Downward causation

[John Clark]

Giulio Prisco wrote on Turing Church

 

> "According to Davies the new physics would be something subtle, “something that interweaves matter and information, wholes and parts, simplicity and complexity” to favor “complex information-managing systems of which life as we know it would be a striking representative.”
This sounds like downward causation."

I don't think there's anything new or mystical in downward causation nor do I think it necessarily must involve consciousness, intelligence, or even life. A chemical reaction would be a low level description of what's going on in your head, and thinking would be a high level description of the same thing. Both are true. A balloon inflates because there are more air molecules hitting the inner surface of the balloon than the outer, would be a low level description of what's going on, and the pressure inside the balloon is greater than the pressure outside would be a high level description. You could say that I quickly moved my hand away after it touched the hot stove because it was painful or you could say my hand moved quickly away because of a chemical change in my brain. And you could say the balloon expanded when I was blowing it up because there were more molecules hitting the inside of the balloon than the outside, or you could say the balloon expanded because the pressure was higher inside the balloon than outside. Both pressure and volition are valid high-level descriptions of what is going on. 

John K Clark

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Downward causation would be more than this: it would mean the behaviour of the system cannot be explained by the low level rules.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Terren Suydam]

This article highlights a new concept called "causal emergence", proposed by Erik Hoel, that is a candidate for that kind of downward causation.

Terren

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[Lawrence Crowell]

I think in terms of emergent processes. In superconductivity there is a quantum correlation between electrons, but largely the transport of electrons on that level of description is just a Luttinger theory. However, the emergent Cooper pair has properties that are bosonic. This is a sort of emergent process.

LC

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[Stuart LaForge]

I think downward causation is the same as, or related to, the phenomenon of retro-causation. Causality is simply the shape of whatever space time manifold one happens to live in. There is something strangely counter-intuitive about time and that is that the very nature of QM makes a singular present give rise to multiple futures. What is  so striking about this is that one can readily define retro-causality as a mathematical function in terms of the wave-function where  multiple states (position, momentum, etc.) can give rise to the same probability amplitude. In a similar way, multiple future outcomes are the domain of a function that give rise to a single past. Mathematically speaking, one can define the past as the codomain of a mathematical function, and the future as the domain of that function, but there is no function that can map from a past domain to a future domain. Instead the best that one can do as is call causality the left inverse of the legitimate retro-causality function and define it along a given interval. Like the inverse trigonometric functions, a causality function would cause a single past to give rise to a single future, thus violating QM. This basically assures that in any future state, you find yourself in, you will likely be able to ascertain or calculate your history through observation, thought, and memory but never the other way around.

Any way, long story short, causality is an illusion, all possible futures for any possible observer, entail the very same past. Therefore the past is a function of the future and not the other way around. If you would imagine your place on the Everett tree.  I can't by analysis tell you what twig you will be on tomorrow based what branch you are on today, but I can tell you what limb you were on yesterday based on the branch you are one today.

Stuart LaForge

[Giulio Prisco]

I don't disagree on that there's nothing mystical (depending on how
you define mystical) in downward causation, but I do think there's
something new.

Your examples are analogous to Roger Sperry’s classic example of the
wheel rolling downhill, where the shape of the wheel constrains the
motion of the molecules that form the wheel.

On the one hand, this high level description is simple and convenient.
But on the other hand, everything in Sperry’s example can be explained
without invoking exotic forms of causation: all the molecules that
form the wheel rolling downhill follow gravity but also the laws of
molecular interactions with nearby molecules, and that’s it. Same for
other often cited forms of emergence with feedback loops between
molecular motions and boundary conditions: I see no reason to doubt
that efficient causation is perfectly able to explain these weak forms
of emergence.

Downward causation is something more than that. It refers to those
cases where high level entities, while being fully consistent with low
level microphysics in the sense that they don't violate low level
microphysics, add something new.

How can that be? Simple (pasting from OP): "if microphysical laws are
not fully deterministic but open to different outcomes, then there’s
room for 'other laws of physics' (see Erwin Schrödinger, 'What Is
Life?') to choose one outcome without violating microphysical laws
(see Thomas Nagel, 'Mind and Cosmos')."

In other words, if the microphysical laws say that A can be followed
by either B or C (without specifying which one), then other physical
laws can choose whether it is B or C without violating the
microphysical laws. The evolution of A can still be explained by the
low level rules of microphysics (in the sense of not being
inconsistent with them), but not without adding other physical laws,
which would be laws of downward causation.

This (that the microphysical lays leave the evolution of a system
under-determined) is true in quantum mechanics (even in Everett's
quantum mechanics if we limit our analysis to the one and only world
that we can observe), and arguably also in classical systems with
strong chaos.

I view backward causation (retrocausation) as a special case of
downward causation. If it is simple enough (e.g. an elementary event
in the future causes the outcome of an elementary event in the past),
then we can describe backward causation as efficient causation working
backward in time. Otherwise, all times get mixed up in Davies'
"subtle" new physics.

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 4:37 AM Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

> In other words, if the microphysical laws say that A can be followed
by either B or C (without specifying which one), then other physical
laws can choose whether it is B or C without violating the
microphysical laws.

If situation A always produces C and situation B also always produces C but A and B are not the same because A+A=A but B+B=A then things are 100% deterministic but they are not reversible, the cellular automation LIFE is like that. 

> then other physical aws can choose whether it is B or C without violating the microphysical laws.

If there is a physical law that we just haven't discovered yet, if there is a reason a system chooses to be in one state rather than another, then things are deterministic, otherwise they're random. There is no way of outrunning that simple fact. 

> This (that the microphysical lays leave the evolution of a system
under-determined) is true in quantum mechanics (even in Everett's
quantum mechanics if we limit our analysis to the one and only world
that we can observe),

Yes but even Everett with his many worlds can't explain what "free will" is supposed to mean, much less determine if human beings have that property or not, I don't believe anybody can do that or ever will because "free will" doesn't mean anything . 

 

> and arguably also in classical systems with strong chaos.

As for classical physics and the chaos it sometimes produces when we try to make long term predictions about large complex things, the reason for that is that precision can be important but we can't observe things with infinite precision and we can't calculate with numbers that have infinite digits.  

John K Clark

 

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 7:29 PM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think in terms of emergent processes. In superconductivity there is a quantum correlation between electrons, but largely the transport of electrons on that level of description is just a Luttinger theory. However, the emergent Cooper pair has properties that are bosonic. This is a sort of emergent process.

Both superconductivity and wetness share that property, a single electron all by itself can't be superconductive, and a single molecule of H2O all by itself can't be wet, but if you stick enough of them together you've got the Pacific Ocean which is quite wet. 

John K Clark  

 

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 10:53 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> Any way, long story short, causality is an illusion,

I'm not sure what you mean by "illusion", we use causality to ensure that the bridges we build don't collapse, I can't think of anything more concrete, more non-illusionary than that. 

