> But I've found that my intuition on matters of such
> complexity can be way off. I'm not comfortable drawing
> conclusion based on reason when it comes to how the
> world works.
>
> And, as I wrote to Ron, I'm not clear whether our
> moral sensibilities changed or we changed who we apply
> them to.
>
> bruce
>
I am making no comment on, or argument for, a claim that our moral
sensibilities may have changed over time. I don't know. One of the
things I notice, though, is that the human mode of thinking does seem
to have changed over the centuries if we measure it by reading
preserved texts. More it's not unreasonable to conclude that human
thinking differs today across certain societies. Whether there is a
moral consensus or other uniformity is a slightly different question
and something well worth examining. I tend to think there is a core
consensus around certain moral claims. One of the things I have
argued here is that such a consensus may be built around this human
tendency toward empathy. As to what constitutes empathy per se or
whether we can deliberately choose empathy vs. non-empathy in given
situations or whether we can argue for the choice of empathy at
all . . . well it seems to me that those are the kinds of questions
a philosophical inquiry into moral valuing can throw some light on.
SWM
swmaerske
>
> > The word "good" does not function like a color word
> > but it does
> > function like a condition word, i.e., see my point
> > about "here" and
> > its similarity to "good".
>
> I read but not with much understanding. A bit of a
> struggle for me. But what about "moral" is that
> different from a "color." I see you answered my
> question later on. Good.
>
> > "Yellow" relates to something we can see and agree
> > on. "Evil"
> > or "good" do not.
>
> Are you certain? Obviously "yellow" is a property of a
> material thing, while "evil" is an abstraction
> attributed to something happenign int he world. But
> there are some very ambiguous instances of "yellow",
> i.e., low observer agreement, and some very agreed
> upon perception of "evil."
>
Saying we can achieve agreement and do achieve agreement is not to
say that such an achievement is easier or harder, or readily
attainable or not. Agreement about observables is at the bottom of
our common life in the physical world. Agreement about moral claims
may simply exist on a different level, as Searle has suggested
elsewhere, though it may be just as necessary for operating in that
context. The point of a philosophical inquiry about this would then
be to determine to what extent such agreement is possible, what are
its criteria, how stable is it, etc.?
> > They are always subject to further
> > debate.
>
> Again, the application of all concepts are subject to
> debate. Though color words usually are less contested
> than moral terms. But there is no theoretical
> difference in the application of the concept.
>
The issue is not a theoretical one or at least it doesn't hinge on
there being a "theoretical difference." It's simply a matter of how
the different concepts operate for us.
> > may conclude that there are some observable aspects
> > of the world that
> > are properly designated by these latter terms, we do
> > not, as Moore
> > rightly noted, believe that they are just what those
> > terms are. Moore
> > thought that this meant we intuit the goodness or
> > badness, i.e., we
> > know it when we see it. But that solution is both
> > obviously wrong
> > (when you consider the range of debate about such
> > things that is
> > possible) and, further, unhelpful in explicating the
> > usage. It
> > doesn't make it any easier to use the terms in
> > question. It just
> > leads us to stop bothering about it, until we hit
> > the first moral
> > difficulty again.
>
> I disagree that it is unhelpful to explicate usage.
I didn't say it was unhelpful "to explicate usage." I said it was
unhelpful in explicating the usage in question. Asserting an
intuition in order to explain an unexplained usage is simply to say
it is unexplainable in different terms.
> It
> is exactly what we have to do if we are ever to come
> to an understanding. Anyway, what is the alternative
> if we disagree whether X is moral?
>
> > 'What do we mean by morally good?'
>
> You are absolutely correct that we hear this question
> differently. I know my answer. Open the dictionary.
> Ask people who use the word. I knwo that this is not
> sufficient for you. But I still couldn't say to a
> third person, outside our discussion, what SWM wants
> to do. Find the basis? How do I do that without asking
> people how they use the word?
>
I didn't say we shouldn't ask how we use the word. I did say that a
dictionary is rarely an adequate source for answering this question
on a philosophical level. Did Wittgenstein simply recount to us
dictionary definitions?
> >We don't have any problem
> > recognizing colors and
> > using the words correctly except where the colors
> > shade into one
> > another or where we have individuals who are color
> > blind.
>
> Nor do millions upon0n millions of people have any
> problem identifying evil. Well, they can't justify
> their claim. Well, how do you go about justifying your
> claim that my car is yellow?
>
We look at it together. Assuming we have roughly equivalent,
adequately operating sensory equipment with regard to vision and
color, then agreement comes rather quickly.
But here is an example that gets at what I think you have in mind. My
wife recently bought a car which is described by the manufacturer as
sea-blue. Well it doesn't look blue to me. In fact it looks green in
most lights (though, of course, the sea does have a greenish blue hue
to it under certain circumstances, the reason, I suppose, for the
name of this color). I bought my mother a car that is labeled silver
blue. Her car looks like a pastel, bright blue with a silvery gleam
to it. When I see the two cars together I find myself wondering how
is it that both are blue since they look so entirely different.
Indeed, they are at such far remove from one another on the color
continuum that I am at a loss to agree that both are blue. One might
have the same problem, I suppose, with yellow and gold or mustard. So
it is perfectly true that agreement on colors is not a given though I
think that more people would be prone to agree that my mother's new
car is blue than that my wife's is. On the other hand, whenever my
wife asks anyone else in my presence to indicate what color they
think it is, they have invariably responded "blue" leaving me
scratching my head. So either my color sensing equipment is slightly
off or I am far more discerning than others when viewing the same
automobile (like the Innuit who were once thought to have many
different words for white and for snow than we do?).
> > > Yes we differ. The point of the philosophical
> > >claim
> > > that I see is that there is no such thing thing as
> >> a
> > > "basis" and further understanding simply
> > elaborates
> > > what we already know.
>
> > And since this is your bottom line, it is clear we
> > cannot talk
> > philosophically on this since you are committed to
> > finding a way to
> > demonstrate that this can't be done and all our
> > discussions on this
> > come back to this angle of yours. I, on the other
> > hand, think it can
> > be.
>
> Have you read the discussion on ethics/wittgenstein on
> sister list?
>
No, haven't had much time to do so. Can you summarize for us?
> > And moral usages have changed in a way that color
> > terms seem not to
> > have changed. What does that tell you?
>
> Perhaps you know this for a fact. I don't. I'm not a
> linguist. My guess is that both have changed depending
> upon the culture in question.
>
I think that it's pretty clear that at one time killing others was
something that was less of a moral problem to human beings than it is
today, just as slavery was. Infidelity, too, varies (both over
history and across cultures). As for color usages, I have seen little
evidence of change, either over historical time or across cultures.
On the other hand it's hard to tell what the ancient Greeks thought
their word for yellow meant. Did they have the same color we have in
mind when we say "yellow"? Is there any point in imagining they
didn't absent evidence for that? So we do know moral usages changed
while we have no evidence that color usages have. Shall we assume
that they did too, merely because moral usages have, even in light of
the fact that there's no evidence of cross-cultural variation in the
present?
> But even if color terms are more stable than moral
> terms, it doesn't follow that the logic of their
> application, how we learn them, apply them, agree and
> disagree, is any different.
>
Well it does if the one is based on physical evidence, sensory
stimuli, and the other is based on some other method of achieving
agreement. Their grammar, in the Wittgensteinian sense, would then be
quite different and worth attending to.
> OK-- let's grant there is a difference. "Moral" is
> applied differently. Thus far you have identified one
> factor, i.e., less agreement, nothing definitive, OK
> -- now what?
>
> bruce
What do you want? I was making a point about Moore's solution to the
question of how we use the term "good." Recall that he likened the
usage to our usage of words like "yellow." I proposed that this was
an incorrect analogy, that it made more sense to think of "good" in a
a way that is similar to how we think of "here."
Both "yellow" and "here" designate something we can find in the
world. The first designates an experience of color. The second
designates a locus in the world. But while the color is an actual
something, a definite source of a particular kind of sensory input,
the locus is really just a point where several agreed upon
coordinates intersect.
The color is a something definite, observable in and of itself, etc.
The locus is nothing like that. It is an abstract referring point or
point referred to.
In both cases the words we're using designate something we can find
in the world, agree on, etc. In both cases, physical criteria are
important to the identification. But the word "yellow" acting as a
designator tags something we can observe whereas the word "here" does
not.
My point was that "good" is more like "here" than "yellow." The
physical criteria which are important for both "here" and "good" are
not themselves the observable in question or even evidence of the
observable's presence. They are, rather, locator functions. What we
refer to by "here" is identified by our pointing, by landmarks, etc.
These actually establish relations between points which are
physically observable in themselves and which establish where "here"
is. Thus it is a mistake to say there is no "here" when someone
says "look over here" or the like. Of course there's a here and we
know what is meant.
Similarly, when someone says that something is good, it's a mistake
to say well there is no such thing as good so the designated object
can't be good, simply because there is nothing in the world that
equates to "good."
This, by the way, is why I don't really accept the suggestion that I
am offering a naturalistic explanation of moral goodness either. My
point is that of course there is a good and a not-good in these cases
though the goodness may consist of different natural (physical or
physically based) characteristics. One doesn't need to posit an
intuition to assert that it makes sense to call some things good and
some things not good. All that is meant is that, as with "here," we
are asserting that there are certain natural characteristics about
the designated object which put it in a certain relation to an agent
just as there may be certain natural characteristics in a designated
area that establishes a relationship of nearness to a speaker ("here"
as opposed to "there").
Moore was right to note that equating "good" with anything in the
world was an error. But he was wrong to suppose the solution was to
assert that what "good" designates must therefore be a simple, non-
natural intuited property. That adds nothing and merely restates the
unknown in a different way, one designed to seem like we now know
something we didn't know before.
SWM
bruce denner
--- Ron Allen <wave...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> You cut out most of my post, including the
> substantive
> part, in your reply, the purpose being to make it
> seem
> like I'm a simpleton.
Mind reading leads to paranoia
>
> When your patients come to you, do you ignore their
> remarks, selectively, in order to make your replies
> seem all the more valid?
I set aside your remarks since I hadn't presented my
case. Having done that I thought you would respond.
But instead in are peeved with me. I'm disappointed.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Yes, so? I have not suggested anywhere that empathy
> and sympathy are
> one and the same
Right -- but do we share the same meaning, viz.,
Empathy is the accurate reflection of the other's
state of mind as judged by the other and sympathy is
the expression of concern for the other's plight.
> I have also noted
> that it was the
> growth of empathy that brought about a sea change in
> certain beliefs
> and practices with regard to the institution of
> slavery.
And your evidence for this claim? You take this up...
But your discussion is impressionistic. Again, I see
history as a discipline of intense study. Not a matter
of ones impression but sifting through data. If you
told me that your review of the historical record
substantiates your claim, and presented some
supportive data, then I'd be impressed.
>
> As with many things, this is a complex question but
> my point is
> simply this: that at one time our society
> countenanced and even
> approved of slavery and then it didn't. A moral sea
> change came about
> and one of the reasons I would suggest it occurred
> was the fact that,
> as a society, we grew to see those who were slaves
> as more like
> ourselves.
Yes, I know that this is your opinion. But history to
me is not simply a matter of what sounds right or what
makes sense.
>Thus
> the growing empathy among individuals in our society
> for those other
> individuals who were enslaved led directly to the
> social upheavals
> that demolished the institution of slavery and
> established in us an
> abhorrence of slavery.
Note your use of "empathy". As I use that term it need
not involve caring or sympathy. Recently I've had
discussions with folks who feel that American society
gets an A for empathy -- we can detect pain in others
and an F for caring.
Again my issue is thinking we can speculate about how
the world works, whether it be history, anthropology,
psychology...our general impressions of what must be
the case is not a method of arriving at what is the
case.
> I am making no comment on, or argument for, a claim
> that our moral
> sensibilities may have changed over time.
The sentence immediately above *seems* to contradict
your claims about empathy and the ending of slavery.
Please show me how I'm mis-reading.
> One of the
> things I notice, though, is that the human mode of
> thinking does seem
> to have changed over the centuries if we measure it
> by reading
> preserved texts.
Changed in what way?
> Whether there is a
> moral consensus or other uniformity is a slightly
> different question
> and something well worth examining.
I know I cut -- but I wanted to isolate the above
sentence. Different question from what? Also, the term
"moral consensus" is quite vague. Surely there are
pockets of consensus.
> I tend to think
> there is a core
> consensus around certain moral claims.
How many people have to agree for there to be a
consensus?
> One of the
> things I have
> argued here is that such a consensus may be built
> around this human
> tendency toward empathy.
I don't believe you have "argued" as much as you've
claimed it. I know you believe it even in the face of
the facts, given again and again, that empathy
(detecting the pain of others) isn't correlated with
moral behavior.
> As to what constitutes
> empathy per se or
> whether we can deliberately choose empathy vs.
> non-empathy in given
> situations or whether we can argue for the choice of
> empathy at
> all . . . well it seems to me that those are the
> kinds of questions
> a philosophical inquiry into moral valuing can throw
> some light on.
Once again.This is our difference.
1. I can't see what a philosopher has to contribute to
the question "what constitutes empathy?" The
dictionary provides the definition and the
psychologist gives the causes and conditions.
2. I don't get why you are asking whether we can
deliberately choose empathy when I do so every day,
deliberately.
3. Sure you can argue for people to be empathetic, I
do all the time. But I don't expect this to have any
effect on their moral position. People on both sides
of any moral debate are equally empathetic. This a
fact of my work. Not a matter of speculation.
Perhaps we just have to note our difference and
respect it.
swmaerske
>
>
> > Yes, so? I have not suggested anywhere that empathy
> > and sympathy are
> > one and the same
>
> Right -- but do we share the same meaning, viz.,
> Empathy is the accurate reflection of the other's
> state of mind as judged by the other and sympathy is
> the expression of concern for the other's plight.
I would agree with your description of sympathy but not of empathy. I
see no reason why it should be "accurate" when it occurs, only that
it occurs. Of course, I'm not quite sure what "accurate" means or
adds to this discussion. I mean, there is no reason to think we don't
generally get it right since this involves our interaction with other
creatures like ourselves so it is not highly likely that we
can't "read" their behaviors, their faces. I suppose the chances of
getting it wrong increase as we move further away from our own
species so there is no guarantee that we always read others correctly
in forming our empathetic images or what not. Even with humans, if we
encounter very good actors or very difficult to read individuals, the
chances of misreading vastly increase. But on balance I think the
issue is not one of being accurate but of doing it, i.e., seeing
ourselves in the other and feeling a kind of resonant emotion with
them because of that projection.
Well I am not claiming to be doing history here, to be doing the work
of an historian, and I don't know why you should expect that I am, or
treat my comments as though that is what I ought to be doing. Once
again you are counting philosophical inquiry as nothing and crediting
only the work of science, in this case the soft science of history.
