[analytic-borders] Defining Art
John
grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but
only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the
falling of the dusk."
This is one of my favorite (and incontestably metaphorical)
quotations from Hegel. Whether it applies to philosophy or only to
historically oriented philosophies like Hegel's is a question for
another time, but I do believe it has a lot of relevance to our
understanding of art.
(Incidentally, "shape of life" German reads "gestalt des lebens" in
the original German. I read it as intending something similar to
Wittgenstein's "form des lebens" but if anyone whose German is better
than mine could explicate any distinction, I would be appreciative.)
I'll return to the history issue, but first some reasons I consider
it relevant.
I referred, in an earlier reply to one of Gary's posts on aesthetics,
to the "problem of criterion". In Sextus Empiricus, we encounter the
diallelus ("the wheel") as a skeptical challenge to present a
criterion of knowledge. The argument has been revived in various
forms by Montaigne and Hegel, among others, but a formulation that
has become a locus classicus is that of Roderick Chisholm. I believe
this way of framing the problem of the criterion is very relevant to
how we approach the definition of art.
Chisholm presents the problem as arising from two conflicting but
plausible propositions (perhaps something of the sort Bruce has in
mind when he refers to a "contest of compelling intuitions"):
1. If we are to recognize instances of knowledge, we must have a
criterion.
2. If we are to formulate a criterion of knowledge, then we must be
able to recognize instances.
We face a circle if we accept both propositions and a vicious one at
that. Some ancient Greek Skeptics did accept both, but Chisholm
considers two other possibilities and points to examples from the
history of philosophy of those who chose one or the other.
We can accept 1 and reject 2, holding that we can formulate a
criterion of knowledge in the absence of instances of it. Chisholm
calls this "methodism" and attributes it to Locke and Hume.
We can accept 2 and reject 1, holding that we can identify instances
without having a criterion. Chisholm cites Reid and Moore as examples
of this and calls it "particularism". He then defends particularism.
(Wittgenstein also defended an approach that could be
called "particularist".)
A fourth option, logically at least, would be to reject both 1 and 2.
The Method of Reflective Equilibrium, proposed by Goodman and
developed in ethics by Rawls, could be called an example of this
approach but it could also be called an embrace of both propositions,
depending on whether the instances or the criterion are regarded as
certain.
The idea is that a mutual adjustment takes place, privileging neither
instances nor criteria as we work toward overall coherence. Rawls
also distinguishes "wide" from "narrow" forms of reflective
equilibrium, the former being distinguished by considering
alternative conceptions and what philosophical (or other) arguments
might choose between them.
Something of this sort seems most plausible to me, though
particularism also appeals to me.
(Incidentally, where I depart from some Wittgensteinians is that I
consider the sort of certainties that some would call "rules of
grammar" that it would be nonsensical to doubt to instead be so
essential to the rest of our understanding that an alternative
conception which entails their rejection must then also provide
alternative accounts of our understanding. I don't imagine any thing
like that to be forthcoming, so the distinction I am making between
myself and Wittgensteinians is very likely of little more than verbal
significance.)
That this problem of criteria would be relevant to attempts to
define "art" should by now be obvious. How do we identify instances
of art without a criterion of art? How do we formulate a criterion of
art without being able to identify instances?
The relationship of all of this to the Hegel quote I started with may
yet require further elaboration.
Kuhn considered in his later years that he had overstated the
seemingly irrational nature of paradigm shifts in the history of
science and understated the role of rigorous education in normalizing
the methods of practicing scientists, but nevertheless has given
pause to those who would posit ahistorical standards of
justification. Our notions of what can be known a priori have been
revised in light of Einstein's successful use of non-Euclidean
geometry and even principles of logic may not be immune if we
consider credible von Neumann's suggestions that abandoning bivalence
may be the best response to quantum mechanics.
Kuhn's historical approach was radical in that he applied it to
science, but the emphasis on discontinuity is quite typical of
histories of other fields (which is another reason that the
widespread use and abuse of "paradigm shift" in other fields and pop
culture is peculiar) and rightly so. The strict training of
researchers may prevent wholly irrational changes in science, but
that hardly seems to apply to art. Likewise, the idea of timeless
standards is far less common in aesthetics and the philosophy of art
than in epistemology or the philosophy of science (or even
ethics). "Methodism" is much less plausible in the philosophy of art.
(Incidentally, Bruce: your references to Kuhn and "paradigm shifts"
in philosophy sounded to me more like a "gestalt switch", a change in
perspective. For one thing, a paradigm shift has taken place when it
becomes impossible to be able to work within a field without
accepting the new paradigm, because of the collapse of the old
paradigm and the incommensurability old with the new. I don't see
anything like this having happened in philosophy. Also, you spoke of
a paradigm shift requiring justification, but part of Kuhn's point,
whether one agrees with him or not, is that the incommensurability
makes justification of the new paradigm in terms of the old
impossible.)
The institutional theory of art seems to me to bypass the problem of
criterion at the price of vacuity: the "artworld" is able to reliably
identify an instance of "art" simply because when they recognize it
as such, they make it so, yet faced with the daunting diversity of
art it becomes a tempting idea.