  

> all possible futures for any possible observer, entail the very same past. Therefore the past is a function of the future and not the other way around. If you would imagine your place on the Everett tree. 

 

Well yes, the world where I got a D in high school in that English literature test about Geoffrey Chaucer is a function of the world of today, but today, even if I study hard and become an expert on Chaucer, that world will also be a function of the world where I got a D on that test. There are lots and lots of worlds on the Everett branching tree that are consistent with, and in that sense a function of, me getting a D on that test so long ago; thus studying now will not improve the grade I got then. If Everett is right then there is also a world where I got an A + on that test, but that is not a world I remember so that is not the person I was, I was the person who got the D.

 

> If you would imagine your place on the Everett tree.  I can't by analysis tell you what twig you will be on tomorrow based what branch you are on today, but I can tell you what limb you were on yesterday based on the branch you are one today.

I agree with that.  

John K Clark

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 20 Aug 2022 at 18:37, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

In other words, if the microphysical laws say that A can be followed
by either B or C (without specifying which one), then other physical
laws can choose whether it is B or C without violating the
microphysical laws. The evolution of A can still be explained by the
low level rules of microphysics (in the sense of not being
inconsistent with them), but not without adding other physical laws,
which would be laws of downward causation.

It would still look like magic if the postulated downward causation resulted in a significant deviation from the probabilistic calculations.

This (that the microphysical lays leave the evolution of a system
under-determined) is true in quantum mechanics (even in Everett's
quantum mechanics if we limit our analysis to the one and only world
that we can observe), and arguably also in classical systems with
strong chaos.

I view backward causation (retrocausation) as a special case of
downward causation. If it is simple enough (e.g. an elementary event
in the future causes the outcome of an elementary event in the past),
then we can describe backward causation as efficient causation working
backward in time. Otherwise, all times get mixed up in Davies'
"subtle" new physics.


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Stathis Papaioannou

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 4:45 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 10:53 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> Any way, long story short, causality is an illusion,

I'm not sure what you mean by "illusion", we use causality to ensure that the bridges we build don't collapse, I can't think of anything more concrete, more non-illusionary than that. 

All I mean is that when one geometrizes space-time as GR has then causality seems to give way to the shape of things. If you had to blindly grope your way along an elephant head on, you might be inclined to believe that the trunk somehow caused the tail when in reality, that is just the shape of the elephant.

 

  

> all possible futures for any possible observer, entail the very same past. Therefore the past is a function of the future and not the other way around. If you would imagine your place on the Everett tree. 

 

Well yes, the world where I got a D in high school in that English literature test about Geoffrey Chaucer is a function of the world of today, but today, even if I study hard and become an expert on Chaucer, that world will also be a function of the world where I got a D on that test. There are lots and lots of worlds on the Everett branching tree that are consistent with, and in that sense a function of, me getting a D on that test so long ago; thus studying now will not improve the grade I got then. If Everett is right then there is also a world where I got an A + on that test, but that is not a world I remember so that is not the person I was, I was the person who got the D.

 

> If you would imagine your place on the Everett tree.  I can't by analysis tell you what twig you will be on tomorrow based what branch you are on today, but I can tell you what limb you were on yesterday based on the branch you are on today.

I agree with that.  

John K Clark

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[Giulio Prisco]

John says:

<If there is a physical law that we just haven't discovered yet, if
there is a reason a system chooses to be in one state rather than

another, then things are deterministic...>

Yes, this seems right. Downward causation is not incompatible with
determinism - on the contrary, if microphysical laws leave the
evolution of the universe under-determined, you need downward
causation to restore determinism.

The only exception that I can see is that there could be an infinite
layers of downward causation. Like, if the laws in layer A leave the
evolution of the universe under-determined, you add the laws in layer
B, but A+B still leave the evolution of the universe under-determined,
so you add the laws in layer C... and so forth up to infinite layers.
The laws in the layers up to any finite order are not deterministic,
and you only have determinism in the unattainable infinite limit.
Actually, I suspect something like this could be the case indeed.

<..."free will" doesn't mean anything .>

Well, free will is THE most basic fact I know about reality. Science
should help make sense of facts, not deny their reality. That's why I
keep searching for scientific models of reality that are compatible
with free will.

<we can't observe things with infinite precision and we can't
calculate with numbers that have infinite digits.>

YES, right, and you should have put this in all capitals and boldface!
See this post in my old website:
https://turingchurch.net/time-is-real-real-numbers-are-not-nicolas-gisin-10e91a65ba28

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[Giulio Prisco]

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 11:04 PM Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> This article highlights a new concept called "causal emergence", proposed by Erik Hoel, that is a candidate for that kind of downward causation.
>

Erik's "macro beats micro" approach is very interesting indeed. I
think he is writing a book about this. What isn't clear to me is
whether causal emergence can be "explained" with known physics (or
with physics of the known kind) or requires a radical reappraisal of
the nature of physical law. I asked Erik but he doesn't seem ready to
answer yet.

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 21 Aug 2022 at 00:39, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

John says:

<If there is a physical law that we just haven't discovered yet, if
there is a reason a system chooses to be in one state rather than
another, then things are deterministic...>

Yes, this seems right. Downward causation is not incompatible with
determinism - on the contrary, if microphysical laws leave the
evolution of the universe under-determined, you need downward
causation to restore determinism.

The only exception that I can see is that there could be an infinite
layers of downward causation. Like, if the laws in layer A leave the
evolution of the universe under-determined, you add the laws in layer
B, but A+B still leave the evolution of the universe under-determined,
so you add the laws in layer C... and so forth up to infinite layers.
The laws in the layers up to any finite order are not deterministic,
and you only have determinism in the unattainable infinite limit.
Actually, I suspect something like this could be the case indeed.

<..."free will" doesn't mean anything .>

Well, free will is THE most basic fact I know about reality. Science
should help make sense of facts, not deny their reality. That's why I
keep searching for scientific models of reality that are compatible
with free will.

Compatibilist free will is trivially obvious and consistent with most scientific models of reality.

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Stathis Papaioannou

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 10:39 AM Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

> >..."free will" doesn't mean anything .>

>Well, free will is THE most basic fact I know about reality. Science should help make sense of facts, not deny their reality.

If you tell me what "free will" means then I'll be able to tell you if I agree or disagree with that, but I'll need more than just a synonym for the words "free" and "will" to do that.  

> there could be an infinitelayers of downward causation. Like, if the laws in layer A leave the

evolution of the universe under-determined, you add the laws in layer
B, but A+B still leave the evolution of the universe under-determined,
so you add the laws in layer C... and so forth up to infinite layers.
The laws in the layers up to any finite order are not deterministic,
and you only have determinism in the unattainable infinite limit.
Actually, I suspect something like this could be the case indeed.