Perhaps this is why we have such difficulty communicating: you have
no respect for philosophy as philosophy.
When I say above that "I have also noted," my statement does not
refer to my taking note of the data (though, of course, I am somewhat
familiar with written material on the matter, some of which does
report or discuss relevant data), as though I were an historian doing
research. I meant that I have "noted" this here, in my comments on
the subject. Thus I have used the term "noted" in one way, to make a
statement, and you seem to have taken it another, to observe or
conclude from information or data. Our language, as we should all
know by now, is very flexible. Yet I note (as in "observe," in this
case) that you persistently read me wrong as you seem to have done
here.
I don't know to what extent this just reflects our heads being in
different places, as it were, and to what extent it reflects an
effort on your part to find points of disagreement. Sometimes I think
it is the one, sometimes the other. If the first it probably means we
are just too far apart in our thinking to communicate usefully here.
If the second, then it means you are just too intent on arguing for
us to discuss these issues successfully since you will simply await
the next opportunity to attempt yet another refutation instead of
using this arena to join me in trying to achieve clarity on the
issues being discussed. Either way, it tends to confirm what I have
earlier said, that we are too far apart to make progress.
> > As with many things, this is a complex question but
> > my point is
> > simply this: that at one time our society
> > countenanced and even
> > approved of slavery and then it didn't. A moral sea
> > change came about
> > and one of the reasons I would suggest it occurred
> > was the fact that,
> > as a society, we grew to see those who were slaves
> > as more like
> > ourselves.
>
> Yes, I know that this is your opinion. But history to
> me is not simply a matter of what sounds right or what
> makes sense.
>
Well I am not acting as an historian here and, frankly, neither are
you. If you will find cause to object to everything anyone says like
this, then what are you really trying to accomplish here? You pose a
question, I give you an answer, reflecting what is clearly my opinion
(and not offered as anything else) and thus a proposal for how
certain facts we both have in common should be understood, and you
reply by insisting that I am not qualified because I am not doing the
work of an historian. Therefore my opinion is to carry no weight. By
this maneuver you simply shut another door, don't you? So are we to
comment on nothing if we are not recognized experts or scholars in
the fields commented on, or are not at least citing recognized
experts or scholars? Isn't this just a rather overly clever move to
block another pathway in this discussion?
I think I see better your modus operandi and thus why I find
discussion with you so pointless.
> >Thus
> > the growing empathy among individuals in our society
> > for those other
> > individuals who were enslaved led directly to the
> > social upheavals
> > that demolished the institution of slavery and
> > established in us an
> > abhorrence of slavery.
>
> Note your use of "empathy". As I use that term it need
> not involve caring or sympathy.
I did not say it had to. My point is that with empathy comes an
argument for, among other things, sympathy. You continue to misread
me on this. Is it deliberate?
Perhaps you would do better to follow the steps in the text above.
Note (in the observational sense) that I said growing empathy LED to
social upheaval (disputes both verbal and physical and, ultimately a
major military conflict) which resulted in the elimination
(demolished) of slavery and thereby set new norms for us, to wit,
establishing in us abhorrence of the demolished (as in destroyed or
jettisoned) institution.
Note the step by step progression. I did not say that achieving
empathy with those who were slaves simply resulted in a change in our
moral beliefs as a society (though it no doubt changed many
individuals if it did not so affect them all, in some cases speedily
in other cases over time). The point is that empathy is a component
in the calculus here but is not a sufficient condition for the new
view. What else might be required? A bit of reasoning, no doubt,
commitment to a principle of consistency, recognition that we have
all previously agreed to treat others like ourselves in a certain
way, etc.
My argument here has been that empathy forms the basis, the raw
material, for certain of our moral claims, in particular the ones I
find most interesting (though not as a psychologist or historian,
neither of which I am, but as a person and philosopher).
> Recently I've had
> discussions with folks who feel that American society
> gets an A for empathy -- we can detect pain in others
> and an F for caring.
>
So?
> Again my issue is thinking we can speculate about how
> the world works, whether it be history, anthropology,
> psychology...our general impressions of what must be
> the case is not a method of arriving at what is the
> case.
>
Again, my issue is not how the world works but how certain of our
reasoning mechanisms work, to wit how we formulate beliefs and come
to moral conclusions. As a philosopher I am interested in the
concepts to which I have access since they arise from my linguistic
uses and practices which, of course, are embedded in the larger
system of uses and practices which many of us presumably share. Your
fetish for science is intriguing but beside the point unless your
argument is that there is nothing for the philosopher to do here in
which case there would be nothing for philosophers to do anywhere. Is
that the point you have been trying to make?
> > I am making no comment on, or argument for, a claim
> > that our moral
> > sensibilities may have changed over time.
>
> The sentence immediately above *seems* to contradict
> your claims about empathy and the ending of slavery.
> Please show me how I'm mis-reading.
>
It may be the case that our moral sensibilities were the same but
their applications simply changed over time, i.e., that we always
felt the same toward other people but simply excluded many from that
class who we do not exclude today. Or it may be the case that our
feelings toward others were genuinely different in earlier times than
they are today and that is why we see a difference in moral
practices. Clear now?
> > One of the
> > things I notice, though, is that the human mode of
> > thinking does seem
> > to have changed over the centuries if we measure it
> > by reading
> > preserved texts.
>
> Changed in what way?
>
Once slavery was held to be acceptable, even in some cases a social
good. Now it is not. Once revenge killing was considered acceptable,
now it is not. In some societies both past and present theft was
encouraged whil in others not, etc.
> > Whether there is a
> > moral consensus or other uniformity is a slightly
> > different question
> > and something well worth examining.
>
> I know I cut -- but I wanted to isolate the above
> sentence. Different question from what?
Since you cut it I'm not sure of the context and don't have the
patience to go back. Why don't you restore it in context and then we
can talk?
>Also, the term
> "moral consensus" is quite vague. Surely there are
> pockets of consensus.
>
Where have I denied that? Or, for that matter, where have I said that
the sole consensus I am seeking is not merely some rather
large "pockets" (as you put it), perhaps interlocking in some way
between different human groups?
> > I tend to think
> > there is a core
> > consensus around certain moral claims.
>
> How many people have to agree for there to be a
> consensus?
>
I have no idea or even whether one has to make a count to recognize a
consensus. What makes you think there must be?
> > One of the
> > things I have
> > argued here is that such a consensus may be built
> > around this human
> > tendency toward empathy.
>
> I don't believe you have "argued" as much as you've
> claimed it.
Well that's your privilege. Of course if you are looking for a
syllogism, I haven't offered that, at least not recently. However in
the looser sense of "argued" it's hard to say that what I have been
doing here is anything but (though I suppose you will find some way
to say it anyway). Making claims, of course, and providing statements
in support of those claims is to argue.
> I know you believe it even in the face of
> the facts, given again and again, that empathy
> (detecting the pain of others) isn't correlated with
> moral behavior.
If by "correlated" you mean that some moral judgements do not involve
empathy, I have long ago said the same. In fact I said it at the very
beginning of these threads. If you mean that some acts of empathy do
not entail or lead to moral judgements, I have also noted and agreed
with that. So what has "correlated" to do with this question? My
point, and do try reading more slowly and carefully, is that SOME
MORAL JUDGEMENTS IN SOME CASES MAY WELL BE THE RESULT OF HUMAN
EMPATHY and that, if so, one could find an argument for THOSE moral
claims in an argument for empathy per se. Such an argument could not,
then, of course be simply another moral claim on the same level but
would have to be of a different order if it is to support that aspect
of the moral game.
I know you are deeply committed to proving me wrong here and, indeed,
I may well be wrong. But by insisting on misreading me and constantly
seeking to close off avenues of discussion as you do and by endlessly
striving to redirect our debate back on itself by shifting meanings
of terms under our feet, you only obfuscate the issue. Your approach
seems to be to argue that there is nothing philosophy can do vis a
vis this question, so I should simply cease asking it, and/or that
there is nothing philosophy can do at all except to get out of the
way of the various sciences.
I'm sorry but as an individual and as someone interested in
philosophy, I continue to see a question here that deserves
addressing philosophically (though I am not sure I can do that
adequately). If this doesn't appeal to you then let's call it a day
(as I have tried to do before, though each time you come on as though
you mean to get serious, prompting me back, only to see you return to
your same obfuscating approach).
I assume that you consider yourself a philosopher as well as a
practicing psychologist. Am I correct? If so, does that mean you
simply see this issue as not relevant to philosophy or is it that you
see philosophy as a poor handmaiden to the sciences, including
psychology and so not worth bothering about? Perhaps getting clear on
this alone can bring some clarity to these discussions.
>
> > As to what constitutes
> > empathy per se or
> > whether we can deliberately choose empathy vs.
> > non-empathy in given
> > situations or whether we can argue for the choice of
> > empathy at
> > all . . . well it seems to me that those are the
> > kinds of questions
> > a philosophical inquiry into moral valuing can throw
> > some light on.
>
> Once again.This is our difference.
>
> 1. I can't see what a philosopher has to contribute to
> the question "what constitutes empathy?" The
> dictionary provides the definition and the
> psychologist gives the causes and conditions.
>
Dictionaries offer many different definitions as we have recently
seen on this list. A dictionary definition is merely a compilation of
different uses, described in various ways. The point of linguistic
inquiry in a philosophical sense is to explore the range of uses,
including but not limited to the definitions documented in any given
dictionary. Let me repeat a question I asked earlier: Do you think
Wittgenstein's philosophical inquiries consisted of looking up the
meanings of words in dictionaries?
As to what psychologists "give" let me repeat that I am not
interested at the moment in "causes and conditions." I am interested
in the role of empathy in our moral reasoning. Psychologists
certainly may contribute here, too, insofar as they set out to
collect information on how different humans and groups of humans tend
to use empathy in their reasoning of this type. And the information
collected and interpreted would certainly be of interest. But as a
philosopher I am interested in how this all fits together in the game
of moral reasoning, how we get from one claim to the next, how we
logically (or otherwise) support our conclusions. It's not a matter
of documenting what is done but of examining the logical power behind
our doing it.
> 2. I don't get why you are asking whether we can
> deliberately choose empathy when I do so every day,
> deliberately.
>
Good for you though it might be argued that to choose empathy as a
clinical stance is not really to choose it at all. It is certainly
possible that we really can't choose the feelings we have, after all.
If we think we can, of course, then it adds an important level to the
moral argument.
> 3. Sure you can argue for people to be empathetic, I
> do all the time. But I don't expect this to have any
> effect on their moral position. People on both sides
> of any moral debate are equally empathetic. This a
> fact of my work. Not a matter of speculation.
>
If you don't expect it to have any effect, then why make the
argument? Do you do it to hear yourself talk? Is it because that's
what psychologists are supposed to do? If you are engaging with
patients, do you do so to affect them in some way or merely to
observe them or to do what psychologists are supposed to do or to
collect a psychologist's fee? What is the point of arguing with
people or trying to cajole them (if you are trying a gentler
approach) if you believe you can have no effect upon them? Why
should any patient come to you if you ultimately doubt your ability
to change their thinking and behaviors through professional discourse
with them? Or are you one of those psychologists who prefers to
administer drugs (can psychologists do that or must one still be a
medical doctor as well?) or other non-verbal therapies?
> Perhaps we just have to note our difference and
> respect it.
>
> bruce
I've suggested that a long time ago though you seem to think it
important to get in the last word. If your next comment is simply to
restate your final statement above, I'll respect that and reply no
more. But if you come back (as I expect you will) with further
statements which seem to require some response by me (assuming some
new issues, at least, are introduced), then I will respond again.
But, as I imagine you can see from this, I have concluded that there
is not a lot to be gained by our continuing to go at these issues. We
are too far apart but, more, I have come to conclude that you are
really interested in something else, e.g., getting in the last word
or just performing for some imagined audience on this site. For the
record, there does not seem to be a lot of posting here so I have
concluded there is not much audience here at all. This is why this
list could be a good one on which to do real philosophy. But for that
we need serious counterparts and I think you are not one of these.
SWM
bruce denner
> Saying we can achieve agreement and do achieve
> agreement is not to
> say that such an achievement is easier or harder, or
> readily
> attainable or not.
Agreed!
> Agreement about observables is at
> the bottom of
> our common life in the physical world.
Disagree. 1- Agreement about observables is vital in
every instance. 2- There is no such thing as a
physical world apart from something called our mental
world. Which does not mean that we don't dream or say
things to ourselves no one can hear.
> Agreement
> about moral claims
> may simply exist on a different level,
I don't know what "different level" means. Moral
claims are about our collective experience of the
world we live in.t
>The point of a philosophical inquiry about
> this would then
> be to determine to what extent such agreement is
> possible, what are
> its criteria, how stable is it, etc.?
Disagree. What our criteria are and how they work is a
subject for social science. That we have criteria is a
conceptual point. How they work is dependent upon
empirical study.
> I didn't say we shouldn't ask how we use the word. I
> did say that a
> dictionary is rarely an adequate source for
> answering this question
> on a philosophical level. Did Wittgenstein simply
> recount to us
> dictionary definitions?
Yes. He asked us to recall, reflect on how we use
words, concepts in order to disentangle philosophical
puzzles. The use of "moral" is given in the
dictionary. No research required. Why folks consider X
moral is answered by asking them. Research is
required.
I love your "what is the color of the car" example. A
robin red-breast does not have a red breast.
SWM: Why is it? When you write of life, I easily
follow. When you write of your philosophy, you
disappear from sight?
SWM: I think that it's pretty clear that at one time
killing others was something that was less of a moral
problem to human beings than it is today."
Bruce: Not clear to me. More importantly, we, on this
list, can throw out ideas but, in all modesty, we
ought to claim them as fact. I wish we had a resident
historian.
SWM: So we do know moral usages changed?
Bruce: We can learn by reading. There is scholarship
here. we ought not speculate.
SWM: Well it does if the one is based on physical
evidence, sensory stimuli, and the other is based on
some other method of achieving agreement. Their
grammar, in the Wittgensteinian sense, would then be
quite different and worth attending to.
Bruce: Their grammar would be different but not
because of "sensory stimuli." LW wasn't a sense-datum
fellow. "Yellow" isn't less of our life then good and
evil.
SWM:I was making a point about Moore's solution to the
question of how we use the term "good." Recall that he
likened the usage to our usage of words like "yellow."
I proposed that this was an incorrect analogy, that it
made more sense to think of "good" in a a way that is
similar to how we think of "here."
Bruce: Moore was right-on when he pointed out the
analogy between "good" and "yellow" since both are
immediate perceptions. "Moral", however, is more like
"color", an abstract term. "Here" is even more
abstract. No matter, all words are learned through
instruction. That's my point. The details of the
instruction don't seem relevant to your question--
"How do we learn that X is moral?"