While it is only a popular myth that most great artists were only
recognized posthumously, the equally clichéd notion that great art
must stand the test of time has a certain plausibility. Must we then
only be able to truly understand art whose time has passed, art that
is beyond rejuvenation to use Hegel's metaphor? Arguably, art is not
less vital, no less able to inspire, for being past. On the contrary,
that's part of what "standing the test of time" means. At the same
time, one would like the philosophy of art to be more than
antiquarian; rather one would like it to actively participate in
discussions of art here and now.
These considerations loosely relate to my tangential discussion (in
an earlier post) of music theory that draws upon the example of
composers of tonal music during the period of "Common Practice", much
of which developed even as tonality was being weakened and even
rejected in contemporary art music. I also believe that this
approach, trying to derive general rules that systematize a practice
represents, on a non-philosophical level, a practice that could be
called "particularist" and that it is not a coincidence that such an
approach would be fully developed only as actual practice had moved
on.
I believe that one's view of history plays a significant role in how
these issues are understood, whether one see mostly decline and
degeneration, subscribes to the formula of modernity, seeing further
by standing on the shoulders of giants, holds to the modernist idea
that progress can only come by overthrowing and discarding the past,
or embraces the postmodernist prescription of incredulity toward all
metanarratives. I for one find modernity's view most plausible in
many areas, but feel tempted by post when it comes to the arts, and I
believe that this providing an account of this seeming inconsistency
brings forth what I see as central to the issue: why are scientists
trained in rigorous conformity to certain standards while for most of
us even the suggestion of training artists to conform would be
anathema? Why is the idea of "methodism" so insulting both to the
creative process and to the appreciation of art?
Berlin persuasively argues that we have inherited from the Romantic
period the valorization of non-conformity, the idea that sincerity is
a virtue in and of itself, apart from what is believed, and that rule-
breaking is in some sense admirable. As heirs to this part of the
Western tradition, we all share these sentiments to some degree, but
we are also conservatives at heart, conscientious about truth and
ethics. If we are not similarly conscientious about art, does that
mean we value it less?
On the contrary, I would say it is precisely because we do value art
that we resist conservativism in such matters and it reveals
something about what it is we are valuing: the particularity, the
individual, the personal. This too reveals something about art (and
brings to mind Hume and Kant on taste).
There are of course cases of art being defended by, gaining
recognition because of, and perhaps even being inspired by,
philosophical arguments. Think of Greenberg, MOMAism (setting aside
the CIA link), and the defense of Abstract Expressionism on
essentialist, formalist, and historical determinist premises, or
Leibowitz's zealous and similarly essentialist defense of Schoenberg
and the Second Viennese School. At the same time, I believe that much
of the history of modern art can be understood in terms of attempts
to challenge presuppositions of what constitutes the essence of an
art. Recall also Rauschenberg's and Cage's responses to these related
dogmas.
I would go so far as to say that were a philosopher to convincingly
argue that they had identified an invariant principle determining an
art form, that would be a thoughtful artist's cue to challenge that
principle. That may make the philosophical quest to define art an
exercise in futility, but art (even with the concomitant quest to
simply shock, which is also a part of contemporary art) is surely
richer for it.
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John
Art" and was quite pleasantly surprised to discover the great extent
to which his thoughts on the subject mirror my own, including the
historical reasons for preferring a "family resemblance" approach to
art and the adventurous nature of art rendering an essentialist
approach misguided at best. I'll be posting more of my own thoughts
on the subject soon, along with some comments relating it to Weitz.
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nikolas
>1. If we are to recognize instances of knowledge, we must have a
>criterion.
>2. If we are to formulate a criterion of knowledge, then we must be
>able to recognize instances.
To unravel this a bit I think it might help to point out that the
above is a discussion of knowledge. And to apply that to a
discussion of art seems forced. While I accept there are criteria
for (evaluating?) art, it doesn't seem to fit, or it drastically
changes the nature of 'knowledge', from what causes the above to seem
problematic. The criteria of art do not seem to help us see anything
that could be attributed as knowledge in its regular uses (identity,
proof, certainty). So if, in art (critique), we are not trying to
prove, identify, or make certain, then in formulating criteria is
there a preset goal ('recognizing instances')? And so the
relationship between the work and the criteria evolves...to the
extent art has no criteria may simply be the extent to which it is
lost (on us or another)---but this is not a crisis for criticism but
simply the nature and possibility of art.
>How do we identify instances of art without a criterion of art? How
>do we formulate a criterion of art without being able to identify
>instances?
How criteria are created and change here seems problematic quite
possibly due to the use of 'identify', and, possibly, the apparent
distinction made between 'art' and 'criteria' (do we have 'art' if we
have no criteria?---can't we in light of the lack?)
>The institutional theory of art seems to me to bypass the problem of
>criterion at the price of vacuity: the "artworld" is able to reliably
>identify an instance of "art" simply because when they recognize it
>as such, they make it so,
Arbitrariness (the "problem") of criteria is one opening for a claim
of relativism (vacuity, impotence); but what are we (through our
criteria; thus, our judgments) trying to accomplish? One person
calls it art; another, trash---is there now a gaping hole in art
criticism? This breakdown is not entire or forever or irredeemable
but simply the nature of having neither a chicken nor an egg in the
dialogue of art.
We feel moved or let down---we are not able to make the other see
what we see (due to ignorance, a degeneration of aesthetic argument
retreating to personal taste, politics, or the simple frustration
that our experience is alone---our entire human gamut). Possibly
this then is simply the despair and joy of art?
tony nickles
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John
In my post, I meandered quite a bit tying together various ideas. In
the process I was apparently unclear on a few points. Allow me to
clarify.