I don't have a problem with any of that in fact it might even turn out to be true, but it still doesn't tell me what "free will" is supposed to mean, much less tell me if humans have it or not, whatever "it" is.

John K Clark

[Lawrence Crowell]

The transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics gets into that. It holds to the Feynman-Wheeler absorber theory. I am not that keen on it to be honest. Then you flip to the many worlds interpretation. This tends to lean on the fact that while quantum mechanics is causal and deterministic, there is a phenomenological reporting of just one amplitude in a measurement or decoherent collapse.

LC

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[Giulio Prisco]

My definition of free will is work in progress. At this moment, it
goes more or less like this:

Free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not
entirely determined by the rest of the universe. A somewhat weaker
definition is that free will is the ability of an agent to make
choices that are not entirely determined by the part of the universe
in the past light cone of the agent. The two definitions are
equivalent or different depending on one's interpretation of known
fundamental physics.

Perhaps free will is in one of the high levels of downward causation,
in the sense that a free agent is part of whatever makes free choices,
and gives an input.

See also:
More thoughts on determinism and free will
Being or becoming, determinism or nondeterminism, predestination or
free will? Or are both valid descriptions of reality?
https://www.turingchurch.com/p/more-thoughts-on-determinism-and

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[Giulio Prisco]

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 5:45 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, 21 Aug 2022 at 00:39, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> John says:
>>
>> <If there is a physical law that we just haven't discovered yet, if
>> there is a reason a system chooses to be in one state rather than
>> another, then things are deterministic...>
>>
>> Yes, this seems right. Downward causation is not incompatible with
>> determinism - on the contrary, if microphysical laws leave the
>> evolution of the universe under-determined, you need downward
>> causation to restore determinism.
>>
>> The only exception that I can see is that there could be an infinite
>> layers of downward causation. Like, if the laws in layer A leave the
>> evolution of the universe under-determined, you add the laws in layer
>> B, but A+B still leave the evolution of the universe under-determined,
>> so you add the laws in layer C... and so forth up to infinite layers.
>> The laws in the layers up to any finite order are not deterministic,
>> and you only have determinism in the unattainable infinite limit.
>> Actually, I suspect something like this could be the case indeed.
>>
>> <..."free will" doesn't mean anything .>
>>
>> Well, free will is THE most basic fact I know about reality. Science
>> should help make sense of facts, not deny their reality. That's why I
>> keep searching for scientific models of reality that are compatible
>> with free will.
>
>
> Compatibilist free will is trivially obvious and consistent with most scientific models of reality.
>

Here I tend to agree with Hossenfelder: no amount of sophistry can
change the fact that free will is ruled out by determinism.

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 21 Aug 2022 at 16:45, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 6:44 PM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 10:39 AM Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> > >..."free will" doesn't mean anything .>
>>
>>
>> >Well, free will is THE most basic fact I know about reality. Science should help make sense of facts, not deny their reality.
>
>
> If you tell me what "free will" means then I'll be able to tell you if I agree or disagree with that, but I'll need more than just a synonym for the words "free" and "will" to do that.
>
>> > there could be an infinitelayers of downward causation. Like, if the laws in layer A leave the
>> evolution of the universe under-determined, you add the laws in layer
>> B, but A+B still leave the evolution of the universe under-determined,
>> so you add the laws in layer C... and so forth up to infinite layers.
>> The laws in the layers up to any finite order are not deterministic,
>> and you only have determinism in the unattainable infinite limit.
>> Actually, I suspect something like this could be the case indeed.
>
>
> I don't have a problem with any of that in fact it might even turn out to be true, but it still doesn't tell me what "free will" is supposed to mean, much less tell me if humans have it or not, whatever "it" is.
>
> John K Clark

My definition of free will is work in progress. At this moment, it
goes more or less like this:

Free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not
entirely determined by the rest of the universe. A somewhat weaker
definition is that free will is the ability of an agent to make
choices that are not entirely determined by the part of the universe
in the past light cone of the agent. The two definitions are
equivalent or different depending on one's interpretation of known
fundamental physics.

An agent that was alone in the universe would make choices that were not at all determined by anything else in the universe, but still would not have libertarian free will if the choices were determined by prior states of the agent. The only way to have libertarian free will would be if the choices were undetermined. However, if the choices were undetermined they could not be determined by the agent’s preferences, values, knowledge of the world or anything else. This is not consistent with most people’s (including most libertarians’) view of freedom. The only way (that makes sense) that libertarian philosophers have been able to get around this has been to say that the agent’s choices are probabilistic. However, the further probabilistic choices deviate from the deterministic case, the greater the hit to purposefulness. It’s the deterministic component that allows purpose and responsibility, the very opposite of the incompatibilist position.

Perhaps free will is in one of the high levels of downward causation,
in the sense that a free agent is part of whatever makes free choices,
and gives an input.

See also:
More thoughts on determinism and free will
Being or becoming, determinism or nondeterminism, predestination or
free will? Or are both valid descriptions of reality?
https://www.turingchurch.com/p/more-thoughts-on-determinism-and

>
>>
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Stathis Papaioannou

[Giulio Prisco]

Right. Let me think of how to reword my first definition. I'll submit
a revised wording later. My second definition is OK, because the part
of the universe in the past light cone of the agent includes the

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[Giulio Prisco]

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 2:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, 20 Aug 2022 at 18:37, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> In other words, if the microphysical laws say that A can be followed
>> by either B or C (without specifying which one), then other physical
>> laws can choose whether it is B or C without violating the
>> microphysical laws. The evolution of A can still be explained by the
>> low level rules of microphysics (in the sense of not being
>> inconsistent with them), but not without adding other physical laws,
>> which would be laws of downward causation.
>
>
> It would still look like magic if the postulated downward causation resulted in a significant deviation from the probabilistic calculations.
>

I think the keyword here is "significant." If downward causation is
not inconsistent with the laws of microphysics, then the deviation is
not significant. But there's a lot that can be done with small
imperceptible tweaks all overs pace and time. Think of random quantum
events amplified to the macroscopic scale.

>> This (that the microphysical lays leave the evolution of a system
>> under-determined) is true in quantum mechanics (even in Everett's
>> quantum mechanics if we limit our analysis to the one and only world
>> that we can observe), and arguably also in classical systems with
>> strong chaos.
>>
>> I view backward causation (retrocausation) as a special case of
>> downward causation. If it is simple enough (e.g. an elementary event
>> in the future causes the outcome of an elementary event in the past),
>> then we can describe backward causation as efficient causation working
>> backward in time. Otherwise, all times get mixed up in Davies'
>> "subtle" new physics.
>>
>>
>> >
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>
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> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 21 Aug 2022 at 18:37, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 2:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, 20 Aug 2022 at 18:37, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> In other words, if the microphysical laws say that A can be followed
>> by either B or C (without specifying which one), then other physical
>> laws can choose whether it is B or C without violating the
>> microphysical laws. The evolution of A can still be explained by the
>> low level rules of microphysics (in the sense of not being
>> inconsistent with them), but not without adding other physical laws,
>> which would be laws of downward causation.
>
>
> It would still look like magic if the postulated downward causation resulted in a significant deviation from the probabilistic calculations.
>

I think the keyword here is "significant." If downward causation is
not inconsistent with the laws of microphysics, then the deviation is
not significant. But there's a lot that can be done with small
imperceptible tweaks all overs pace and time. Think of random quantum
events amplified to the macroscopic scale.