We are taught. Examples, of events in the world, that
we can observe, material things, distinctions are
made...etc.
SWM: My point was that "good" is more like "here" than
"yellow."
Bruce: As in, my good hat is the yellow one??????????
SWM:Similarly, when someone says that something is
good, it's a mistake to say well there is no such
thing as good so the designated object can't be good,
simply because there is nothing in the world that
equates to "good."
Bruce: Agreed. That would be nonsense.
SWM: One doesn't need to posit an intuition to assert
that it makes sense to call some things good and some
things not good.
Bruce: Agreed. We don't need to posit anything to
assert something makes sense. Either it makes sense or
it doesn't.
I'm far from an expert on Moore. But I don't think he
was positing some psychological act called an
"intuition." What he was saying, perhaps, is that a
claim "X is good" can't be analyzed any further.
So-- he wouldn't be a fan of your question "What is
the basis of a moral claim" because he would see that
any answer would just be more the same.
SWM: Moore was right to note that equating "good" with
anything in the world was an error.
Bruce: The very idea of equating words and world seems
misguided. Not just "good", but any word.
SWM:But he was wrong to suppose the solution was to
assert that what "good" designates must therefore be a
simple,
Bruce: Again, my guess is that Moore wasn't trying to
solve "your problem" of a basis for making moral
claims but, rather, any empirical basis would have the
same conceptual justifiication.
Philosophy can't tell us "what is moral?". But it can
show us the grammar of that question and what it means
to ask "What is the basis of a moral claim?"
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> I would agree with your description of sympathy but
> not of empathy. I
> see no reason why it should be "accurate" when it
> occurs, only that
> it occurs.
It is not "my description" but "our definition" (some
psychologists) definition. Of course, you can, if you
wish, define "empathy" as an attempt to capture what
is going on with the other without regard to the
other's feedback.
You are correct to question the use of "accurate".
More precisely, it ought to be put as "an attempt to
be accurate by feedback." Its relevance here? Well, my
experience and reading suggests little or no
correlation with moral reflection or action.
BTW: I think we are slipping into identifying moral
reflection with action. A person with a moral
sensibility need not act morally.
> Well I am not claiming to be doing history here, to
> be doing the work
> of an historian, and I don't know why you should
> expect that I am,
Because you are making historical claims that require
evidence. Note the title of the Thread.
> Once
> again you are counting philosophical inquiry as
> nothing and crediting
> only the work of science, in this case the soft
> science of history.
> Perhaps this is why we have such difficulty
> communicating: you have
> no respect for philosophy as philosophy.
That is one way of seeing it. In fact, I have respect
for all disciplines (including theology) but little
patience when questions asked by one discipline is
answered by the other. More specifically, I see
philosophy as un-mudddling our thoughts, where ever
they appear, in science, what have you...but not
collecting or analyzing data.
Whether, historically, morality has changed, is not a
philosophical but an empirical question. Speculation,
while interesting, apart from data collection, is open
to bias and prejudice.
> Well I am not acting as an historian here and,
> frankly, neither are
> you. If you will find cause to object to everything
> anyone says like
> this, then what are you really trying to accomplish
> here?
To find a place for philosophical reflection.
SWM:you reply by insisting that I am not qualified
because I am not doing the work of an historian.
Therefore my opinion is to carry no weight.
Bruce: Nor does mine. Opinions are not the stuff of
any serious discipline.
SWM: By this maneuver you simply shut another door,
Bruce: to speculation, when fact finding is required.
SWM: So are we to comment on nothing if we are not
recognized experts or scholars in the fields commented
Bruce: We could read the scholars and comment. You are
interested in how folks make moral claims. What have
you read. The research is vast. I get the impression
that philosophy, for you, is speculating about
anything of interest and posit causal relations
because they make sense to you. But what makes sense
may not be factual
SWM:Note (in the observational sense) that I said
growing empathy LED to social upheaval (disputes both
verbal and physical and, ultimately a major military
conflict) which resulted in the elimination
(demolished) of slavery and thereby set new norms for
us, to wit, establishing in us abhorrence of the
demolished (as in destroyed or jettisoned)
institution.
Bruce: A nice story. How do you it is true?
SWM:The point is that empathy is a component in the
calculus here but is not a sufficient condition for
the new view. What else might be required?
Bruce: Who knows? It is your story. You can make
anything up that is logical and reasonable and others
would probably agree. But this your conventional
wisdom and historical study may proof it true or
false. I just don't see any philosophy in it.
SWM: My argument here has been that empathy forms the
basis, the raw material, for certain of our moral
claims, in particular the ones I find most interesting
(though not as a psychologist or historian, neither of
which I am, but as a person and philosopher)
Bruce: You not making an argument. You are making a
claim about how the world works absent any method for
testing its truth. Yes, people make claims all the
time. Free speech. I'm for it. But please examine your
claim. What if psychologists and historians find out
that you are wrong. Will it still have philosophical
truth? What in the world is that?
SWM: Again, my issue is not how the world works but
how certain of our reasoning mechanisms work, to wit
how we formulate beliefs and come to moral
conclusions.
Bruce: Please, our mind is part of the world. How it
works is subject to study. Anything you arrive at
through untested speculation is just that. There is no
such thing as a philosophical truth about mind.
HERE IS WHERE WE DIFFER PROFOUNDLY!
SWM:As a philosopher I am interested in the concepts
to which I have access since they arise from my
linguistic uses and practices which, of course, are
embedded in the larger system of uses and practices
which many of us presumably share.
Bruce: Yes, you can tell me what "morality" means. Not
as a philosopher but as a native speaker. But you
can't find out the basis for moral claims -- their
causes and conditions -- by thinking very, very hard
-- as you once suggested.
SWM: unless your argument is that there is nothing for
the philosopher to do here
Bruce: There is plenty to do here. The first thing is
to see how "pure thought" doesn't tell us how mind
works. That is a philosophical task started by Kant,
continued by LW, and clearly is still required.
SWM: My point, and do try reading more slowly and
carefully, is that SOME MORAL JUDGEMENTS IN SOME CASES
MAY WELL BE THE RESULT OF HUMAN EMPATHY
Bruce: Stands to reason. But since you have no method
for determining when and where this happens it remains
a possibility that, in fact, may never occur. Who
knows?
SWM: and that, if so, one could find an argument for
THOSE moral
claims in an argument for empathy per se.
Bruce: Yes it follows that if empathy precipitated
moral behavior in situation X, then, if we want moral
behavior we ought to prompt empathy. Of course, it may
not work because of other factors. Human behavior
doesn't conform to single causation. Of course you can
make an argument for empathy even if it has no effect.
This seems to be a practical question unrelated to any
philosophical issue. Listen, I'm all for empathy
training. Done it for years. I feel it is good stuff.
But I don't see the philosophical issue.
SWM: Your approach seems to be to argue that there is
nothing philosophy can do vis a vis this question,
Bruce: Right!
SWM: so I should simply cease asking it,
Bruce: No! Read the research. Become informed.
SWM: and/or that there is nothing philosophy can do at
all except to get out of the way of the various
sciences.
Bruce: Wrong! Well, correct, philosophy has no
business becoming a speculative science, LW is clear
about this, but there is much to do.
Philosophy is not a poor handmaiden. It is a social
critic, a de-mystifier, etc....not in competition with
the explanatory disciplines.
But for some reason philosophy wants to get into the
explanatory act. Typically it doesn't mess with
physics but the "soft" sciences are easy prey. Hey we
all have a mind. Just look inside...
So what is philosophy to me? I'll try to say in a
separate Post.
SWM:The point of linguistic inquiry in a philosophical
sense is to explore the range of uses... Let me repeat
a question I asked earlier: Do you think Wittgenstein'
s philosophical inquiries consisted of looking up the
meanings of words in dictionaries?
Bruce: Specific words. Those contributing to our
muddles. So, it ain't the "range of uses", which is
the domain of linguistics, but those uses involved in
a conceptual muddles. And the "uses" are what everyone
knows. No research required. Linguistics is an
entirely different matter.
SWM:I am not interested at the moment in "causes and
conditions." I am interested in the role of empathy in
our moral reasoning.
Bruce: That makes no sense to me. A "role" is a
metaphor for how something works. Work is caused and
occurs under certain conditions. Even an actors role
fits this definition. What do you mean by "role."
SWM: But as a philosopher I am interested in how this
all fits together in the game of moral reasoning, how
we get from one claim to the next, how we logically
(or otherwise) support our conclusions. It's not a
matter of documenting what is done but of examining
the logical power behind our doing it.
Bruce:First you have to document how it is done before
you can describe the game. Doesn't matter whether you
are a philosopher or psychologist. So go ahead
describe the game. But when you tell me that empathy
is part of it, I want to know what part? And how are
you going to arrive at the truth of the matter. Does a
logical argument that empathy is vital make it so?
SWM:If you don't expect it to have any effect, then
why make the
argument?
Bruce: Empathy is a psychological tool. Its
effectiveness is reducing mental suffering is widely
documented. That's why I use it. What I doubt is that
mentally healthy folks are more or less moral than
unhappy ones.
It is true that I'm quite ambivalent about our
discussion. I feel that I'm as a serious as a heart
attack. If I weren't, I'd be more accepting about your
generalizations. You certainly impress me as a decent
guy trying to make sense out of a very complicated
business. In fact, I feel that we would get along fine
if we ever met. This has happened from time to time.
Have you ever met anyone you debated on these lists?
swmaerske
>
> > Saying we can achieve agreement and do achieve
> > agreement is not to
> > say that such an achievement is easier or harder, or
> > readily
> > attainable or not.
>
> Agreed!
>
> > Agreement about observables is at
> > the bottom of
> > our common life in the physical world.
>
> Disagree. 1- Agreement about observables is vital in
> every instance. 2- There is no such thing as a
> physical world apart from something called our mental
> world. Which does not mean that we don't dream or say
> things to ourselves no one can hear.
>
Here I obviously meant domain of discourse, not distinct worlds in
some metaphysical sense. Surely that was obvious and homing in on the
term "worlds" can only have been disingenuous, designed to deny a
claim in order to be able to offer a denial. I don't have patience
for this sort of thing anymore. We should be beyond it by now.
> > Agreement
> > about moral claims
> > may simply exist on a different level,
>
> I don't know what "different level" means. Moral
> claims are about our collective experience of the
> world we live in.t
>
See above vis a vis your response to my use of the term "worlds."
That is an example of how you shift levels in these discussions.
Obviously I was not using the term to refer to a planet or to
Popper's multiple worlds theory or to anything resonant with Kripke's
talk of "all possible worlds," etc. You know that from many things I
have said in the course of our long discussions. I was clearly using
the term to delineate different areas of discourse and merely
chose "world" as a convenient delineator.
By asserting disagreement because "There is no such thing as a
physical world apart from something called our mental world" you not
only miss my point but deliberately misdirect the discussion since it
is clear from the context that I was not asserting the existence of
separate and incompatible realms. But if you thought, for some odd
reason, that I was, a simple request for a clarification would have
sufficed. Instead you shifted the discussion by misconstruing my
usage. Whether you did it intentionally or not (and I think it must
have been intentional at this point though perhaps it is done so
automatically by you that you don't even notice what you're doing) it
changes the focus of the discussion, creating an argument where none
existed before or needed to exist.
I have seen so much of this sort of rhetoric on these on-line lists
and really am rather tired of it.
> >The point of a philosophical inquiry about
> > this would then
> > be to determine to what extent such agreement is
> > possible, what are
> > its criteria, how stable is it, etc.?
>
> Disagree. What our criteria are and how they work is a
> subject for social science. That we have criteria is a
> conceptual point. How they work is dependent upon
> empirical study.
>
Not how they work when WE use the terms in our discourse with others.
You don't do social science to learn a language or to learn to think,
do you?
> > I didn't say we shouldn't ask how we use the word. I
> > did say that a
> > dictionary is rarely an adequate source for
> > answering this question
> > on a philosophical level. Did Wittgenstein simply
> > recount to us
> > dictionary definitions?
>
> Yes. He asked us to recall, reflect on how we use
> words, concepts in order to disentangle philosophical
> puzzles.
Let's try this again: Did he refer us to dictionaries?
> The use of "moral" is given in the
> dictionary. No research required. Why folks consider X
> moral is answered by asking them. Research is
> required.
>
No dictionary definition is anything more than someone's effort to
document usages. Given language's richness it is hardly likely that
uses can ever be exhaustively documented in a single entry or perhaps
in a book of entries. Nor do we use dictionaries to learn how to
speak. First we must know a language to use the dictionary. Thinking
is done in language and, of course, the languages we use shape our
ideas.
> I love your "what is the color of the car" example. A
> robin red-breast does not have a red breast.
>
The last one I saw did. Or so it looked to me from afar.
> SWM: Why is it? When you write of life, I easily
> follow. When you write of your philosophy, you
> disappear from sight?
>
Because, I suppose, you simply don't want to acknowledge the issues
I'm raising as philosophical material. I think you just dig your
heels in about this. I'm too tired this evening to play this game in
any greater depth than this. If others on this list have an interest
in some of what I've written I shall be glad to re-engage. Otherwise,
well I'm drifting away from this for now . . .
> SWM: I think that it's pretty clear that at one time
> killing others was something that was less of a moral
> problem to human beings than it is today."
>
> Bruce: Not clear to me. More importantly, we, on this
> list, can throw out ideas but, in all modesty, we
> ought to claim them as fact. I wish we had a resident
> historian.
>
You don't need a historian to do what we're doing here. We're working
with shared knowledge to arrive at conceptual clarity. We are not
engaged in determining what is an accurate rendition of what actually
happened in the past and what is not. If there are informational
disputes and they are serious, we can resolve them by going to
various sources. At the moment I am not aware of any such serious
disputes about historical claims made here.
> SWM: So we do know moral usages changed?
>
> Bruce: We can learn by reading. There is scholarship
> here. we ought not speculate.
>
One can make the case either way, I expect. Depends, as Bill Clinton
once said of "is" on what we mean by "usages" and "changed" doesn't
it?
> SWM: Well it does if the one is based on physical
> evidence, sensory stimuli, and the other is based on
> some other method of achieving agreement. Their
> grammar, in the Wittgensteinian sense, would then be
> quite different and worth attending to.
>
> Bruce: Their grammar would be different but not
> because of "sensory stimuli." LW wasn't a sense-datum
> fellow. "Yellow" isn't less of our life then good and
> evil.
>
I don't recall suggesting it was. Do you think I did?
> SWM:I was making a point about Moore's solution to the
>
> question of how we use the term "good." Recall that he
> likened the usage to our usage of words like "yellow."
> I proposed that this was an incorrect analogy, that it
> made more sense to think of "good" in a a way that is
> similar to how we think of "here."
>
> Bruce: Moore was right-on when he pointed out the
> analogy between "good" and "yellow" since both are
> immediate perceptions.
