Leggett's inequality

[Stuart LaForge]

I just watched one of Leggett's lectures and I do not not think that violations of Leggett's inequality disprove macroscopic reality quite like he thinks.

His proof is based on a flawed definition of what constitutes physical realism. He defines physical realism as that the world has, at any given time, a definite value for any measurable properties, whether those properties are measured or not.

Then he shows that experiments prove that macroscopic objects do not have definite values for their physical properties until measured, and acts like he has disproven reality and realism. That is non-sense.

He has only disproven the Newtonian fallacy that there are absolute "values" for measurable properties. But Einstein already disproved that with special relativity over a century ago.

The value of any measurable property is not definite or fixed, but is instead relative depending on the relative motion of the observer and the thing that she is making measurements on.

Stuart LaForge

 

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 16, 2023 at 1:07 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> I just watched one of Leggett's lectures and I do not not think that violations of Leggett's inequality disprove macroscopic reality quite like he thinks.His proof is based on a flawed definition of what constitutes physical realism.

Flawed definition? I don't know what that means, some definitions are more useful than others but "realism" is just a word, as long as you make clear what the word means at the start you can define it anyway you like. 

> He defines physical realism as that the world has, at any given time, a definite value for any measurable properties, whether those properties are measured or not.

I think that's a very useful definition of "realism" and is what I have meant when I used the word, and will continue to use it in that way unless you come up with a definition that's more useful. That's why I say Many Worlds is not a realistic theory, things can be, and in fact are, in every physically possible state regardless of if they have been measured or not. 

> Then he shows that experiments prove that macroscopic objects do not have definite values for their physical properties until measured, and acts like he has disproven reality and realism. That is non-sense. He has only disproven the Newtonian fallacy that there are absolute "values" for measurable properties.

The distance between two events in space-time is a measurable quantity and yet it has an absolute value, all observers agree on it regardless of the frame of reference they're in. And in spite of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, or rather because of it, you can measure the position or the momentum of a particle with as much accuracy as you like, it's just that the more you know about the one the less you know about the other. 

John K Clark  

[Stuart LaForge]

On Saturday, September 16, 2023 at 10:36:12 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sat, Sep 16, 2023 at 1:07 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> I just watched one of Leggett's lectures and I do not not think that violations of Leggett's inequality disprove macroscopic reality quite like he thinks.His proof is based on a flawed definition of what constitutes physical realism.

Flawed definition? I don't know what that means, some definitions are more useful than others but "realism" is just a word, as long as you make clear what the word means at the start you can define it anyway you like. 

 

What I mean is that his definition does not account for relativistic effects. It is incomplete. 

 

> He defines physical realism as that the world has, at any given time, a definite value for any measurable properties, whether those properties are measured or not.

I think that's a very useful definition of "realism" and is what I have meant when I used the word, and will continue to use it in that way unless you come up with a definition that's more useful. That's why I say Many Worlds is not a realistic theory, things can be, and in fact are, in every physically possible state regardless of if they have been measured or not. 

I am saying that with the exception of the spacetime interval and proper time, most measured properties of an observed system will be different in different inertial or accelerated reference frames. Therefore an object does not have a single position or momentum but an infinite number of possible positions and momentums, depending on the state of motion of the observer to the observed. Therefore that definition of realism is violated by most objects that are being observed by multiple differently moving observers, let alone an object that is not being observed.

 

> Then he shows that experiments prove that macroscopic objects do not have definite values for their physical properties until measured, and acts like he has disproven reality and realism. That is non-sense. He has only disproven the Newtonian fallacy that there are absolute "values" for measurable properties.

The distance between two events in space-time is a measurable quantity and yet it has an absolute value, all observers agree on it regardless of the frame of reference they're in.

Yes, I have corrected myself.

 

And in spite of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, or rather because of it, you can measure the position or the momentum of a particle with as much accuracy as you like, it's just that the more you know about the one the less you know about the other. 

I don't see how Heisenberg is relevant to discussing macroscopic realism.

Stuart LaForge

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 16, 2023 at 3:27 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> What I mean is that his definition does not account for relativistic effects. It is incomplete. 

I still don't understand your objection. Do you have a more useful definition for the word "realism" than "at any given time, a definite value exists for any measurable property regardless of whether that property is measured or not"?

 

>> I think that's a very useful definition of "realism" and is what I have meant when I used the word, and will continue to use it in that way unless you come up with a definition that's more useful. That's why I say Many Worlds is not a realistic theory, things can be, and in fact are, in every physically possible state regardless of if they have been measured or not. 

> I am saying that with the exception of the spacetime interval and proper time, most measured properties of an observed system will be different in different inertial or accelerated reference frames.

Time and length may change but most properties of objects stay the same regardless of if they are in an inertial or accelerated reference frame. For example, if I accelerate a paperback novel the plot of the story will not change nor will the name of the main protagonist , however if Many Worlds is correct then there is a world where the title of a book about a boy wizard which sold millions of copies was entitled "Homer Snured And The Philosopher's Stone" and the boy wizard is a villain, but no matter how much you accelerate "Harry Potter And The Philosopher's Stone" it's never going to turn into that.

 > Therefore an object does not have a single position or momentum but an infinite number of possible positions and momentums, depending on the state of motion of the observer to the observed.

Then those 2 properties are not realistic, but if Leggett's Inequality is violated, and it is, then ALL properties are not realistic.

John K Clark

 

[Stuart LaForge]

On Saturday, September 16, 2023 at 1:07:45 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sat, Sep 16, 2023 at 3:27 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> What I mean is that his definition does not account for relativistic effects. It is incomplete. 