First, I certainly recognize that the problem of the criterion in
Chsholm, et al, is a concerned with knowledge specifically, not
classification generally.
Second, I recognize that the problem of defining art is not the same
problem, nor is it even a related problem in this sense: I do not
consider it inconceivable that epistemological questions about e.g.
justification of empirical knowledge might be resolved satisfactorily
while leaving the problem of defining art untouched.
Third, in calling the definition of art a "problem" I do not mean to
suggest some great urgency upon which the fate of our aesthetic lives
depends; no "crisis" is implied here.
Fourth, I believe that it is important to distinguish (as I had not
yet done) between the evaluative and classificatory senses of "art".
It is quite conceivable that one could have an adequate definition
of "art" in the classificatory sense while nevertheless being wholly
unable to resolve differences between those who disagree whether a
work is "art" in the evaluative sense.
Fifth, I do not believe that logical argument and appeals to
definitions could compell the appreciation of a work of art in any
case. Such considerations would be quite beside the point in my view.
Now, regarding my first and second points, my purpose was to make a
comparison, to show affinities between two different problems, not to
suggest that they were the same problem, that one problem is
derivative of the other, nor even that the solution to one problem
must necessarily take the same form as the solution to the other. On
the contrary, I had hoped in fact to suggest that some of the
differences between the two problems, particularly how we view them
(related to my third point here), might actually shed some light on
the subject. I hoped to draw out, by way of the comparison, some of
the problems with essentialism in art, which has been used to
attempt the derivation of evaluative judgements from classificatory
ones (compare points four and five). Apparently, I was not very
clear.
nikolas
>I believe that it is important to distinguish (as I had not
>yet done) between the evaluative and classificatory senses of "art".
Yes, I realized right after I sent that email that, indeed, we may be
talking about two things and that one of them, in a sense, WAS trying
to "identify" (or classify) what is art. If we substitute "art" for
"knowledge" the saying would read:
>1. If we are to recognize instances of art, we must have a criterion.
>2. If we are to formulate a criterion of art, then we must be able
>to >recognize instances.
And maybe my main point was "a criterion of art" does not seem
foremost concerned with classification (though some are), or as you
put it, I believe, as well:
>essentialism in art, [...] has been used to attempt the derivation
>of evaluative judgements from classificatory ones
I think we would need some examples (of someone evaluating art and
classifying it) for this to be drawn out, but I would throw into the
mix as well that I was actually only considering the ways in which
art is described (how a painting is put together---the terms of the
critic) as what it means to evaluate art. But if we are not going to
say a painting is valued because it is classified as 'art' ("This
work contains all the elements of a Baroque painting and is thus high
art"), then we are left with reflecting on what makes us interested
in or value art (originality, beauty, transcendence?)---and are these
then the "criteria" for evaluation, but then why not for
classification? (And maybe the difference is, as you said originally,
that when our interest in art is formalized into classifying, some
times we forget they are OUR interests and they become dead
checklists for identification.)
>I do not believe that logical argument and appeals to
>definitions could compell the appreciation of a work of art in any
>case. Such considerations would be quite beside the point in my view.
And here (with appeals to definitions at least) I would agree someone
may have forgotten that our criteria reflect our INTERESTS in art
(appreciation of course is rarely moved by authority), but I want to
point out that without the ability to have logical argument about
what compels us, there would be no aesthetics, no art history,
nothing to learn about art...etc. Or that argument about what we
value and are interested in does not seem to me to be void of the
ability to be logical (based in the criteria or "grammar" of
describing art, which I would say express our interests in art)
though prone to breakdown (this harkens back to Mr. Goss' 5-28 and my
5-31 posts on aesthetics).
ggos...@aol.com
The opening statement below did interest me, partly because
I am interested in what is and what is not a family
resemblance word and also in how a stipulated meaning
works.
I wonder how, say, a genre can be a "closed concept." Take
the field of mystery novels as an example. I doubt that an
inclusive set of necessary and sufficient conditions can
be formulated. Too many exceptions. But perhaps I don't
have a good grip on this. I await the next installment.
Best,
Gary
In a message dated 9/6/03 1:14:29 AM, sceptic...@yahoo.com writes:
>I'm offering very brief summary of some of Weitz's points in "The
>
>Role of Theory in Art" for Gary and anyone else interested, before
>
>moving on to some of my own (very similar) ideas. I'll try to focus
>
>on those points which may not be familiar.
>
>
>
>In part, there is an historical argument that we are no closer to
>
>defining "art" than Plato and that previous attempts failed by
>
>neglecting the fact that art changes. Various attempts are summarized
>
>and some of their faults addressed. The failure is attributed to the
>
>assumption that some set of necessary and sufficient conditions is
>
>adequate to define art. Realizing this is a fundamental error, we
>
>should reject the question. The actual logic of the concept shows
>
>that such a set of conditions is logically impossible. We should not
>
>ask "What is art?" but instead "What sort of concept is it?" and "How
>
>is the concept used in our language?"
>
>
>
>I would imagine that much of this is of course familiar to most of
>
>those on this list.