Demonstrate how "moral" is a matter of perceptions in keeping with
Moore's claim then. It was precisely my point that that didn't work
and that it didn't because a color is publicly observable whereas
moral claims arise from our feelings about things we observe, in
relation to a variety of other factors. If there is that big a
difference between color words and moral words then the grammar is
significantly different.
> "Moral", however, is more like
> "color", an abstract term. "Here" is even more
> abstract. No matter, all words are learned through
> instruction. That's my point.
It's an irrelevant point. I wasn't talking about how we learn words
or these words. I was talking of what we are doing with those words
and why we are not doing the same thing with "good" that we are doing
with "yellow" (which, of course, was what Moore claimed was
happening).
> The details of the
> instruction don't seem relevant to your question--
>
> "How do we learn that X is moral?"
>
> We are taught. Examples, of events in the world, that
> we can observe, material things, distinctions are
> made...etc.
>
Again, this is simply irrelevant to my point about what we are doing
with moral words.
> SWM: My point was that "good" is more like "here" than
> "yellow."
>
> Bruce: As in, my good hat is the yellow one??????????
>
Well we know where the yellow is, eh? Where's the good?
> SWM:Similarly, when someone says that something is
> good, it's a mistake to say well there is no such
> thing as good so the designated object can't be good,
> simply because there is nothing in the world that
> equates to "good."
>
> Bruce: Agreed. That would be nonsense.
Hallelujah. So here you have gotten over your knee jerk
argumentativeness?
>
> SWM: One doesn't need to posit an intuition to assert
> that it makes sense to call some things good and some
> things not good.
>
> Bruce: Agreed. We don't need to posit anything to
> assert something makes sense. Either it makes sense or
> it doesn't.
>
I wasn't talking about asserting that something makes sense but,
rather, asserting that something is good (or, as I put it above, that
it makes sense to say something is good). Your response here again
shifts the focus to an entirely different issue. This strategy of
yours keeps cropping up. I think you just like to argue about things,
for whatever reason. Presumably you derive something psychologically
rewarding from being able to go on and on like this? On another list
I have another interlocutor, a Popperian, who pursues the same
strategy (though he's probably more outrageous about it than you). He
is forever taking my words in wildly different ways than the context
in which they are stated and thereby changing the trajectory of the
discussions. After awhile I have to throw up my hands because we have
gone so far afield. I have a pretty good memory for lines of argument
but he even manages to lose me with his wilfull circumlocutions. I
think you play the same game albeit on a more modest scale (which is
somewhat to your credit).
> I'm far from an expert on Moore. But I don't think he
> was positing some psychological act called an
> "intuition." What he was saying, perhaps, is that a
> claim "X is good" can't be analyzed any further.
Yes, and he explained that by saying of "good" that it denotes
an "intuited non-natural quality". Of course one of the things he
failed to do was explicate what he meant by "intuited" but his point
was that it reflected direct knowledge without the intermediation of
any other information or factors, i.e., it did not have to be deduced
just as it could not be equated with any natural thing in the world.
As he himself put it, I can't tell you what good is but I know it
when I see it. Of course, that is a problem when you realize that
different people consider different things good.
In more recent times, there has been a movement back to what Moore
rejected, i.e., so-called "naturalism" though it was never called
that before Moore criticized it as such. The idea that moral goodness
is explicable in natural terms hinges on the notion that human
beings, as a matter of fact, desire certain things universally or
pretty nearly universally and so it became a matter of identifying
that thing or things which we always held to be good.
An alternative solution, offered by Hare, was to build on
Wittgenstein's insight on the wide range of linguistic games we can
play to note that calling a thing good is no more than to commend or
recommend a thing. That is, while it appears to designate something,
in fact that is an illusion and all we need to know is that we are
performing the speech act of commending or recommending.
Intriguingly, in every language that I am aware of the grammar is
always to designate a thing. If Hare were right then one would expect
that some languages (and there may be since I don't know all
languages so I'm still open to this) would rely simply on purely
commendatory uses, i.e., never involve a term like "good". My
instinct is to say that if our language is structured in a way that
involves designating something, then there must be a reason it works
in that way. Thus I think my solution to Moore's problem is better
than Hare's.
> So-- he wouldn't be a fan of your question "What is
> the basis of a moral claim" because he would see that
> any answer would just be more the same.
>
Well he thought he'd resolved the problem in the Principia but later
acknowledged that he hadn't. (He was really writing in response to
the existing ethical thinkers of his day who were largely
utiliarians. His criticism was against the notion that good = the
greatest happiness for the greatest number.)
He also later admitted that the naturalistic fallacy which he is
credited with having discovered may not be a logical fallacy at all.
Ron and I discussed this briefly earlier on. Ron says he later
recanted that recantation. That may be though I don't think it
matters all that much in considering whether his analysis was right
or not.
> SWM: Moore was right to note that equating "good" with
> anything in the world was an error.
>
> Bruce: The very idea of equating words and world seems
> misguided. Not just "good", but any word.
>
Again you absolutely miss the point. I can only assume it is
deliberate. Obviously to say "what we mean by 'yellow' is the
following examples of certain colors" is to equate the word "yellow"
with something in the world as I was using these terms. The point is
that there is nothing in the world, on Moore's view (and I agree),
that is what we mean by "good." To assume that there is is to fall
into what Moore called the naturalistic fallacy.
> SWM:But he was wrong to suppose the solution was to
> assert that what "good" designates must therefore be a
> simple,
>
> Bruce: Again, my guess is that Moore wasn't trying to
> solve "your problem" of a basis for making moral
> claims but, rather, any empirical basis would have the
> same conceptual justifiication.
>
Don't guess. Read him if you want to dispute this. Otherwise what
good is a guess here?
> Philosophy can't tell us "what is moral?". But it can
> show us the grammar of that question and what it means
> to ask "What is the basis of a moral claim?"
>
> bruce
Philosophy can tell us how moral discourse works. If you want to take
a look at the Principia I'll get my old copy out and we can go over
it here. It was once my favorite philosophical work.
SWM
swmaerske
different wavelengths here but I suppose I will offer a bit of a
response at least:
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, bruce denner <blroadies@...>
wrote:
>
>
> --- swmaerske <swmaerske@...> wrote:
>
> > I would agree with your description of sympathy but
> > not of empathy. I
> > see no reason why it should be "accurate" when it
> > occurs, only that
> > it occurs.
>
> It is not "my description" but "our definition" (some
> psychologists) definition. Of course, you can, if you
> wish, define "empathy" as an attempt to capture what
> is going on with the other without regard to the
> other's feedback.
>
> You are correct to question the use of "accurate".
> More precisely, it ought to be put as "an attempt to
> be accurate by feedback." Its relevance here? Well, my
> experience and reading suggests little or no
> correlation with moral reflection or action.
>
> BTW: I think we are slipping into identifying moral
> reflection with action. A person with a moral
> sensibility need not act morally.
>
Who said they needed to? Where do you get these things you think I am
saying?
> > Well I am not claiming to be doing history here, to
> > be doing the work
> > of an historian, and I don't know why you should
> > expect that I am,
>
> Because you are making historical claims that require
> evidence. Note the title of the Thread.
>
I am citing historical information that I take to be common knowledge
and using it to examine what we know about our moral usages. If you
or anyone have historical information that contradicts this
information I take to be unquestioned, by all means present it. I am
open to new information. However, I am operating within the context
of what I believe I know. That, in the end, is what we all do.
> > Once
> > again you are counting philosophical inquiry as
> > nothing and crediting
> > only the work of science, in this case the soft
> > science of history.
> > Perhaps this is why we have such difficulty
> > communicating: you have
> > no respect for philosophy as philosophy.
>
> That is one way of seeing it. In fact, I have respect
> for all disciplines (including theology) but little
> patience when questions asked by one discipline is
> answered by the other. More specifically, I see
> philosophy as un-mudddling our thoughts, where ever
> they appear, in science, what have you...but not
> collecting or analyzing data.
>
Nor am I arguing for collecting or analyzing data, though you keep
insisting that that is what needs to be done in order to answer the
questions I've raised. Of course, I have said numerous times that
that is a different line of inquiry, one which I am certainly
interested in (as I am interested in all relevant information) but
not one that I am pursuing. I know that you want to say that this
must be pursued because you believe or want to believe that it is the
only way to answer the questions I've raised but we have disagreed on
this. I don't think anything more is gained by arguing this same
point though I suppose you will continue to do so.
> Whether, historically, morality has changed, is not a
> philosophical but an empirical question. Speculation,
> while interesting, apart from data collection, is open
> to bias and prejudice.
>
Again, I am working from knowledge that I take to be common between
us. If you have different information that has a bearing on this then
let's see it. This is not, itself, an exercise in historical inquiry
but in conceptual analysis.
> > Well I am not acting as an historian here and,
> > frankly, neither are
> > you. If you will find cause to object to everything
> > anyone says like
> > this, then what are you really trying to accomplish
> > here?
>
> To find a place for philosophical reflection.
>
> SWM:you reply by insisting that I am not qualified
> because I am not doing the work of an historian.
> Therefore my opinion is to carry no weight.
>
> Bruce: Nor does mine. Opinions are not the stuff of
> any serious discipline.
>
I am not offering opinions on historical questions but relying on
what we know of history as background for my inquiry.
> SWM: By this maneuver you simply shut another door,
>
> Bruce: to speculation, when fact finding is required.
>
What fact finding? The question is NOT what happened in this or that
era? It is what do we do (and have in mind) when we engage in moral
discourse and how does that discourse work for us?
> SWM: So are we to comment on nothing if we are not
> recognized experts or scholars in the fields commented
>
> Bruce: We could read the scholars and comment. You are
> interested in how folks make moral claims. What have
> you read. The research is vast. I get the impression
> that philosophy, for you, is speculating about
> anything of interest and posit causal relations
> because they make sense to you. But what makes sense
> may not be factual
>
This is not about new facts but conceptual analysis, i.e., new
understanding.
> SWM:Note (in the observational sense) that I said
> growing empathy LED to social upheaval (disputes both
> verbal and physical and, ultimately a major military
> conflict) which resulted in the elimination
> (demolished) of slavery and thereby set new norms for
> us, to wit, establishing in us abhorrence of the
> demolished (as in destroyed or jettisoned)
> institution.
>
> Bruce: A nice story. How do you it is true?
>
I don't. I proposed it as an explanation for how empathy works in the
moral game and laid it out as I did above based on what I know of the
history. However, in the above I am responding to an earlier
criticism you made of roughly the same description in which you
misread what I had written. So here I am laying it out more carefully
to eliminate that misreading. So now you say, 'very nice, how do you
know it's true?' But whether it's true or not is not the issue. It's
a proposal based on information from history which is part of our
shared knowledge. In fact, as a proposal, it may be true or not
whether or not my historical rendering is itself true. So now that I
have corrected your misreading AND explained to you why your point
about knowing it's truth is irrelevant, what will you say to keep the
argument about this going next?
> SWM:The point is that empathy is a component in the
> calculus here but is not a sufficient condition for
> the new view. What else might be required?
>
> Bruce: Who knows? It is your story. You can make
> anything up that is logical and reasonable and others
> would probably agree. But this your conventional
> wisdom and historical study may proof it true or
> false. I just don't see any philosophy in it.
>
The proposal I have made is not an historical claim. Your confusion
of this with that again strikes me as an effort to derail the
discussion in unhelpful ways. Really, Bruce, you have convinced me
that this is a no-go. I kind of concluded that when we discussed
these same issues back on the Wittgenstein list but since you seemed
genuinely interested and I needed an interlocutor on this subject I
agreed to switch over to here. Then we ground to a halt here and I
walked away. Then I came back on a Wittgensteinian issue and you
suckered me back into this whole discussion. More fool me, eh?
> SWM: My argument here has been that empathy forms the
> basis, the raw material, for certain of our moral
> claims, in particular the ones I find most interesting
> (though not as a psychologist or historian, neither of
> which I am, but as a person and philosopher)
>
> Bruce: You not making an argument. You are making a
> claim about how the world works absent any method for
> testing its truth. Yes, people make claims all the
> time. Free speech. I'm for it. But please examine your
> claim. What if psychologists and historians find out
> that you are wrong. Will it still have philosophical
> truth? What in the world is that?
>
I've already addressed your use of the term "argument" here vs. mine.
Enough said on that one.
>
> SWM: Again, my issue is not how the world works but
> how certain of our reasoning mechanisms work, to wit
> how we formulate beliefs and come to moral
> conclusions.
>
> Bruce: Please, our mind is part of the world. How it
> works is subject to study. Anything you arrive at
> through untested speculation is just that. There is no
> such thing as a philosophical truth about mind.
>
You are talking about "philosophical truth" not I. I have only talked
of conceptual clarity. Reminds me of the days when you were arguing
with me as though I were making some sort of Rationalist claims. You
have yet to get beyond that.
> HERE IS WHERE WE DIFFER PROFOUNDLY!
>
> SWM:As a philosopher I am interested in the concepts
> to which I have access since they arise from my
> linguistic uses and practices which, of course, are
> embedded in the larger system of uses and practices
> which many of us presumably share.
>
> Bruce: Yes, you can tell me what "morality" means. Not
> as a philosopher but as a native speaker. But you
> can't find out the basis for moral claims -- their
> causes and conditions -- by thinking very, very hard
> -- as you once suggested.
>
Sure I can since I am making such claims. Therefore if I work at it I
just may be able to get clearer on what I am doing and what I mean
when I use them.
So what do you think is the role of philosophy Bruce? You have
decided that what I am doing is not a proper thing for philosophy or
philosophers. So, presumably, you have an idea what is. Give me an
example then of what philosophers do on your view. Let's discuss our
competing concepts of philosophy since you think mine's all wet. So
far you haven't offered anything but some generalities about yours.
> SWM: unless your argument is that there is nothing for
> the philosopher to do here
>
> Bruce: There is plenty to do here. The first thing is
> to see how "pure thought" doesn't tell us how mind
> works. That is a philosophical task started by Kant,
> continued by LW, and clearly is still required.
>
If by "how mind works" you mean how brains cause minds (in Searle's
sense) then of course not. If you mean how our mental life operates,
I think Dennett has given us a rather good picture of it. But, of
course, that is not what I'm engaged in doing here. Here I am engaged
in asking what we are doing when we engage in moral discourse. Do you
see the word "mind" anywhere in this?
Also what do you mean by "pure thought"? That's an interesting usage.
Obviously you think I am arguing for something called "pure thought."
If so, please clarify your term. Do you mean as in "a priori"?
Something else? I don't recall using the term "pure thought" anywhere
though, perhaps, you think that is a good term to denote what it is I
am trying to do. If so, please define this term.
Since you are citing Kant, by the way, how do you think he comes into
this discussion vis a vis Wittgenstein?