I still don't understand your objection. Do you have a more useful definition for the word "realism" than "at any given time, a definite value exists for any measurable property regardless of whether that property is measured or not"?

My objection is that Leggett's definition of realism consigns reality to nothing but n-tuples of numbered units. Any meaningful definition of realism needs to reference the belief that there is a physical world out there that is composed of matter that exists independently of the human mind and measurement in general. The earth exists and spins on its axis whether we are around to say it takes 24 hours to rotate or not. If a large rock falls on you and injures you, then it is clear that the rock is real, even if you don't know how much it weighs.

That the rock does not have accurate numbers associated with it when nobody is measuring those numbers might say something about the physics of measurement, but it says absolutely nothing about the reality of the rock.

 

>> I think that's a very useful definition of "realism" and is what I have meant when I used the word, and will continue to use it in that way unless you come up with a definition that's more useful. That's why I say Many Worlds is not a realistic theory, things can be, and in fact are, in every physically possible state regardless of if they have been measured or not. 

> I am saying that with the exception of the spacetime interval and proper time, most measured properties of an observed system will be different in different inertial or accelerated reference frames.

Time and length may change but most properties of objects stay the same regardless of if they are in an inertial or accelerated reference frame. For example, if I accelerate a paperback novel the plot of the story will not change nor will the name of the main protagonist , however if Many Worlds is correct then there is a world where the title of a book about a boy wizard which sold millions of copies was entitled "Homer Snured And The Philosopher's Stone" and the boy wizard is a villain, but no matter how much you accelerate "Harry Potter And The Philosopher's Stone" it's never going to turn into that.

That is fine because unlike matter and the material world, information is less realistic and is dependent on the mind. If you threw a hardcover copy of "Harry Potter And The Philosopher's Stone" at Plato's head, you could hurt him with it, but he would not be able to read it, so it might as well have been "Homer Snured And The Philosopher's Stone" because either would have been equally incomprehensible to him unless they were translated into ancient Greek. 

 

 > Therefore an object does not have a single position or momentum but an infinite number of possible positions and momentums, depending on the state of motion of the observer to the observed.

Then those 2 properties are not realistic, but if Leggett's Inequality is violated, and it is, then ALL properties are not realistic.

It is one thing to say that the properties of material objects are idealized  mental constructs and therefore not real. It is entirely another thing to say that the material objects themselves are not real. The existence of a physical object is independent of whether you know everything about it or nothing at all about it or are yourself conscious or not. It is as you like to put it, a "brute fact". Leggett's inequality is like a revival Berkeley's idealism with the appearance of mathematical rigor and idealism is reprehensible. At least in solipsism, the observer knows he exists even if nothing else does. With idealism, nothing exists, not even the observer. Everybody could go on a lawless rampage raping and pillaging because nothing is real and therefore nothing matters.

Stuart LaForge  

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023 at 9:17 AM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> Any meaningful definition of realism needs to reference the belief that there is a physical world out there that is composed of matter that exists independently of the human mind and measurement in general.

There is really no need to mention the human mind or even measurement, a definition that is just as meaningful and is far more useful is realism is " at any given time, one and only one definite value exists for any measurable property". And by that definition we now know that the universe is not realistic. And I think that fact is something worth knowing.

> The earth exists and spins on its axis whether we are around to say it takes 24 hours to rotate or not.

And if Many Worlds is correct the Earth also rotates in 23 hours and 25 hours and doesn't rotate it all. 

 

> If a large rock falls on you and injures you, then it is clear that the rock is real,

 And if Many Worlds is correct then "You" is not realistic; in one world Mr.You is crushed by the rock, in another world Mr.You is fine, and in yet another world the rock is crushed by Mr.You. As for the rock, it's real because it can have an effect on other things but like "you" it is not realistic.

> It is one thing to say that the properties of material objects are idealized  mental constructs and therefore not real. It is entirely another thing to say that the material objects themselves are not real.

We're just arguing about the meaning of words here.  Leggett and physicists in general have a very precise meaning of what they mean by the words real and realistic which is far more unambiguous and far more useful than the everyday meaning of those words. 

> With idealism, nothing exists, not even the observer.

That is certainly not what the violation of  Leggett's Inequality implies, far from saying that nothing exists the exact opposite would be closer to the truth, it's saying everything that could exist does exist. As Hamlet tells Horatio in Shakespeare's play   "There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

 

> Everybody could go on a lawless rampage raping and pillaging because nothing is real and therefore nothing matters.

I don't see why the belief that the universe is unrealistic would make people behave like barbarians, but even if it did it would be irrelevant because we were talking about what is true and  if  belief X causes people to behave in a way that is socially undesirable that doesn't necessarily mean that belief X is untrue.  

John K Clark

 

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sunday, September 17, 2023 at 7:52:55 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023 at 9:17 AM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> Any meaningful definition of realism needs to reference the belief that there is a physical world out there that is composed of matter that exists independently of the human mind and measurement in general.

There is really no need to mention the human mind or even measurement, a definition that is just as meaningful and is far more useful is realism is " at any given time, one and only one definite value exists for any measurable property". And by that definition we now know that the universe is not realistic. And I think that fact is something worth knowing.

I agree that the universe is in a perpetual state of superposition, existing in all states at once. I just don't like calling it unrealistic because it is reality. 

I think the problem is that realism is an overloaded word and a poor choice for such a technical term. There is artistic realism, mathematical realism, philosophical realism, and now physical realism and they all mean completely different things that seem to dance around the elephant in the room which is reality itself.