>
>
>
>(One interesting point is that in the essay, "The Form-Content
>
>Distinction", written only a few years earlier, Weitz defends the
>
>notion of a "real essence" of art, referring to Russell and also
>
>defends universals, citing Peirce and Russell, as the only way for
>
>communication to be possible. Quite a dramatic change!)
>
>
>
>He draws out the distinction between the classificatory and
>
>evaluative senses of "art", the latter being a term of praise, the
>
>former being what he is concerned with in this essay.
>
>
>
>In addition to discussing Wittgenstein, he also a discusses Waismann
>
>and proceeds to distinguish between "closed concepts" (those for
>
>which necessary and sufficient conditions can be stated) and "open
>
>concepts" (those whose conditions for application are subject to
>
>change and correction), suggesting that particular art forms, genres,
>
>etc. may be closed concepts, but art itself must be an open concept.
>
>He argues that the use of the concept its openness. We could only
>
>make it a closed concept by stipulation which would stifle creativity
>
>and lead to repetitiveness. Inventiveness and experimentation are
>
>part of the nature of the art.
>
>
>
>Now, a few words about Waismann. Waismann developed the notion
>
>of "open texture", which has some affinities with Wittgenstein's idea
>
>of "family resemblance", but also with some of the considerations
>
>of "rule following". (Waismann was sent by Schlick to take notes on
>
>some of Wittgenstein's discussions in the 30s, so clearly there was
>
>some influence.)
>
>
>
>The idea, which Waismann presents as in part an explanation of why
>
>phenomenalist attempts at reducing statements about material objects
>
>to a sense-data must fail, is that even concepts which are not vague,
>
>per se, are not defined for all conceivable contingencies. Some
>
>seemingly ordinary situations are discussed with unanticipated and
>
>fantastic differences suddenly introduced (cats that suddenly grow to
>
>gigantic size, men who are only one foot tall), pointing out that we
>
>would then have difficulty knowing whether the word applied, whether
>
>e.g. we should say we had encountered a new species or merely an
>
>extraordinary specimen of the old. While such things as he describes
>
>do not happen, they are conceivable, and therefore we cannot exclude
>
>the possibility of having to revise our definitions. Empirical
>
>concepts are not delimited in all possible directions.
>
>
>
>Even scientific concepts exhibit this possibility. For example, there
>
>are many scientific tests for identifying "gold", but let's say we
>
>encounter some metal which passed all of the chemical tests, but
>
>emitted some new sort of radiation. We define terms relative to our
>
>present needs, drawing the contrasts that seem important, limiting it
>
>in some directions, but we tend not to notice that there are many
>
>unforeseen directions our definitions are not prepared for. We cannot
>
>close off every conceivable possibility. "Open texture" is the
>
>possibility of vagueness and whereas ordinary vagueness can be
>
>eliminated with more accurate rules, open texture cannot.
>
>
>
>Some of Weitz's arguments for the "open concept" view of art are
>
>family resemblance" arguments, but the "open texture" argument is
>
>actually more on point for the historical argument.
>
>
>
>Before I go, a few words about the "institutional" theory of art.
>
>Weitz's theory and Dickie's were debated, but I have come to wonder
>
>if the debate is somewhat misplaced. I suspect that the strengths of
>
>both could be accommodated in a "language game" approach, where the
>
>institutional theory is dealing with who the players are and family
>
>resemblances with the way in which they play.
>
>
>
>Anyway, I hope that this has been interesting and not too rambling.
John
>
> And maybe my main point was "a criterion of art" does not seem
> foremost concerned with classification (though some are)
Precisely! I believe that the classificatory question is secondary
and really of quite marginal importance, except to the extent that
addressing those who put classification foremost and derive the
evaluative judgments from alleged "necessary and sufficient
conditions" is part of the philosophical debate. I believe, as you
seem to, that those who argue this way have things the wrong way
round. That's my reason for preferring the "open concept" approach. I
shall develop this point as I go.
> I think we would need some examples (of someone evaluating art and
> classifying it) for this to be drawn out
Yes! I'll be presenting at least some hypotheticals presently.
, but I would throw into the
> mix as well that I was actually only considering the ways in which
> art is described (how a painting is put together---the terms of the
> critic) as what it means to evaluate art. But if we are not going
to
> say a painting is valued because it is classified as 'art' ("This
> work contains all the elements of a Baroque painting and is thus
high
> art"), then we are left with reflecting on what makes us interested
> in or value art (originality, beauty, transcendence?)---and are
these
> then the "criteria" for evaluation, but then why not for
> classification?
"Why not?" indeed!
I am assuming you mean "criteria" in a Wittgensteinian sense and
don't mean to make these into a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for being art. In that case I agree.
(And maybe the difference is, as you said originally,
> that when our interest in art is formalized into classifying, some
> times we forget they are OUR interests and they become dead
> checklists for identification.)
>
Exactly!
I should say that I suspect that the evaluative/classificatory
distinction is a bit of an artifice, though not strictly a
philosophical one. I do think that many do make the distinction under
fairly normal circumstances (to the extent that discussions of art
are "normal"). Of course the history of discussing "art" has been
tied to philosophy for a long time, so perhaps we cannot speak of
some kind of "uncontaminated" ordinary language of art.
Let us say we have two people viewing a word of art.
He says, "That's not art! It's trash!"
She says, "Oh, it is art, but it's bad art."