Quantum effects are tiny but can be readily shown to exist experimentally. It is a major part of the job description of experimental physicists to find such small effects. If something like this were discovered in the brain it would be revolutionary. However, what motivation is there to even theorise about such a thing when all human behaviour can be better explained deterministically?

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Stathis Papaioannou

[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 21, 2022 at 2:45 AM Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

> My definition of free will is work in progress. At this moment, it
goes more or less like this:Free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not
entirely determined by the rest of the universe. A somewhat weaker
definition is that free will is the ability of an agent to make
choices that are not entirely determined by the part of the universe
in the past light cone of the agent.

A "choice" is a decision reached after a consideration, if you were considering there must be something you're thinking about and whatever it was was the reason for your choice and thus, although it may not necessarily be the correct choice, it was a reasonable choice, it was determined by cause and effect. But if you did what you did for no reason, that is to say if it was random, then your action was unreasonable and nobody, including yourself, will ever know why you did it because there is no reason why you did it.

> Perhaps free will is in one of the high levels of downward causation, in the sense that a free agent is part of whatever makes free choices, and gives an input.

There is no evidence downward causation exists but for the purposes of this discussion it doesn't matter if it does or does not; it doesn't matter if the reason, if the cause, comes from the past or the future because in either case it would still be true that you either did what you did for a reason or you did what you did for no reason. So I still don't know what "free will" means.

And very often we are unable to do what we want to do, and sometimes we can't because we aren't smart enough to find the correct reason to make a reasonable choice. For example, every physicist before Einstein would've loved to find a new theory that revolutionized the field, but we had to wait for someone smart enough to find a reason strong enough to make a reasonable argument in support of his theory. And why was Einstein so smart? There are only 4 possibilities: his genes, his environment, a combination of the 2, or there was no reason, no cause at all and he was smart simply because of a random fluctuation in the atoms in his brain. 

John K Clark

[Giulio Prisco]

<But if you did what you did for no reason, that is to say if it was random...>

Not random. I'm speculating that I (this agent with free will) am part
of whatever makes the choice (call it Mind at Large if you like, or
call it God if you like) and therefore I have some (perhaps small)
input in the choice.

<And why was Einstein so smart? There are only 4 possibilities: his
genes, his environment, a combination of the 2, or there was no
reason, no cause at all and he was smart simply because of a random
fluctuation in the atoms in his brain.>

To me, intelligence is like physical strength, so I have no problem
believing that Einstein was smart "for no reason" and Usain Bolt was
fast "for no reason." But I think Einstein and Bolt, and you and me,
are connected to a source of existential freedom.

>
>
>>
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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 22 Aug 2022 at 17:50, Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sun, Aug 21, 2022 at 1:52 PM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Aug 21, 2022 at 2:45 AM Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> > My definition of free will is work in progress. At this moment, it
>> goes more or less like this:Free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not
>> entirely determined by the rest of the universe. A somewhat weaker
>> definition is that free will is the ability of an agent to make
>> choices that are not entirely determined by the part of the universe
>> in the past light cone of the agent.
>
>
> A "choice" is a decision reached after a consideration, if you were considering there must be something you're thinking about and whatever it was was the reason for your choice and thus, although it may not necessarily be the correct choice, it was a reasonable choice, it was determined by cause and effect. But if you did what you did for no reason, that is to say if it was random, then your action was unreasonable and nobody, including yourself, will ever know why you did it because there is no reason why you did it.
>
>
>> > Perhaps free will is in one of the high levels of downward causation, in the sense that a free agent is part of whatever makes free choices, and gives an input.
>
>
> There is no evidence downward causation exists but for the purposes of this discussion it doesn't matter if it does or does not; it doesn't matter if the reason, if the cause, comes from the past or the future because in either case it would still be true that you either did what you did for a reason or you did what you did for no reason. So I still don't know what "free will" means.
>
> And very often we are unable to do what we want to do, and sometimes we can't because we aren't smart enough to find the correct reason to make a reasonable choice. For example, every physicist before Einstein would've loved to find a new theory that revolutionized the field, but we had to wait for someone smart enough to find a reason strong enough to make a reasonable argument in support of his theory. And why was Einstein so smart? There are only 4 possibilities: his genes, his environment, a combination of the 2, or there was no reason, no cause at all and he was smart simply because of a random fluctuation in the atoms in his brain.
>
> John K Clark
>

<But if you did what you did for no reason, that is to say if it was random...>

Not random. I'm speculating that I (this agent with free will) am part
of whatever makes the choice (call it Mind at Large if you like, or
call it God if you like) and therefore I have some (perhaps small)
input in the choice.

Then your choice is determined. If you prefer A to B and can think of no reason to choose B, you will always choose A. That is a determined choice. Otherwise, you would under the same circumstances sometimes choose A and sometimes B. In that case you would have no control over the choice and all you could do would be to hope for the best.

<And why was Einstein so smart? There are only 4 possibilities: his
genes, his environment, a combination of the 2, or there was no
reason, no cause at all and he was smart simply because of a random
fluctuation in the atoms in his brain.>

To me, intelligence is like physical strength, so I have no problem
believing that Einstein was smart "for no reason" and Usain Bolt was
fast "for no reason." But I think Einstein and Bolt, and you and me,
are connected to a source of existential freedom.

>
>
>>
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Stathis Papaioannou

[John Clark]

On Mon, Aug 22, 2022 at 3:50 AM Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Giulio

>> if you did what you did for no reason, that is to say if it was random...

 

> Not random. I'm speculating that I (this agent with free will) am part
of whatever makes the choice (call it Mind at Large if you like, or
call it God if you like)

This thing called "God" cannot help because if He exists He is in the exact same situation that we are in, He does what He does for a reason, in which case He is a cuckoo clock, or He does what he does for no reason in which case He is a slot machine, or if you want to be more classy a roulette wheel. If God makes a consideration before He makes a choice (and if He doesn't then it's not a choice) then there must be something He is considering and whatever it is that He's thinking about is the reason, the cause, of Him acting the way he did.  

> and therefore I have some (perhaps small) input in the choice.

And there was either a reason you chose to make that particular small input rather than another one, in which case your choice was reasonable, or you had no reason for making that particular small input and your input was unreasonable and, because the very definition of "random" is an effect without a cause, your input was just random noise to God. 