> The earth exists and spins on its axis whether we are around to say it takes 24 hours to rotate or not.

And if Many Worlds is correct the Earth also rotates in 23 hours and 25 hours and doesn't rotate it all. 

But if the inhabitants of those duplicate planets call their planets Alice, Bob, and Carroll respectively, then would those planets still be the Earth?

 

 

> If a large rock falls on you and injures you, then it is clear that the rock is real,

 And if Many Worlds is correct then "You" is not realistic; in one world Mr.You is crushed by the rock, in another world Mr.You is fine, and in yet another world the rock is crushed by Mr.You. As for the rock, it's real because it can have an effect on other things but like "you" it is not realistic.

I understand Many Worlds and I believe it to be the most accurate description of reality, which is why it is causing so much cognitive dissonance for me when you say it is not realistic.

> It is one thing to say that the properties of material objects are idealized  mental constructs and therefore not real. It is entirely another thing to say that the material objects themselves are not real.

We're just arguing about the meaning of words here.  Leggett and physicists in general have a very precise meaning of what they mean by the words real and realistic which is far more unambiguous and far more useful than the everyday meaning of those words. 

Leggett defined "realism" in his lecture, but he did not define "real". Could you please do so?  You could really help me understand by answering this question: Can something in physics be real and unrealistic at the same time?

> With idealism, nothing exists, not even the observer.

That is certainly not what the violation of  Leggett's Inequality implies, far from saying that nothing exists the exact opposite would be closer to the truth, it's saying everything that could exist does exist. As Hamlet tells Horatio in Shakespeare's play   "There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

But if all those things exist, then that makes them real does it not? Even if we can't see them, right?

 

Stuart LaForge

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023 at 11:58 AM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> I agree that the universe is in a perpetual state of superposition, existing in all states at once. I just don't like calling it unrealistic

You can't fight City Hall. You might not like the vocabulary but that's the technical term for it, and physicists aren't going to change so if you wish to communicate with them you're going to have to.  

> But if the inhabitants of those duplicate planets call their planets Alice, Bob, and Carroll respectively, then would those planets still be the Earth?

If Many Worlds is correct then they call their planet "Earth" and every other name you can think of. 

> I understand Many Worlds and I believe it to be the most accurate description of reality, which is why it is causing so much cognitive dissonance for me when you say it is not realistic.

Many Worlds is completely consistent with things NOT being in one and only one definite state which is the technical definition of being unrealistic. If X is unrealistic that does not mean X doesn't exist, if anything it means it Hyper-exists.  Many Worlds is unrealistic, good thing too because if it had been realistic today we would know it can't be true. 

 

> Leggett defined "realism" in his lecture, but he did not define "real". Could you please do so? You could really help me understand by answering this question: Can something in physics be real and unrealistic at the same time?

 

An integer that is larger than 5 but less than 6 does not exist and is not real and thus can have no effect on anything.  When a photon is first emitted from an atom the photon is unrealistic because its polarization is not in one and only one definite orientation, but the photon is real because it exists and we know it exists because it can have an effect on other things and other things can have an effect on it.  A particle that moves faster than light is not real because even if there are an infinite number of worlds, a particle like that doesn't exist on any of them.... Probably.

John K Clark

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sunday, September 17, 2023 at 10:07:56 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023 at 11:58 AM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> I understand Many Worlds and I believe it to be the most accurate description of reality, which is why it is causing so much cognitive dissonance for me when you say it is not realistic.

Many Worlds is completely consistent with things NOT being in one and only one definite state which is the technical definition of being unrealistic. If X is unrealistic that does not mean X doesn't exist, if anything it means it Hyper-exists.  Many Worlds is unrealistic, good thing too because if it had been realistic today we would know it can't be true. 

Yes, and even when we measure a particle's position down to a single precise value, the particle's momentum simultaneously takes an infinite number of values in as many Everett branches.  

 

> Leggett defined "realism" in his lecture, but he did not define "real". Could you please do so? You could really help me understand by answering this question: Can something in physics be real and unrealistic at the same time?

 

An integer that is larger than 5 but less than 6 does not exist and is not real and thus can have no effect on anything.  When a photon is first emitted from an atom the photon is unrealistic because its polarization is not in one and only one definite orientation, but the photon is real because it exists and we it exists because it can have an effect on other things and other things can have an effect on it.  A particle that moves faster than light is not real because even if there are an infinite number of worlds, a particle like that doesn't exist on any of them.... Probably.

Thanks, John. This help the terminology to be less confusing. With regard to the photon, it would be possible in superdeterminism for the photon to be realistic and have a polarization at exactly 45 degrees to whatever angle you set your polarizing film to since you only think you are making choices when you are actually following a script. But I guess that Leggett's inequality rules out superdeterminism.

What about the particles in the galaxies past the cosmic horizon? Aren't the ones that managed to get 45 billion light years away from us in only 13.8 billion years still real?

Stuart LaForge

 

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023 at 4:20 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> I guess that Leggett's inequality rules out superdeterminism.

No nothing can do that, superdeterminism is completely unfalsifiable, that's one of the reasons I think it's a silly idea. The other reason is that for a theory to be any good you've got to be able to get more out of it than you put in, but with superdeterminism you've got to put everything that exists into it before you get anything out of it, and a greater violation of Occam's Razor is impossible to imagine. I could say the same thing about the God theory. It's impossible to prove that superdeterminism is wrong but it's easy to prove it's silly.  I could say the same thing about the God theory.