> SWM: My point, and do try reading more slowly and
> carefully, is that SOME MORAL JUDGEMENTS IN SOME CASES
> MAY WELL BE THE RESULT OF HUMAN EMPATHY
>
> Bruce: Stands to reason. But since you have no method
> for determining when and where this happens it remains
> a possibility that, in fact, may never occur. Who
> knows?
>
As I said, I am looking to see to what extent some moral claims we
make devolve into claims for empathy and, if so, how convincing they
are likely to be. But, of course, on your view this is not worth
doing, so why do you bother noodging me on-line about it? I'd just as
soon find a different interlocutor since you are merely intent on
keeping the argument going like some circus juggler throwing around a
bunch of balls.
> SWM: and that, if so, one could find an argument for
> THOSE moral
> claims in an argument for empathy per se.
>
> Bruce: Yes it follows that if empathy precipitated
> moral behavior in situation X, then, if we want moral
> behavior we ought to prompt empathy.
Not prompt, argue for.
> Of course, it may
> not work because of other factors. Human behavior
> doesn't conform to single causation. Of course you can
> make an argument for empathy even if it has no effect.
>
True. And that's the difference between prompting (or stimulating)
and arguing for, isn't it?
> This seems to be a practical question unrelated to any
> philosophical issue. Listen, I'm all for empathy
> training. Done it for years. I feel it is good stuff.
> But I don't see the philosophical issue.
>
What philosophical issues do you see? I'd like to know.
> SWM: Your approach seems to be to argue that there is
> nothing philosophy can do vis a vis this question,
>
> Bruce: Right!
>
> SWM: so I should simply cease asking it,
>
> Bruce: No! Read the research. Become informed.
>
That is not the point. Of course I am interested in the research. But
what I am interested in doing with it is not what psychologists and
sociologists and/or neurophysiologists are interested in doing with
it. Nor am I interested in doing the research itself. I'll leave that
to research psychologists and the like.
> SWM: and/or that there is nothing philosophy can do at
> all except to get out of the way of the various
> sciences.
>
> Bruce: Wrong! Well, correct, philosophy has no
> business becoming a speculative science, LW is clear
> about this, but there is much to do.
>
Don't cite Wittgenstein to me, Bruce. I'm at least as familiar with
him as you are.
But what do you think is there for philosophy to do?
And why do you think conceptual analysis applied to our moral
discourse is the same as "speculative science"?
> Philosophy is not a poor handmaiden. It is a social
> critic, a de-mystifier, etc....not in competition with
> the explanatory disciplines.
Good, give me some examples of the work philosophy has done for us
then. Let's have a look.
> But for some reason philosophy wants to get into the
> explanatory act. Typically it doesn't mess with
> physics but the "soft" sciences are easy prey. Hey we
> all have a mind. Just look inside...
>
What's this hang-up of yours on "mind"? Have I mentioned mind in the
discussion of moral discourse here? What are you afraid of?
Philosophers are not interested in treading on psychologists' turf.
Certainly I'm not.
> So what is philosophy to me? I'll try to say in a
> separate Post.
>
Provide some examples of actual philosophical work as well. Merely
offering generic descriptions will not be enough without some
concrete examples to chew on.
> SWM:The point of linguistic inquiry in a philosophical
> sense is to explore the range of uses... Let me repeat
> a question I asked earlier: Do you think Wittgenstein'
> s philosophical inquiries consisted of looking up the
> meanings of words in dictionaries?
>
> Bruce: Specific words. Those contributing to our
> muddles. So, it ain't the "range of uses", which is
> the domain of linguistics, but those uses involved in
> a conceptual muddles. And the "uses" are what everyone
> knows. No research required. Linguistics is an
> entirely different matter.
>
Exactly. What everyone knows. We know how to use "good" so let's look
at how we do it. But when I want to do that you tell me go collect
data or read the research of those who have collected data on this.
When I tell you I am doing something other than collecting data or
interpreting data collected by others to come up with a picture of
what human beings do, you tell me then there's nothing for a
philosopher to do. Yet above you say look at the uses where we have
muddles. Well sometimes we get muddled with moral words. Look at the
utilitarians. Look at Moore. Look at Hare's effort to sort it out.
You seem to want to have it both ways: parrot Wittgenstein's talk of
muddles while denying that there are any muddles to be clarified.
Give us some specific examples of what you think philosophy can do.
Don't talk in generalities. Only examples will enable us to determine
if you are muddled on this matter or I am.
> SWM:I am not interested at the moment in "causes and
> conditions." I am interested in the role of empathy in
> our moral reasoning.
>
> Bruce: That makes no sense to me. A "role" is a
> metaphor for how something works.
A "role" is a lot of things and it is not always a metaphor.
> Work is caused and
> occurs under certain conditions. Even an actors role
> fits this definition. What do you mean by "role."
>
The part empathy plays in our moral usages. When do we refer back to
it, when does it form a basis for moral claims and which moral claims
are they?
> SWM: But as a philosopher I am interested in how this
> all fits together in the game of moral reasoning, how
> we get from one claim to the next, how we logically
> (or otherwise) support our conclusions. It's not a
> matter of documenting what is done but of examining
> the logical power behind our doing it.
>
> Bruce:First you have to document how it is done before
> you can describe the game.
Here I used "document" in terms of gathering data, sorting it,
recording it, etc. As when we document information we pick up in the
world through observation. I did not use it as the equivalent of,
say, "describe" which is implied by your use above. Again you misread
a term. This shifting of meanings is a bad habit of yours.
> Doesn't matter whether you
> are a philosopher or psychologist.
No philosopher has it on his or her resume to go out and collect
data. So if a philosopher is describing something he or she is doing
so based on information which is accessible to all and at least
potentially in the common pool of knowledge.
>So go ahead
> describe the game. But when you tell me that empathy
> is part of it, I want to know what part?
Well we can never get there, can we, if you niggle about as you do,
shifting the meanings of terms, misreading me, switching tracks, etc.
In fact, I don't think you want to know at all, at least not if I am
suggesting it. All you want to do is play around on this list,
keeping the argument in the air.
> And how are
> you going to arrive at the truth of the matter. Does a
> logical argument that empathy is vital make it so?
>
I am not setting out to offer logical proofs of anything, only a
clarifying explanation which, when seen, will be clear to anyone
looking at it with an open mind.
Where have you ever seen me offer logical proofs in this or any
discussion? Why do you persist in trying to characterize my words in
a way that is contrary to what I've actually said? Do you do that
with everyone with whom you have discussions or do you reserve that
for the select few of us?
> SWM:If you don't expect it to have any effect, then
> why make the
> argument?
>
> Bruce: Empathy is a psychological tool. Its
> effectiveness is reducing mental suffering is widely
> documented. That's why I use it. What I doubt is that
> mentally healthy folks are more or less moral than
> unhappy ones.
>
I think we just have different things in mind by "empathy." Indeed, I
think this "psychological tool" of yours is not what we normally call
empathy at all. I think it is merely to adopt an attitude toward your
patient of sympathetic interest to draw the patient out, put him or
her at their ease, lower their resistance, etc. One can do all those
things without feeling any genuine empathy at all. Thus, if this is
what you have in mind by "empathy" then we are talking apples and
oranges.
> It is true that I'm quite ambivalent about our
> discussion. I feel that I'm as a serious as a heart
> attack. If I weren't, I'd be more accepting about your
> generalizations. You certainly impress me as a decent
> guy trying to make sense out of a very complicated
> business. In fact, I feel that we would get along fine
> if we ever met. This has happened from time to time.
> Have you ever met anyone you debated on these lists?
>
> bruce
Actually no, though I did develop an off-line relationship with that
mad Popperian I mentioned nearby. I found him incredibly frustrating
and annoying as he shifted meanings, introduced non sequitors, and
tossed out insults in the course of our discussions. But after I
threw up my hands in disgust and left the list where he and I had
butted heads, he started sending me off-line e-mails and though I
subsequently concluded he's still nutty and pig-headed, I have found
him to be a decent fellow and we have had some very cordial exchanges.
I suppose you do think you are serious about this though I am
concluding more and more that you are not. And I'm sure you're a very
nice guy in person. I've been accused of being that myself. But I
really do find your responses frustrating in the extreme. I just
think we are not talking to the same point and that you have got it
into your head that what I am doing can't be done and so you will
keep denying its efficacy. I think some of your strategies, even if
unintentional (which I'm inclined to doubt), are very wrongheaded.
Perhaps you are not entirely aware of it when you shift meanings and
alter the lines of discusion into irrelevant paths.
I have seen others do it and, usually, when I see that I can't put
them right (as I see it), I withdraw. But you are so cordial, despite
your pig-headedness that I find it hard to withdraw. I always think
that the next point I make will show you the light. But of course
that is a vain hope, isn't it?
Really what you ought to do now is tell us what you think
philosophers CAN do and, in telling us, give us some real examples of
philosophy at work on your view. Then we can compare this with what I
think I am doing and see if you are right, that I am doing what
philosophy can't do, or if I'm right and that you are arbitrarily
attempting to shut the door in order to, perhaps, protect your turf
as a psychologist or just to defend your idea of philosophy itself
(which you clearly take from Wittgenstein when he was inveighing
against traditional philosophy).
SWM
P.S. I would also be interested in discussing Searle, Dennett and AI.
I'm sure you have some very strong opinions on this and I'd love to
hear them. Of course I'm also sure we will find no agreement on this
subject because, I think, you are constitutionally impervious to
agreeing with others on lists like these (aside from offering
conversational pleasantries as you do periodically). But I'd be
interested to test this hypothesis.
Ron Allen
You know, in thinking about it, I guess I don't care
if you select portions of my posts as the bases of
your replies. After all, the posts we make to the
group belong to the group, not to the individual
poster; you can do what you want with them!
In that earlier reply, I was acting as if my comments
were somehow perfect and sacrosanct. Uh, not true. You
should take them as you find them and not worry about
whether it's pleasing or disagreeable to me when and
how you use them. And besides, anyone who wants to
know the context can just go and look it up on the
website.
Thanks & sorry for being so thin-skinned on the web,
of all places...
--Ron
--- bruce denner <blro...@yahoo.com> wrote:
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Nor am I arguing for collecting or analyzing data,
> though you keep
> insisting that that is what needs to be done in
> order to answer the
> questions I've raised. Of course, I have said
> numerous times that
> that is a different line of inquiry,
Sorry, I can't grasp what this different line is.
> This is not, itself, an exercise in
> historical inquiry
> but in conceptual analysis.
That line I get. And the philosophical task is to ask
whether to ask for a basis of any concept is an
intelligible question. You simply assume that is and
want to go. Am I stopping you? You initially answered
you question with "empathy" Do you get why I've been
arguing that E can't be basis, that nothing can be the
basis, because, philosophically, the request for a
basis goes in circles?
> It is what do we do (and have in mind) when we
> engage in moral
> discourse and how does that discourse work for us?
Yes, that is your original question. You reject the
ordinary answer because it gives us nothing
definitive, a resting place, as you call it. Hence
your search for a "basis." And in this move you raise
the philosophical question of whether there is a
"basis" for our language games.
You may answer "yes." Others have. But at least you
ought to present an argument for a "basis." You simply
assume. And then to save the assumption, you shift
into social-science talk in which a basis makes sense.
But then you deny your are doing science. That's my
dilemma with your Posts.
SWM: I don't. I proposed it as an explanation for how
empathy works in the moral game
Bruce: And that's the social science move. But not
really, because you have no method of testing and way
of determining whether it is true. You use the notion
of work without any testing of the working, exacpt
your impression. As you go on..
SWM: But whether it's true or not is not the issue.
It's
a proposal based on information from history which is
part of our
shared knowledge
Bruce: That's bizarre. If we don't know whether it is
true, it ain't knowledge no matter how many people
"share" it. This is a conceptual point, a
philosophical one.
SWM: The proposal I have made is not an historical
claim.
Bruce: Then what kind of claim is it? You impression?
OK. I can read it like that. I guess some folks would
share your impression and others not. But if I'm
really interested in the workings of moral claims, I
surely want more than impressions. Is philosophy just
about ones impressions?
SWM: Here I am engaged in asking what we are doing
when we engage in moral discourse.
Bruce: We've gone over this again and again. Folks
give reasons, defend their values, express empathy,
mention religious beliefs...what more you want to
know? Their basis that lies behind all this? How would
I recgonize a truthful answer? If I can't conceive of
a possible answer, I wouldn't recognize an actual one.
A philosophical point.
SWM:And why do you think conceptual analysis applied
to our moral discourse is the same as "speculative
science"?
Bruce: I don't think that. I think you are speculating
about an empirical matter and I'm calling "foul."
However, there are lots of philosophical questions
associated with moral discourse. One is whether it has
a basis. But let's ask the question and not assume the
answer.
SWM: Exactly. What everyone knows. We know how to use
"good" so let's look at how we do it. But when I want
to do that you tell me go collect data or read the
research of those who have collected data on this.
Bruce: Yes, that is tricky. Perhaps this story will
help.
I'm in a traditional Russian village, soon to be
extinct, near the Belarus border as a volunteer with a
bi-lingual anthropological team. They are recording
the peasant's world view, including their moral
beliefs. We ask them "what is moral", not what the
word means. In the evening, someone asks..."How do we
know that we understand their use of moral?" This
question gets us late in the night.
While the data collection goes on, step by step, we
learn more about the details of their moral world
view, the conceptual question (philosophical) haunts
us. What we need is not more data but a perspective on
the question
> Here I obviously meant domain of discourse, not
> distinct worlds in
> some metaphysical sense.
Whatever sense you meant, there is a lot of
clarification needed-- the work of philosophy -- to
sort out what is meant by "observable" "physical
world" and "domain of discourse."
SWM: It was precisely my point ...a color is publicly
observable whereas moral claims arise from our
feelings about things we observe, in relation to a
variety of other factors.
You asked "what is my sense of philosophy?" And it is
just this. That "color is publicly accessible where
moral claims arise from feelings" is a metaphysical
splt between something real that exists apart from our
language and something else which arises from a mental
projection. Ok. That's not put well. Why? Because I
can't make good sense out your distinction. More
philosophy
SWM:Well we know where the yellow is, eh? Where's the
good?
Bruce: Just where is the yellow? In the object? In the
mind?
> I have seen so much of this sort of rhetoric on
> these on-line lists
> and really am rather tired of it.
You think it just rhetoric but it is the bread and
butter of conceptual analysis. True, I'm heavy handed,
blunt. But my point remains. Do we (notice I said "we)
know what we are saying when we claim that "yellow" is
different from "good."
> Let's try this again: Did LW refer us to
> dictionaries?
Did he use the word "dictionary?" Probably not. But he
did ask us to recall how we use a word. And that's in
the dictionary. the philosophical point is this: The
meaning of a word is in its use, not in the analysis
of the use.
> No dictionary definition is anything more than
> someone's effort to
> document usages.