John K Clark

[Stuart LaForge]

I don't think that Cramer's interpretation is incompatible with Everett's when both are simultaneously viewed through the lens of general relativity. Also I don't think MWI needs to lean on anything because nothing truly collapses. When you measure a particle's position with near certainty, the particle is still in the mother of all superpositions when it comes to its momentum. If both position and momentum wave functions refer to the same particle, then  what exactly "collapses" except for your uncertainty about one variable in exchange for maximal ignorance or multiplicity of another variable?

Another example would be how after measuring the linear polarization of light, it can still be decomposed into the superposition of x and y polarization states. The wave function doesn't collapse, it just shifts superposition and uncertainty to complementary variables. We become entangled with the states that we measure; the Universal Wave Function never collapses. The various versions of you are always in superposition dancing to the quantum music that only they can hear because they are in phase with it. Even the you that performs a measurement is never wholly in one universe or another. This is especially true for other observers until you become Wigner's friend to them.

Stuart LaForge

[Giulio Prisco]

Engineers often simulate physical systems using computational optimization methods. A common strategy used to avoid getting stuck in a local optimum that is not the global optimum is to give the simulation a random push now and then, to kick it out of a local optimum and let it continue searching for a better one. These methods work if the pseudorandom numbers used to generate the fluctuations are as random as possible - in fact current methods often use random sequences from physical sources e.g. radioactive decay.

So in some cases allowing randomness is the best (the most reasonable) strategy to achieve a goal. Random events that seem to have no reason are actually instrumental to achieve a perfectly reasonable goal, which wouldn't be achieved otherwise.

We have been smart enough to find these optimization strategies, but the universe (or God) is smarter than us. So I think these tricks must be embedded in fundamental physical laws.

Changing subjects, I have been thinking of my previous definition of free will (a few comments above this):

Free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not entirely determined by the rest of the universe. A somewhat weaker definition is that free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not entirely determined by the part of the universe in the past light cone of the agent.

I'm asking myself if I should abandon my first definition and keep only the second one.

In the first definition I refer to the whole of spacetime. But of course if something *has already* happened in the future, it must happen in the present.

So pending further reflections I'll keep this definition:

Free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not entirely determined by the part of the universe in the past light cone of the agent.

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[John Clark]

On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 12:21 AM Giulio Prisco <giu...@gmail.com> wrote:

> in some cases allowing randomness is the best (the most reasonable) strategy to achieve a goal.

Very true, but I don't think that fact will help much in determining what the term "free will" is supposed to mean nor in figuring out if human beings have that property or not.

> We have been smart enough to find these optimization strategies, but the universe (or God) is smarter than us. So I think these tricks must be embedded in fundamental physical laws.

Regardless of if randomness is used or not we know that in general there is no way to prove you have the most efficient algorithm to accomplish a given task, but if God is omniscient then he always knows what the most efficient algorithm is even if he can't prove it, (by"prove" I mean  He can't derive it from a finite number of axioms in a finite number of steps) he just knows it's true nevertheless. God might be omniscient but even He can't be omnipotent because that ultimately leads to paradox, the simplest being God making a rock so heavy He can't lift it.

> free will is the ability of an agent to make choices that are not entirely determined by the part of the universe in the past light cone of the agent.

If you use that definition then a neutron in the nucleus of a Carbon-14 atom has free will when it chooses to release an electron and turn into a neutron and thus transmute the Carbon-14 into Nitrogen-14.  Meaning needs contrast, so if everything has "free will" then that is equivalent to saying nothing does.

John K Clark

[Giulio Prisco]

Hi John,

<Very true, but I don't think that fact will help much in determining
what the term "free will" is supposed to mean nor in figuring out if
human beings have that property or not. >

It's a starting point. Assuming (as I do) that I have free will, I can
choose to make some decisions randomly (e.g. by tossing a coin).
Actually, I think optimization methods like simulated annealing also
work in life. Like, make one in ten important decisions by tossing a
coin to avoid remaining stuck in local optima that prevent you from
searching the global one.

<God might be omniscient but even He can't be omnipotent because that
ultimately leads to paradox, the simplest being God making a rock so
heavy He can't lift it.>

Yes. In fact I don't think of God as omniscient and omnipotent. But
even a finite God that knows and can do MUCH more than us would be so
much above us that "omniscient and omnipotent" would be a good
description. Omniscient and omnipotent compared to us, of course. In
pure abstract mathematics there are concepts of infinity, but in
practical engineering "infinite" means just VERY big.

<a neutron in the nucleus of a Carbon-14 atom has free will when it
chooses to release an electron>

I prefer to think that the universe has free will when it chooses to
induce the Carbon-14 to release an electron.

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[Stuart LaForge]

On Wednesday, August 24, 2022 at 7:23:03 AM UTC-7 giu...@gmail.com wrote:

Hi John ,

<Very true, but I don't think that fact will help much in determining
what the term "free will" is supposed to mean nor in figuring out if
human beings have that property or not. >

It's a starting point. Assuming (as I do) that I have free will, I can
choose to make some decisions randomly (e.g. by tossing a coin).
Actually, I think optimization methods like simulated annealing also
work in life. Like, make one in ten important decisions by tossing a
coin to avoid remaining stuck in local optima that prevent you from
searching the global one.

<God might be omniscient but even He can't be omnipotent because that
ultimately leads to paradox, the simplest being God making a rock so
heavy He can't lift it.>

Yes. In fact I don't think of God as omniscient and omnipotent. But
even a finite God that knows and can do MUCH more than us would be so
much above us that "omniscient and omnipotent" would be a good
description. Omniscient and omnipotent compared to us, of course. In
pure abstract mathematics there are concepts of infinity, but in
practical engineering "infinite" means just VERY big.

<a neutron in the nucleus of a Carbon-14 atom has free will when it
chooses to release an electron>

I prefer to think that the universe has free will when it chooses to
induce the Carbon-14 to release an electron.

What if it was the dharma of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? What if God was a duty, responsibility, or literal job of the most powerful being in your universe? Or do you think God is multiversal or transversal? 

Stuart LaForge

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 26, 2022 at 9:12 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> What if it [free will] was the dharma of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? 

Then the most powerful being in the universe is as deterministic as a cuckoo clock, all His actions are just a function of cosmic law; and if the term "free will" doesn't mean anything when applied to God then it will certainly not do any better when applied to human beings.  And of course it leaves open the question of why cosmic law is the way it is rather than some other way. Logically there are only 2 possibilities, cosmic law is the way it is for a reason, in which case it is reasonable and deterministic, or cosmic law is the way it is for no reason, in which case it is unreasonable and random.  

> What if God was a duty, responsibility, or literal job of the most powerful being in your universe?

Well among other things it would mean that God has nothing to do with morality, it's just that God, being perfect, always obeys cosmic law but human beings, being imperfect, sometimes do not. And if it's possible to disobey it then cosmic law is more like the law that you can't go faster than 60 miles an hour on the turnpike than the law that you can't travel faster than light. Perhaps "cosmic suggestion" would be a better name than "cosmic law".  