 

> What about the particles in the galaxies past the cosmic horizon? Aren't the ones that managed to get 45 billion light years away from us in only 13.8 billion years still real?

According to the Inflationary Theory of cosmology particles that are now far past our cosmic horizon were in the very very distant past in causal contact with us, but then space started to expand much faster than the speed of light, the universe got about 10^40 times larger in about 10^-33 seconds. That's why when we observe photons from our left and right from themost distant thing we can see, the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation, they both seem to be coming from places with nearly identical temperatures; at one time they were in contact with each other and reached thermal equilibrium so that now the difference in temperature is only about one part in 100,000. 

 John K Clark   

[Stuart LaForge]

On Monday, September 18, 2023 at 2:54:57 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023 at 4:20 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

> I guess that Leggett's inequality rules out superdeterminism.

No nothing can do that, superdeterminism is completely unfalsifiable, that's one of the reasons I think it's a silly idea. The other reason is that for a theory to be any good you've got to be able to get more out of it than you put in, but with superdeterminism you've got to put everything that exists into it before you get anything out of it, and a greater violation of Occam's Razor is impossible to imagine. I could say the same thing about the God theory. It's impossible to prove that superdeterminism is wrong but it's easy to prove it's silly.  I could say the same thing about the God theory.

I don't quite understand this. If realism, as it is defined by physicists, is that any property that can be measured has one, and only one precise value, whether it is measured or not, then how can superdeterminism, which says that every property and every little thing, including my own choices are predetermined to be a single precise value, and therefore, realistic, survive the violation of Leggett's inequality, which says that no properties are realistic?

Stuart LaForge

 

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 7:40 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>>No nothing can do that, superdeterminism is completely unfalsifiable, that's one of the reasons I think it's a silly idea. The other reason is that for a theory to be any good you've got to be able to get more out of it than you put in, but with superdeterminism you've got to put everything that exists into it before you get anything out of it, and a greater violation of Occam's Razor is impossible to imagine. I could say the same thing about the God theory. It's impossible to prove that superdeterminism is wrong but it's easy to prove it's silly.  I could say the same thing about the God theory.

> I don't quite understand this. If realism, as it is defined by physicists, is that any property that can be measured has one, and only one precise value, whether it is measured or not, then how can superdeterminism, which says that every property and every little thing, including my own choices are predetermined to be a single precise value, and therefore, realistic, survive the violation of Leggett's inequality, which says that no properties are realistic?

One of the assumptions that Leggett made before deriving his inequality is that superdeterminism is untrue, it's the same assumption that is made, implicitly or explicitly, in every theory and in every proof without exception because without it the scientific method and even logic itself can not be trusted. That's why superdeterminism can never be disproven. And that's why it's silly.  

John K Clark 

[Stuart LaForge]

Are not platypuses rather silly? Superdeterminism might be silly, but if it cannot be disproven, then might there be any evidence in its favor?

Regardless, it seems to me then that the violation of Leggett's inequality simply ruled out those interpretations of QM that are dependent on hidden variables. Bell's inequality ruled out local hidden variables and Leggett's inequality ruled out global hidden variables. There is either but one completely scripted and predetermined universe, OR nobody is ever in a single universe at a time, OR we create reality by looking at it. Leggett's inequality completely torpedoes Bohmian mechanics. It also seems to rule out the past light cone of GRW.

Stuart LaForge

[John Clark]

On Thu, Sep 21, 2023 at 8:53 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>  Leggett's inequality completely torpedoes Bohmian mechanics. 

No I don't think so, when you boil it down to fundamentals Bohmian mechanics is really just Many Worlds expressed in a more convoluted way. 

> It also seems to rule out the past light cone of GRW.

It's not clear if GRW predicts that Leggett's inequality is violated or not because GRW is a work in progress, as of today nobody has been able to make a version of GRW that incorporates Special Relativity, much less General Relativity. But Dirac was able to find a quantum equation for the electron and all spin 1/2 particles that have mass
that Incorporated Special Relativity as far back as 1928, so GRW  has a lot of work to do.

>> One of the assumptions that Leggett made before deriving his inequality is that superdeterminism is untrue, it's the same assumption that is made, implicitly or explicitly, in every theory and in every proof without exception because without it the scientific method and even logic itself can not be trusted. That's why superdeterminism can never be disproven. And that's why it's silly.

 

> Are not platypuses rather silly? Superdeterminism might be silly, but if it cannot be disproven, then might there be any evidence in its favor?

If  Superdeterminism is true then the word "evidence" is meaningless and the scientific method is silly. So something is certainly silly. When forced to choose between the Scientific Method and Superdeterminism I say Superdeterminism is the one that's silly.

John K Clark

 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

If superdeterminism is true, and the scientist’s experimental choices and outcomes are determined, he still learns something interesting about the world that he didn’t know before. Arguments that he didn’t have the “free will” to do the experiment differently (since everything is fixed for eternity) do not invalidate science.

[John Clark]

On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 12:54 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If superdeterminism is true, and the scientist’s experimental choices and outcomes are determined, he still learns something interesting about the world that he didn’t know before.

If I perform an experiment today and know that superdeterminism is true then the only thing I've learned is that the initial conditions at the time of the Big Bang must've been such that 13.8 billion years later I would perform the experiment today and get a certain result today, but there would be no logical reason to suppose that if I performed the exact same experiment tomorrow I'd get the same result. Anybody else performing the experiment would be doing so at a different time and a different place than I did so there would be no reason to believe they'd get the same result and so there would be no reason they would be interested in the results of my experiment, unless of course the initial conditions during the Big Bang were such that they were required to express such an interest.

