[analytic] A philosopher in the news

[larry_tapper]

Paul Reddam, owner of Triple Crown contender I'll Have Another:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/sports/belmont-stakes-ill-have-anothers-owner-is-one-win-from-triple-crown.html

True, he gave up philosophy for loan sharking, but hey, it's a life like any other.

One amusing detail for philosophy of science buffs: Bas van Fraassen, one of Reddam's teachers, apparently made quite a few bucks investing in Reddam's company Ditech.

LT

[larry_tapper]

Sean asks:


> Two questions: (a) is your list better without Stuart?

Yes.

> (b) is it better without Stuart's mind conversation, but with him?

No.

YMMV.

Larry


--- In anal...@yahoogroups.com, "seanwilsonorg" <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> Larry:
>
> ... why don't you let Stuart back in here? I bet he'll keep all the mind stuff on my list. He could periodically chime in on stuff like this, which is bound to get more traffic going in reply. You cannot deny his value to start discussion traffic.
>
> Besides, it would make you look better by converting his death into a suspension. The annals of cyber registry would speak better of the matter. Of course, we disagree on whether any of it was necessary, but that isn't he point. The point is that this seems like a true, blue solution.
>
> Why not give it a go?
>
> Two questions: (a) is your list better without Stuart? (b) is it better without Stuart's mind conversation, but with him?

[iro3isdx]

--- In anal...@yahoogroups.com, "seanwilsonorg" <whoooo26505@...> wrote:

> (a) is your list better without Stuart?

Now it is empty. Before, it was overflowing with stuff not worth reading.

I prefer empty.

> (b) is it better without Stuart's mind conversation, but with him?

It would still be empty. So, no, it wouldn't be better.

The list could use an occasional good discussion topic. I am not a real philosopher, so I'm not in a position to originate such a topic.

[larry_tapper]

Hello Neil,

Glad to see that you are still checking in from time to time.

I agree with your general assessment that in a discussion group, there are fates worse than no posts.

Analytic has had fallow periods before, and as the moderator I'm not especially concerned about that. All it would take to revive it is someone introducing a topic of enough general interest so that the regulars would gradually shuffle back in.


Yrs, Larry

--- In anal...@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:

[Eray Ozkural]

The stupidest debate I can envision is "free will".

> ------------------------------------
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--
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[walto]

Hi, Larry.

I thought you might be interested in the following, some remarks by my
old teacher and colleague Steve Schwartz on the same Putnam musings I
sent to you. Not sure what to think about them yet. (I think he's
definitely right about Putnam's proof following from Skolem, though.)
Anyhow, I thought maybe we could make this a three-way confab!

Hi Walt!

Thanks for reminding me of the Putnam arguments against realism. I've
looked at the original again, and even google-searched "Putnam cats
cherries" and got some interesting results. You might try it if you
haven't.

I am very interested in this and related issues. When I get a chance
I'll sketch in my thoughts in more detail. This might not be for a
month or more however as I'll be away on and off boating til probably
mid-Sept.

In the meantime, let me give you some thoughts on what you've written.
This is obviously a complex and highly technical issue, and I am just
now reviewing this aspect of it, so excuse me if I'm off base. But
here goes:

On Fri, Jul 27, 2012 at 7:13 PM, Calliotte/Horn <cal...@rcn.com
<mailto:cal...@rcn.com> > wrote:
On the other hand, there's something clearly weird about a term
that has one meaning in the actual world and different meanings in
certain other possible worlds.
Ok, but I do not think that was Putnam's claim or part of his argument.
His claim, I think, is that we cannot tell whether "cat" means cat or
cat* in the actual world. This is an extension of Quine's indeterminacy
of radical translation argument.


Part of the weirdness seems to me to stem from the fact that the
meanings of words (and sentences) should be independent of the facts of
the matter, and thus can't vary from world to world.
Yes, this is certainly correct in the sense that when we talk about
other worlds the meanings of our words, sentences, etc. are the same as
they are in the actual world. Of course, "2+2=4" could mean "The sky
is blue" in some other world. But that seems to be irrelevant to
anything interesting.


It's hard to put that correctly: say meanings ain't in the
head and if world A and world B were to be made of different
"stuff" most of the words in the two worlds couldn't mean
the same things. Wouldn't it be correct to say that we then have
different words (not shapes and sounds, of course) but different terms
precisely because they do have different meanings in the different
worlds?
Yes again. Surely you are right about this. "2+2=4" in the world in
which means "The sky is blue" contains different terms, etc. For all
that, the proposition 2+2=4 exists in every possible and is true in
every possible world (regardless of the color of the sky and how it is
expressed in that world). At least this is the way it works in the
standard sort of modal logics that I am familiar with.


Could it be that, saying that "mat*" means one thing
"here," another "there" already begs the question
against the metaphysical realist?
Again, I doubt that Putnam has fallen into this fallacy with his
cat/cherry argument. Keep in mind that I tend to the anti-realist,
pro-Putnam side of this dispute--although I would never countenance
such an abstruse argument as Putnam's cat/cherry one. I mean formal
logic, esp'ly model theory generates this result pretty easily. It's
not all that original. I think somewhere Putnam writes about the
"Skolemization of everything." I'll find the ref for you and send it.
Skolem proved that first-order theories cannot describe their models
"up to isomorphism" as it's put. Basically what this means is that
every set of consistent first-order statements has models that make all
of its statements true but are different in structure. First-order
theories are limited in descriptive power. I think this is all that is
going on with Putnam's argument and is indisputable. The so-called
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem is one of the first things one learns when we
go beyond the symbolic logic course I believe you had with me. No?

I think I still have this right. Anyway, here is what I at this moment
think. We know for sure that there are all sorts of paradoxes that can
be generated with formal logic and set theory. And that there are
undecidable questions, etc. But why go to all that trouble? Isn't my
favorite, the sorites paradox, enough to upset the realist applecart?

Cheers,

Steve

*************************************************

Best,

W

[walto]

I think I'd personally go with "Why Romney Should be President" as the stupidest.

W

--- In anal...@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@...> wrote:
>
> The stupidest debate I can envision is "free will".
>