> Or do you think God is multiversal or transversal? 

I note that many people are perfectly willing to abandon the idea of God but are not willing to abandon the English word "G-O-D" so they define God in such a vague way He becomes little more than a blurry gray amorphous blob; and by that definition everybody believes in "God", even me, because everybody believes that blurry gray amorphous blobs exist; and for that reason that definition becomes completely useless. I define God in a way that is more consistent with the historic usage of the word as a being of infinite intelligence who created the universe, and the multiverse too if it exists.  And by that definition I do not believe "God" exists because there is no empirical evidence in favor of it and because the God hypothesis solves no scientific, philosophical, or logical problem.

John K Clark

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 4:27 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Aug 26, 2022 at 9:12 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> What if it [free will] was the dharma of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? 

Then the most powerful being in the universe is as deterministic as a cuckoo clock, all His actions are just a function of cosmic law; and if the term "free will" doesn't mean anything when applied to God then it will certainly not do any better when applied to human beings.  And of course it leaves open the question of why cosmic law is the way it is rather than some other way. Logically there are only 2 possibilities, cosmic law is the way it is for a reason, in which case it is reasonable and deterministic, or cosmic law is the way it is for no reason, in which case it is unreasonable and random.

Lol. The way you shoe-horned free will into my question that did not contain it must mean you really want to talk about it. Whether something is random or deterministic is often relative to an observer's time scale and state of knowledge. If you only glanced at a cuckoo clock intermittently every few years, the time it displayed to you would seem random. Similarly, if you pressed start and stop on a stopwatch, it is very difficult to predict what digit 0-9 would show in the 1/100th of a second place. Randomness is more often about ignorance and scale than it is about  non-determinism. On geologic time scales, cuckoo clocks would be as fleeting and random to a God-like being as virtual particles are to us. Similarly, if you had "neutrino vision" and could track neutrinos in real time, then random processes like radioactive decay would probably not seem random at all. Gods, girls, and other complex beings could be completely deterministic in their own reasoning but work in mysterious ways to others who don't understand their reasons. So maybe freewill exists because psi (mind-reading) does not?

 

> What if God was a duty, responsibility, or literal job of the most powerful being in your universe?

Well among other things it would mean that God has nothing to do with morality, it's just that God, being perfect, always obeys cosmic law but human beings, being imperfect, sometimes do not. And if it's possible to disobey it then cosmic law is more like the law that you can't go faster than 60 miles an hour on the turnpike than the law that you can't travel faster than light. Perhaps "cosmic suggestion" would be a better name than "cosmic law".

You seem to be stuck on a very Judeo-Christian concept of God as some perfectly moral, omniscient, and omnipotent being. Even taking the Bible as evidence does not warrant granting God any moral superiority. Since when is it a moral act to punish a head-of-state by killing the first-born children of an entire nation as the Judeo-Christian God did the pharaoh of Egypt? God's moral philosophy is that might makes right and even tigers understand that.

 

> Or do you think God is multiversal or transversal? 

I note that many people are perfectly willing to abandon the idea of God but are not willing to abandon the English word "G-O-D" so they define God in such a vague way He becomes little more than a blurry gray amorphous blob; and by that definition everybody believes in "God", even me, because everybody believes that blurry gray amorphous blobs exist; and for that reason that definition becomes completely useless. I define God in a way that is more consistent with the historic usage of the word as a being of infinite intelligence who created the universe, and the multiverse too if it exists.  And by that definition I do not believe "God" exists because there is no empirical evidence in favor of it and because the God hypothesis solves no scientific, philosophical, or logical problem.

The God hypothesis solves the problem of who sits at the top of all primate hierarchies.  It is God that kings, emperors, and dictators must answer to.

 

Stuart LaForge

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 9:33 AM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>>> What if it [free will] was the dharma of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? 

>> Then the most powerful being in the universe is as deterministic as a cuckoo clock, all His actions are just a function of cosmic law; and if the term "free will" doesn't mean anything when applied to God then it will certainly not do any better when applied to human beings.  And of course it leaves open the question of why cosmic law is the way it is rather than some other way. Logically there are only 2 possibilities, cosmic law is the way it is for a reason, in which case it is reasonable and deterministic, or cosmic law is the way it is for no reason, in which case it is unreasonable and random.

> Lol. The way you shoe-horned free will into my question that did not contain it must mean you really want to talk about it.

If the pronoun "it" that you used in your question did not refer to free will then what did "it" refer to? 

> Whether something is random or deterministic is often relative to an observer's time scale and state of knowledge.

But what is NOT relative to an observer's time scale and state of knowledge is the fact that everything, absolutely positively everything, happens because of cause-and-effect OR it does not happen because of cause-and-effect. One of those 2 things has got to be true, it's a cuckoo clock or a roulette wheel.

> If you only glanced at a cuckoo clock intermittently every few years, the time it displayed to you would seem random.

Yes, people make mistakes including me, so if I was wrong when I said the clock was random and thus acted the way it did for no reason then that must mean it acted the way it did for a reason and so is deterministic.  It's always cuckoo clock or roulette wheel.

> Randomness is more often about ignorance and scale than it is about  non-determinism.

Not, at least as far as anybody knows, if you're talking about the decay of a Carbon-14 atom. But I don't understand why you're trying so hard to completely eliminate randomness because even if successful it would not help you one bit in providing a meaning to the term "free will" that even approximately made sense. If randomness were out of the picture then you could simply say that everything happens deterministically, and so you could say everything has free will or, if you prefer, you could say nothing has free will; this is because meaning needs contrast and free will would have none, and the only time X is logically equivalent to not X is when X is gibberish. "Free Will" is gibberish, it's not even wrong.

 >So maybe freewill exists because psi (mind-reading) does not?

I don't understand the question.  

> You seem to be stuck on a very Judeo-Christian concept of God as some perfectly moral, omniscient, and omnipotent being.

You seem to be stuck on the English word G-O-D but care much less about the idea of God. As I said before, if God is a vague amorphous gray blob then I believe in God, but that statement tells you absolutely nothing about me because everybody believes in vague amorphous gray blobs.

> The God hypothesis solves the problem of who sits at the top of all primate hierarchies. 

The answer to that question is the most advanced primate, and you don't need the God hypothesis to answer it.  

John K Clark

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 7:44 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 9:33 AM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>>> What if it [free will] was the dharma of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? 

>> Then the most powerful being in the universe is as deterministic as a cuckoo clock, all His actions are just a function of cosmic law; and if the term "free will" doesn't mean anything when applied to God then it will certainly not do any better when applied to human beings.  And of course it leaves open the question of why cosmic law is the way it is rather than some other way. Logically there are only 2 possibilities, cosmic law is the way it is for a reason, in which case it is reasonable and deterministic, or cosmic law is the way it is for no reason, in which case it is unreasonable and random.