> Arguments that he didn’t have the “free will” to do the experiment differently (since everything is fixed for eternity) do not invalidate science.

I can't comment on that because I don't know what "free will" means. 

John K Clark

 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 23 Sep 2023 at 03:41, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 12:54 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If superdeterminism is true, and the scientist’s experimental choices and outcomes are determined, he still learns something interesting about the world that he didn’t know before.

If I perform an experiment today and know that superdeterminism is true then the only thing I've learned is that the initial conditions at the time of the Big Bang must've been such that 13.8 billion years later I would perform the experiment today and get a certain result today, but there would be no logical reason to suppose that if I performed the exact same experiment tomorrow I'd get the same result. Anybody else performing the experiment would be doing so at a different time and a different place than I did so there would be no reason to believe they'd get the same result and so there would be no reason they would be interested in the results of my experiment, unless of course the initial conditions during the Big Bang were such that they were required to express such an interest.

If induction works, then it was determined to work. If you think it’s a silly idea then you were determined to think it is a silly idea. If determinism is true then everything is determined and nothing is undetermined. People who believe in libertarian free will thar that if determinism were true every detail of their lives, from their choice of dinner to their choice about whether to murder someone was “predetermined at the Big Bang”, and this thought upsets them, but that’s just their issue.

[John Clark]

On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 2:05 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If induction works, then it was determined to work.

Induction works most of the time (it will always fail if you wait long enough) because there are regularities to the universe, to put it another way things usually stay the same. If there was nothing but white noise then induction would never work. But if there were no regularities to the universe then intelligence and consciousness could not exist and we would not be having this conversation.  

> If determinism is true then everything is determined and nothing is undetermined.

Yes but if superdeterminism is true then out of the infinite number of initial conditions the Big Bang could've started out as it could only have started out in one way, a way that determines that we ALWAYS make the wrong choice when performing experiments regardless of where or when we perform them.  

 

> People who believe in libertarian free will thar that if determinism were true every detail of their lives, from their choice of dinner to their choice about whether to murder someone was “predetermined at the Big Bang”, and this thought upsets them, but that’s just their issue.

I'm not upset by determinism but I am upset by superdeterminism, the idea that out of the infinite number of initial conditions the universe could've started out as, it started out in the one that ALWAYS lied to us when we performed experiments. Something like that can't happen by accident, if I knew super determinism is true the only way I could explain it is that the initial conditions of the universe must have been set up by a malevolent being that got pleasure by making fools of us, and the initial conditions that produce that being in its own Big Bang were such that He would develop into a sadist. Determinism says that the laws of physics are deterministic but says nothing about what the initial conditions of the universe were, superdeterminism also says the laws of physics are deterministic but in addition it claims to know what the initial conditions of the universe were, it was the one that 13.8 billion years later would lie to us and made us look stupid. I would say there's about one chance in infinity of that being true.

John K Clark

 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Initial conditions were also such that you would write that exact paragraph on this exact day, out of all the other things that could have happened, such as a slightly different paragraph, gibberish, or no John Clark and no paragraph at all.

[John Clark]

On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 6:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> I'm not upset by determinism but I am upset by superdeterminism, the idea that out of the infinite number of initial conditions the universe could've started out as, it started out in the one that ALWAYS lied to us when we performed experiments. Something like that can't happen by accident, if I knew super determinism is true the only way I could explain it is that the initial conditions of the universe must have been set up by a malevolent being that got pleasure by making fools of us, and the initial conditions that produce that being in its own Big Bang were such that He would develop into a sadist. Determinism says that the laws of physics are deterministic but says nothing about what the initial conditions of the universe were, superdeterminism also says the laws of physics are deterministic but in addition it claims to know what the initial conditions of the universe were, it was the one that 13.8 billion years later would lie to us and made us look stupid. I would say there's about one chance in infinity of that being true.

> Initial conditions were also such that you would write that exact paragraph on this exact day,

Yep. But in addition initial conditions were also such that whenever I perform an experiment that involves statistics and probability I get a bogus result that I believe is genuine because it exceeded the 5-sigma rule which means there's only a 0.00002% probability that I'm not observing what I seem to be observing, and every other intelligent being that is ever performed an experiment which involved statistics has always reached a similar incorrect conclusion for the same reason. Out of the infinite number of initial conditions the universe could've been in there was one particular initial condition that would cause all of the above to actually occur and would also cause me to write the next sentence.  I would say there's about one chance in infinity that the initial condition of the universe was actually in that one particular state.

Superdeterminism is a bad name because there's nothing super about its determinism, it has the same old sort of determinism that every other theory has, the difference is in the initial conditions, so it should really be called Super-Initial Conditionalism, but I guess that was a bit of a mouthful. 

 John K Clark

 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 23 Sep 2023 at 21:03, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 6:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> I'm not upset by determinism but I am upset by superdeterminism, the idea that out of the infinite number of initial conditions the universe could've started out as, it started out in the one that ALWAYS lied to us when we performed experiments. Something like that can't happen by accident, if I knew super determinism is true the only way I could explain it is that the initial conditions of the universe must have been set up by a malevolent being that got pleasure by making fools of us, and the initial conditions that produce that being in its own Big Bang were such that He would develop into a sadist. Determinism says that the laws of physics are deterministic but says nothing about what the initial conditions of the universe were, superdeterminism also says the laws of physics are deterministic but in addition it claims to know what the initial conditions of the universe were, it was the one that 13.8 billion years later would lie to us and made us look stupid. I would say there's about one chance in infinity of that being true.