Nor anything less. Back to the philosophy. What is it
that you want to accomplish that is not in the social
science literature or in the dictionary? You believe
in some project that will get you to the basics. The
philosopher asks whether you have a purchase on what
you are doing. The answer is found in thinking through
the language of your claim. What sense does it make to
ask your questions.
> Because, I suppose, you simply don't want to
> acknowledge the issues
> I'm raising as philosophical material.
I am acknowledging the philosophical issue I see
raised by your query. But it isn't the issue you see.
You think "What is the basis for moral valuing" is a
straight forward question waiting to be answered. I
see it as anything but straightforward and have noted
that its been more than year and you haven't moved
ahead with your thought. You're not waiting for me to
agree, I hope.
SWMN: offered by Hare, was to build on Wittgenstein' s
insight on the wide range of linguistic games we can
play to note that calling a thing good is no more than
to commend or recommend a thing.
Bruce: Maybe that's Hare's but not my concept of
"good." Do philosophers get to tell us what our
concepts really mean? do you think that's what I'm
saying? I'm not. I'm not saying that "asking for a
basis" is a wrong application of a concept. I'm saying
I don't understand it.
SWM:That is, while it (the good) appears to designate
something, in fact that is an illusion.
Bruce: Then all our abstractions are illusions because
they don't designate material things. Is this really
your philosophy?
> SWM: Moore was right to note that equating "good"
with
> anything in the world was an error.
> Bruce: The very idea of equating words and world
seems
> misguided. Not just "good", but any word.
SWM: Again you absolutely miss the point. I can only
assume it is
deliberate. Obviously to say "what we mean by
'yellow' is the
following examples of certain colors" is to equate
the word "yellow" with something in the world as I was
using these terms.
Bruce: First you tell me I miss the point. Then you
repeat yourself. You think that the expression "equate
the word 'yellow' with something in the world" makes
sense. Philosophers have big trouble with this talk.
Which is not to say that some would agree with you,
but, rather, in philosophy, we are obliged to explain
ourselves. We don't take such liberties with language.
SWM: The point is that there is nothing in the world,
on Moore's view (and I agree), that is what we mean by
"good."
Bruce: If there is nothing in the world that is what
we mean by "good" then what in the world are we
referring to with the word? Our feelings? There not in
the world. In our minds? So how do I know what you are
talking about when you refer to something hidden in
your mind? This is the work of philosophy. A pain in
the ass? Yes!
SWM: Exactly. What everyone knows. We know how to use
"good" so let's look at how we do it. But when I want
to do that you tell me go collect data or read the
research of those who have collected data on this.
Bruce: Yes, that is tricky. Perhaps this story will
help.
I'm in a traditional Russian village, soon to be
extinct, near the Belarus border as a volunteer with a
bi-lingual anthropological team. They are recording
the peasant's world view, including their moral
beliefs. We ask them "what is moral", not what the
word means. In the evening, someone asks..."How do we
know that we understand their use of moral?" This
question gets us late in the night.
While the data collection goes on, step by step, we
leqrn more about the details of their moral world
view, the conceptual question (philosophical) haunts
us. What we need is not more data but a perspective on
the question -- that is not an answer, but a way of
getting past the question.
Some philosophical muddles I’ve recognized in our
Posts.
1. We both know what “moral” means, i.e., how to use
it, but when asked to justify our use we feel stumped,
like your psychologist who can’t give a definitive
answer to why one ought not steal. We look for some
basis of justification, perhaps Empathy, but then are
faced with same problem, viz., what is our
justification for using Empathy. It seems as if our
discussion floats in mid-air and yet we do
communicate, especially when we turn away from the
question of “basis” and justification. How can we make
sense out of this?
2. If we can’t find a strong justification for using a
concept, then perhaps the concept is illusory. The
moral game is just so much hot air, a game without
rules, without end. Well, we can specify an end. But
that is just arbitrary. Well, isn’t any game
arbitrary? How do we sort out our illusory games from
our actual ones?
3. Perhaps only the games that are grounded in actual
stimuli associated with real material objects.
Basketball is a real game because a material ball is
thrown into a material hoop. The fashion game of
wearing matching colors is real because colors are
observable. But is “matching” observable?
Whatever the above questions are, they are not stuff
of an explanatory science that gathers facts to test a
theory. No new facts decide anything. What we need is
a sifting through of what we already know in the hope
of gaining a perspective that yields an understanding
that includes a clarification of why we were muddled
in the first place.
bruce
SWM:P.S. I would also be interested in discussing
Searle, Dennett and AI.
Bruce: OK-- I know something about Searle, little of
Dennett and AI a mystery, Maybe I should just sit back
and learn.
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swmaerske
>
> > Nor am I arguing for collecting or analyzing data,
> > though you keep
> > insisting that that is what needs to be done in
> > order to answer the
> > questions I've raised. Of course, I have said
> > numerous times that
> > that is a different line of inquiry,
>
> Sorry, I can't grasp what this different line is.
Yes, I see you don't. If you did, you wouldn't keep asking the same
question (or making the same point), over and over again.
I'll try again: science collects information systematically with an
eye toward formulating explanations and theories that predict
happenings in the observable world or that can be used as a guide to
doing things, making things, etc. in the observable world.
(By "observable world" I mean, of course, the public world which we
share through our ability to see and otherwise perceive the same
phenomena. It is sometimes also called the physical world or the
empirical world . . . or realm, etc. By "world" I don't mean a
particular planet or dimension or locus of all that's real, etc. I
ONLY mean it as a term for delineating a particular domain or area of
human activity in the sense that "area" applies not to any delineated
physical space but to any sort of space at all, e.g., think of the
term "logical space," but, of course, THIS IS NOT to say that I
mean "logical space" but only that I am using THAT term as an example
to show that the term "space" needn't be tied into physical
phenomena.)
Back to science vs. philosophy: science has as its aim the
formulating of predictive theories and is done through a process of
systematic data collection and analysis. I include analysis because
analysis is obviously a part of the process any time one has data
(however it has been collected). However, not all information or data
is collected systematically or with an eye to formulating predictive
theories. SOME information we operate with comes to us in other ways:
1) through informal education; 2) through formal education; 3)
through our own direct experiences in the world.
While we must learn certain information to do science in the modern
world effectively (1 and 2), and while learning by our own direct
experience is somewhat akin to the observational practices of science
(3), they are NOT the same. Why? Because science is done
systematically as part of a program with a specific aim, i.e., to
formulate predictive theories for application in the observable world.
Now why is philosophy not the same as this? Because it is not a
matter of operating scientifically which is to say formulating
predictive theories for application in the observable world.
Philosophy has a different aim. Working with the knowledge we have
(though it does not shut the door to new knowledge if philosophy is
done intelligently) it aims to hone our understanding of the things
we know or think we know.
In this philosophy is not entirely different from science which
certainly applies analysis to the data collected, too. But Philosophy
does not collect new data as part of its program. It focuses on and
relies on the data we have or which we obtain in the course of our
ordinary pursuits. It does not include a program of collecting new
data in the world.
Insofar as I am interested in philosophy, I am not interested in
collecting data about my area of interest in order to make
predictions about how things are done or what can be done in the
observable world. (I don't know how to say this any more clearly. It
is simply a matter of stating it and your reading it.) I am not
averse to looking at such information and even grant its relevance to
what I am interested in when it touches on the same areas, of course.
But the purpose of science, to develop theories about the human mind
and human behavior, is not the task I have undertaken. The task that
interests me is to understand what I am doing, and by dint of that,
what humans like me are doing, when we engage in the game of moral
discourse. That is, I want to know how that game works and why it
does (if it does) and when it does and when it doesn't. That is to
say, I want to know when claims of moral goodness are well grounded
(convincing) and when they are not.
I am NOT asking when human beings, as a matter of fact, are convinced
by some arguments and when they're not or what arguments tend to look
more convincing to them (though these are interesting questions). I
am asking when I would be convinced by a moral claim and, thus, when
I would expect others who think like me (i.e., look for reasons and
can actually be convinced by reasons) would be convinced.
Thus I am interested in the logical power of a moral claim (NOT in
terms of formal logic but certainly in terms of rhetorical logic). I
am NOT interested in the psychological powers of moral claims unless
it seems to be the case that that is all that is at work, i.e., that
there is no underlying logical power to any moral claim, which would
be true if moral claims are at bottom merely chimerical.
So, to reiterate: science, and in this case the sciences of
psychology, sociology, etc., in particular, are interested in
building up pictures of what human beings actually do across a range
of real cases in the world and of using that information to formulate
predictions of what will happen under different scenarios and to
shape the things we do in dealing with human beings under such
various scenarios.
Philosophy as I am proposing it, by contrast, is interested in
building up a picture of how we make our moral claims for the purpose
of doing this better (making moral claims) through a clearer
understanding of what it is we are doing when we make them.
It is certainly the case that there are areas of overlap. I have
already said that philosophers are naturally interested in the
findings of science in this area and I would add that scientists are
as likely to be interested in the conceptual clarifications developed
by the work of philosophers. Neither the one nor the other can
operate in any kind of isolation. That is, scientists need clarity of
thought just as philosophers need information about the world. Trying
to enforce a rigid divide here, except in a methodological sense, is
just wrongheaded.
Now I fully expect you to respond either by saying you still don't
get it or by simply ignoring my explanations here and proceeding as
though I have never made these points. So, for the record, I don't
plan on repeating them at this moment (though nothing is ever certain
in this world so who knows?). In future I would simply suggest that
when you raise questions about the distinction I have been making
about the differences between psychology and philosophy in this
inquiry (i.e., looking into the moral game), you refer back to what
I've said here. I suppose you won't but I live in hope.
> > This is not, itself, an exercise in
> > historical inquiry
> > but in conceptual analysis.
>
> That line I get. And the philosophical task is to ask
> whether to ask for a basis of any concept is an
> intelligible question. You simply assume that is and
> want to go. Am I stopping you? You initially answered
> you question with "empathy" Do you get why I've been
> arguing that E can't be basis, that nothing can be the
> basis, because, philosophically, the request for a
> basis goes in circles?
>
You are right, on my view, IF I am trying to develop a metaphysical
basis here. It's perfectly clear to me (and thus I believe it's the
case) that we do what we do not based on any undergirding of pure
reason, i.e., we don't come to where we are (what we think, what we
believe in, etc.,) merely by reasoning from some "first principles."
(Contrary to your past assertions, I am not making the case for
Rationalism.)
Indeed, this notion that there must be a metaphysical first principle
or set of first principles does not, it seems to me, even work in the
moral game. However, the moral game, insofar as it's got a logical
aspect to it, insofar as it involves giving reasons and using reasons
to justify our choices, requires that those reasons be convincing.
But they cannot be convincing if we believe they are somehow
arbitrary or imposed on us by factors beyond reason. Now this may
well be the case but if it is, then the moral game breaks down.
Therefore I am interested in seeing whether there is a basis for
playing the moral game of giving reasons that we can understand as
being a matter of individual choice.
I don't assume that there is, of course, but ask whether there is and
consider different cases in an effort to determine if there is such a
basis, if not for all moral claims then at least for some. Hence, my
suggestion that empathy provides a basis for some such claims and
hence, again, the reasons I have given for suggesting this.
> > It is what do we do (and have in mind) when we
> > engage in moral
> > discourse and how does that discourse work for us?
>
> Yes, that is your original question. You reject the
> ordinary answer because it gives us nothing
> definitive, a resting place, as you call it. Hence
> your search for a "basis." And in this move you raise
> the philosophical question of whether there is a
> "basis" for our language games.
>
No, I don't. See above.
> You may answer "yes." Others have. But at least you
> ought to present an argument for a "basis." You simply
> assume.
No, I don't. I look at the moral game itself and notice that it's
about giving reasons. Take away the ability to do that and we have
merely arbitrary claims. But no arbitrary claim can convince anyone
else if that person is being asked to choose. But if by convincing we
don't care about choosing, if we only concern ourselves with
manipulating others into being "convinced" then we cannot hold them
accountable for not being convinced. The whole moral game simply
collapses. Therefore I do not assume that there is a basis. I note
that the game requires one, whether it has one or not.
> And then to save the assumption, you shift
> into social-science talk in which a basis makes sense.
> But then you deny your are doing science. That's my
> dilemma with your Posts.
Then read what I've said above. You simply fail to credit what I've
said about what I'm doing, either because you genuinely don't get it,
don't (or refuse to) process it, or don't agree with it. If the last,
then you should say WHY you don't as I have said why I believe my
view is the correct one. Otherwise, I can only conclude you are not
getting it or not processing it.
>
> SWM: I don't. I proposed it as an explanation for how
> empathy works in the moral game
>
> Bruce: And that's the social science move. But not
> really, because you have no method of testing and way
> of determining whether it is true. You use the notion
> of work without any testing of the working, exacpt
> your impression. As you go on..
>
No, it's not. Social science asks: What is it that we humans do when
we speak and behave in moral ways? It takes no position vis a vis
this or that set of responses nor could it. It merely asks what do we
humans call moral and what do we think is moral (using "moral" as a
synonym, of course, for "morally good") and how does this differ, or
not, across human groups and, perhaps, types?
Philosophy asks: What works in the moral game as a reason to be a
certain way? What does it mean to think of anything as morally good?
And does the category of "morally good" have any real validity?
These are distinctly different questions though they have some
similarity and we use some of the same words in formulating them.
> SWM: But whether it's true or not is not the issue.
> It's
> a proposal based on information from history which is
> part of our
> shared knowledge
>
> Bruce: That's bizarre. If we don't know whether it is
> true, it ain't knowledge no matter how many people
> "share" it. This is a conceptual point, a
> philosophical one.
>
I am proposing a model for how moral judgements may work. Obviously,
the model will be affected by the truth or falsity of the example.
That's why we give examples. But at the end of the day the question
is about the model, not the example. Indeed, the example can be
wrongly formulated or inapplicable for various reasons without it
saying anything about the efficacy of the model. However, if the
model doesn't accord with enough examples that really are the case,
then the model would be in doubt. However, again, it does not rise or
fall on any single example.
Your attempt to refocus this on the historical question, as if THAT
were the issue, is what is actually "bizarre."
> SWM: The proposal I have made is not an historical
> claim.
>
> Bruce: Then what kind of claim is it? You impression?
> OK. I can read it like that. I guess some folks would
> share your impression and others not. But if I'm
> really interested in the workings of moral claims, I
> surely want more than impressions. Is philosophy just
> about ones impressions?
>
Go back and read what I've written up top.
> SWM: Here I am engaged in asking what we are doing
> when we engage in moral discourse.
>
> Bruce: We've gone over this again and again. Folks
> give reasons, defend their values, express empathy,
> mention religious beliefs...what more you want to
> know? Their basis that lies behind all this? How would
> I recgonize a truthful answer? If I can't conceive of
> a possible answer, I wouldn't recognize an actual one.