If he says, "Yes, that's what I meant," then I think we may have a
basis for the distinction. If he insists, "No, it's not art at all,"
then should we say that the distinction is invalid or perhaps that he
does accept such a distinction, but that in this case, the work
doesn't even meet the most minimal criteria for being art in even a
classificatory sense?
What sorts of things could either of them say that would lead us to
favor one interpretation over another?
Suppose he says that it's not art because it's not X. Would the sort
of X he names have a bearing here? I think that may be an important
part of the question.
Leaving that to one side, let's look at her response.
Does she say that not all art is X? Does she disagree and insist that
the particular work is X, but perhaps that if it were not it would
not be art?
And maybe this is relevant: does she point to other works of art,
works that she can proclaim to be GOOD art, that are not X?
Would we do better to distinguish between evaluations and
classifications, without supposing that "art" is being used in two
different senses?
What about reversing things? Can we imagine someone saying that
something is "art" in an evaluative sense but not in a classificatory
sense? Is "The human body is a work of art?" a metaphor or is it
using the word in a different sense? Or on the theological
assumption, is it perhaps a work of art in a classificatory sense as
well? Nonbelievers can say it too, but are they using the sentence
differently? On what basis would we make the distinction?
Here's another question: can works of art lacking a previously
assumed X (say DuChamp's ready mades when they first appeared) be
accepted in the classificatory sense without someone being committed
to them in the evaluative sense? Put in a way that doesn't presume
the distinction, can revolutionary putative work of art gain
acceptance as such if everyone says "It's art, but it's bad art?"
Would such a thing even be said if no one thought it was "good art"
(good meant broadly to cover "original", "important", etc.)?
I'm not certain if the distinction is valid or if there's even a
basis for deciding it, but I suspect that at least some of these may
be important questions in judging the matter.
>
> And here (with appeals to definitions at least) I would agree
someone
> may have forgotten that our criteria reflect our INTERESTS in art
> (appreciation of course is rarely moved by authority),
Yes! That was the point I had in mind.
> but I want to
> point out that without the ability to have logical argument about
> what compels us, there would be no aesthetics, no art history,
> nothing to learn about art...etc.
And the shift from my saying that arguments do not compel us to
arguing about what compels us is the key here. It is not the argument
itself that compels us to appreciate a work of art, but the argument
about what IS compelling can draw our attention to compelling things
we may have missed in our first encounter with the work. Does this
distinction make my point clearer?
Let me provide a pair of examples:
Let us say that a particularly observant, trustworthy, and
perspicacious friend of mine has witnessed a scientific experiment
and I have not. She describes with great (dare I say "loving" or
might this taint the objectivity?) perspicuity the protocols followed
and the measurements made. The experimental set-up is described with
tremendous precision. We discuss the interpretation of the results
and she presents compelling arguments for the interpretation favored
by her and by the scientists in attendance. There is no question of
her veracity and her arguments are impeccable. It would not be a
misuse of language for me to say that I found not only her arguments,
but also the experiment itself, "compelling".
Now, let us say that this friend of mine is also an art lover. She is
as gifted in describing a work of art as at describing an experiment.
Her sensibility is as refined as her intellect. Again, her veracity
is likewise not in question. She describes to me the work of art,
speaking in both literal and figurative terms, of mathematical
proportions and of sweeping gestures, of subject matter and of
allegorical significance. She also shares information about the
historical context of the work, its significance in relationship to
previous works and its influence upon others. She and the art critics
and scholars in attendance were all deeply impressed.
I would certainly want to see the work. I might even be utterly
convinced that I would find it compelling were I to see it for myself.
But note the difference! Should I say that I DO find the artwork
compelling just as I found the experiment compelling? No. And my
friend would not feel dejected that her patience and enthusiasm had
failed to completely win me over, because as someone of sensibility,
that would not be her purpose! She knows that appreciation by proxy
is not genuine and that argument is beside the point.
This is not however to say, had we instead attended the show together
and she found the work compelling whereas I felt unmoved, that she
could not facilitate a change in how I viewed the work, through some
of the very means she had used in describing it in the previous
example. She could very well draw my attention to elements of the
design and to points about the work's significance that would alter
my perception of it.
It is this phenomenon that can lead us to suppose that it is the
arguments themselves that compel us, but I maintain that this is a
mistake.
Now, let us still be careful here. Have we identified some element of
aesthetics that can lead us toward some definition of art? Perhaps
not. This may apply to many forms of art, but does it apply to all?
Perhaps some forms of Conceptual art can compel us by proxy, the idea
rather than the work itself being the point. We don't want to rush to
a conclusion.
> Or that argument about what we
> value and are interested in does not seem to me to be void of the
> ability to be logical (based in the criteria or "grammar" of
> describing art, which I would say express our interests in art)
> though prone to breakdown (this harkens back to Mr. Goss' 5-28 and
my
> 5-31 posts on aesthetics).
I went back and read your interesting discussion (I am somewhat
influenced in my views by Sibley but do not presume to speak for him)
and have some comments on the third post in your dialogue's trilogy:
>
> Tony wrote:
>
> >If my take on your paraphrase of Sibley holds weight, then what
you
> >may be struck by is that getting any value from, or idea of,
> >something can only come from examining it (without assumed
> >ideas)---or something like that, but we still haven't drawn out
what
> >this examination involves (and does not).