> Initial conditions were also such that you would write that exact paragraph on this exact day,

Yep. But in addition initial conditions were also such that whenever I perform an experiment that involves statistics and probability I get a bogus result that I believe is genuine because it exceeded the 5-sigma rule which means there's only a 0.00002% probability that I'm not observing what I seem to be observing, and every other intelligent being that is ever performed an experiment which involved statistics has always reached a similar incorrect conclusion for the same reason. Out of the infinite number of initial conditions the universe could've been in there was one particular initial condition that would cause all of the above to actually occur and would also cause me to write the next sentence.  I would say there's about one chance in infinity that the initial condition of the universe was actually in that one particular state.

Under “ordinary” determinism you sneak in randomness from the initial asymmetry of the universe, which plays out in a random choice the experimenter makes to test a hypothesis (even though the experimenter may be a deterministic machine). Under superdeterminism, the initial state of the universe is also determined. There isn’t any randomness ever, anywhere; there is a reason why everything is as it is, and not otherwise, and no experimental choice could ever be other than it is. Statistical independence would be impossible.

Superdeterminism is a bad name because there's nothing super about its determinism, it has the same old sort of determinism that every other theory has, the difference is in the initial conditions, so it should really be called Super-Initial Conditionalism, but I guess that was a bit of a mouthful. 

 John K Clark

 

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[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 8:38 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Under “ordinary” determinism you sneak in randomness from the initial asymmetry of the universe, which plays out in a random choice the experimenter makes to test a hypothesis (even though the experimenter may be a deterministic machine).

Yes.  It is extremely unlikely that the initial conditions of the universe were such that today 13.8 billion years later everybody always makes the wrong decision when performing experiments, that is to say there are VASTLY more initial conditions in which the experimenter makes correct choices not the incorrect one. Therefore, acting as if the choices were random (even though in reality it's only pseudorandom) would allow you to learn things about the nature of reality.

> Under superdeterminism, the initial state of the universe is also determined. There isn’t any randomness ever, anywhere; there is a reason why everything is as it is, and not otherwise, and no experimental choice could ever be other than it is. Statistical independence would be impossible.

And what odds would you give to the likelihood that the initial conditions of the universe were exactly such as to render statistical independence to be impossible? As for me I'd say the likelihood is about one chance in infinity, give or take an infinity or two. 

 John K Clark

[Stuart LaForge]

On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 5:53 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thu, Sep 21, 2023 at 8:53 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>  Leggett's inequality completely torpedoes Bohmian mechanics. 

No I don't think so, when you boil it down to fundamentals Bohmian mechanics is really just Many Worlds expressed in a more convoluted way.

So we are back to Leggett's inequality being useless because of faulty assumptions. The assumption that the universe is not superderministic is equivalent to the assumption that counterfactual results can and do happen, and that is equivalent to saying that the universe is not realistic.  So Leggett's inequality is equivalent to saying if the universe is not realistic, then the universe is not realistic. It just gives you back the assumption you started with. If it is merely a tautology that can't rule out any of the interpretations of QM or superdeterminism, then of what use is Leggett's inequality?

 

> It also seems to rule out the past light cone of GRW.

It's not clear if GRW predicts that Leggett's inequality is violated or not because GRW is a work in progress, as of today nobody has been able to make a version of GRW that incorporates Special Relativity, much less General Relativity. But Dirac was able to find a quantum equation for the electron and all spin 1/2 particles that have mass
that Incorporated Special Relativity as far back as 1928, so GRW  has a lot of work to do.

What I mean though is that if gravity caused the wavefunction to collapse, then it would remain collapsed while in the gravity well and therefore the variable would remain realistic even after everyone stopped observing it. This contradicts the violation of Leggett's inequality because a collapsed wave function only has a single definite value.

 

>> One of the assumptions that Leggett made before deriving his inequality is that superdeterminism is untrue, it's the same assumption that is made, implicitly or explicitly, in every theory and in every proof without exception because without it the scientific method and even logic itself can not be trusted. That's why superdeterminism can never be disproven. And that's why it's silly.

 

> Are not platypuses rather silly? Superdeterminism might be silly, but if it cannot be disproven, then might there be any evidence in its favor?

If  Superdeterminism is true then the word "evidence" is meaningless and the scientific method is silly. So something is certainly silly. When forced to choose between the Scientific Method and Superdeterminism I say Superdeterminism is the one that's silly.

Something can be silly, but nonetheless be true. If silliness is defined as something that defies common sense, then all of QM is every bit as silly as superdeterminism. Common sense left the building when Thomas Young first did his two-slit experiment.

Stuart LaForge

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 7:38 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 8:38 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Under “ordinary” determinism you sneak in randomness from the initial asymmetry of the universe, which plays out in a random choice the experimenter makes to test a hypothesis (even though the experimenter may be a deterministic machine).

Yes.  It is extremely unlikely that the initial conditions of the universe were such that today 13.8 billion years later everybody always makes the wrong decision when performing experiments, that is to say there are VASTLY more initial conditions in which the experimenter makes correct choices not the incorrect one. Therefore, acting as if the choices were random (even though in reality it's only pseudorandom) would allow you to learn things about the nature of reality.

If all decisions are predetermined by fate, then how is it possible for an experimenter to make the wrong decision?

 

> Under superdeterminism, the initial state of the universe is also determined. There isn’t any randomness ever, anywhere; there is a reason why everything is as it is, and not otherwise, and no experimental choice could ever be other than it is. Statistical independence would be impossible.