> A philosophical point.
>
I am not asking what do folks do across a range of questions. I am
asking whether there is a reason that is convincing for certain kinds
of claims of moral goodness. Period.
You would recognize a truthful answer the way you would recognize
truth in any other way. I'm sure I don't have to spell it out.
But what I am doing is not dependent on the truth or falsity of what
anyone answers to the question what do you have in mind when you make
moral claims? The way to find the answer is to examine as honestly as
we can what we do ourselves and compare it to other naive examples of
moral judgement which we find in the world around us. We don't do
this systematically though, as science would require, just
consistently and with an open mind.
> SWM:And why do you think conceptual analysis applied
> to our moral discourse is the same as "speculative
> science"?
>
> Bruce: I don't think that. I think you are speculating
> about an empirical matter and I'm calling "foul."
> However, there are lots of philosophical questions
> associated with moral discourse. One is whether it has
> a basis. But let's ask the question and not assume the
> answer.
>
See above as to why I conclude there needs to be a basis, whether
there is or not. Such a basis can be naturalistic in the Moorean
sense or it can be rationalistic in the Kantian sense. It can even be
religionistic in the sense of a revelation or a mystical insight. I
don't know. I am just saying that without a reason to act in certain
ways, there is nothing to convince and without the ability to
convince (ourselves as well as others) the moral came collapses.
> SWM: Exactly. What everyone knows. We know how to use
> "good" so let's look at how we do it. But when I want
> to do that you tell me go collect data or read the
> research of those who have collected data on this.
>
> Bruce: Yes, that is tricky. Perhaps this story will
> help.
>
> I'm in a traditional Russian village, soon to be
> extinct, near the Belarus border as a volunteer with a
> bi-lingual anthropological team. They are recording
> the peasant's world view, including their moral
> beliefs. We ask them "what is moral", not what the
> word means. In the evening, someone asks..."How do we
> know that we understand their use of moral?" This
> question gets us late in the night.
>
> While the data collection goes on, step by step, we
> learn more about the details of their moral world
> view, the conceptual question (philosophical) haunts
> us. What we need is not more data but a perspective on
> the question
>
Okay. Now what. What conclusion do you propose to draw from this? The
question of what these villagers consider moral is still a scientific
question. One needs to compare their uses in the context of their
overall behavior. Take the Ik for instance (though I think that the
credibility of the fellow who allegedly documented this people has
now been thrown into doubt). In their case, the conclusion was that
1) they had no normal moral conventions as we see them in nearly all
other human cultures and 2) that they were a natural culture and not
merely an artifact of some destructive circumstances that has
shattered a more ordinary human culture. Suppose they were
the "village" being studied by your team. Would determining whether
they had genuine moral concepts or not, whether they participated in
the larger human game of moral interaction, be a philosophical
question or a scientific one? I think it's quite clear that it would
be a scientific one. No philosopher could throw light on this except
insofar as he or she could contribute something to the understanding
of what moral discourse means. But even here the outcome of the
scientific research would have to inform the philosopher far more
than his or inquiry could inform what the scientists are doing.
> > Here I obviously meant domain of discourse, not
> > distinct worlds in
> > some metaphysical sense.
>
> Whatever sense you meant, there is a lot of
> clarification needed-- the work of philosophy -- to
> sort out what is meant by "observable" "physical
> world" and "domain of discourse."
>
See above.
> SWM: It was precisely my point ...a color is publicly
> observable whereas moral claims arise from our
> feelings about things we observe, in relation to a
> variety of other factors.
>
> You asked "what is my sense of philosophy?" And it is
> just this. That "color is publicly accessible where
> moral claims arise from feelings" is a metaphysical
> splt between something real that exists apart from our
> language and something else which arises from a mental
> projection. Ok. That's not put well. Why? Because I
> can't make good sense out your distinction. More
> philosophy
>
It's not merely philosophy to note that when we name colors we are
naming observables in the world whereas when we name moral goodness,
there is no such observable to be found except for the things that
are characterized as "morally good."
While this is something that philosophers are often moved to note,
and non-philosophers rarely pay attention to, you don't have to be a
philosopher to see the obvious truth of this. Even Moore acknowledged
that if there is an intuition of "good" as there is an intuition
of "yellow" (yes that's how he explained our knowing yellow when we
saw it), then the latter must be natural while the former is non-
natural. The difference is clear, even if we don't always know quite
what to make of it.
> SWM:Well we know where the yellow is, eh? Where's the
> good?
>
> Bruce: Just where is the yellow? In the object? In the
> mind?
>
It's in the object, of course, though you can formulate a different
way of talking that purports to place it in the mind, i.e., you can
redefine "yellow" as certain wave lengths of radiation or whatever.
But, of course, that is an artificial redefinition since it's not
what we mean by "yellow" nor how we learn the use of the term. In the
sense in which we use "yellow" in perfectly ordinary and natural
ways, the yellow is in the object or on the object referred to (or
somewhere in our visual field if you prefer that way of speaking)
while the good is plainly not.
> > I have seen so much of this sort of rhetoric on
> > these on-line lists
> > and really am rather tired of it.
>
> You think it just rhetoric but it is the bread and
> butter of conceptual analysis. True, I'm heavy handed,
> blunt. But my point remains. Do we (notice I said "we)
> know what we are saying when we claim that "yellow" is
> different from "good."
>
I would say that we most certainly do and that any attempt to fudge
it by playing games with the words in question is merely to make
obscure what is otherwise perfectly clear.
> > Let's try this again: Did LW refer us to
> > dictionaries?
>
> Did he use the word "dictionary?" Probably not. But he
> did ask us to recall how we use a word. And that's in
> the dictionary. the philosophical point is this: The
> meaning of a word is in its use, not in the analysis
> of the use.
>
No dictionary is adequate to capture all possible uses since usage is
both ambiguous and also subject to continual change. Philosophical
analysis, conceived as linguistic analysis, does not involve looking
up the meanings of words in dictionaries. (I believe Popper made this
same error when criticizing Wittgenstein's interest in linguistic
analysis.) What is involved? Exploring our actual usages in ordinary
(and sometimes extraordinary) situations. If all one had to do was
open the dictionary, there would have been nothing left for
Wittgenstein to do except say go check Oxford's or whatever
dictionary he had access to.
> > No dictionary definition is anything more than
> > someone's effort to
> > document usages.
>
> Nor anything less. Back to the philosophy.
No, you are utterly wrong when you insist that the dictionary has the
answers that we need. Until you see that, shifting gears to go "back
to philosophy," as if your error has no bearing on your conception of
philosophy, is a mistake.
> What is it
> that you want to accomplish that is not in the social
> science literature or in the dictionary? You believe
> in some project that will get you to the basics. The
> philosopher asks whether you have a purchase on what
> you are doing. The answer is found in thinking through
> the language of your claim. What sense does it make to
> ask your questions.
>
Read what I wrote at the outset here. If that doesn't answer this for
you then nothing will.
> > Because, I suppose, you simply don't want to
> > acknowledge the issues
> > I'm raising as philosophical material.
>
> I am acknowledging the philosophical issue I see
> raised by your query. But it isn't the issue you see.
> You think "What is the basis for moral valuing" is a
> straight forward question waiting to be answered. I
> see it as anything but straightforward and have noted
> that its been more than year and you haven't moved
> ahead with your thought. You're not waiting for me to
> agree, I hope.
>
Heaven forbid. I'm waiting for me to agree.
> SWMN: offered by Hare, was to build on Wittgenstein' s
> insight on the wide range of linguistic games we can
> play to note that calling a thing good is no more than
> to commend or recommend a thing.
>
> Bruce: Maybe that's Hare's but not my concept of
> "good." Do philosophers get to tell us what our
> concepts really mean? do you think that's what I'm
> saying? I'm not. I'm not saying that "asking for a
> basis" is a wrong application of a concept. I'm saying
> I don't understand it.
>
Then re-read what I wrote above. I can't say it with any more
specificity than that.
No one, by the way, said philosophers get to tell us anything.
Philosophers say and do what they say and do and through their
efforts add or subtract clarity the world of ideas. If they're any
good, then, like Wittgenstein, they are remembered I suppose and
their ideas have resonance and influence. If not, as with most, they
simply fade away and are forgotten. Unlike science, however, which
reflects a body of accumulated knowledge, philosophers deal with
questions of understanding. Each of us makes our own journey of
understanding and we often have different tendencies to understand so
that some philosophers speak more to some than to others. I tend to
believe philosophy has made progress, just as science has. But the
difference is that with science the body of knowledge is always
growing and becomes part of the received learning of each succeeding
generation. But understanding is always a personal journey and so
must rebuilt anew with each new person on the planet.
> SWM:That is, while it (the good) appears to designate
> something, in fact that is an illusion.
>
> Bruce: Then all our abstractions are illusions because
> they don't designate material things. Is this really
> your philosophy?
>
That's simply a misreading of what I said. Note that I was
likening "good" in this context to "yellow" and comparing the usages.
I said nothing about the reality of abstracts such as relations,
generalizations, etc. I make no comment on these here. I merely noted
that the word "good" acts a lot like "yellow" in our language but not
exactly like it though the similarity in how we use the two terms
tends to lead us to think they work exactly the same. Of course they
don't and Moore, while noting this, came up with a clumsy and
ultimately unsatisfying solution, i.e., that "good" denoted a non-
natural intuited property of a thing in the world, because, on his
view "yellow" denoted a natural intuited property.
> > SWM: Moore was right to note that equating "good"
> with
> > anything in the world was an error.
>
> > Bruce: The very idea of equating words and world
> seems
> > misguided. Not just "good", but any word.
>
> SWM: Again you absolutely miss the point. I can only
> assume it is
> deliberate. Obviously to say "what we mean by
> 'yellow' is the
> following examples of certain colors" is to equate
> the word "yellow" with something in the world as I was
> using these terms.
>
> Bruce: First you tell me I miss the point. Then you
> repeat yourself. You think that the expression "equate
> the word 'yellow' with something in the world" makes
> sense. Philosophers have big trouble with this talk.
Do you imagine when we accurately say of a car that it is yellow
(i.e., it has the color we all call yellow when we are using that
word correctly) that, in fact, it really isn't? If not, what color is
it? Green? No color at all? Here I assume you want to introduce this
metaphysical talk about how colors are really in the mind, as you did
above. But THAT is not how we use our color words nor is it how we
learn them. You can't have it both ways: demanding we pay attention
to ordinary usages but when that gets in the way of a point you want
to make, suggesting we need to consider non-ordinary usages. Isn't
this another example of how you shift the ground to keep the argument
going?
> Which is not to say that some would agree with you,
> but, rather, in philosophy, we are obliged to explain
> ourselves. We don't take such liberties with language.
>
Who is taking the liberties here?
> SWM: The point is that there is nothing in the world,
> on Moore's view (and I agree), that is what we mean by
> "good."
>
> Bruce: If there is nothing in the world that is what
> we mean by "good" then what in the world are we
> referring to with the word?
Note that, particularly in the English language, when we say "is" we
may have a number of things in mind. Sometimes "is" means "equals" as
in "water is H2O". Sometimes it denotes a characteristic as in "water
is wet". Thus the same word, "is", does two different things in the
two sentences vis a vis the meanings. Of course, "is" may also
mean "exists" in English so there is a third thing it can do: "water
is" though this last usage, when applied to water at least, strikes
us as somewhat odd.
When I say that Moore was right, what I am saying is that he rightly
noted that the use of "is" can too readily become confused in its
reference to "good". Thus, saying that "X is good" can and often does
lead to the confusion between a claim that anything has the
characteristic of being good and that it is equivalent to what we
mean by good. At the end of the day, that is the real core of
his "naturalistic fallacy." So I was affirming his recognition of
this problem, not suggesting that the use of "good" involves no
references at all. If you recall, I suggested the use is better
explained by comparing it to words like "here" than to words
like "yellow."
> Our feelings? There not in
> the world. In our minds?
I'll leave that to you and colors!
> So how do I know what you are
> talking about when you refer to something hidden in
> your mind?
When did I do that?
> This is the work of philosophy. A pain in
> the ass? Yes!
>
Only if you insist on going in circles as all too many people who
take up philosophy seem to like to do. Sorry, but I have grown
exceedingly impatient with that.
> SWM: Exactly. What everyone knows. We know how to use
> "good" so let's look at how we do it. But when I want
> to do that you tell me go collect data or read the
> research of those who have collected data on this.
>
> Bruce: Yes, that is tricky. Perhaps this story will
> help.
>
> I'm in a traditional Russian village, soon to be
> extinct, near the Belarus border as a volunteer with a
> bi-lingual anthropological team. They are recording
> the peasant's world view, including their moral
> beliefs. We ask them "what is moral", not what the
> word means. In the evening, someone asks..."How do we
> know that we understand their use of moral?" This
> question gets us late in the night.
>
> While the data collection goes on, step by step, we
> leqrn more about the details of their moral world
> view, the conceptual question (philosophical) haunts
> us. What we need is not more data but a perspective on
> the question -- that is not an answer, but a way of
> getting past the question.
>
Are you in feedback loop mode here?
You've asked good questions which address the issues I've raised and
you've been responding to. Now can you do something to take us beyond
the questions or is it to be your contention that merely raising them
is enough? Are you going to take the position that philosophy's only
job is to raise interesting questions, some of which may prompt us to
think more clearly while others may prompt us to stop asking other
questions? If so, is your work done do you think? Or should a serious
philosopher seriously try to wrestle with these questions?
Wittgenstein, of course, did some of what you've done, i.e., raise
questions to challenge what others had previously thought in just
this way. Generally, he succeeded because his questions kept coming
and so, entering into the questioning mode with him, led one to think
very differently about a whole range of things (usually having to do
with the previous answers of professional philosophy). What insights
are you offering in this vein? Or do they stop with the questions
you've raised?
> SWM:P.S. I would also be interested in discussing
> Searle, Dennett and AI.
>
> Bruce: OK-- I know something about Searle, little of
> Dennett and AI a mystery, Maybe I should just sit back
> and learn.
>
I've only read the one book by Dennett so far though I have
previously read several by Searle. I was initially quite taken with
Searle's vigorous attacks on the possibility of creating artificial
minds on a machine platform but the more I thought about this, the
more wrong I thought he was. He was wrong for logical reasons but
also because his argument just misses the point. When I finally
dragged myself to read Dennett's Consciousness Explained (a very long
and often longwinded book), though my instinct was to oppose him as a
simple reductionist, I was surprised to see that his thinking
precisely mirrored what I had come to think about Searle's arguments,
particularly the Chinese Room thought experiment. Searle criticized
Dennett for saying, in that book, that consciousness doesn't really
exist and that we are, in the end, basically all zombies. But this is
an incredibly simplistic misreading of Dennett. I find Searle an
interesting thinker but I am constantly surprised to see how wrong he
is on this question of AI.