> Lol. The way you shoe-horned free will into my question that did not contain it must mean you really want to talk about it.

If the pronoun "it" that you used in your question did not refer to free will then what did "it" refer to?

"It" referred to the dharma of "speaking for the universe". I might have mistakenly assumed you were more familiar with eastern religions than you appear to be.

 

> Whether something is random or deterministic is often relative to an observer's time scale and state of knowledge.

But what is NOT relative to an observer's time scale and state of knowledge is the fact that everything, absolutely positively everything, happens because of cause-and-effect OR it does not happen because of cause-and-effect. One of those 2 things has got to be true, it's a cuckoo clock or a roulette wheel.

I am not disagreeing with this. I am saying that people are more like cuckoo clocks than roulette wheels and what causes them to do things is free will. Which part of free will do you object to, the freedom or the agency?

 

> Randomness is more often about ignorance and scale than it is about  non-determinism.

Not, at least as far as anybody knows, if you're talking about the decay of a Carbon-14 atom. But I don't understand why you're trying so hard to completely eliminate randomness because even if successful it would not help you one bit in providing a meaning to the term "free will" that even approximately made sense. If randomness were out of the picture then you could simply say that everything happens deterministically, and so you could say everything has free will or, if you prefer, you could say nothing has free will;

Not everything is capable of making choices so, obviously not everything has free will. Stathis would say I am simply stating a compatibilist viewpoint but I don't see how determinism would rule out free will. 

 

this is because meaning needs contrast and free will would have none, and the only time X is logically equivalent to not X is when X is gibberish. "Free Will" is gibberish, it's not even wrong.

I tried to give you contrast but you didn't get it. Telepathy and technological mind probes are the opposite of free will. Once some entity can completely predict your actions, your will is no longer free, because that entity can control you.

 

 >So maybe freewill exists because psi (mind-reading) does not?

I don't understand the question.

I am saying that the ability to read minds takes away the free will of the mind that is read. And free will exists because the ability to read minds does not ... yet.

Stuart LaForge

 

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[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 12:05 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

 >What if it [free will] was the dharma of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? 

If the pronoun "it" that you used in your question did not refer to free will then what did "it" refer to?

> "It" referred to the dharma of "speaking for the universe". I might have mistakenly assumed you were more familiar with eastern religions than you appear to be.

Then your question was: what if speaking for the universe was the speaking for the universe of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? And I don't understand your question. 

>> what is NOT relative to an observer's time scale and state of knowledge is the fact that everything, absolutely positively everything, happens because of cause-and-effect OR it does not happen because of cause-and-effect. One of those 2 things has got to be true, it's a cuckoo clock or a roulette wheel.

> I am not disagreeing with this.

Glad to hear it.  

> I am saying that people are more like cuckoo clocks than roulette wheels

Just more like? Other than vastly increased complexity how are humans different from cuckoo clocks?  If it's that a little randomness in a mostly deterministic mechanism is the secret sauce that produces this thing you call "free will" then does a cuckoo clock with an attachment that gently hits the clock's pendulum with a tiny hammer at times determined by the decay of Carbon-14 have free will? 

> and what causes them to do things is free will.

If you could give me a concrete example of something that does NOT have free will then I might have a better idea of what you mean by "free will. And I can understand why you call it "will" but if X always turns into Y because of Z then what is "free" about it?

 

> Which part of free will do you object to, the freedom or the agency?

What I object to is the part of the term "free will" that is gibberish, and that is virtually all of it.  

>  obviously not everything has free will.

That is far from obvious to me, but then I don't know what the hell "free will" means so an example would be nice.  

>  I don't see how determinism would rule out free will. 

I don't either because to me "free will" is just a sequence of ASCII characters.

 

>> meaning needs contrast and free will would have none, and the only time X is logically equivalent to not X is when X is gibberish. "Free Will" is gibberish, it's not even wrong.

> I tried to give you contrast but you didn't get it.

I sure didn't.  

> Telepathy and technological mind probes are the opposite of free will.

And I still don't get it. If I learned that you wanted to do something that I didn't want you to do and were just about to do it but I physically restrained you from doing so then what difference does it make if I learned that information from mind reading, or from a manuscript you had written and hidden but I had found, or I learned it from a friend you told the secret to, or I learned it in some other way?  

> Once some entity can completely predict your actions, your will is no longer free, because that entity can control you.

As I've mentioned before, something can be as deterministic as a cuckoo clock but not be predictable. It would only take a few lines of code to program the computer you're using right now to find the first even number greater than two that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then stop, but nobody can predict what your computer would do when it's in that configuration, nobody can predict when it will stop all they can do is watch it and see, and they might need to watch it forever.  

John K Clark

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 10:19 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 12:05 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

 >What if it [free will] was the dharma of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? 

If the pronoun "it" that you used in your question did not refer to free will then what did "it" refer to?

> "It" referred to the dharma of "speaking for the universe". I might have mistakenly assumed you were more familiar with eastern religions than you appear to be.

Then your question was: what if speaking for the universe was the speaking for the universe of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe? And I don't understand your question.

Allow me to translate the foreign word that is giving you so much trouble. "What if it is the [sacred duty] of the of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe?"

>> what is NOT relative to an observer's time scale and state of knowledge is the fact that everything, absolutely positively everything, happens because of cause-and-effect OR it does not happen because of cause-and-effect. One of those 2 things has got to be true, it's a cuckoo clock or a roulette wheel.

> I am not disagreeing with this.

Glad to hear it.  

> I am saying that people are more like cuckoo clocks than roulette wheels

Just more like? Other than vastly increased complexity how are humans different from cuckoo clocks?  If it's that a little randomness in a mostly deterministic mechanism is the secret sauce that produces this thing you call "free will" then does a cuckoo clock with an attachment that gently hits the clock's pendulum with a tiny hammer at times determined by the decay of Carbon-14 have free will?

No, because free will is compatible with 100% determinism or even super-determinism if one restricts oneself to a single Everett branch. For the reason of deterministic chaos that you reference, secret sauce is unnecessary. That being said, it would certainly taste more interesting with the sauce.

 

> and what causes them to do things is free will.

If you could give me a concrete example of something that does NOT have free will then I might have a better idea of what you mean by "free will. And I can understand why you call it "will" but if X always turns into Y because of Z then what is "free" about it?

You just gave yourself a perfect example. Concrete is a concrete example of something that does not have free will. Sidewalks do not make decisions, therefore they do not have free will. What makes it free is that it was your private decision that Y should follow X instead of Z while in my own mind I could decree that Z should always turn into Y which should always turn into X. That you cannot force me to accept that alphabetical order is better than reverse-alphabetical order is what is free about it. We are in effect, cuckoo clocks that build ourselves; a constant work in progress.  

 

 

> Which part of free will do you object to, the freedom or the agency?