And what odds would you give to the likelihood that the initial conditions of the universe were exactly such as to render statistical independence to be impossible? As for me I'd say the likelihood is about one chance in infinity, give or take an infinity or two.

If the universe is superdetermined, then its initial conditions are irrelevant; the whole thing is just a giant 4-dimensional sculpture set in stone. If you are scanning along Michelangelo's statue of David one millimeter at a time, the appearance of his toes give you no particular insight into what his head looks like.

Stuart LaForge

 

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[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 2:23 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>> when you boil it down to fundamentals Bohmian mechanics is really just Many Worlds expressed in a more convoluted way.

> So we are back to Leggett's inequality being useless because of faulty assumptions. The assumption that the universe is not superderministic is equivalent to the assumption that counterfactual results can and do happen, and that is equivalent to saying that the universe is not realistic. 

No they are not equivalent. If things are realistic then things could have been other than what they are because the initial condition of the universe could've been different from what they are, in fact there could've been an infinite number of different initial conditions, but if things are superdeterministic then there is one and only one way the initial condition of the universe could've been in.  

> So Leggett's inequality is equivalent to saying if the universe is not realistic,

No, the violation of  Leggett's inequality proves that the universe is not realistic, in other words the initial conditions of the universe could've been different (and the Many Worlds case they were different)  resulting in different outcomes today. All this is assuming that superdeterminism is untrue, but Leggett's inequality is no different than any other idea in science in that regard, without making that assumption no idea can be proven or disproven and the word "evidence" has no meaning. 

> Something can be silly, but nonetheless be true. If silliness is defined as something that defies common sense

I would define silly as an idea in which you have to put more into then you get out of, and with superdeterminism you have to put the entire universe into it before you get anything out of it. Another silly idea is the God theory in which you have to put in an infinitely knowledgeable and infinitely powerful being in order to get a visibly finite universe out. In a non-silly idea a very small input produces a huge output, the simple and very small function that generates the infinitely complex Mandelbrot set is one example, Darwin's theory of evolution is another.  

John K Clark

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 2:39 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>>It is extremely unlikely that the initial conditions of the universe were such that today 13.8 billion years later everybody always makes the wrong decision when performing experiments, that is to say there are VASTLY more initial conditions in which the experimenter makes correct choices not the incorrect one. Therefore, acting as if the choices were random (even though in reality it's only pseudorandom) would allow you to learn things about the nature of reality.

> If all decisions are predetermined by fate, then how is it possible for an experimenter to make the wrong decision?

If when performing an experiment we make a choice which causes us to incorrectly believe that things are not local or realistic when in reality they are then we made the wrong decision because it led us to the wrong conclusion.  

> If the universe is superdetermined, then its initial conditions are irrelevant

Huh?

John K Clark

 

[Stuart LaForge]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 12:10 PM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 2:39 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>>It is extremely unlikely that the initial conditions of the universe were such that today 13.8 billion years later everybody always makes the wrong decision when performing experiments, that is to say there are VASTLY more initial conditions in which the experimenter makes correct choices not the incorrect one. Therefore, acting as if the choices were random (even though in reality it's only pseudorandom) would allow you to learn things about the nature of reality.

> If all decisions are predetermined by fate, then how is it possible for an experimenter to make the wrong decision?

If when performing an experiment we make a choice which causes us to incorrectly believe that things are not local or realistic when in reality they are then we made the wrong decision because it led us to the wrong conclusion.

The universe could be completely predetermined and yet have no linear dependence between successive states. For example, the infinite digits of pi are precisely predetermined, knowing that the first digit is 3 does not give you any information about the 2nd, 10th, or 100th digits. 

 

> If the universe is superdetermined, then its initial conditions are irrelevant

Huh?

If the universe is completely predetermined, then its destiny, its future form or its big picture, is far more informative and important than its past.  Like you said, you have to know everything in order to know anything. The initial conditions don't tell you to squat.

Stuart LaForge

 

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 4:39 PM Stuart LaForge <stuart....@gmail.com> wrote:

>> If when performing an experiment we make a choice which causes us to incorrectly believe that things are not local or realistic when in reality they are then we made the wrong decision because it led us to the wrong conclusion.

> The universe could be completely predetermined

If the laws of physics are deterministic then the universe is completely predetermined, but the big question is, determined from what initial condition? Superdeterminism says that the initial condition must've been the one and only one, out of the infinite number it could've been in, that always lies to us and always makes us look stupid. Regular determinism, not the super variety, says it doesn't know what the initial conditions were, there are an infinite number of ones it could've been in.

    

> and yet have no linear dependence between successive states. For example, the infinite digits of pi are precisely predetermined, knowing that the first digit is 3 does not give you any information about the 2nd, 10th, or 100th digits. 

Yes but if you know the simple infinite series 4 - 4/3 + 4/5 - 4/7 + 4/9 -...  you can calculate as many digits of pi as you wish. And there is a formula that allows you to compute any digit of pi without needing to compute any of the previous digits. 

> If the universe is completely predetermined, then its destiny, its future form or its big picture, is far more informative and important than its past. 

I don't know what the future will be so it's not very informative to me, but I can remember the past.  

> Like you said, you have to know everything in order to know anything.

We certainly don't know everything but we do know some things, however if we had to know everything before we could know anything then we wouldn't know anything.    

> The initial conditions don't tell you to squat.