>
Gary wrote:
> Right. "Just look," as Wittgenstein might say. But in looking at
> art we do have some assumed ideas. Sibley seems to argue that
> the more we know about art, the better we are trained to
> evaluate it. For one thing, a trained eye has a better sense
> of the range of what is possible.
>
Here I agree with both of you (and my reading of Sibley is also in
accord). The willingness to set aside preconceived ideas in looking
at art does not require starting with no preconceived ideas at all.
The "innocent eye" perceives nothing at all.
> Gary wrote:
>
> >>Sibley considers taste to be something that can be learned.
> >>You can learn to recognize finer and finer shades of colors.
> >>A child capable of simple aesthetic pleasures can learn
> >>to appreciate more and more complex things. Wine tasting
> >>is a skill anyone can learn through enough sampling.
>
> Tony wrote:
>
> >These seem to imply as if through "immediate experience" we become
> >experienced at how to discuss these things---but isn't this done
> >through learning the concepts of (what counts as) taste (not that
> >this couldn't be what is happening).
>
> Yes, we taste many wines but we also learn an appropriate
> vocabulary, which can at times be rather odd, as when a
> wine taster tells us that a wine contains a hint of nettles
> or gunpowder, as if he knew what nettles and gunpowder
> taste like. A good Wittgensteinian question might be:
> does he have to know what nettles and gunpowder taste
> like?
>
Not knowing about wine, I can only wonder if the similes in use are
about scent and scent is of course intimately connected to tasting.
Of course, some similes, e.g. "This tastes like Sh*t!" are amusing
when one asks the "good Wittgensteinian question".
> Gary wrote:
>
> >>Seeing grace, however, we can ask on what it depends.
>
> Tony wrote:
>
> >Having the grammar of grace, we can even say anything; if not we
> >might think the awe we felt was caused by invisible waves.
>
> Sibley wants us to say something that is potential
> testable. "If we remove that line from the drawing, the
> sketch will no longer be graceful." We could then
> reproduce the sketch without the line and see what
> occurs.
>
Speaking from my art school days, artists certainly do sometimes test
their designs in precisely this way. Picasso would sometimes make
tracings of tracings of tracings in selecting and deleting elements
until he felt a composition was "just right" and its an excellent
student exercise.
> Tony wrote:
>
> >Doesn't this assume something like: you have agreement (or not) in
> >the amount of grace, and then explain the cause of it (doesn't
> >testable seem the wrong word for a discussion of art?)
>
> Hmmm. Well, I doubt if we would use "amount" in discussing
> grace. "Grace" probably doesn't work that way (not that I
> have thought this through). There is some testing involved
> in art -- I wouldn't rule out use of the word.
>
Not an "amount", no, but I do think testing can play a role in some
forms of appreciation, particularly when a fellow artist is the
audience. To appreciate decisions Rembrandt made in what seems an
entirely impromptu sketch (and "decisions" may be the wrong word, but
comparing how design problems are solved in a drawing by Rembrandt
and one by one of his lesser contemporaries imitating his style can
tempt us to this sort of language), we may consider alternative
solutions to a given problem.
For example, why use a line of varying thickness to describe the edge
of a thigh? In other places lines with less variation are used, but
the line of varying thickness suggests the variation in the light on
the surface as it curves away from you.
But that could be done with a wash and he uses washes elsewhere in
the drawing? Yes that's true, but then the boundary between
foreground and background would be less clear.
But he could use a darker wash for the background adjacent to the
thigh? Yes, but that contrast would draw our attention to that side
of the image and away from the face.
(How do we know this? Well it's a judgment call, but experiments by
gestalt psychologists seem to bear out some of these judgments)
Also note that the length of the line describing the underside of the
thigh is approximately parallel to the line describing the edge of
the ceiling and that it interrupts the oblique line that defines the
underarm to the elbow, but which seems to continue along a vector in
the shin of the other leg...
It seems as if this one "decision" serves so many functions and that
any alternative we entertain would not do so well. Doing this in a
sketch that seems to have been done in great haste seems
quite "graceful" whether or not the work itself would be described
this way.
And that reminds me. I believe that sometimes these metaphors may
reflect an empathy with the process of its creation, even for a non-
artist whose familiarity with writing may perhaps account for it: try
to copy an Schiele drawing without getting a cramp in your forearm.
Try to copy an Ingres drawing when you have a cramp.
> I wrote, on Sibley:
>
> >>A line in a
> >>drawing, being a property special to one particular work,
> >>will have a unique dependence relation to the aesthetic
> >>features emerging from it. (A line that works well in one
> >>drawing may not work well in a second drawing.)
>
> Tony wrote:
>
> >Couldn't we say these 'features' are the grammatical concepts used
in
> >critiquing paintings.
>
> I'm grappling with this idea. An aesthetic feature like grace
> is a grammatical concept? Well, the word "grace" is a grammatical
> concept. A line in a painting that creates grace may be
> a bit of painting-grammar -- I'm not clear about that. I think
> painting does have a grammar. . . .
>
I think that the grammar metaphor is quite useful in some contexts
and that we could speak of the grammar of a particular style, of an
artist, and of an individual work, although the metaphor breaks down
in some respects.