SWM
bruce denner
I'm forwarding an example of the discussion that is
hot and heavy on our sister List. There you will find
support for your position, I believe. At least you'll
hear different voices.
gins" <benco...@hotmail.com> Add to Address Book
Add Mobile Alert
Date: Tue, 08 May 2007 17:38:21 +1000
Subject: RE: [analytic] Re: Wittgenstein and Ethics
Hi Peter,
Thanks for your post. I think you got to the heart of
the matter when you
said:
*Of course not, since neither provides a substantive
foundation. Hint:
meta-ethical justification*
This is actually why I have been arguing that we need
a theoretical
foundation to ground all these intuitions. This is
actually the central
thing I have been trying to work out, and why I said
in a previous post:
*However, it seems to me that we still need some kind
of theory (or meta-ethic, if I can stand to call it
that) that
explains what it is about the things that "have a
definite positive or
negative impact in the realm of both individual and
collective human life",
that
make them substantively different from those things
that lack this definite
impact. This is becausewe want the difference between
the ethical and the
non-ethical to be a substantive difference (such as
the fact that 'a
whale is not a fish' is a substantive fact, as Kelvin
has been rightfully
arguing).*
I have actually started to develop something like a
meta-ethical foundation
out of a Wittgensteinian/ Marxist analysis of the
preconditions of a form of
life. My tentative meta-ethical formulation is:
"A form of life presupposes principles of interaction
that enable individual
and collective self-determination with regards to
meeting individual and
communal needs.
So what grounds "the ethical" is the fact that
principles of interaction
that enable successful collective interaction within a
socio-material
environment, are necessary for a form of life to exist
at all."
In other words, my meta-ethical justification is
simply that these
principles of interaction are necessary for a
collective group of
self-determined individuals to exist in the first
place (i.e. for a form of
life to exist).
>From: "Peter D Jones" <peterdjones@ yahoo.com>
>Reply-To: analytic@yahoogroup s.com
>To: analytic@yahoogroup s.com
>Subject: [analytic] Re: Wittgenstein and Ethics
>Date: Mon, 07 May 2007 16:18:51 -0000
>
>--- In analytic@yahoogroup s.com, bruce denner
<blroadies@. ..> wrote:
> >
>
> > > So the problem is, if whether or not something
is
> > > ethical is simply subsumed
> > > beneath what a linguistic community happen to
> > > endorse or condemn, (as
> > > communitarianism and relativism would have it)
> >
> > The above paragraph doesn't show that C&R -OK?--
are
> > fallacious. You are just not pleased with it. Not
> > definitive enough. Isn't that the case?
>
>C&R are fallacious because they can lead to "anything
goes" and do not
>allow meaningful comparisons between different
communities.
>
>
> > AND CALLING A POINT OF VIEW BULLSHIT IS NOT AN
> > ARGUMENT!
It's not that C and R are simply bullshit, its that
they cannot do the
conceptual work they needs to, (as Peter just said
above). Ipso facto they
are false.
> >
> > > Ethical facts are to be decided about by what
the
> > community
> > > 'agrees' upon, which either trivializes them, or
> > distorts them.
> >
> > Do I hear you saying that what the community
decides
> > is a trivial distortion but what philosophers
decide
> > is the "truth?" Apparently philosophers are not
part
> > of the community. That's not a good place to be.
You
> > can see why.
>
>
>He didn't say anything about philosophers. For a
moral realist, the
>truth-values of moral propositions are established by
facts, not by
>the say-so of some group of people. You are thinking
in a
>communitarian box -- that any criticism of the
communitarian approach
>can only be an appeal to another community.
BEN:Thanks Peter. That's exactly what I meant.
>
> > Ben:This is WHY WE ACTUALLY NEED A THEORY THAT
GIVES A
> > SUBSTANTIAL FOUNDATION TO THESE CLAIMS AND DOESN'T
> > JUST PARROT EMPTY WITTGENSTEINIAN RHETORIC, THAT
> > HAS NOTHING TO OFFER IN SOLVING THIS PROBLEM.
> >
> > Bruce: It just may be that the request for a
theory is
> > empty rhetoric. Theories, as i use the word, are
> > abstract notions that EXPLAIN how something works.
Are
> > you interested in a behavioral theory of how folks
> > make ethical judgments or an anthropological
account
> > of their origins. You could examine those
theories.
> > But I feel you are not using "theory" in this way.
>
>
>Of course not, since neither provides a substantive
foundation. Hint:
>meta-ethical justification.
>
> > Correct me, I'm probably wrong, but I get the
> > impression that you want a JUSTIFICATION for
ethical
> > claims. Why rape is bad A justification doesn't
> > explain but it does encourage pro-social behavior.
I'm
> > all for that. Let's talk about why we ought not
rape.
>
>Justification often involve explanation. To justify
getting a
>vaccination involved an explanation of
disease-transmissio n.
>
> > Have you no confidence that we can come to some
> > substantial agreement on this matter without
recourse
> > to any general justification of why ethical claims
are
> > ethical?
>
>That is no help if what is being aimed at is truth,
not agreement.
>Again, you have given an example of defending moral
relativism on the
>basis of epistemic relativism.
>
> > bruce
> >
____________________________________________________________________________________
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bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
a description of how science works that works for
me..no need to copy...but the we begin to part company
> While we must learn certain information to do
> science in the modern
> world effectively (1 and 2), and while learning by
> our own direct
> experience is somewhat akin to the observational
> practices of science
> (3), they are NOT the same. Why? Because science is
> done
> systematically as part of a program with a specific
> aim, i.e., to
> formulate predictive theories for application in the
> observable world.
As a scientist, I do not see any difference between
the causal observation of the ordinary and the
systematic. If I want to know whether my wife is home,
I call and look for her. If I want to know if she is
unfaithful, I'm more systematic. If I fear she has
cancer, then I demand an even more systematic study.
It is true that I do not need a formal theory to test
whether she is home. Is that your point? Still, my
search is based on background assumptions. Now, some
of these are untestable because they are the very
basis of testing. Is that what you may be driving at?
> Now why is philosophy not the same as this? Because
> it is not a
> matter of operating scientifically which is to say
> formulating
> predictive theories for application in the
> observable world.
That much we agree!!
> Philosophy has a different aim.
Will you state the aim further on?
> In this philosophy is not entirely different from
> science which
> certainly applies analysis to the data collected,
> too. But Philosophy
> does not collect new data as part of its program. It
> focuses on and
> relies on the data we have or which we obtain in the
> course of our
> ordinary pursuits. It does not include a program of
> collecting new
> data in the world.
Here is my position. Is it different? Philosophy must
be consistent with what we know to be the case. If new
data comes along, it may have to change. But
philosophy has nothing what so ever to do with
explaining the data. Here I haven't said what philo
does do. But I have elsewhere. I've said that philo is
concerned with certain conceptual moves that puzzle
us. I gave examples. None of these are comparable to
the examples above of looking for my wife, etc.
>
> Insofar as I am interested in philosophy, I am not
> interested in
> collecting data about my area of interest in order
> to make
> predictions about how things are done or what can be
> done in the
> observable world.
Neither am I. But it often seems to me that though you
claim not to be interested, your text only makes sense
if you were. The same problem presents itself with Ben
Coggins on Ethics; and I say the same thing to him.
You go on...and here I'll try to show you why I read
you as trying to explain by theory.
> task that
> interests me is to understand what I am doing, and
> by dint of that,
> what humans like me are doing, when we engage in the
> game of moral
> discourse. That is, I want to know how that game
> works and why it
> does (if it does) and when it does and when it
> doesn't. That is to
> say, I want to know when claims of moral goodness
> are well grounded
> (convincing) and when they are not.
I can't think of that question any other way then
this: SWM is intrigued with how folks make moral
decisions. He wants a description of this activity. He
wants to know when and why they find them convincing.
He wants to know the game in more detail. All of this
requires research, data collection...and in face the
research exists. There is a ton of it. It answers your
question, in part. But it is not to found in philo
texts.
But now I get confused.
> I am NOT asking when human beings, as a matter of
> fact, are convinced
> by some arguments and when they're not or what
> arguments tend to look
> more convincing to them (though these are
> interesting questions).
Obviously I thought you were asking just that. So I'm
lost. Let's see...
> am asking when I would be convinced by a moral claim
> and, thus, when
> I would expect others who think like me (i.e., look
> for reasons and
> can actually be convinced by reasons) would be
> convinced.
I can't see the difference between "when human beings,
as a matter of
fact, are convinced by some arguments" and "am asking
when I would be convinced by a moral claim." Not
people in general, just you? Even so, it is a matter
of data collection and analysis.
>
> Thus I am interested in the logical power of a moral
> claim (NOT in
> terms of formal logic but certainly in terms of
> rhetorical logic). I
> am NOT interested in the psychological powers of
> moral claims
This really helps me. I can see why I'm lost. What is
the difference between the logical power and the
psychological power of a claim? I claim that we should
be more generous. It's logical; also it has
psychological appeal. How do you separate the two?
Better yet, how do you find out the logical power of a
claim separate from the psychology?
> unless
> it seems to be the case that that is all that is at
> work, i.e., that
> there is no underlying logical power to any moral
> claim, which would
> be true if moral claims are at bottom merely
> chimerical.
I can't grasp the above until I get what "logical
power" means. And your notion that a moral claim may
be chimerical is a mystery to me. I think you are
saying that if there are strong psychological causes
for me to hold that generosity is the way to go, the
moral value is diminished. This is a confusion of is
and ought. On the Analytic List there are folks who
make this distinction real clear.
> Philosophy as I am proposing it, by contrast, is
> interested in
> building up a picture of how we make our moral
> claims for the purpose
> of doing this better (making moral claims) through a
> clearer
> understanding of what it is we are doing when we
> make them.
Can you anticipate what I'll say? It really doesn't
matter who makes a picture of "how we make our moral
claims", i.e., philosophy, literature, the expert on
TV. The question remains. Is it true? And how do we
test its truth.
A proposal that empathy is critical must be tested in
the same way that any claim to knowledge is.
RIGID DIVIDE: That's not my idea. Rather there are
different kinds of questions that can come up in any
discipline and if one has muddled the question, the
answer will follow in type.
So-- you are correct. For the reasons stated I feel
that you are muddling two types of questions. You deny
asking a data collection question about how X works,
while doing so. And while you recognize that
philosophy is concerned with conceptual muddles, and
claim that is your interest, you never state a muddle.
The following is well put and I essentially agree up
to a critical point. And it is because of the clarity
of your prose that I can see it.
"Indeed, this notion that there must be a metaphysical
first principle
or set of first principles does not, it seems to me,
even work in the
moral game. However, the moral game, insofar as it's
got a logical
aspect to it, insofar as it involves giving reasons
and using reasons
to justify our choices, requires that those reasons be
convincing.
But they cannot be convincing if we believe they are
somehow
arbitrary or imposed on us by factors beyond reason."
There is a conceptual muddle here. If we start with
the "big bang", then everything that follows is
"imposed", i.e., caused. But on another level, one of
everyday discussion, we persuaded each other and we
are free to agree or disagree. If you collapse the
levels, confusion reigns.
"Therefore I am interested in seeing whether there is
a basis for
playing the moral game of giving reasons that we can
understand as
being a matter of individual choice."
There is no question that there is unless you are a
materialist, empiricist, causal ideologue. But I find
that position incoherent. Still, it is philosophy.
Science can't settle it.
More importantly, appeals to empathy mean nothing to
the causal-empiricist. Empathy is caused like anything
else. That move doesn't address your question of
whether it makes sense to say that we are free moral
agents.
"No, I don't. I look at the moral game itself and
notice that it's
about giving reasons. Take away the ability to do that
and we have
merely arbitrary claims."
Sure. Take away my freedom and I can't make moral
choices, or any for that matter. But you don't mean
"take away" in a practical sense, you mean if a
philosopher says "you have no free will." But is that
a "take away" or nonsense?
"Philosophy asks: What works in the moral game as a
reason to be a
certain way? What does it mean to think of anything as
morally good?
And does the category of "morally good" have any real
validity?"
Right. That I go along with. There are philosophers
who have PRESCRIBED how we should live. They have
arguments. But they can't ask whether *morally good*
has validity. They must assume that it does in order
to propose how to act. You are correct. There is a
vast literature on morality. i./e., how to act moral.
Are you interested in this? Why aren't we reading any
of them. Because none of them are convincing. I think
that was your answer. Well, why do you think?
Ben thinks we need a meta-theory. Do you?
"I am proposing a model for how moral judgements may
work."
There you go again. Models have to be tested. And
again...
"I am not asking what do folks do across a range of
questions. I am
asking whether there is a reason that is convincing
for certain kinds
of claims of moral goodness. Period."
ISR at U of Michigan has tons of relevant research on
that question. It is not a matter of speculation.
And now it gets weird for me..
"But what I am doing is not dependent on the truth or
falsity of what
anyone answers to the question what do you have in
mind when you make moral claims? The way to find the
answer is to examine as honestly as we can what we do
ourselves and compare it to other naive examples of
moral judgement which we find in the world around us.
We don't do this systematically though, as science
would require, just
consistently and with an open mind."
Yes, there have been some individuals who have looked
into themselves and have discovered what and who we
are. I'm not up for the task. I'll listen to you,
though. Tell me what you see,.
"See above as to why I conclude there needs to be a
basis"
You are with Ben. I call it foundationalism. It's a
philo position. We need to discuss its
intelligibility.
Tell me how the outcome of the Russian village study
informs your foundational philosophical position.
"No dictionary is adequate to capture all possible
uses since usage is
both ambiguous and also subject to continual change.
Philosophical
analysis, conceived as linguistic analysis, does not
involve looking
up the meanings of words in dictionaries."
What does it involve?
"Do you imagine when we accurately say of a car that
it is yellow
(i.e., it has the color we all call yellow when we are
using that
word correctly) that, in fact, it really isn't? "
Not on your life!
"Here I assume you want to introduce this metaphysical
talk about how colors are really in the mind"
You miss my point. It is you that are concerned about
the location of a color. Didn't you ask? Anyway, to
ask for a location is the metaphysical move. "
"Are you going to take the position that philosophy's
only
job is to raise interesting questions, some of which
may prompt us to
think more clearly while others may prompt us to stop
asking other
questions? If so, is your work done do you think? Or
should a serious
philosopher seriously try to wrestle with these
questions?"
The wrestling never stops. We keep on getting into the
same muddles. The search for foundations, the dread
that reason is underminded by passion, etc. The work
is endless.
"What insights are you offering in this vein?"
Constant vigilance. A primary concern is what has been
called "over-socialized man."
"I find Searle an interesting thinker but I am
constantly surprised to see how wrong he is on this
question of AI."
Would like to hear why.
I found this helpful.
bruce
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