Regardless of what the laws of physics are and how many of them you know you won't be able to predict anything unless you know the initial conditions. If I drop a lead ball how fast will it be going when it hits the floor? I don't care if you have a PhD in physics, you're not gonna be able to answer that question unless you know the initial conditions, such as the height at which the ball was dropped and if it was dropped in a vacuum or in water or in the air. 

John K Clark 

 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

That makes sense if you consider that, counterfactually, if the early universe had been different, the outcome would have been different, and there are an infinite number of ways the early universe could have been different. But if the early universe were itself determined, it could not have been different. It would be like asking what the chances are that 3^2 = 9, rather than some other number out of the infinite possibilities.

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>>And what odds would you give to the likelihood that the initial conditions of the universe were exactly such as to render statistical independence to be impossible? As for me I'd say the likelihood is about one chance in infinity, give or take an infinity or two.

>That makes sense if you consider that, counterfactually, if the early universe had been different, the outcome would have been different, and there are an infinite number of ways the early universe could have been different. But if the early universe were itself determined, it could not have been different.

It could've been different only if an even earlier condition of the universe was different.  But none of this changes the fact that determinism is fine but superdeterminism (a.k.a. super-initial conditionalism) is dumb.  

John K Clark

[Stathis Papaioannou]

It couldn’t have been different if even earlier conditions could not have been different, which would be the case if there are no random events anywhere, ever. It would mean that physical events, whatever they happen to be, are as rigidly fixed as mathematical relationships, which not even God can change.

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 6:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It couldn’t have been different if even earlier conditions could not have been different, which would be the case if there are no random events anywhere, ever

If randomness does not exist and if the initial condition of everything is really initial, then the initial condition of the universe MUST be a brute fact. But If you want to invoke a brute fact it's vitally important that it be as simple as possible, and a brute fact in which things could be in any condition is astronomically simpler than a brute fact in which things must be in one very particular condition. And superdeterminism postulates that the entire universe started in the very particular condition that causes us 13.8 billion years later to ALWAYS make decisions when performing experiments that lead us to form an incorrect conclusion.  And that's why superdeterminism is not necessarily wrong but is necessarily silly.  

> It would mean that physical events, whatever they happen to be, are as rigidly fixed as mathematical relationships,

Good luck trying to prove that any other initial condition would lead to logical self contradictions.  

> which not even God can change.

Because God's initial condition, which was the initial condition of everything, was such that He would never evolve into a state where HE would want to make a change in our initial condition. 

 John K Clark

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 24 Sep 2023 at 20:30, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 6:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It couldn’t have been different if even earlier conditions could not have been different, which would be the case if there are no random events anywhere, ever

If randomness does not exist and if the initial condition of everything is really initial, then the initial condition of the universe MUST be a brute fact. But If you want to invoke a brute fact it's vitally important that it be as simple as possible, and a brute fact in which things could be in any condition is astronomically simpler than a brute fact in which things must be in one very particular condition. And superdeterminism postulates that the entire universe started in the very particular condition that causes us 13.8 billion years later to ALWAYS make decisions when performing experiments that lead us to form an incorrect conclusion.  And that's why superdeterminism is not necessarily wrong but is necessarily silly.  

If the world is a particular way and it could not have been any other way, then that’s just the way it is. It is like asking why 3^2 = 9, why not 9.3 or 547 or 0.00035? Those questions assume that 3^2 could have been anything else, but it is not true that it could have been anything else. Similarly if the world is fully determined it is an error to reason as if it could have been otherwise. It is different to reasoning that initial conditions at the Big Bang could have been otherwise. And I don’t think the simplicity argument applies if things could only have been one particular way and in fact are that particular way.

Perhaps a solution is that determinism is wrong. What we usually call determinism is not really determinism because the initial conditions are assumed to have been random. Superdeterminism is just the idea that everything is fully determined.

> It would mean that physical events, whatever they happen to be, are as rigidly fixed as mathematical relationships,

Good luck trying to prove that any other initial condition would lead to logical self contradictions.  

> which not even God can change.

Because God's initial condition, which was the initial condition of everything, was such that He would never evolve into a state where HE would want to make a change in our initial condition. 

 John K Clark

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[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 24, 2023 at 12:05 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If the world is a particular way and it could not have been any other way, then that’s just the way it is.

Obviously. That's what a brute fact is, but is it wise to take it as your default position that out of the infinite number of ways that things could be, the particular way things actually are is the way in which the scientific method doesn't work? And if it doesn't work why does it seem to work? 

> It is like asking why 3^2 = 9, why not 9.3 or 547

If I was a believer in superdeterminism I would write that 3^2 is not equal to 9 and is really equal to 547, and if our minds were not pre-programmed from the initial conditions of the universe to believe it's equal to 9 it would be obvious that it's equal to 547 and we would immediately see the gaping flaw in the logic that claims it's 9, and we were not pre-programmed from the initial condition of the universe to think of the simple short ironclad proof that 3^2 = 547. If  superdeterminism is true then you can't trust the scientific method, arithmetic, logic, or even your mind. But I'm not a believer in superdeterminism so I won't write any of that.

> Superdeterminism is just the idea that everything is fully determined.

No it is not! That's just regular old determinism. Superdeterminism is the idea that everything is fully determined AND is fully determined from the one initial state that evolved in such a way that 13.8 billion years later whenever we perform experiments we ALWAYS make choices that causes us to reach the wrong conclusion, and NOTHING is fully determined from any state in which we reach the correct conclusion in our experiments; this despite the fact that those states are quite literally infinitely more numerous. And that is just silly.  

John K Clark