> >The line IS unique in being not the same
> >(identity-wise) line as others---it may have a unique, as in
> >abnormal, relation to a concept of art (an avant garde line)---but
do
> >we want to say there is a special property of the line that makes
it
> >work well; that every line has a unique place in our grammatical
> >concepts of art / to us? (that one is just as bad as all the rest,
> >I've looked at it carefully and the balance still doesn't give it
any
> >more grace; or: I find the grace lies in the color playing with
the
> >brush strokes, and not from the contrasting shapes, as you say.)
>
> I'm unsure where you are headed, Tony. It seems to me that a line
> doesn't have to be unique. The exact same line can be placed in
> a new context, just as a word can be place in a new context.
> Okay, I'm lost.
>
One area where the grammar metaphor may be relevant is in speaking of
lines as analogous to words.
For example, the same phoneme can have entirely different meanings in
two languages, e.g. the sound of "leaped" or "liebt". In Chinese, the
same phoneme, with the same intonation, represented by the same
ideogram, functions as a different part of speech and has a different
meaning depending on word order. In English, something like this is
true often enough, e.g. "mass" can function as a noun (several
meanings), a transitive verb, an intransitive verb, or as an
adjective.
By analogy, two lines with the same length, direction, thickness,
value, and speed, may serve entirely different functions within the
same or different paintings.
So, the same or different depends on the distinction we want to make.
> Gary wrote:
>
> >>We can also settle disputes by looking
> >>and seeing, "as we indeed settle disputes as to whether it
> >>is raining outside" (Lyas).
>
> Tony wrote:
>
> >Isn't the dispute simply that the other person does not see what
you
> >do---analogous to our disagreement over # 11. "It is not
raining."
> >'--yes it is.' "No, that is just misting." '---yeah, but jeesh,
> >picky!' (and is he now LOOKING outside); or: "No, that is just
mist;
> >look, don't you see" '--but isn't mist, rain?' (and here, what
> >would they be SEEING).
>
> Just looking will settle some disputes and not others,
> I suppose. This decision process ("just looking") is new
> to my consideration, and I suspect it has some interesting
> implications, particularly in relation to hard core perspectivism.
>
> Gary wrote:
>
> >> Sibley tended to point out such
> >>things rather than argue for them.
>
Whether pointing out the particular similarities that make a metaphor
fitting can be called argument is perhaps an issue here.
> Tony wrote:
>
> >If he sees it and nobody else does, does he point emphatically?
(this
> >strikes me as similar to PI) would that help in the rain---look,
> >SEE? And "pointing them out" could sound either exactly like
arguing
> >for them, or rather dictatorial / helpless. I would think the
point
> >would be to try to get someone else to see the same thing, and
that
> >this could be accomplished with more experienced use of the
grammar
> >of art.
>
Another analogy reveals my take. It's like looking at clouds. I see a
dragon and you do not. Pointing emphatically may prompt you to run
through possibilities, but I am more helpful if I say "See, that's
the tail..."
It doesn't always work, but often enough it does. I believe that the
most fruitful aesthetic discussions work something like this (how the
perceptual phenomenon itself "works" isn't fully understood by
psychology), although it is usually much more subtle.
> Pointing something out either works or it fails, right? If
> it fails, then the other person probably considers Sibley
> dogmatic. Perhaps Sibley is dogmatic. Or maybe what he
> points out is obvious enough to earn acceptance.
>
One art school exercise is making multiple tracings of Old Master
paintings, some of the value patterns, some of the verticals, some of
the horizontals, some of the diagonals, some of just the curved
lines, sometimes continuing lines that in the actual painting are not
continuous, not describing the same object or the same plane of the
pictorial space, sometimes only the lines that represent actual
boundaries between shapes, between volumes, between colors or values.
The different tracings can be superimposed or viewed in isolation. It
definitely helps to see underlying relationships and these can be
pointed out. I tend to appreciate reading art critics who, whether or
not they have ever done this exercise, seem to be able to describe
things in these terms, things I may have missed.
Alas, all to often now it's more important to drop names and use
postmodernist jargon. Maybe it's a valid approach, but it's not for
me.
> In philosophical discussion there sometimes appear useless
> arguments where one party refuses to concede the obvious.
> I hope not to be guilty of that.
>
> Gary wrote:
>
> >>whether a painting has grace is not the
> >>sort of decision we can make by close reasoning, according
> >>to Sibley.
>
> Tony answered:
>
> >We don't get an impression of grace that way, but we explain it
that
> >way. We don't walk by saying "left foot, right foot", but we may
> >explain walking that way.
>
That's an excellent point! That's similar to why I hesitate in
referring to Rembrandt's design "decisions". Often it's a rational
reconstruction of a situation that may not have involved any kind of
deliberation.
If our rational reconstruction of our response works, we may lead our
our discussion to a similar response, but maybe it's not the accuracy
of the reconstruction but something else.
John
>
> The opening statement below did interest me, partly because
> I am interested in what is and what is not a family
> resemblance word and also in how a stipulated meaning
> works.
>
On the first question, you may enjoy an upcoming post to Bruce about
the logical structure of the "family resemblance" simile.
As Ayer conceded, with his anti-climactic suggestion that the
verification principle, being neither analytically true nor
empirically verifiable and thus apparently nonsense by its own
lights, could be viewed as simply a stipulation, one can always
reject the stipulation.
My understanding is that a stipulative definition is an artificial,
that is explicitly agreed to, precisification of a term for its use
in a particular context. Of course, rule-following issues can arise
in any event and any stipulation can exhibit what Waismann
called "open texture", the inability to foresee directions in which
we might be asked whether the term applies. Also, its use outside of
the particular context is changed only gradually, if at all.