What I object to is the part of the term "free will" that is gibberish, and that is virtually all of it.  

>  obviously not everything has free will.

That is far from obvious to me, but then I don't know what the hell "free will" means so an example would be nice.

Contemporary Californians still have plenty of free will. 18th century Virginia plantation slaves would have had considerably less free will unless they managed to succefully escape to the northern states or Mexico. Ravens might have more or less free will than dogs. And rocks and toilet seats have no free will at all. Are those enough examples or do you want more?

> Telepathy and technological mind probes are the opposite of free will.

And I still don't get it. If I learned that you wanted to do something that I didn't want you to do and were just about to do it but I physically restrained you from doing so then what difference does it make if I learned that information from mind reading, or from a manuscript you had written and hidden but I had found, or I learned it from a friend you told the secret to, or I learned it in some other way?

Well mind-reading would be more efficient than any of those other options, and thus allow you to control entire populations instead of individuals.Other than that there is no difference really. The Spanish Inquisition could take away somebody's free will with their crude methods, but a telepath could do it easier. 

 

> Once some entity can completely predict your actions, your will is no longer free, because that entity can control you.

As I've mentioned before, something can be as deterministic as a cuckoo clock but not be predictable. It would only take a few lines of code to program the computer you're using right now to find the first even number greater than two that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then stop, but nobody can predict what your computer would do when it's in that configuration, nobody can predict when it will stop all they can do is watch it and see, and they might need to watch it forever.  

I can predict when it will stop. It will stop when I press Ctrl-Z, because I freely choose, exercising my free will, to use my computer for some purpose other than chasing the Goldbach conjecture.

Stuart LaForge

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 27, 2022 at 2:49 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> Allow me to translate the foreign word that is giving you so much trouble. "What if it is the [sacred duty] of the of the most powerful being in a universe to speak for that universe?"

OK, at least the question makes sense now, but either there is a reason one should perform his "sacred duty", in which case it is reasonable and deterministic, or there is no reason one should perform his "sacred duty", in which case it is random and unreasonable. And God has nothing to do with morality, it's just that God, being perfect, always obeys his "sacred duty" but human beings, being imperfect, sometimes do not. So human beings could do things that God cannot, because sacred duty is not a law of nature it's just a suggestion, although it is not at all clear who is doing this suggesting. Mega-God? Turtles all the way up?

>>does a cuckoo clock with an attachment that gently hits the clock's pendulum with a tiny hammer at times determined by the decay of Carbon-14 have free will?

> No, because free will is compatible with 100% determinism or even super-determinism if one restricts oneself to a single Everett branch.

If I knew what "free will" means then I'd be able to tell you if I agree with the above or not, but as it is I have no opinion about it. It's interesting that we are five or six posts into a discussion about whether humans have "free will" or not and yet nobody seems to know what the hell "free will" means. Call me crazy but I tend to think it is often more fruitful to agree on what a term means before debating if that term is appropriate to use when describing X.

> For the reason of deterministic chaos that you reference, secret sauce is unnecessary.

 The decay of Carbon-14 is NOT an example of deterministic chaos.

 

>> If you could give me a concrete example of something that does NOT have free will then I might have a better idea of what you mean by "free will. And I can understand why you call it "will" but if X always turns into Y because of Z then what is "free" about it?

> You just gave yourself a perfect example. Concrete is a concrete example of something that does not have free will. Sidewalks do not make decisions,

Sure they do, sometimes concrete sidewalks decide to crack and sometimes they decide not to crack. And sometimes concrete sidewalks decide to chip and sometimes they decide not to chip. And, there being no evidence to the contrary, maybe sometimes concrete sidewalks consciously decide to have deep thoughts and sometimes concrete sidewalks decide not to; but I strongly doubt it because I believe consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of intelligent behavior, and concrete sidewalks most certainly do not behave intelligently. Although I can't prove it, I think concrete sidewalks are no more conscious than human beings are when they are sleeping or under anesthesia or dead because when they are in those conditions they do not behave intelligently.  One thing is certain, concrete sidewalks change over time and there was either a reason for that change, in which case it was deterministic and reasonable, or there was no reason for that change in which case it was random and unreasonable.

 

 > What makes it free is that it was your private decision that Y should follow X instead of Z

That does not help because there was either a reason for your decision or there was no reason for your decision. It always comes back to cuckoo clock or roulette wheel. 

 

> while in my own mind I could decree that Z should always turn into Y which should always turn into X.

There was either a reason you didn't make an alternative choice or there was no reason you didn't make an alternative choice.  It always comes back to cuckoo clock or roulette wheel. 

> Contemporary Californians still have plenty of free will. 18th century Virginia plantation slaves would have had considerably less free will unless they managed to succefully escape to the northern states or Mexico.

Slaves had a more restricted range of possible actions than non-slaves, but even 18th century Virginia slave owners couldn't do everything they wanted to do, they may have wanted to jump over a mountain but they were not free to do so. Nobody is omnipotent.

 

> Ravens might have more or less free will than dogs. And rocks and toilet seats have no free will at all. Are those enough examples or do you want more?

I don't want more examples I want better examples.  

>> I still don't get it. If I learned that you wanted to do something that I didn't want you to do and were just about to do it but I physically restrained you from doing so then what difference does it make if I learned that information from mind reading, or from a manuscript you had written and hidden but I had found, or I learned it from a friend you told the secret to, or I learned it in some other way?

> Well mind-reading would be more efficient than any of those other options, and thus allow you to control entire populations instead of individuals.

Well sure, but we're talking philosophy here and as everybody knows Philosophy has absolutely nothing to do with practicality.  

> The Spanish Inquisition could take away somebody's free will with their crude methods, but a telepath could do it easier. 

If you replaced the words "free will" with "freedom" in the above sentence then not only would it make sense I would agree with it; sometimes I can do what I want to do, and in those instances I have the freedom to do so.  

>> As I've mentioned before, something can be as deterministic as a cuckoo clock but not be predictable. It would only take a few lines of code to program the computer you're using right now to find the first even number greater than two that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then stop, but nobody can predict what your computer would do when it's in that configuration, nobody can predict when it will stop all they can do is watch it and see, and they might need to watch it forever.  

> I can predict when it will stop. It will stop when I press Ctrl-Z,

No you can't predict it because people often change their mind at the last second. Granted you may be absolutely positively 100% certain you know the exact time you will press Ctrl-Z, but being certain is not the same thing as being correct. The 911 hijackers would have had to have been pretty damn certain to do what they did, and they were certain they'd have 88 virgins in the afterlife; and the pharaoh Khufu would have had to have been pretty damn certain that his enormous stone pyramid was a workable resurrection machine. I'm pretty damn certain that both the 911 hijackers and the pharaoh Khufu were wrong, and logically at least one of them MUST have been wrong because both were absolutely certain their religion was the one and only way to achieve immortality.

John K Clark