The force of stipulation is law is tied to the whole structure of
legal authority, to the extent that the term is relevant to a crime,
tort, or contract, but as Hart argues, open texture is part
why "judicial discretion" is an issue.
In science, stipulations are essential to the progressive and
cooperative nature of the endeavor, but again, open texture arises.
There are also other reasons, such as the Quine-Duhem thesis and
simple facts about the history of science to conclude that scientists
do not and cannot view stipulations as binding come what may. Hence,
the disrepute of Operationalism.
In the context of a particular discussion, agreeing to a stipulation
facilitates communication and debate, so long as the stipulation does
not beg the question under discussion. Its force is quite restricted
and may be a point of contention.
In a particular text of course, agreeing to the author's stipulations
is part of reading him charitably, but while it can assist him in
avoiding fallacies of equivocation, it can also promote them if the
conclusions of the work are applied in contexts where the stipulation
isn't presupposed.
> I wonder how, say, a genre can be a "closed concept." Take
> the field of mystery novels as an example. I doubt that an
> inclusive set of necessary and sufficient conditions can
> be formulated. Too many exceptions. But perhaps I don't
> have a good grip on this.
That's an excellent question and I think it's definitely tied to the
issue of stipulation. I no longer have the essay available to me, but
as I recall, it was more a concession that making such a stipulation
might not be problematic in the same way that it would be with art.
My impression was that stipulatively defining "tragedy"
or "portraiture" would be pointless but doing so with say, "analytic
cubist painting" might not be. Following your example, I suppose
stipulating to a definition of "English manor-house whodunit" might
be acceptable while "mystery novel" would almost certainly not be.
Could the continuing vitality of the style or genre perhaps be an
issue in whether we can reasonably presume to close it? I suspect so.
I wish I still had it handy so I could more closely examine his
comments.
A postcript to my remarks to Tony, related to this point:
The evaluative/classificatory may be more profitably read (and I
believe the context supports such a reading), not as a distinction to
be found in ordinary usage, but rather as a recommendation (Bruce
will like this!) as to how we should proceed.
It may very well be (in fact I think it highly likely) that
evaluation is prior to classification, or at least inseparable from
it, in ordinary usage, but for philosophers, the distinction is a
recommendation that we attend to the variety of uses to which people
put the word, rather than presupposing our evaluative judgments and
being more tempted therefore to close off the concept.
How this relates to my remarks here, Gary, is in something important
I left out in my comments on Weitz, something that in fact resonated
well with my own views on art: the appropriation of old (incomplete)
definitions and theories of art into styles of criticism. Rather than
speaking of Formalism (or Expressivism, et al) as definitions, we can
speak of Formalist criticism and explore problems within that theory
as part of exploring the wider landscape of art, including exploring
relationships between say, Formalist and Expressive theories. This
ties into examining the criss-crossing and overlapping that
Wittgenstein recommends we attend to.
This has for a long time been my view on the subject and I was
particularly struck to see so many of my own views represented by
Weitz (although there's a risk that this may only show that my
reading may have been colored).
I hope to get to some examples of how this applies, my own approach,
in my next posting on the subject, but as you know I haven't been
well and I wanted to get caught up on replies first. It's also been
awhile since of really focused on art, so I am refreshing my memory.
I appreciate both your feedback very much.
ggos...@aol.com
In a message dated 9/13/03 4:35:08 AM, sceptic...@yahoo.com writes:
>My impression was that stipulatively defining "tragedy"
>or "portraiture" would be pointless but doing so with say, "analytic
>cubist painting" might not be. Following your example, I suppose
>stipulating to a definition of "English manor-house whodunit" might
>be acceptable while "mystery novel" would almost certainly not be.
>Could the continuing vitality of the style or genre perhaps be an
>issue in whether we can reasonably presume to close it? I suspect so.
>I wish I still had it handy so I could more closely examine his
>comments.
That's a good example. It is true that we stipulatively define subgenres.
I'm thinking of the "Old Dark House" subgenre of scary movie.
"Travelers get trapped in a storm, their car breaks down,
and they then enter an isolated old dark house etc." That definition
can be useful. Someone might
write an entertaining book on the variations on this movie, how the
form shifted over time and why, and so on. But the cut off points about
which tales are dark old house tales -- the cut offs would be somewhat
arbitrary and subject to change. You run into this in the history of
discussions of film noir, I believe.
Scepticalwhimsey wrote:
>How this relates to my remarks here, Gary, is in something important
>I left out in my comments on Weitz, something that in fact resonated
>well with my own views on art: the appropriation of old (incomplete)
>definitions and theories of art into styles of criticism. Rather than
>speaking of Formalism (or Expressivism, et al) as definitions, we can
>speak of Formalist criticism and explore problems within that theory
>as part of exploring the wider landscape of art, including exploring
>relationships between say, Formalist and Expressive theories. This
>ties into examining the criss-crossing and overlapping that
>Wittgenstein recommends we attend to.
Nice point. That's the sort of thing I am finding in Bouwsma.
Inclusion as enrichment as opposed to exclusion on the grounds
of imperfection.
Best,
Gary
What a beautiful thought I am thinking
concerning a great speckled bird. . . .
-- from "The Great Speckled Bird"